OSS - OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE FOR OPERATION OVERLORD/PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST GERMANY, PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES, 1944

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 22, 1944
• Content Type: MISC

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,then you nave had a chance to see the .4topapera
transmitted 'Nita CJionel 3r1d1ey's letter ,:).f 22 WAy
we believe you may wish to refer thm to tho Pldnning
Group.
The Secretariat is nctif
documents-have boon received.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
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Outline Plan. Zr Political WArler
NOTMORD0
Supplementing above reference, tha enclosure is
furnished herewith for 1.
your information and files,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
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COMB,M.ALIINer
OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFA.
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1. By informal action, the Combined Chittl of 5'441 OpteNT
the recommendation containe0 In 545/4. Th* voptIgi5d
message to the Supreme Commander, Allied ExpoOLtiotarlr torco, vng
dispatched as FAGS 28.
2. The proposal by General Eisenhower In, SCAF 27 Is IdentIcail
in wording with that suggested, by the Britsh Chiors of start in
C.C.S. 545/3.
H. REDMAN,
A. J. McFARLAND,,
Combined $ecretariat.
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IMMORANDUK TOR MN tOg4TOR or stuvzod!ssity.,
Subjects Outline Plata for *eat*
Reference: JOS aamorstnaustto OSS, Mit la
oubject as abovoi,
COS 545/1, 30 ApT 44, oubet, at *boys*
COS 545/2,, 11 My 44, enitijitrot Iktgov4i*,
CCS 545/3, U. May 44, subject sit?allitriiit,-
COS 545/4,, 20 My 44, subjmot ustove',
Supplementing above refirrence? tilti rAmlowures aro
furnished. herowith for your informatiaa and till's.*
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
GOMBINE 0
OUTLINE PLAN VOR POLITICA/
Refroncel C.c 0.
Memo andum b th UnitEld St
The United Statcs k;hiefs of Staff
the views of the British chiefs of Staff
soction on Austria for the- aUtlIne Puti
OVERLORD (c.C.S. 545)1 and mdomtiond thitt
545/30 concerning a
Political Warfare -
if the BrItash Chiefs of Staff concur the attar:3110d mosage--ttli
dispatchd to the Supreme commander, Alliod Expeditionary Port
are grey
Aa oxproslod, IA 0
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From: The Combined Chitda ftaff
To: Supreme Commander Alliod. tiepedit tOnal?1 leitqfeie
?
Changes suggested in SCAF 27 with respeot .004.1,0A
on Austria are acceptable as part of tho out1irk4 PlAtt t6.7gr
Political Warr are - OVERLORD.
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9,p1:111A1,...2LESLP01.1 TICAT4 WARPA
of the Britizh
1. With regard to the 'United States Ch-if o T Or*ptl-
that a section on Austria should bci added,. tho Chtets Of
Staff have proposed that the following footaott which Wts be4A
drawn up in consultation with Supreme Headquarters: kilted Upo-
ditionary Force, should be added at the end of pllgo 2 Aane% 1
of the Political Warfare Executive - Office of Wm, Taro. mat140
"Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD" (C.C.S,
pEGINS
Austria.
In propagandn to Austrians, our objecttvez aro not
essentially different from those given above. 410 math, dIStor-
ences of emphasis are:-
Under objective (c) it la part of our oblpattvo to
exploit the Moscow Declaration: therob7 shc4ing Austrtano
that the consequences of Germany's unoonatioaa aurrendoit.,
include the liberation of Austria and are far preferable to?
the Austrians than the continuance of Hitleris
particularly if the AUStri8119 contribute to thetr own,
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liberation.
Under objective (e), it is part of our ,616112,01.V9i
exp the difference in, tradtttonland intoTe$1
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AUStria and Nazi GormanyiAiin order. to,intre030-
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Austrian dissatisfactic
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The message contained in the enclosure to CC Sv 545/1
approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by Informal actiOrkir
'and dispatched to the Supreme Comnander, Allied Expeditionary
Force (FACS 24), in the form shown in the enclosure to this
paper, Reference to C.C.S. 545 was deleted from the message,
as the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force/ has not
been furnished a copy of that paper. The new page re4J)rences
refer to the original document forwarded to the Combined Secre-
tariat by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
A. J. McFAR1AVD1
R. D. COLERIDGE)
Combined Secretariat.
1:6tl Ad-TMO _ .114
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The Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff ha Con4idered th* ()Wain
Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD and in general agret-
with the provisions of the plan.
74,
However, certain changes which cnn readily be incorpmmt/m1
in the plan are desirable. Specifically, those aro:
a. The reference on page 7 to recognition of the French
National Committee of Liberation should be eliminated, 0
the same and following page references to the Moditarramomm
Commission should be changed to Advisory Council for Ital
be As regards the references to Germany, we believe that
with respect to the propaganda objectives set fotbrt
Annex 1, it would be wise to eliminate paragraphs C8 and
C9 (page 8).
c. It is noted that the document makes no mention of
Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, a section on
d. That section of the document on page 19 which suggests
the encouragement of people in the occupied countries to
collect evidence for and against local officials is que5-
tionable, There
will probably be all too much of th141 sort,
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COMBINEDgigM..0.1?
pUTLYNE PLAN FOR
M morand
POLITICAL W1Afi1
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ythelInited Statos chi
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We are of the opinion that the Combinod Chiefs cir St
should accept the Outline Plan for PolitLcal Wartar#
0 :MI4 'V
(C.C.S. 545), with certain minor changes whioh ars s factei
in the attached draft of a pmposed message to the Su: Not'
Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
It will be noted that the principal amendment suggestod
is the addition of a section on Austria. Although this is not
an essential feature, it should be helpful in view of the
Moscow Declaration on Austria.
If the British Chiefs of Staff approve, it is recommended
that the enclosed message be dispatched to the Supreme Com-
mander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
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From:, The Ceil'Ibined Ci1?of Jt 1
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To: 5u17reme Commander, Allied txpe lila.
The Combined Chiefe of 5tafthaYtidoftWIdt#d'
Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD (d4,g, $4
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However; certain changes which attin readily litt',;11A
in the plan are desirable SpecIficaily thoso
agree with the provisions of the plan.
a. The reference on page 10 to reeOgnitlaa a
National Committee of Liberiltion ahould bef eliMinated.0
the same and following page referencOs to tht Mat'
Commission should be changed to Advisory Council 0
b. A:; :egards the references to Germany we belI0I6 th
Ortl '
with respect to the propaganda objectives set forth in
4*
Annex 1, 1, it would be wLse to elimirAste paragr phs CS aiAd, 4'H' 4
C9 (a6e 11).
C. It is noted that the document makes no mention ek.f ,
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Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, a section. am .
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Austria should be added.
d. That section of the document on page 29 which suggests
the encouragement of people in the occupied countries to
collect evidence for and against local officials is vat-
tionable. There will probably be all too much of this: sort;
of thing without our encouragement. Since civil adminit-
,
tration is to be a function of the national goverbbvants
concerned, who doubtless have their own means of knovin
what local personages have been workinglath the olowlaY4,
...;igitt
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believe this problem should, be left to ts,:.''.m.:',,
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NEIROPANDTal raft ,r,trz areIMIMIIT
Outline ?len for
"Overlord?.
1. The Planning Group ail 1
yesterday, through the aeoreta
of staff, of ?CS 64S, 13 April 104*,
Political Warfare - "Overlord", copy
2. It is noted that the plan time the *pip
the f4upromm Commander, Allied Rxpedlticaary Forget*
that the approvel of the Coniblned Chiet4 ei Ste .
now requested, It hes bean suggested orell- that 40010",
ments from the Planning group Are 0410106
3. The plan as drawn seems to vs to rtitleot
situLtion as It existed in the sualmer And LAU.*
not Mao situation mu It now exiatalv The draft
coyering or overall section end the drafts co:
Annexes were dated 5 October 1406
were dated 26 November 194a, but their Imp
stated to be dependent upon eectptance by
L a Resistance in the case of France, and upon
specific support by Governments in Exile irz the ea
Belgium, Hollend and Norway. What respwuit If
been obtained from tho Conseil and these Goverommats
does not appsa
4. Since the plan vas dravEL there have
changes in the Europeen Theater of Operottl
Hwadquerters of the Allied T;1 it1oar3r ,z.
the place of CasSAG, valleh Last fafl ,s cal
Lnary state of orgam1xation.,.4is
logical warfare activities A
been made wholly or prima)*
and Pfgeholoc,icalWariamire Dirisis
Psydhologioal) Warfare Branik:,
largely Xrom the (British) ,P141
from Ora, tnd from OSS,
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The details of 001111
u erstAnd still to be inecolpietW.
*ported to *how thdit tiro 0 Nevi
LM (Romeareh and Anal eis) Ore
importaat tanetion* a)oij ,ith
titration and opertitifte. 1et10
Oporationi) 'Wawa le OSA 1it146
understand to bo oubstantis
in tho plan though now in
indicated*
6. The Pl?anning, Group eansider*
to be revised now, airing effect 'WO
noted above, bo11eve4 to be neetiNg
those !nvolving combat propiondas it
tire program for opertitiona
? Subject to the fo
Group favors tho plan.
cot
1r4 gorgan
Gan. Smith
Secretariat
Col. Sigelvw
Mo Branch
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FROM: Acting Cha :trump
AMMCN Outline Plan for Poll o&
*f;
Attached hereto is a propood rot-
Chiefs of Staff concerning the nwh,
directly to the Planning Group resteAl p,
for comments to the Joint Chitra or ttI.
Group has agreed on this reply.
In its deliberations, the Pliknni'
advantage of discussion with Lt. Col. -Bleu
(j.g.) McFadden who have agreed with tho itt*aied
Since this subject Is to be distussged,
Staff Planners this afternoon, 10 Apr11 10440
of the Planning Group should he dolIvired to th*
Chiefs of Staff before 1200 today.
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Attached hereto is a propOsed t,orr-
Chiefs of Staff concerning the Plan lithldh wa
directly to the Planning Group yeatevdayr with a.,
for comments to the Joint Ci?f ofatta. The, #1soi
Group has agreed on this reply.
H
In its deliberations, the PlanAing Group
IL
advantage of discussion with Lt. Col* Bleglow *1014
(j4g.) McFadden who have aefreed with ttached-
,
since this subject is to be discuslod by
Staff Planners this afternoon, 19 April 1944, t
of the Planning Group should be dalivered to the
Chiefs of Staff before /200 toda.
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04.171: r 1
14,
THE Jr:.)111kIT CFI igFil OF STAPP
/MS I te,41oti,
. ? t ? 1.
141.
4?grct
'estg.1,
? 1 ir
THE 1)1P PiCTOR O V' IG C
711 t 1 I tv4 Finn r Poi t 1 o4 Vii,ltrarv
"?)Txtizto-Rvf
C3 545, 1:3 Aprilt 191414. troy Ptik-A
f r1r ELUtetL1 Vecr r ro Itoinarzarat-
cary,:iir
The onc1otparo ia rtIrra tri
c rtrf
ICTORY
113Ult
ora.roo
AR
Npi
Asia.
nool
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,
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OUTLINE PLAN FOR POI ITICP vtIA-PIPAR
tho SQ.arcs tri,r z,
1. In the cnclosum to this papiiv will bc; rOulAd thc, OuttiA6
plan for politlell limrPxrc us, psycli014glora 7/41f-
for Oper?.Lion OVERLORD. IL has b,un submittal b7 Supr-mk,
HerldqwrtGrs, ExpAittionflry Ffonft whc.iro it w's
by tht_; ruprk?senLltiv,s of G111, Orfic_5 of Orrtul n Lrgii.
IdnrfrIrL, Thc, tr%s thL. !Ipprovti of tht..
Suprem,; CommndLr, Alliud ExpLdiLIQn A;prov-,1 of ult.,
Combinud Ohifs of SLelff J now
2. Th,,, French si,ction of ch pr rrly :unt.acirnent In
th(.: 1ilat of cht. dLeisLon o bt9.k?4.n thcw
degre(.. of rccoE,nition to bt, accordt,d to tht, FrLnah ComnUttk,-4;
Nntional LauL.rotion.
,f;tri ' .; ? ?
? ?
, 1114
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r??;.
' "4"4-'-'4044.4.0.44.0r41
?
?
pr,'-fro.?
Ir.? ?
-? 4,7
.T717-7P'!"
,J't ?
),?
'4 v
?MIA:1U_ PLO FOR ..PO.LITV
;i
OVERLORD?P.W.E./O.W.I. Outlint
Warfare (= U.S. Psychologll Warfaro
Propaganda Objertives and Metes trom. TcVatO
D-Day (Annex I) ...... .......
.0$
Joint P.W.E./0.y.I. nnd 3.0.E./O.S.S. Polit1oa1
Warfare Plan ia Support of P.W.E./O.W I. Outlia(7
Plan (Annex II) ............ . ..... . ........"e. c
To Injure the Enemy (Appendix T to Annex III, of :24
To Serure Maximum Aid for Allied Mi1itar7
Operations (Appendix II to immix II).....,..p.
(it kir
1 o,
To Secure the Morale oC Civilian PopulatiOt$
Between Nov and D-Day: To Guide Their 7ublid
Opinion and Direct Thei.r Activities (Appondix I=
to Annex II)
?'41Tt.
???4??404',11,4'1*4:
OVERLORD?Joint P.W.E./0.W.I. nnd
Political Warfare Plan (in support of p.w.e
Outline Plan) ................ a ..... .
In
France polp4040.44=e?40w
Belgium 41?000411041. 43
Holland ........... ........... 4a
Norway .... 064441 4,041.4**1.4,E*W#4,NikW 51.
Denmark .......... . . ......... ..... 5
RANKIN C--Outline Plan for Political/Psychological
Warfare
1.1 )
?
1?.:74,r% 1.Th.,
Propaganda Objectives and Themes (Annex
?;',1
-
8. ?? 4. 4. ?? a. 4 0.,
I)Lai,o0
11
64
rt:
rr
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--
Political Warr
The above elan has now been ppc>ved ty"COZSAGI MI6 Sea
being submitted to the Combined Chiefs Of 3tAffi, Wute. ta
following additiwis and amendmentslw
1. On page 2*,
sentence hasbElen guided ti telto lavt, sub
yaragraph to III, 1, as follows:
-
"Careful political advice must tie secured 1Q1 nIst
matter and reflected irt the weekly nnd speotql dIrectivOs
which implement the .Plan".
al ?
11
2. eage
attach0d.
8.12.43.
has been
redrafted; ecipy if t kct
is/ R. D. BROOKS.
'4apr-Oenerd1)
Deputy Direotor-Gene
14 .W.E.
*rage 4 of this paper.
**Beginning with note 2 at bottom of page
bottom of page 7, this paper contains
1943.
,
4
6 and, exic4 at*
redraft of: 50-
1 t.
4.
"" tra4
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TOP 3ciiiT
V
44.44746ar.-ii
p,w.E yo W OUTLINR
FOR POLITICAL WARWE "Vagl 4
I. TERMS OF REFERENCE
-It
In accordance with the Instrucitons tynctved tffi Way
P.W.E. and ir Pppropriate consultntion wtth S.0,E0 'and;
0.3.3., submit the following OUTLINF PLAN FOP POLITtCAL
(te U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE) to prepnrn the wny rlt OVEPLOPD
and RANKIN and to as5tst whi hover opovation evt,mtuAtes, 1YDr
Political Varfare purposes the propArtcnv phasm
OVERLORD and RANKIN, tho only (Itffer-nco Ing tLming,
t s mflor to
IT. APPRECIATION
1. Morale in GerTnny will be n "t;-)u8her nut to crnee Ulan vg
the cat-,e in Italy where (onditons wvro ndvantagvous,
br
Werfare operations. Nevertheles, morale in German7 ha.); tIttalaod
a brittle state which presents promIng opportunLtias for
Political Warfare. (e.6. The oxistene of six million foreign
workers who have been pressed into Corced labour in Germany and
who form an indispensable but explostvo pert of the Gierman war
machine.)
2. While the Balkan Satellites lie outside the dirsct cope
of the proposed operations, events in the, Balkans can mats iAllY
assist OVERLORD. There is an opportunity for Political Warfaro
to exploit several factors which might combine to bring about
conditions in the Balkans which would seriously affect Germaa
morale as well as military dispositions. These factom
nL
the course of military events especially op the Russian:,t
ifl
Slamia. 80. Or041
groving,activities of patriot forces
Arid the fact that the Sate:AiteS are
J-
tanige,';
eSe) could:be u'ttiedto
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3 Tho
military interVentiOn"to
been greatly hei htened
Warfare a three-fold rospozs!
first that or furthering the
istili inortiv
coordination or the Resistance MoveMeftea;
premature outbursts; and third that of rit
when desired, and if necessary on a Ettropeate
4. In all calculations, Political War re. Mla consideration the the extent to which conditiCtO 6rettedr
fifth winter of the war favour morale operations la 004.coratow
the Satellites, or militate against them in the Occupted
Territories.
?
?
III. OVERRIDING CONSIDFRATIONS
1. The impact of FPSciSM And four years of German domination
have created a powerful ferment or political forces th1Out
Europe. These do not neresmrily follow the pre-/war political
pattern, but the common trend is againat the political and
economic conditions which led to the progressive destruction of
the rights of the individual.
Whereas the State uses Diplomacy directly to tluence
Governments, political personalities and dominant groupa. it
uses Political Varfare to exert diAct and indirect inflU: .
upon the mass of the people; Political Warfare must theref;
utilise the popular trends and emergent forces in, 12rope'
To render the maximum assistance to OVERLORD=
Political Warfare must at the proper time
these, political ferments existing behind
1 ,
, I
timing of upris.ings. be tellp4.24
o't
Pq.r,11041P4ei*
Awl
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?oiitiGcl Watfate agent'
efretjvolrth6' hi #t autkitt ipe
these '1flovement0 and vanrtiOn mob ttitulatItak
2, The effertivenesn or Politic61 Warfare LIT 601t6d
OVERLORD and RANXIN will olso be qualified *'7 th f(51
e n
t-rf.R.7?
Tr.;t:,;;?;
?
factors:-
(i) Political. The extent to which Alliod urvity
maintained and to which the political alits or the thit0d,
Nations are clearly defined and are accepted by the goorAW
of Europe.
(ii) 1.22ELIEE. The extent to which mort;Ile lonsIdersttow
are taken into account in the implementation or bombLnx b7;2
(iii) 22222LIa. The extent to which morale fnntors Are
taken into consideration in the formulation of deception
plans. (A deception plan based upon purely military constde
tions might prove to be a boomornn- from a morale point of
view, since it might creatIN premature action before D-day
or discredit authentic instructions At D-day,)
?
4K-
IV. AIMS In rooperation with the United NPton s Armed Forces
and all rompetent departments;
1. So to affect the will of the German People and or the
German Armed Forces as to make them refuse to continue the war.
2. To cause the Satellites to abandon Germany in circumstanoes
which will assist OVERLORD.
3. To complete the process of enlisting, preparingaui
'
mobilising the Peoples of Occupied Countries for ,a.04,oiri tb
the framework of United Nations plans in such a 'way asi readel
maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN',
4-4
'
?
3
? ? '' "t.1: Orti.I=4"
?'; ..J.1
7.4 -
e'1"0
7411-44.17-
4. To create MAXiMUM goodWil ova
9;
34,1146)14" the Unitedtlistions ctus,
,
-004t riop!14,
,
?,
,off'
''.1;? _
17i).1?44%..r,,
'Ana .140,
2:1,1kr
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?
?
111
?
Actkib-W
. ,
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objoutives alild therms fti4p017t1.41
I;
In Annex Y., and cognate Ojechivet eacyvtli.rietted
in Annex LI.
IAA
?
' tot rig
'1 !
,)
The weekly dirertIvns or P.W.t, 4nd 0.W#1, deerti
for rurrent implementtlon.
t!g.'
'?itt itatiittATI
The nbove nimr Ire basirnlly those putt:Wed by the
and Ameriran outhoritths in the Euroenan thvatre up to the
present time. They will be brought tn n ctimaX by thwoon-
tingencies contemplated. The extnnt to which they areqc?Atilavr3d
will be conditioned by the deren or polit1e.q1 and military
2Euccess attained by United Ifrtions between now and ID-d4y,
V. /EA-NS
A. PreliminPr, rind Preparntorscz.. From n Pont :L(141. 'kArfAre?
point of view these arc, identicD1 exept tto retords temo.
During these phr,ses, P.W.F, !Anti
1. Harness their reE,ular medIfT, rL:)(11.o broadcasts, lon.ri
publications, rumours, et. to tht tkor nchieving the ains
and objectives laid down in Annex T. by eplottn to the full
the supporting themes listed therein.
2. Make the maximum use oC lovort vA,Ato ::ovort leaflets
to the same effort.
3. Support the subversive and sabotae activities which, will
be earried out by the duly authorlsed agencies in eneMy and
enemy occupied territories.
.1
4. Assist, in consultation with, the authorities coricenpd,, and
to the extent required, in Implementation of bombin6, 1601i0. and
deception plans.
5. Recruit and train personnel for front
echelon Political Warfare.
4?';5:',F4 ..,Z;IW
Vfl
'
,
.R ?
4r:-1
;:114.1 1.:4!Ihj
,!!
_ _ ? .! !!!' !!!
( '
? t,
d
.11
1;
11
3sg
?
i'AN A
i;
4
$
?:?!, ,1!` "
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d
D.)
upth'00osaary M 0
equipment and' hod perlionnel eti
liberated.
3. Assist the competent authorities in t
proclamations,' instructions, etr,. tor ri-dpilfr
B. 112,1 (Assault Plan)
On D-day, whether as schedUled for 01/WR o1
111
about by RANKIN, P.W.E. and 0.W.I. 4i11:-,
4.?
1. Broadcast and disseminate by leaflet such pr6OlamatLahW'
or instructions as may be issued by the Supreme Aired, Commaildbr
1
and the highest United Notions Political nuthorities.
2. Issue whatever instructions the Supreme Alllea Commilnder
requires to:-
(a) areas of the same country riot involvod in the immediate,
operation;
(b) other Occupied Countries not ixnmediately involved.
3. Organise and stimulate, In conjunctIon with tho authorititml
concerned (see Annex II) strikes, guerilla action and armed
uprisings behind the enemy lines in the area involved in mi1itar7
operations.
4. Put into effect in conjunction with the authorities o
cerned (see Annex II) the tactical plans for the confusiaa
Qr
,
,
? ,, . ,,,,
J ?
the enemy, the destruction of his will to resist,, the di_STUP , '?,Q. 1'
.
, . .
;._
,::1
*,e,-;;v
?
'
of his communications) the destruction of 41$ suppliest
-0
-
NOTE 1. The above applies to OVERLUkb or BA,
but (3) and (4) are either _4100,1111*
modification in connect1.9alorA#ORAPC'
NOTE 2, Political Wrfare, in the eogi
OVERLORDI,vill be ex4cA*din
" F
14
;
?a-i;
'Liberated zg40,1,
,CoMbatZ0r*.
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jt.
C. After capture of Initl,a4 b
21:M.2g.
Plans for this phase (!artnet bfY 64#4flj
intentions of the politicaland militAvy ktithlOrl ;
These, in turn, will be diVendont upOnthedO td#
military success achieved.
1. Whenever it becoms necessary to Mot at 14
approved themes already embodied in the COMA Oti4i
following procedures will become operativet
(a) P.W.E.-0.W.I. will on their own Initiativt,
consultation with S.A.C., effect the nocossary altin0
their Central or in Specinl Directives.
(b) S.A.C., on his own Initiative) will suggest feasilao
changes to be incorporrIted In P.W.E.-01.W I Central =a
(c) For emergency or continsency decisions. L
VII. INFORMATION
1. The releasing of information dealing with the Ira,
of major phases of the operation must be the funotioa
In drafting the form in which the information i*'releaae4.41,
will be essential that the requirements of P.W, is OQ
those of public relations and censorship,,hOuld tpo
tak
full consideration. Directly S.A.C. has, Ade known hi5 t
,
P0W.E. and give full public to
by all media including radio announcements.
,
lib
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?
;
With v referenda to my Most Searat
COSSAC haa requested that the folloving furthOIT dda
made to the above Plan:
1. Add in the parenthenis under item 1 t Theirt#6,4.14
?
i..orting Objective (b) (page 1* of Annel I) the vdt64 '& ,
'European Advisory Council".
2. Add a p4renthesis tl item 8 of Themes BtrpportiAg
Objective
(0) (Page
2** ')f" Annex 1) the neatenoq "C4Ve 40;0:
be exercised t iermit n.) latitude either toward
nens n'.?, a kindly feeling In develN?Ing this themet
?
il
P. R. CHAMBSRSt
.1
f)r (Major-Oeneral ,
Deputy DIrect=t-00110,r414 II '
1 -
, 1
1, )
20th Dacerithort.
*rage lu of this
**Page 11 of this oaper.
43,2
igse
oalat
? 4.?..[i];',
tt't,l
0
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vre,410,
L
?
1 ?
????,..?
Q AOANDA
AIM ONE, SO TO AFVECT THE W114.4. OP THE OBPMA MY"'
GERMAN ARM FORCES Ars TO MAXI' T'EtorMr'
-
TII4UE THE WAR. ,
?
OBJECTIVES.
j
-
( a ) To make the German People and the Armed
nise that their defeat is a present realltv.
(b) To make the German People recogniew that ufloDrid':
tional s-Jrrender Is our irreducible domand and .;1,...1U t1ier0
is no possibility or splitting the tni ed Nat.!,on qft thls'
or any other issue.
(c) To make the German It'ople reAlise that all tlzi(oy aaa
accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse for.
themselves, not only durIng but. after the warp and thoZ tbe
consequences of unconditional surrender will be more beaz-
able than the consequences of conttnuinz the
(d) To dispel the fear of the German terror rtkaohirte*
(e) To produce pressure for ending the war by arokm
i
4
'
A.
ti
11
'1
VII,
??es
7.i''.
.1.
.
1"4"
,
.F4'71-.71,
?
mass resentment among the Germans against their political
and military leaders, and by appropriate stimulasam Q1 .'
foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Countries);
THEMES.
Supporting Objective
(a) 5o make the German People and theiA*q,
,
nise that their defeat is a ptesght-re41-'10'11-
?,,,e., ,
, .
Ii.:-Germartv has lost,
...,--..;.. ., -
I
. ? e: ,:rt, :
rthaa: ,haaf 1 0 st
, ,
?
.14
t;N:.1,01.4. ?
f 14
Are': f
4..?4
,
-
:lc, ?
_
J
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Si 6 ?- 16,
.??
Collapse Un:Ltedfrt 6,0 4e,;11441
6. Germany hht lestt 01# Od6A6MIVW
and Manpower
7. Osman leader0 rettlise that 06:0140
Supporting Objective
11
(b) 2To make the German People recognia6 that iidiI
surrenoer is our irreductbie demand and that, tht1r0 it A
possibility of splitting thn Unitold Nattoro on thla or hay
other issueg
1. United NatLons solidarity in the political fIelet
(e.g. recognition (.t. the F.N.C.L., Mediterranean Costz1:*
Three Power Conferonco), I
United Nations co-operation in the eo0A0M10
(e.g. Lease-Lend).
fit
United Nat:'fi.ona unity in the field of military gtra-.
tegy.
4. United Nations community of intevests in post-war
planning (e.g. Atlantic Charter, U.N.R.R.A , etc.)
Supporting Objective
(c) _go make the German People realise that all they
accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse tar
themselves, no only during, but after the war and th4t,thal
P
consequences of unr..nditional surrender will be more bearable,!
than the consequences of continuing the war:7
1. United Nations strength makes a successful defeasiM,..
war impossible for Germany.
2. The longer the war, the greatGr the humtitil&
,1 40
and material destruction. The greater thkp
German industry (e.g. by bombing):, the,
cult of reconstruction.
I.
3 The longer the war, theA'
?
, or Germany to be reconst
? tw4,-1-
? -
? ;`-?
.? at::"
-rat.
?
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?
?TOP- SE
- 4 !
4.!
40 The lonor tieOernitins CoAtiri
oppression of the ?coupled Peeples,
,
postpone relief for themselves? OUr rl
to our Allies, particularly to 0066 viuthAVe-
starved and enslaved by the Nazi regiffie0
5. The example of Sicily and Italy and tho 4_ Ivit/
"11
of the Mediterranean Commission upon which PuSSItt, la tiltOr,
sen ted.
6. United Nations' leaders a$surances t4 thty WII1 OV
be party to mass reprisals but will insist upon stern
punishment of the guilty.
7. Evidence of good treatment from prisoners of var.
8. The traditional just treatment of a beaten enemy by
Anglo-Saxon peoples.
9. It is in the Interests of ?the United NatIOns
Germany, stripped of Nazism and tradit;onal militarism. be
reconstituted as a member of the family ,:)f nations and
share peacefully In the prosperity of the post-war world.
10. Unconditional surrender means that never In the lire
-
time of any livinj, 13(-,t-Imar. will a German boy go off to war
again.
Supporting Objective
(d) Do dispel the fear of the German terror madhine_
1. The terror machine is betnt.; weakene0 by casualties
dispersal, and doubts as to its own powers and effectiTaneSs.
2. The terror machine can function only so ions aSlt, Is
accepted by the German people.
41'
3. The increasing brutality of the terror machille:
H
4
J;11
4. Examples of successful resistance0*.:theerrq:
!?5
evidence of its anxiety and weakness.,
me by the peoples of Occupied Countries,,
Supporting Objective
(e) 50 produce pressure 1,or
4 ifill.t.Vg
,rrt'
);'Akti
'1!
't
j'
'rrrr,3'b
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'
-
Y101(i.SP/OA
4.111?11.11.161?1.1.ffirmisom....11.4.44*.a.'
1
111
111
11
I ? Th erman IeudePthip :446
German people into a war, of likogrts6i611,.
2. The military, political and obilOM
German leadership.
,
3. The German leadership destrOyed this bisit
German civilization.
4.
The German leadership has feathoTed it awn nest *
the expense of the people and of the national tntertast
5. The German leadership la prolOnging the war
to save its own skin.
;7
AIM TWO. TO CAUSE THE SATELLITES TO ABANDON GERMANY,
OBJECTIVES:-
(a) To convince the Satellites that Germny's deit. i6 a,
preseni; reality.
(b) to convince the Satellites that the consequencos or
sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse than the
consequences of a prompt surrender to the United Nations and
that there is no third course open to them.
(c) To make the Satellites conscious that the7 ar4) already
within the reach of United Nations military power.
(d) To convince the Satellites that Germany will not and-
cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegroundsi
for the defence of Germany. (11.B. This does not apply to
Finland).
(e) To show Germany's decreasing power to enfoikce her will.
upon the Satellites.
(f) To cause the peoples of the Satellite Countries to
sabotage the German war effort,
,
bring pre8iU2v:-'14:6:4-',t4
;
Governments to get out of the war,
ments if they resist such pressure,
JJt uill vary for each opuntry.
ear
,To dispel both th Bolev
,? ;
1
J.!.?
7.t".
bMMTIFI.
-
MIL
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_
r
? 'no =
a
V!,?-??:1K'
p, h pets;
s:bt1?iExit ofet4,*ite,rn, 2urOpst.
t/itig
?
p
'5- ? r , ,
c
Supporting Objective
(a) 5o convince the SatpIli,As that', ().
'7;711
Avo?,
4 ?
present reality:7
4.41
4
Same as themes support n Objectiv cf Aid Ottf?. A
Supporting Objective
(b) ZTo convince the Satellites that the conooquet Of
111
.J44"
,
sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse thati
consequences of a prompt surrender to the Unitud Nationt4 and
that there is no third course opt!In ta them.7
1. The longer they stick with Germany, the greater trim1P
human suffering and matt!rial des?ruction.
2. The longer they slick with Germany, the ionsor vill
they be exploited and impoverished Co. Germay's benorit.
3. The longel.. they stik wir_h Oerman;, tiolp longpr
they po'itpone their own rclifj and rethabilitatian.
4. The sooner they surrt:nder, the sooner will thoir
countries be reconstitutd as accepted membats, or thoim
of nations.
Supporting Objective
(c) 5o make the 3atelliLes conscious that they are. already:
within the reach of United Nations military power.7
I. Ploesti and similar examples as available.
2. The growing strength of patriot forces of? the e
Nations close to the frontiers.
Supporting Objective
(d) 50 convince the Satellites that Oan
cannot defend them, but will try to make thiis
the defence of Germany. (LB.,' This doe13:,n9
, Oer
I. The eXamp1e:,,Of-Ipa1ylep.44,,
rt:t .?
to
.1 1 ?
r
diSlierSe-Ratallar
e onal,
477 .t? ? ??--
. 11.4
.4,41
ut '1 not ark
4esrouncip,'
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?
show 0 ma doetql
upon the Satellit
1. Same as them eS pport'
I
2. The deorease of Oermany
both less able to back her demand- by. to-dt tttct Wrog
dent upon the Satellites
3. Examples of Germany's failure to ontorde her
demands upon Satellite or even upon Occupled CitittAtrlosf
Supporting Objective
(f) IT? cause the peoples of the Satellite Cottatrieb
tage the Gormnn war effort, bring pmssur9 upolt thatr
merits to get out of th wnr or c!vrthrow thotr GOVdrnMan
thcy re5i3t such prtur. (N.P.Thcs tImi.e oF thts wtil
for ch country.I7
1. Campaigns to encourage sabotage of transpor
t wt
holding of manpower, hoarding of crops etc.
2. Promotion of dissension and explicit
stimulation of all democratic groups.
3. The Satellite Governments are continuing in Germ
war at the expense of their peoples either to serve their
own interests or because they lack skill and courag to, re-
verse their course.
4. The Satellites must work their passage honwi
lictt
I P
will be judged by their actions and by the degree t
they help to Shorten the war.
5. Mutatis Mutandis, same as theme a u po,t
(d) of Aim One.
Supporting Objectives
(g) 5o dispel both the BO*11,
Anglo/U.S.A.A.55:11. iMperia
Soviet comM0iitY ofinttires
fit1:44
b46
A
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ioptl bopeo
aettlem6nt Eatitierti
Came ao thomt7d %
?
TO COMILETE THIt PROa g OP VAILLTIOlt
MOBILISING THE PEOPLZS OF TRE oCCUPttb
=DING FOlitION WORMS IN, MAY MAMA .je
WITHIN TRE PRAMEWORK OP UNITED NATIONZ
avoid premature overt action,
the requirements of the Unitod NatIonsi.
(d) To stimulate the peoples of the Occupl'd CourallleS,
to prepare themselves for fuLure voluntary :.-m-oporqtton A We- 1
dependent members of the family of natt:)ns.
THEMES:
Supporting Objecttve
(a) 2To sustain moraleg
1. The Un1t0 Nations aro winning
2. The peoples of the CcQupied Countries are
the
workers are the he advCe guard.
3. The Occupid Nations
through their armed fore01 aol
resources outside Occupied Territory are alr,,a mal3g.IM&
.. , .
'
v
11 '
major contribution towards winniag the war,
4, Each Occupied Nat in will deal
wit
II
and collaborationists. t, "
-
?
-!4o
5. This is the last
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th6 WadtiV6
mtrita (Oto6a r ortAAg tti3OW
2. Iht Otivain. An it tO,
monta by provoking thtft to 04-4
3. The Occupie eopled) p4k
tion, will .r.secolve unmIstako6b1 IA
time (Avis etc.)
co-opollc
the requirements of the United Nations.7
1. Stimulation of undetectable sabot
2. Stimulation of the withholding ot
3. Stimulation of ac}minitriVQsOotag
4. Stimulation of evasion of Thbour constrip -11
5. Support of para-maitary aotivitl
where consistent with United Natiaas planso
6. Demoralisation of German troops
'Supporting Objective
prepare themselves fir future voluntary
pendent members of the family Of nation:
1. Reaffirmation of United..,%
-
each people shall fre03.1i! choOs,
? s
government, provi0
which .might enapOi-g'
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Wo are W1r thdt Afte
created within the Occuple4 Ofttttle04:
3. We share and supporu the 06MMOA 'b""
tions of the people or hhe OcouplOd douittrUai,
4. Recognition that thg_l sufroringt ar
the Occupied Peoples have -ivon them nidit the v.140t
but the competenoe to Mako an Lmportaftt cottribu-Lot, td, thOi
reorientation of the post-war world,
5. Full explanation, with partioula.r applIcabilit7 to
each country, of United Natinns planz for rellof
habilitation.
6. The United NahLcins wili instst uon the reatottetlat
of all property looted or stolt7n from the Occupied, Gvattr.4.4
by whatr-ver means.
AIR' FOUR: TO CREATE rHE MAXIMUM GOODWILL TOWARDS AND MOTIFICk-
TION WITH THE UNITIT NATIONS ;;41.:SE AMONG THS nous
OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. (N.B. Thls tn Brittsh gractiae
19 a MlnLstry of Informatin functiOn.)
OBJECTIVES:
(a) To ensure resisancJ. to eventual enemy aggreSsion.
(b) io ensure continued neursdity whore it is in the 1..a7-
terests of the United Nations military poli(4.
(c) To create an atmosphere favourable to such t
ur
countries entering the war on our side as the United Natiana
High Command wish to have do so.
THEMES:
Supporting all three ObjectLves:
1. The continued existence of the neutrals a4,free 43114
independent nations depends upon a United Nationi
So does their continued enjoyment of thetour freedantii, ,*
2. The sooner the war ends JAI&
4
the better for the peoples, of thea
..,,.:,
-
: 3, Eventual United Nations vi4; .?
, .
,
c;
.be accelerated -by the. a1
1c1;r'7. ;.?
;
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TOT'
- -;
;
o
Vittr
1
t10 prooeftt 111mA:etas, 141i1
and attitude of the P.Outriii#
111
wax
5. Theme I, upporting Otjeoti40-011-
!!7
Supporting Objective
(b) 2To ensure continued neutr4l1t4 whore it
interests of the United Nations milltAr" C*e
1. German defeat In a presont reality
themes supporting Objdctive (a) under Aim Cr.)
t
tC4.:
!4i0.
5th October 1943.
111
? ? T ?-?.! ,..!
- ? 1
4
?
?
!ill' 4
; .?
?
???r;
- ,1!
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'
:4;?it2g,
P4W.t
EPLEPLITILIILHEEME
AN1iM
JOINT PeW0E0/0,W.I. AND
IN SUPPORT OF P.W.E.
0.Si POL:r
0 VA tk,
The activities considered in paragraphs (A) tei
will be undertaken jointly by P.W.E./0.L and 8w04;4,,GAS,0
as an extension of, and in conjunction with, the malt #4)1C15
O.W.I. Politi.cal Warfare campaign. The operation's owl-Lagged 6-1,J4
in fact, a continuation of current P.W.E./0.W,I, black and wIllt
propaganda themes, to be suppirmentp.d by um) of agents Mid. roare.11
to the requirements of OVERLORD and the contingmcy of RAXXI5
For convenience, each paragraph is divided into two paranol
sections: Occzaied Territorie_a, and Gclrmanx.
A. PRELIMINARY PHASE
OccupteLd_122rmill.
This is the period of organization and education of the
civilian populations in occupied territories. Politicai Whrfare
will be planned and executed with the purpose of bringing about
conditions considered essential for the success of OVERLOAD:1'
minimuIR enem1211 Ing:ILL.....91EL.1.21E1SII_Lnoret__ Should to co
tingency of RA1E1N intervene, current activities would, 'he
accelerated and brought to a climax; but the preliminary voTtc
is identical for both operations.
The objects of this first phase fall under
?.
tt*Ial
?? .J7
headings:
(i) To Injure the Enem
To supplement the spe4ifi,
,L
around the Resistance grcr4
the populations will be edcf,,
#.11 -4
?
take oxan1hO
ar,
I.
?
:FrA
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????
T0 7.14E01171
,
tibilit6tiOW0f-
arcitoiegl.Qtrih dOmmUtidAtimi:'
(b) Undermining, ovOmy trOO -
E
(c) uonfugion and dittergiOAn tn endm'
(d) Guntilln activities.;
(Q) Promotion of strikes.
(For dotaila of operations, see App::7
0.1) To Secu MaxImum Aid tor
The populations in grioval will bo stimaatod' tO
auaiat the Alli,x1 milltary nu horitiem, oft the folicwIng
broad ltnus:
(a) Utilization nf inhabitant?' knovlodgv or
eflflly cilspositions, 1-r-no0:11 dumnis, .)tc.
(b) Utiltzation nf locni labour, sktliod and unsi:,10-6",
to .:uuolmcnt militetry prvzonnol.
(c) Pres2rvation and r,:?.constitutien of local, rocord$
Lu;.?ful to th,. Alliel.
(d) Pr,ps(-,rvation of food-stuffs, livstock, Pao',
etc.
(or Cttails of o7,.ration5, Apryirndix
(ifl) To uucure Moral of civilian Po ulat o g .4 to
Guido their Opinion bwo:?n now and D.
Th?-) succc)ss of tht-: cbj.?cts in sub-paragraphs (1.) and
(ii) dL:ly:'ndent on thc' malnt.manc: of civilian morale, at
the 1134;ht possiblo during tho 'o,..7riod of suspense
betwc:on now and D. day. In addition to a general,educatloa 1
campaiRn instructing the populations how to c,)--operate bore
and on D. day, wo must contoract the depressing effeots of
another winter without invasion by a constant? over-riding ,
-
; ?
moral-J-building theme. Ono factor will be especially streSme
?? '-
,1
'?'
we consider the populations as being our Allies,
greatly rely on their disciplined and organizedho4
.
..
\during and after D. day. . , ? ? : i,,,-
--t,,,
spe,Ap
-...6. li.,?'2.?'?';', ,
''''' ' "" ' I ''?'' ::::.,,,....P,. , -,-;, ?.- , details d operation!,p
. .
- (Fo .
?...,,-:-1, r" . :,"7":z' ':? '', , , ,. 7. --i,,, ,.: , ,, , , ?
-,."'., - , , .?,': ''',, - .% - q "--' , ' ,''', ?i- - . , , , .?.1 - ,.., 4 .-...,"' '-'-' -',: J.' .11, " .%-
t '?, ?- -41,:, ' ''''i:, " -0,1;': "i-,- ,, .: : -' k ' ' r?f,,--' 41; ; ,? - . t? , ? ' ' 4.' - ,.- ,::,..',,,,,,,, 11.,;.:
''''':''r..11?,'-. ,
1-.7 ' ' ' -:?_, , . : .,T, - , ' ''',. :I ..' ' ' ''' ''" ' - :!C.-1''''
):1:!...;1': ...,,, i: ?;--,1,-.,...ht - ?..::, ''
, ., .. , , ..,.,,, . `: i --. 1..- .:' ' " .;?
.',, 1 ,C'..?'..
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Olt ?
y
f
_
?
etmatag
TO assibt the) main' lit14'
posod to concentrate on tv6 pr
9
Columns inside Oermany:
(a)
rtn
,
f;onctcripted Fore...LIELE521,ye vith 1-4ition gOltia A
11.1,144e
ha n already beon genarated by 3.0,Ee, 9111 bd. fillitht
and organized by sp00161 agettb, bordre doparturo
ovn countries Defeatist talk, rumontS1 atnet g,on6.064,
agatnst the Gorman civilians will be th0 chief VO4pond:',
0.517i?.
?
(b) Todt Orsanization, now manned chLe4f1y by fore:atm -
workers, will also bo ponotratod so as to underminu th0- IThi4,
of Gorman troops, tho 3.D., the 5.S., and Todt AArdSe
B. PREPARATORY PHASE
Occupid Turritorit:s.
Ao D. da- approaches, th() tompo of all activiti3 undAr'
A(i), (ii) and (lit) will b,.2 accl,trateth A sense of urp:oncl
will be pn:sent in all whit(: and black activities and modta.
Agents and missions in tht:. field will be lastructod to clos
ti
last gaps Ln their organizational and operational plans. In?
particular, undermining of troop morale, and confusion ot tho
enemy, w:.11 tinter tho final stages and will be made aa vido'spread
as pocsLb1.3.
Gormara.
Foreign workers in factorios and Todt workers, will bo
urged to voic subversive and defeatist views more freeI to
slack, and ideally, to persuade their co-workors (in the to,rw.r
group) and their guards (in tho latter group) to joint. them tm
"cat canny? tactics and breaches of discipline
, ?
-
O. ASSAULT PHASE
Occu ted Territories
' ?
`.0
Co-incident withthq of rid
toc-,
,?:
that "The invasion has begun4!' Axotmuct1Ofillt4
? ? jlesistaneel, grOups and agants.,:tw,
?.
i4t4'
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K-
or piop6
Aid
ittatlett Will 6.M.
different dogmas Or destruotiVe Or citm
ing to proxJmity to tho bAttlfq zottr, 0
mer' masu difJorder, will bK/ tho objvot beating:
tablo poljAlcal inplt 1Ori, .nd tho possIbIli
measuron by the :nomy qgninnt
sio
During thf first hours
iot be praotIcablo to Instruct conscripted wort ,i-,.
?
..',.' .
11,
:'? -;,... I4, , :7 7, .; : , , ., ?
.i
4)'I? II
?T?
.
,
1?41,
, ,.`? 1?,i,
? t
"?,41:,
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III\ TO,
ii WWL,
,
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-
,A1 c,
provide p'pecial oronloo, , tho
soloctod oub-ageato, Ingtruottorto to ttitint'T 'id1111614Th --'
,i.
t,
T,opulatlon will bo in brondo general te,'01Ady, 6.46 litfyomy, 0.10
:
will be made to prevent "confusian whit:h tho ollom7 olght he
able to turn against our forcos. .0,t.0b0, Atttnali. 11,41114g
already been givcn their Elpucific Decoction taskst 14111 bo
kept entirely separat(.. from thLsc rIctIvIties, un1,95, IA
certain instances, a linkLnE,-up is cliE.ritt)d to be dosimlbtOe
A. 4. Guerrilla Activitics - In viw of extt;,nsi.vt; guiAvrILlak
1.,.,. ..a.mo,......r
activitius for D.-day insl.irt,d ilnd divect,,:d
P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda and orEjanisational work wL11 st;rss ,k,
the following points: lndividulls /who, on D.-d7, vd1r,h to
perform guerrilla activitius, and havL the arms, stloulu Corm
their own indepundent bands if th,,y do not bi,lonr:. to 'ccildj
organised groups, thuy should not attmp:: to qutl.ch thLA ;LvJs
to other bands which thuy may s-, in theLr n,lhbouxhoo; trItyy
should not attempt attcks aur2..nr.;t Exound,,, lirevrt, ci.u,I.
guarded transport or t.:In? prks, important p t ol d,rct'll. lr
well-protccted GGrMan Millry H..(7':.'s, but shoul, Is muc'fft Is
possible, attack only isolatud unttf.1, small 1.nst111-4t,onst
and ill-protectd militari H.Q.'s. To avolci Gc..rman r.crl:,Lls
efforts will bu made to rustrict indL:pndL,nt Eukdrri11,1 cic-
tivitios to districts not so far rumovc,d from tht_ battl,:;
as to make their activitius so dangurous AS tO be us,.1c;ss.
A. 5. stirri,1715__REJIIIIIsap. - D,Atuilt-d plans 5md instruc -aas
for D.-day can only bc. Llaboratud aftor consultation wi..;,h the
ConsE;ill which will be rt,quired to divulgt, the tant of tjawt
own plans and those of tbs., C.G.T. H0wevc[r1 it should be noted
that many French workers do not belong to established tra40,3,
unions; agents autside the C.G.T. but havin6 eonneations, w.l.t
it, will be required to influence the non-union aro $.,
,..,
;A 1;
,
?
,.
t
.,
t
?'
a
a
.. . .
?:.,,?: -,;,,,f , V
,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
4't
2:4e4
.1H
ttiQ V1
4444
S.0.1'1118.0, tnokg, it In laondad iLM
;If
and instructions should unoouVAITIO ddricoalff6AZ r
outrif5ht d(Jstruction. Prf,sent eitYpocilti .0114
claboratud after consultation with the, contelL tuld S0(14g1LAao
A. 7, D St
tprivlialEnomy of Food ocks - DustruotiOr
_
S raalb 94V 9
hiding of foodstuffs is partly covor6d by ZiAlet itIVIt ta
envisagcd for guorrillas when attacking military LYn
dumps. Pfevious P.W.E. instructions to fluimort to deprive
Gcrmans of crops and producuo will be continuodj but the
population will bu discour?6(:d from ,9tcickIng argep woll
guarded dumps.
A. C. Dcpriv_laa Enemz of CollFlborators - This op(vrntloil can
be performed only with the- full co-operltion or the local
Resistance groups, and thGreforc; through thc Consuil. The
importance of discouragin& and avoiding pvrsonal vond?ttas
is reconisud. IdQally, the Resistance groups should formulate
their own complete lists of collaborators which could be
published or posted up on D.-day. The population would be
instructed only to seek out those Quislin8s whose mulles
aptear on these "official" lists.
* * * * * * * *
B. 1, 2. 3. 4. Utilisation of Population's K,noNcrf -
Enemy Dispositions - Local Topovaphy - Local Labour Resouraws--
Local Personnel for Public Sorvicos Rusistanctl Group avnts
aro to some extent familiar with the necessity of asc4.4 tairtias,,
these facts; the briefin6 of asents In the fivld there
fore, bE; extended, and agents will be provided with a baAia
directive for the further education of thQ populatlam,, whieh
can be amplified through ordinary P.W.EM:W.I vhito aad
black radio and leaflcts.
-4-
39 -I!'
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f
dOvurod ift tiwdutall
OpOrationa
* - *
C. 1. Pruzar.in thG, tiO
and what _this Entails ThG basic instructlonta eidtkOi
booklut, cluarly dunning thc diffGronce bcitv(yon
and "non-profGssional" holp and hindrance), vill requir the
widt:st possiblG distribution betw%een now and D.-da2 Thig,
distribtuion will bu offccted through 5.0.E./5.0. oharlftels,
(as Gnumuroted in A. 2.) and will be supplGmt,ntd throu
Rcsistanck; Groups.
C. 2. S.,curins information for Dir?cti0r2, of pro2sseall
Civilian opu1.c2ti0n - Political considt.rations rondor tht
co-operaLion of thu Conscil impossiblu. Whilo rilxognising
the imi:ortance of this operation, its suoccss must, depGnd on
securinp, agents wholly undcr P.W.E./O.W.I. control.
C. 3. Distribution of iiL0.4s and Instructions - Asvamins
nc.cussity on and after D.-day, of pa Sing ilmwx ortoy
communication chann..ls for dissemination of mews and
instructions indcpt;ndent of local powtr and curre,ntl, 1130
be mad,, of thu S.O.E./S.Ob rwtwork of somo hundmds of battery
rec(,ivcrs which will bG in tho field at that time. Arraav
monts will bt; completed, botwEJon P.W.E./0,.W.I, and S.(144
and the Conseil, for thesu listoning-posts to distribute
bulletins whGru necessary to Ulu local clandeStiml preaa
alternatively, to produce their own omoncI buila
public distribution.
drtfP
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4
' civilian r4i0tanco iA aett6111 i66011ft
P
aj,EtPtI from, purvly guurrlItt-z, aottleititaf '
?
for P,W,E./O.W.I., irt conjullati6n it tlet- 'b
---
.
..?,
political warf9xu clnd propagnndo
Britalln, of sptJcinlly trfAinud .4,taIrtel willb't'; rovired
,
thus() cmrp,uncy dutlos.
.;!
.4r
2,??
(Notu 2: Polcs in Franco Eduostion and
instruction of Ulu FrGnch povalltion will
includu matcrial to thu B.0E./S.O. orga-
nisd 6roups of Polos in Northurn Franct.J.
Howuvort bucausL. thus PoLt.;s nrct so fart
no compromisud in subvcrsiv, actIvitiost
all instructions will bu IssuGd in thc Frt,nch
3.1,r*,uagu. Thc opurql:ions in which thk, Poltds,
can p,ive cruatust 2,ssistricu arG: A. 1, -
Immobilis-tion of T-122i0rt. A. 2, -
minlns Troop Morr_Llc, concun'ixatin8; on Ot;rmnn
troops of Polish oriE,ini A. 4. - Guurrilla
Activities; A. 5. - stirriny niTTJE-47
(Notu 3: Pruparatory PhS - Occupid
T,rritorius - Thu st?,ipulation containt.d In
7E-1717FE-flir2.t "as D.-?approach-s) thu
tumpo of all activitius will incrast...
rald a sunso of urFuncy will bu prusunt in all
black and whitc activitius d mudian
should bu takcn to mc.an thot th- final
statu of prui.arudncss which this acccl.uration
is dcsisn-d to cructuwi.1 btachiuvk,d
without sL:rvinE; prior noi:icu on E'4,unts, thc;
population: or thu Gn,my that military opQrationa
art, impcnding.)
* * * * * * * *
3. ESTIMATE OF REQVIREMENTS
(i) Abunts:
Until thu dereu of collnboration obtainabl from the
Conseil has bc?dn asccrtainud, and an estimat of suitabl*
Rcsistance group lgunts st;cd, no dotaileA lizt can be
drawn up. It should bu notod that thu followini :nerations
arb morc particaarly depandoM on a sufrioA. DO:
,
v4trie
.t:,
4,
4f'
agants:
? IfC:'f''W
,4,4r
'
,11
-1,1r
t. ?
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4
A.20Xmdii tiMni-Ar
Ufidormimittig Trotr,/ _
Ap,, (1611fUt$16h: ejr_th4 tA'
A66 - stitving tstf11014,
B?11 I?, 30 t `11. ttitt
looal knoWledgoi
Mainton-ano of aOtAlta,
"
Tho posSiblc COVorngo by agont. dovb h
proportionato stvcngth o1 thc RultilttaAd
locality 9111d the
subjects requiro
4
tt?
Lft
'
,
tolitability or avall4blo mtripow '040'
close study in conjundtion, with tile: OrtAII4
It is Psnumed that one aehont in ono locality ao'la
undertaku the orsanisation or vrloporatianti thu6'
i,ffectinE uconomy of manpower and communications.
(ii) Eguipment and facllities reQuired ly.ktv.etc4
D.-day.
Detailed estimates c'.nnot be formulatod until tt
discussions with ;h Corz.1, Howevor, thQ rollowtn6 gunovIl
requirements cin be :Jnticipated. To obtrltn thst;7 tht.i
authority and b-rtckinE of C.O.S.S.A.C. will protrIbly bo
necessary.
(r) Greatly increas..d rircrift facilLtios for dripping
cont-Idne;rs of ruruly P.W.E./O.W. . mrttE;rill;
(b) Greatly incliease drovping o tt. 1.lt by
R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on sceific tar-.uts.
(c) IncreasL of S.O.E. communicrItion,: (g/T) for
instructions to, (And receiving reports from, 1trts.
field.
?-? '
? ?.-
4. CONCLUSION
As statud in the APPRECIATION, the implearomtation Or thitx_,.
operations in the Plan is largely, if not wholly- depg.ludant
sucuring agents through thu Conseil do la Rk7siataa^0,,
necessary for C.O.S.S,A.C. to intervene on betalt ot r
and S.0 ?E./5.0 to scurc full co-opQration or th., Co-nAla1V-
, 4
however, this contingency will not octlur-0 m
_
limina.ry'discussions which will b1dth
1.4f.
?`""
'
I
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1, 7
4
zot?r
5
Ejit,:r...-,1121(iSAL ? ftri
01414`
c.Ox
122,a1
ottt
(Goneral Moto: Thi8 pnvert
,
draftod by P.4E./0,W*Ti nnd Z4- e ef
wi.11 be usod An guldnnoo by thogo 156405t&ta-
monts when trqnsintIng from tho pnoVni,
Into tho particulnr, the terMS Of tho
P.W.E./O.W.T. Outline Pinn foil o:i..iiL1
Wnrfaro, Annex II with Ap ndices t,, 11
rind III. Tho pnner should, thertforo bo
rond nnd considered ns n nommentavy On
thr oporntionnl Appendices.)
,
APYRECT:.TION
Collor-tion on polttlr!nl wnrfaro mntters, tn London and
in the fylel, hc:twcon P.W.E., S.O.E. nnd the Bolginn ',.uthorttlea
(the Govornmnt nnd thc Surot) hno boon well devoiopod
the pnst yor. Tr.n joint P.W.E./S.O.E. missions have
despatched to Boli;ium for oolitionl wnrfnro activities tt
the full Ppnroval of the Surett, which hns coopornted loynliy
in the scic.ct!on of the ngents (the Surete is the only tiource
of recruits), ns well 35 in the nroparntion and financing-of
the missons.
As z result of this collnborntion, F.W.E./0.W.I. and
S.O.E./S.O. ond the Belginn Government sre in complete agroement
as to which clandestine orgnntsntions In Belgium should recE7tve
imcourPgement and support. The main political orl nisation is
the "Front de l'Independance", a union of all pre-war poiitical
parties; most of the formations which, within this organisattort,
engage in .?.ctive sabotage are Communist-controlled.
None of the joint missions is now in contact with purel-
para-mthtnry formations such as the former "Legion Beige,
which hs now been reorganised under the nm r of "It'Armee 11114aiLei.-
An emissary from S.O.E. and the Belgian "Zeme Se-ation." Adilo
,
deals with para-military activities) recently returnect
,!','
_
I.,' !PA.'
,r ?
,
43 ?.... 5,
, 1 ' %.-?1 . 'iis:,;. ,
Ti
,,...*
,--.! ..._, , -..,:., . ,.:6 'I , . ,,,,,, -",,t.,'-'2''''?:?1--' -
?':?,, .: ,
. - ...
?
III
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,
,
III,
aeiiri with v full roriart on thin fd Ola
visit, the Beigitn AUthePIties Are tsf1l1At4 tdo fcist6i''
i
nnd to g:ve moral and financial suppeilt,
rre in ngreemOnt sinceo ilthough "10 di# 1?61 ff
not
tintjve
nd
In vnrrnrc.,
vell-q
eactplinod and can
Its flrgAnisAtidft LO Vid60
probably
be ustvi 4Er 016 didteld
tion of ler,flets and instructtons, betwoon now ann D-ddle Purthore
that all para-milltPry orionisntIons $15.01.114
political warfare directives gent tO politicAl,
it is desirable
acquainted with
warfare oronisattons proper, so that misunderstandings! in, MI6
cn "oe minimised, if not avoided entirely.
Con'Grcts mny also be developed for the purPose6 mentiOned.--
above with a third organisation, "Le Mouvement National 'Beige%
which works in harmony with the "Front de 11Indopondaftee.
Should thi.s materialise, contact will bo tnitinted and maintained
in agreement with the Belgian nuthortties.
2. 22MMENTS ON APPEHEI2E_IL.ILAIIIIL
Because. of the well-developed political warfnire activities-
during the pa.st twelve months, many of the themes In ApPendices
I, II and TTT have already received treatment. Their develop-
ment, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, requires ex.
tension nnd acceleration of present activities. In Appendix
all themes with the exception of A.3 (Confusion and Diversion
of the Enemy) and A. (Guerrilla Aotivities) have already re
ceived some development in black or white radical, or in both.
Degree o.i7. omnhasis and frequency of mention will require further
field
111
plennfins.
rte.
1
In Anpendix II, themes B.1 (Population's knoled .pr "Ra
11 ,, ,
Disposttops), B.2 (Population's knowledge of Topagraphyp 404
B of Foodstuffs, etc.), have
.7 (Preservation already been, 4 -,
If' 11
;!
II
developed in black and white radio. The remainin$ themei d4
it is expected _4
be Oarted at an early date. However,
Otilatien of Loyal Local Personnel) may meet viti
aitionrfroM Belgian authorities,
,
F-
9
-
Inrf;
,
41.
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Vffak
It 4pondix III# o
Instruotiono) to covoroWby
'
tho m8in ph/It:di:a roquitomonto tx OU?
of Voids And InstruCtiOns to thtv P'6'01416t14 1 4e
pnrngrill-th 3(11) bolow; tho rmnIning atiot,qt1MAW*4t
roouiro filirther disoussion and oinnniti,.
L'sr
0-?
;
:2,5:0Hi:PE OF REQUIPEMENTS
(;) rocu.lroel
gomo difficulties nro nnt. lotEsydtxviouribg the
requrocl number of now agents for tho extonston or the
ooltYcr.1 warfnrc progrnmmo in Bolaium, unitss tho Poroitok
Office LnterviAltis with tho Bo:L"n ;onwn toporswdo
the 1!,tter to mlc,Isc thu nect;ssrry numbo.- of Mot to th(1
Surote (loe CONCLUSION)
nrc, rwluirod for tho follovIngl ort!ItIOn$1
'
A.1 - Immobtlisntion of Trnnsnort:
(b) At.5 -.Stirrtng un Strikosl
(c) Orgrnio?tion of Blinn workers
in Germn.m.).:
(0)
Dioscminition or suggustions nnd
imstructIons to thd unorgsnised
opalntion:
(k-,) Reserves for rk::pincing oventual
losses:
Organiser
W/T:
Orgaaisors
W 1.
Organisers
Assistants
Organisers
(2 Flemish
2 Walloon
W t:
Orgarti tiers.
Totals: OSe4-1.3-
Wirt
?
(Note: Those cents are required to supplement
the six organisations still in tho ttid
which are specially trained for P.W.E.
QkI
and one of which contains an S.Or.E. sabota
mission.
-;
???
IL
These groups are:
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,
3
(-17
Shea
(b) Son/1_122
) Oth0110
(d) C9mcni
4114,6 prIttk.
ihttrig: 64(1 ,ftar
Orgalttlatitidli
An rilrtmatlital ',.t Arktt ,
shouU dovOlOV i :0111detwItIdk
orwinisatio4t
withhOid supp1i6a. ;06 OtTMdtt
and DO uto the 1:51Adk flid144t VW
the tuvply e the g*pultI,Hicrt ect
ronsonable priOta.
ft
Destruction of orrt N tional
nu Trnimil" recdrdO.r HA also
been distributing nlvti-R0ertda
mornlo ienflots,
Gibbon Pigeon Post,
Mandrill Nation-wide organization
undorminIng enemy morttle.
) Ecuioment and Fricili1152.122214red bet
rELJILIIE
DetrAled estimPtos will be formulated after tho ric;irth
comin: Informn1 discussions between P E /0.X.I. and S.0.11
3,0. Irth the Belgian ruthorities. Howevori the tone:Wing
genern1 requirements cm be anticirmted. To obtain these*
the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C4 will probabl
necessary.
(r,) Several hundred Emerson battery rad _o recolvers;
suffciont, in any case, for country-vide organised
liszenJmg-posts.
(b) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping
containers of purely P.W.B./Q.W.I. materia.
(c) Greatly increased dropping of yhito loolawts
R,A?Fs and U.S.A.A.F. 2.11.122Elasjar$e,t$,,
(d) A small number or mobile print1ng.
1
Stocks of paper,, ink4 etc,4:::.and the ne.q041,,
,
i:Aaffs, for use during Pha ILl
::::''''''''''''
_ ir, ,?_ vo ,-?,
0 ,i':? ,. ..
Ht-0 P,,produce?t ,
. ,
'?.... 1t Atitide '?
4.1f+ 4 ? e ;
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." ? ?
*4 ? ?
"
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_
Jti/ON
A
;
n, .?.
the ,attontIOn, of thil' OovortztIont' to,
0 b606 8d ngk t4
1
theAr mnk:ing nvailable tho rr1nti.mbox
Vi611
tho field, Tho Belgittn urete Vo1a6t0 tAttdr
as they oncountor difficulty in oortunelitig thu g610(4416 diAhbitt
to order, or nVen permit, the ro1en$0 of tinoll ft6101 thd 6d' I?
which ore vlmost their only source of recruitt vi&efthtt 646np60-
from tho Continent or from North Africn nre so Cot
,
..,1"
I,.
.1c.?
. , . , .?.?
4 I
! I C-1 , - ? , : , ..., '., - .: ' ',.;.--''''':.:1.,, 1.a,,:-.:2 ,-':1.. ?.,, i,.:,,i::
...,
' , t: 'I I I . :I., ?-: ' ', '.,-.,.? '',,,..I,,-4 -.-!?;" I.:: ;?'.. .
.,.. ...,,,,i.
, _.? , :.:.,,.. .r.. ? ? :::: I' " "." :, I, , ,,,f,.",,' -.:.,: .-,' , '
' 1,..:1"- --',.,1.,;!',',.: .,,,:':' .:..;,',.?.:, ?:::::''."i1/4:::,?''. ,. ,:'...,:',I,":,,, .1 ''' .1-.?.:,:-..
..
,,,,: .?,,;.; , , . ...:::;-?,, -`,,'1' ', -:'" !,j,.;-::".!:.! ':!!!.
'4 . !.....r....!. ., ?, I, , ? .? ., .. ?. ?
..
'' .1
..',,,,,,:,,,
:?T.1
?
4
.! .r?
"44
41,??
'44 q?-4
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
i!?
,r1i,, 1." '; ?
'
? ? ,
..
,;,_ : 1 r , ? Ci: 1 ''' r." -'" ' '',' ' ' I I . 1 ' ''',. rt! I : ,-
LI r
. ' . 1 ' ,
4-
'
? ,
(On Vote: Thtg per,
Wirlr.1770.V.I. and
used n5 gutdnnce by thefse
tronslating frOm the genetta
culgr, the toms e)f the Pifti
rii!"01, Pion for PolitIcal Wnrfnrei An
Appendices finr1 CAI. The
therfore, be read littd conold#red 104r
mentary on the operatIonnl Appeftd1,66
ID
1. gaigihno
At the present time, only one P.W.L./ 00it. *int ti IA Vft#:
field, and there is on absence of rt,ILIblo nad detailda trittrmAtioft, -1
available upon the various Resistance movomentS *,thloh H:t.. 14Advn, td
exist in Holland,
This state of affairs is dao to n vir 'y *f octua.&ti tmong
whlch mny be cited the following:
(i) The department In the Netherlands Govrntet,t, vl (1,00r.
responds to P.W.E., i.e. The Notherind IniforwtttonturoAta, has
no contacts of tts own with Holland, and Its liAlsonmUll,tho,
Dutch Action Service which, In conjunction vith S.0.114, has such
contacts, is of the loosest. ,
(it) Until recently, any contacts which Moro may Wee beaa ,
between the clandestine press in Holland and the Netherlan0
Government In London were handled by' the Dutch 41* BTA11.911,i Irk
,
conjunction with S.I.S.; this further tended to le,e.p.. auCh CO
?,.? ,
tats divorced from these ionartments which ootad most,*astay
' ? '' '''''All, H'I
and advantageously exploit them in an active: rather than- 1,A,,a,-'
passive manner. Recent discussTLoas betweeit tbe departmkilt hOi'
, cerned have, however, remOV thiS obstacle to cohcertelid:.
1
0.W.I. and S,O.B,./S.O.: Action.
. ,
,(1.41.1) ,.i.rtoc. p'dzson.p.el whi.0.. are. reoruite4 I':
. ,. ..
. . .
, ?., , ., _ . , - r . _
1 '
''--
, qb t 4 1. TIP d ,,i'froti ,,,the,:.D;t1t6,h; P06,6,,,..: ,;:thrOkag, tb-! :,Dki:Oti :
,
tQ D1
upon th
tin'at'd"e artInertti,ii,b. -s-,:i .; no, j.!..- - el
. ?.-..., ,..,?? . _ , .,.. , - .,,,
.,, .. 10_ d4t
. upone';:7
rl'!::
,,?.,.
Y w
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
'' ' ' ? -,! - z-q?
,
f.,,t1061fin.014_,.
Ii
1W741,
11\
,
bOen thiti.,
wbUid bo suit/. joAtit
"mibniOn it,. tn. any cdt.e.?
Discutmions will ilhortly b(3 bbld bp-
'
s.o.n./s.o. on the ono hid nnd thd Dutoh 60thdrite
the Dutch Action 3ervice, on thf) other? Ot dartat
Joint Plan, to nscertnin whnt degree Of cloilAbotfttitt
forthcoming. Should those tmlks provo sntis'rmOtOry 6
plans, including tho degree of Dutch pnrtii t1LY ?b
formulated.
2. COMMENTS ON APP3NDICES T L AND III
Owing to the inck of previous P.V.E. contnot with the Otttch
Action Service, ns well ns to tack of distribution ohm:111E11a nnd,
contact with the Dutch clnndestino press, detntlf,,,d comment upon:
the extent to which the proposed operations would bo feasible, LM
Hollnnd cnnnot be made nt this juncture. The object$ are,?r thOk
main, cleirly desirable but their implementation will be,. depondeat
to a very large extent upon their degree of ncceptnnce by the Outoh
Action Service.
f
4(
r , ?
;'.' "
I (1);
. in-
3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS
,Agepts:
Assuming that the Dutch Action Service 'will accept the
greater part of the Plan, the rollowing minimum number of agents
is required:-
(a) A.1.-Immobil1snti0n of Transport Organ:L.1er,-;1.-
W Tz
(b) A.2?-Undermin1ng Enemy Morale
(c) A.5.-Stirring up Strikes
OreAlserar
OrFanisersii,
-
? 4
! ?),
(d) Col.-Dissemination of suggestions, antae,
,
and instructiOnSito the
12dorganised popu:Lation,
Cohttot vitt!). the 0101-00:et1ne pressn
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mr.er
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,r"??
Irlite:idti. 11,e,
for mOrti 0641
bin o to tritirti146P1
Ats tOrthOr tr61i160.Aga
ablIc) ,
(ii) ,lik.ulptnt and Pao 4tiOo
now imp D,:laz
Detailed estimatos wt I be, formuinted eirttr aohsuit:tt66-
betweon F.1,1 E./0.W.I. nnd g.0.3./3.0.1 wlth tho, 01.1tdh authotItt
However: the followLng gonerni rliquiremtnts dan be tatidIpKt61.,
To obtain thezo, th-) authority $ind bAcking or (..1 0i8,8.A *Ili
probably be nf,cossary.
(a) 3everal hundred Emerson battery roaolvoto.; auft1-tott.t
in any case, for country-wide organized 1,..ateriing polltst.
(b) Greatly Increasod aircraft fletlitios for droppIng
contninomi of purely P.W.E.A.W.I. matertal;
(c) Greatly increased dropping or white leaflota
and U.S.A.A.F. on aas1.11S:_tiLE:
(d) A small number of mobile prtnttag units, wtth stocka
of paper, Ink, etc., snd the necesslry printing staffa, for
use during Phase II of C.O.S.S.A.C. operations: to producet
1. Anti-German morale material
2. Local pesters and announcements
,
hor
f
4. ampusIoN
At a later stage, it may be necessary to request the Fortga
Office to support the direct requests for cooperation whIch win. be
made by P.W.E./O.V.I. and 3.0.E./S.O. to the Netherlands Govornmeat,
26th November: 1943.
? -4. ..,;
'.1
!
,
7,1,,,?ri ,
'
owe
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Pt
1
(g52112m1.4)712: Th ts pApor,
by nnd
used as guidance by those DopArtmOtts
translating, rrom the general iali16 gm
cular, the terms of the P;Wel4/0?Wa.
Plan for Political Warrtirt, Antic% I,
Appenlicos I, tIp and III. Th6 Onpqr
therefor', be rc%nd and considered ns 6 cet.-
,
mentary on the operational Appendlektig.
1. APPRECIATION
Thc Norwegian Govornmont regards all informttont, prbvig**A.,
da, nnd political warfare activities in Norvay az '64tiltg its concern, concern, as representative of tho Norwegtan poapto Atd tht
servant of the Home Front; tho latter has A1vay3 boon, and ti
tinues to be, extremely jealous of What it cotsiOrt "Snttr-
,
feronce from outside" in Norvegisn domostio matters. 'Mitt
tudo is given substance by virtue of an agrecmont concludo4 ttT,
1940 between the Foreign Offico and the Norvogiatl Government
which the NOrWOgilln authorities maintain effectivo control:Orer: '
...a. ? .2
all B.B.C. broadcasts In thc Norwegian langlowp
adio s on r policy have been abortivq; tho
dt.scussion Iforvogt
?
plain news bulletins). Efforts by P.W.E. to tatrodutc Sotmt
authorities. have remained adamant in Vtkeir dovire to klaop,,t
r
control. As 'co black radio, one black st0,t,Ion. did operate
1
considerable periods but was foroed to clip,so dorm beo-auts.t4,Ht.
P.W.E. disposes of the necessary tochnto4,rp3'.0urce
i --
Norwegian authorities refused to releas011e-NOrvei.
necessary to continuo those activitios4 *at*
con-troL o
,
secured ireturn
Att
3ithi oh
for full
,
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4.31.. ?
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?
Ai. a direet roittrilt or tho 116 -0
Be.E joint activit1ti6 have beeniiii
1
does maintain full centrel over P4A0T,Ieari-
operatlons over Norway are infrequent? It additit04
1.
quantities of leaflets are sent into Norwa thredgh iit
controlled by the Norwegian authorities; addition/4a ittmaiii
quantAt:Los aro distributed in Norway without the knoViedge dr
th
Norwegian authorities, through E.O.E. channels, but thi lattor
distribution is limitad by the fact that 500vE. aro bound '07
agreement not to undertake activities in Norway without approval
of the Norweians.
P.W.E. has been able, to effect a small amouut of
propaganda by the indirect method of indoctrinating, during
the train:l_nb period, S.O.E. agents sent to the field; but, the
Norwean authorities have refused to permit the despatch and
operation ot agents for thc specific purpose of political
warfare.
P.W.E./S.O.E. collaboration in the past has been as
close as the difficult conditions allowed; any closer colla-
boration on the part of S.O.E. would have exposed that organisa-
tion to the risk of joopardising its relations with the
Norwegian authorities, with whom it is already far advanced in
planning jo%nt para-military operations.
P.W.E./0,W.1. and S.O.E./S.O. are in full agreement a3
1
to the allocation of activities arising out or the operations
envisaged in the P.W.E./00W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. %Iroint
These joint operations can only be conducted sucessfullyuE
the following conditions:
-
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,
111
(a) that a basis
P.W.E4,/O.W4I and th 64,444:
already existing betVoen ax.E?J5io4
rittes.
?
Jitit
(b) That the NOrWogian authOritle6 pottit 5,14i#E/3
to allocate to P.W.E./O.'W,I. up to tWettylMOrlieg14116 6 -'..etibIq
for training andebspatch as pont:lead varta:NJ obts, A.
few potential
'
r
_
agents aro available in the S.0
holding pool, hut, aa they are
armed forces, they can only be
.0.. -managed
-
"
all members or the Notweglaa
seconded to' P.W.S.,
w.I-*by
perrossion of the Norwegian HLgh Command. It will,, therG-
fore, be mcessary to recruit further personnel s.emo, of
whom may be found among Norwegian ref ugcm in Sweden.
(c) That the Norwegian authorities make available to
P.W.E. thu nocessary personnul for tho revival oL aNor
wean black radto station, to sssist operations In thfeid o
bcforc and after D.-day.
In ordc:r to d'sarm any pesstble Norwegian suspiciozz
that P.W.E./Q.W.I. and 3.0.E.45.0, are attempting to carry
on "fore3n propaganda in Norway, and to ensure active colla-
boraten from the Norwegian sift, it is recommended that the
Joint P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan be presented all an intiwal
part of, and a necessary precursor to) the Allied military
plan for the 12.oeration of Norway.
2. COMMENTS CN APPENDICES I II AND III
The following comments are made on the aaaumptIon that
the Norwegian authorities will accept the principle q't,h9 Out-
line Plan for Political Warfaro and
will procdei
? ,It
manpover and facilities required for the 4t1p4-91rnet.
operations llsted below.
;
,
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.11
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111
,``?11.)i
:
'
A1. iMmobi
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n,
:j$ T
? :I
propaganda and organisAtial by Agelitt( V It 4-
sabotag0 taskg (6.40. r4111464) t.
by "profossional" agents, and potty satmettl6t th.thiL th'
scope of "non-profossional" agents. TO%*Alritt in tN,JA
difforonti.ation, S .0 /5 ? 0 Win irldiCkte'
the typr: of target seIneted for their oporlitIOnCe
A,2.talrndcaminj:aLlrs2sTjtmlo Onde tho ftvirod ritleWt
of agonts are In the field, contact wiI1 be maintalnad
throu2;h S.0,E./3.0. communications. P.U.V.t/04,1441,. vill
furnIsh S,0.E./S.0, an ostimate or communications require-
%
monts, as well as estimat..)s of distribution faallttios
need(3d to feed agents with propaganda matorlalw
A.3. - Confusion of I.122LElamy - As far as tho masses of tho
populatLon aro concerned, P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda, and
organlsaLlon by agents will supplement the moo specifla
deccptIon tasks allottcd to S.O.E./S.O. by C.O.B.S.A.G.
P.W.E,/0.W.I. support will bo all the more effective if
the maf.n terms of these tasks are divulged, so tt-,at their
instructions to the field can be rad o as definite as possIblow
A.4 - Gu-rrilla Activities - The extensive suer
actiw_tIcs for D.-day lnspird and directed by S,0,,X,./
S.O. and the Norwegian Homo Front will be supplemanted bZ
pro-Day education of the "nen-professional" ma5se$, by
F.W.E./00W.I.propaganda, In addition, some speotal P.'4,1A.EJ
agents will be required, so tha.t the eazI19'r77
of any spontaneously organised bands will con. to
requirements.
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4,1
.-A
ortiogian
1
TA.VadAl Unions havo alread(
knoWn? HoidoVor, P.W.E./0.140, 140p, 0
:
. . .
endeavour to enlarge, thane) actiVIt'
?
traitY 111'
with tho Norwogi,an authoritiOs.
Paq11241111-912.9112.Mt1t .a All g4of ta,
despatchod to the fiold Will nijacial ttgailiftg 16
thta subject, to be basod on LnformattOn seaurod fr0tt tato
Norwogan authorities, In addition, P.1.4.8j04WtX, III
enduavour to despatch ono agont woll-aqquaintod wttfl vl' 41
enemy and Norwf:gian rocords who will in turn recruit,
and tram a number of special agents. Black md whito,
propaL;anda to thu massos of tho population will back up
actvvtiL;s of agunts.
A.7. - pc_jaLrialof c',0,11*/S,O, plans.
and tarets will bu discussed with P,W.E /C.V,I.,; the lattvr
will (0.ve support with blac'- and whit prop' nda to those
spc;clal activitios which appoar to roquiro stres ins.
A.8. D5_,Iierizit_o_r_29.2.1.21.tors
and the Norwegian Home Front have) fofrimulated plans fo...r
this operation; P.W,E./004.I, will, therufore, give sixpport
wtth black and white propaganda.
;
* * * * * * * * * *
B.1, 2 - Utilisation of Po ulationis knowledge - of
ALI.2c2jEWah,-S,O..Z
1
agents are automatically Instructed In the importance of
those subjects; but, thi) wider task pf informiag, the Ut.a03,34
, ,,c,. , :1! ?
of the population will be accomplished, by,,,F.L.E.,10,14'.;t0...
..,,,.:
i,i: ...?..:,_
propaganda, such instructions to be ,ibfrokelv.down;,1to;,,_c,..AL::
broad, simple categories based on.% -. ltary're44
. , -
:
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JAI
.171
4 4
:PLItatIFT*''J
'
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it 5 -,',110,104tidit
to,t50,10,1
116c41
in the Mold by po lai ageintb and di38e1rk01wLi16:
aLm at reaching the ratObb6 Or tilt)?pui
as tho various occupational grOUpa already"
extent, by activitios of S.O1L/.O nd the 11 1*(41,84,
Front.
13.6, ProsorvatLon of Roords ?ProsorvtitioA_Or
Foodstuffs Thoso aro the positive counter--
1111/ parts of Ae6. and A.7., and aro included Ln thOso Operntl(tinelii
:1
C.I. - prepartna_11_222plation for an Alliod InyaaL2n,,
and what this Entails - The distribution roquirodx
throuh 3.0,E./3.0. and Norwegian Homo Front 6hanno1ai of n
bac (;ducational booklet will be eatimatod In toms of
quantit'.us v..nd areas; P.W.E.M.W.I. may requlro spoctaI
agents to supplement S.O.B./S.O. facilities.
C.2. - SecurinF Information for Distribution of
11/122atElradatonnulatiop. the p, and
importanco of this operation requires the
sorvIces of special agonts; in addition, adequate communic
tions wYch agents in the field will be neodad, elthor throu
the S.O.E./S.O. W/T network or through the NorwogianHoma
Front courior service from Stockholm.
0.3. - Distribution of News and Instructions -
On tb
assumption that there may be a complete or partlal
.out" of radio listening duo to the cutting offor
. '... ,'
and current on D.-day, emergency dhannels,Tfo_di-amin0;:_ ,
,..,, Ss
..,,
:, -,..?..,?- , :: .,,- ?,) ? '',,i . - N '''.7' ,s, ,
,r,,--.7.1;r - - r' , , ,c :;'''.--' ? il., ' X, ,%?'-x:
PV:
,
of news and instructions may be nraedad.,','
receivers now boing prooce.d., b-t,30?4';`.
, . . .,,,-, . ,. -il, ,,.?-.;,,,.t;IS:i?
wegian Homo Front! should provid adoqua
L ,...,
, , r gl' 1 P:,4 i :=, ' ? ,r,f ??-''-''Yl,l'?,.,Yt ''-'7:-
1 - ? 's 1,t -; ' ' --1 - ? ' 'I" - .;?-,
for
''''ijaieWet i:/ r.
. 'VeD
?
.2.-:,"-,'!'?,
tonl t,tin66.83,'-
1 ,.. ,
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004. Maintollpnoo, ,d
liatoon ta Uchiovod be woon PeVc2
Homo 'Front, it io congiderod tilat tho okatit rova-4,
and 3.04E./$40, actIvalog 14.11 prcwido *(1154400, 01,11
with tho MaSSOSof tho poi:natal but tMt, itf;g1Olta;
bo soarod, ono or two should bo al tica,tOd r'r thIA t
ESTIXATE OF REOU 'REMITS
(1) Acnts:
Approximatoly twenty agvnts will be equired to 'b,a
drcwn, 1,/th tho consent of the Norwegian authovttl froa
thc S.O.E./S.O. Norwcgian holding pool,
Th,-;sc mon will tx; rcquirod principally Cor the
14-.; oprations which .1,,s; more particularly dopondont on,
sufr'cnunr.y of trained agcnts:
A.1. - Immobilisation of En my .r Isport
A.2. - UndQrminLng of Troop Moral?
A.3. - Confusion of tht, Enemy
A.4. - Guerrilla ActivItios
A.5. - Stirring up Strikca
;1.3, 4, 5. - Utillsatton of Local Labour Resource$
.2. - Securing InformatEon for Propaganda to Clvii,ans.
C.44 - ma:ntenance of Contact.
It is proposed to employ one agent in one locality.
on soveral operations.
1) Equipment and facilities renuired between no(v and,
Detailed eStimates cannot bo formulated until afteri
discussions have been arranged with tho Norwegian GOve;1,
Howover, tho following general reqUiroments:
To obtain these, the authority and ba0)404
.probably,,benece, se
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111
TI'-:
..,:.
) '-' Cji' ' . 4...ritif ' , ..,-,I,
,
.1.06.41.0
...".;;'
!
'
(a) Greatly 1110r-0460 4trp
? . !.
containers Of purely P,W#E40'0
(b) Greatly tnorease6 drao
,
11,A.F. and U.S.A.A.F, on ,g
(c) Increase of SiG.E. c(Nmmunica,464,(/
I
instructions to/ and receiving reportg' TrOM, Ageritt
the field.
?
CONCLUSION
As stated in the last paragraph of the APPRECIATIONI,
intervention by 0.0.S.S.A.C. with the Norwegian Oove:rnment
a pre-recluisite to the establishment of satisfactory vorkitg
relatons between the latter and P.W,E./0.W.I. Unt11 31.1rh a
relationship exists in fact, the urgent task of training and
despatching agents cannct be undertaken; without agentsi the
majority of the operations would. either be impracticable or
ineffective.
26th ilovember, 1943.
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5
fripiet
779-11ferl
4
11
_
OINT:p
smowro,
potriert
RatralOrin
,
?
(Gene I Note: This paper? jointi 01W y,
by P.W.E./b.W.I. nnd,S40.X.fig, Tidal
used as guidnnco by those DePOJIMOnt? =
transinting from the goneral
culnr, tho terms of the P.W#Et/G:W,I., OatLino
Plnn for Pc,litten1 Wnrfare? At00X Ivitt;
Appondices I, II nnd Tho 'mpitylt 6Mu1d
thereforo, be road nnd considered ati q6M0
mentnry on tho operational Appondico.
1. APPRECIATION
In constdring pollticn1 warfare in Donmnrk? ono dt '
fnc, must be remombored: it is the only occupir:d co.14ntryhrh..yirlg
no Govcirnmont in Exil. ThLs c-enditton allows gr-z4ntor froe-dor* or
nct.Len for poitticni wnrfnre thnn would oxist If n Govornment had
to bo consultQd, or wns requirod to collnborato on operotions.
However, owing to its geogrnphical posttion and consoquont
difficulties of communtcntion nnd the introduction of ngonts Into
tho country, hitherto purely operntionnl considerations have boon
domtnnnt; it hns not been prncttcn1 to givo political warfare till:
Ing to those S.O.E. ngcnts now operating instio Denmark. But
Li
future, ill S.O.E./S.O. agents lespntchcd to the flold will receivo
political wnrfnre trnining.
It is agreed between P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E. Z.O. that thpf
recruiting nnd trnining of political wnrfare agents to.x,' the further?
nnce of t'ae Joint Plnn should be put in hand st once. '111,11.e, on os
two ngonts might be found In Great Britain, it isbelied Mat the
considernble number of Dnnish Aryan refugees who ireclent,y, aacaped
to Swoden offer possibilities which should be ex0ored through
5.0.E./S.O. contacts from Stockholm. Training !illfi imloOirination
would probnbly tnke place In Sweden, owing to alim0 Li'p,uperat1.0'
difficultios in trnnsporting men from SwedenItoGrciOt Piirlitain. Iii,1
i III .
1
heck to Sweden or direct to Denmark.
:
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
,!!
,
1MtOr
4n,
'
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t h 1*(:)f?i (.3 d thtt Orne4
1 -
tainod_hd dellve'red to DonMet
practicable.
24 COMMENTS ON ND ,:;t_AN17).
It should be noted that politio'61 imp6
organised from inside Denmark, ?tr th thO 06:0*5tAtArg64 bf
development. On the other Ilan), the olf-disclplitiAd 0--
tion of the Danish Resistance groups, as oxem011tied by Ch6
i4,1?1
of actions and attitudes inspirod nnd dirooted bjtfhtie,th4
potontially, the following eporations could bo ergatAW.b 4126 Or-
fective basis,
A.1.-Immobilisation of Ii12.21_1=222y1 3po trtt
pinns will be supplemented by diroctod and orgnaised atttornA of
the mnssea of th-1-) popuintipn; howeverl tho masses will 1,0
Instructed to kcop nwny from cortran types of Aictivity,, 50 t
nvotd conflict with S.O.E./3.0. oporations.
A.2.-Undernanire_Tr22221=119.-ActiNLty cnn bst be StImuid
through avnts; it Ls possiblo that S.O.E./S.O. cqn nasiAt by-
indoctrinqting sevt;rni head-agents who will In turn traln and
recruit sub-agents; the latter will remain vntirely outsi e the
S.O.E./S.O. field organisation. S.O.E./S.O. my ab,
to provide courie:- facilities.
A.3.-Confusion of tile Enema-Distinction will ba between
specific S.O.E,/S.O. deception oporations undertaken on, tam-!4=--
tions from C.O.S.S.A.C. and mass action to be, stimulated bf;
P.W.E./O.W.I. methods. Detailed plans, inoludinz tho circul^
of P.W.E./O.V.I. rumours, will be worked vat when doteas are
.SA1
A.4.-Guer1rilla_Activities-Apart from 3,0 ').'ol!g
4 .., 4
guerrillas 1:Tho will operate on D.-day, somo:spohtmed143;
! 21.
by the "non-profdssional" masses can bo el,*ilted,
'
activities wil* O.R at indoctrinating t(.136 '
,
available as to the main deception plane
, . * .;',' I"? 14", .), . ii-, ' - ' , ' :7 ,
,... , ,, A-
da140114-r Y/4110:1.1 ar tirrang-A-
,..? . --
a - tJt 11 md&1,1, LIflWil.'-':4
,...
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in. hand 4 :OPiting 'ttio 410,
_
co-ordinated With SIOetc/
selecting potontial
A.6.-Desitruc_tion or jcjoxds
trikd Itittde
all Danish ciV11 servants aro arliti-0-0,5rMAti; d060b*:-
desirable than destruction, and b6610t
A.7.-pokriv_ir_lig.Epomt. of Food BtoOk6- torml baZkgro'utd.
propnganda will be sufficient to nchievo thIS Ob5et
A.8.-kiprivlEFLENITx_sf_goilaborators.-PN,t,fa.401
n comprehensive list of collaborators; it ma7 provo dozytrAW
through blnck rndio or other mennst to denounCe sotto of thts,.
individuals before or on D,-day.
4
B.1,2-Uti1isation of Populationb locnLknoWict.
Military Di...s.s.111.1-412/922.EuT)t,L.11 ' prey
much as possible, nn excess of uneo-ordinated tnformattono_
instructions and appeals wt11 be mode as definite
ns possible, rind in line with known military requiremmts.
B.3, 4, 5, 6, 7-Utilisation of Local : tabour Resouroos -
Personnel for First Aid - Administrative Personnel -
Preservation of Foodstuffs P servation ct1.2.ttRattLI
As the D-nish civil administration is a functioning eatlt,
rvb
and is expected to be loyal to the Allies, general propaganda
expected to be sufficient to nttain these objects.
* * *
C.1.-PreparinE. 122alla/lons for an Allied r4yALI2Dol?.111L4t4S:%-
this Entails - 3.672775757 -are 405,FiriTTIFiiYiiidling F.'.-
0.W.I. with suitable intelligence from the field, so the. la%-'"
latter's continuing morale-building task can be' made meore,
,.
,-
fective. Propaganda on this wide theme %all a.or4tIntio tig'
,, .; .?:,- , ;;.,i1.,.,.
made more intensive, %,. ?
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iv t
pAlt-trri
H
40014istointtot vi ll prto6m4b1V
L1.0 made 00mewhat easier
;
C.,.-Ditribution of NewsAnd Inkt Adt.6
a radio "black-out" on D,-day caused ty
current, it may be necessary to provide' ,Xt61.1*
3.0. field communications (W/T), nnd, in additl 114.0:-,t6
into the country prior to D.-day (we:cal hundrdd beittorg roc'ei/
ori which can be organised into a national netvork or llatottAg
posts, for now and instructions.
C.4.-Maintenance of Contric-ThIs oporntIon t agnin rendere
easier through the expected loyalty of the civil 6dmitistratt
S.O.E./S.O. Agents, and Resistance group agcnts, will probably
be called upon to co-epernte.
3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS
(i) Agents:
Six ngents, nnd if possible, four ns roaorves Te re-
quired ns a minimum number to Lmploment the operations onv.isavd.
In all probability, these men will have to be recruited and . -
trained in Swcdcn, from among the DPnish Arynn refugees. It
may be possible to bring onc or two to Great Britain for tratn-
ing, but it is unlikely that time or travelling difficulties
will permit n11 the agents to be trained here.
(ii) Lulpment and Frcilit1.22_s2gyls21,12.1!Ren nay' and
Detailed estimates cannot be formulated at this
However, the following general requirements can be an.tiipette0,"-,,
'
To obtain these, the authority and backing of,
,
2
will probably be necessary.
-
(a) Greatly increased aircrafTC't*cAl
,
dropping oontainers of purely- -
(b) Greatly increased dropping-;or'!(ht
2.
_12.2,211AIAlssl=
,
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Increaso Or ErvO.gt oomtunidd
.!
tions to, and roceiving rOVOrt8 frOlffrA'e'lpte
ii,. CONCLUSIOV
I
i Thp possibilit eri of recruiting tuttth1r elo44o t1
be
be examined shortly by 5.0.E./S.O. through the r rw#14onteitttexes,
. ..
Stockholm. Methods 8nd place of trilning willbo depi.tindynt dii, thit
,
outcmo of this enquiry. It is clenr, hovel/r, that un101 trollted
1
4
agents cnn 1)) despatched to Denmnrk, the gronter part o. the ..IdtAt
Pion cnnnot be implemented; the necessity of tmplcfMenttng the plan
is all tho grentur sllacc) comparatively itttlo OolitIc81
activity hn:3 been organised from thc fLold.
11
?
26th November, 1943.
1
-
,
,
11
4.
,'-;.414.11'44.t*431.1i
,4 5 ???
.04
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'354
Pub i it nnd v.
111
9
?
REVISED
RANK
OUTLINE MAN FOR POLITIC AL/WCEOLO WMA.
T HMS OF NEFERENCE
RANKIN C. is defined as: The end of Or anived flJ
resistance in North-West Europe): Unconditional Surrendtial 0
Germany."
II. APPRECIATION
1. This outline plan for RANKIN C. proceeds from the OVMLORD'
Plan and is a particularisation of some of its asincts.
2. This plan's first three aims are predicated on the exit.4
ene of unorganised resi3tanco. The last three aims conceAtrat:.
on the transition from combat to occupational conditions.
3. The aims and objectives of this plan will in a largo
measure depend on the proclamations of S.H.A.E.P. which will
in this context be P.W. instruments.
4. In implementing this plan particular attention will be
paid to avoid inciting Occupied People to premature or precipitate
action, whi(,h may lead to civil war or to German reprisals
III. AIMS
1. To enlist all possible aid in ensuring the rapid seizure
of our military objectives.
2. To affect the will of remaining combatants so that they,
-will cease resistance.
3. To affect the will of both GERMANS and .NO
they will both actively and passively make, con
impossible.
1-
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?
enlis
by United Notionsito c06 r l000kot
,
5.1To induce in the enemy orderly coMPliAn, idtbt
imposed atter unconditional surrondeto
c. To promote in all Europe an atmosphoreqn, 14t16
pacification of GERMANY and the reconstruction or th 0
may proceed with minimum expenditure of United N6tiC511. fort4)60
7. To minimize the effect of the DisplAced Per ss istoble
the military operations envisaged in RANXIN C.
The objectives and Themes suportiflg these aits are ct
in Annexe I.
IV. MEANS
The preliminary and preparatory phases are covered
ir 'the
OVERLORD Plan.
The Political/Psychological warfare operatiO =der
RANKIN C. will be carried out with the same policy machinery
the same personnel and the same media as in the past D-day phase,
of OVERLORD.
V. CHADGES
Whenever it becomes necessary to effect changes in the
approved themes already embodied in the COSSAC Plan, one of the
following procedure will become operative:
(a) O.W.E./O.W.I. will, on their own initiative in, aon.-
III\
\
!
\ sultation with S.H.A.E.F., effect the necessary changes in.
their Central, or in Special, Directives.
(b) S.H.A.E.F., on their own initiative, will sxIggest
dhanges to be incorporated in P.W.I./O.W.I. Central and
Special Direatives.
(c) For eiergency or contingency dp Isiop
sie Special Directives.
'
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VII, INFORMATION
The releaslng of inrormation delAling
of major phases oe the operation MtintHbt' t4e,
S.H.A.E.P. In drarting the form ill hioliOtiv
released, it will be essential thaththe 'rokuir*minl
opposed to those of public relationa an&ettispfttil
H
taken into full consideration. Direct17-
known their wishes, P.W.E. and. O.W. ill give, fun
to the proper audiences by all media including, rAdia:
and, whenever feasible, leaflets.
Lernos and aims as stated hereunder:
1, Aim II, Objective C, Theme 4
I, Aim III, Objective A, Thome 3
?
,
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RANKI,N
ouTLINE_PLAN Fop POLITICAL PSYCH OGICAL W
ANNEX.
PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVE AND THLMES
AIM ONE
To onlIst all possLblo aid in ensuring tho rapid strli
Of our militnry objectivs.
A.
At-ng tho AlliGs to ontor GERMANY quickly win
onsurc that War Criminals arc punished.
It
ThAues
3. AssIstanco from local transportation facilities will
aid ialius.
2. AssJ.sting Antos to ,Altor GERMANY vickly will onsuro
that WII.r CrLminals arc punishcd.
Asssting in implom-nting the "stand-fast" order.
0212ipctive B.
Assisting the Antos to obtain military object ves will
speed rehabilitation and relief.
4..?-?4,.
Theme.
Assistance from local labor and transportatioa groups
will ensure speedy rehabilitation and relief. .
AIM TWO.
To affect the
ri*
, .
will of remaining combat:an
.....?--,1
' tl 4V, .
. T'
A' 1
......01,
they will cease resistance.
'2' 7
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a
1!1 t
?
To make Combatants z'ra1iso4
complt)te defeat,
Thom) s
'..
1. Contral politicnl and military a(thO ed4 MOW
have surrundered to tho Unitod Nations, dnd, ordOPod th4,111*
nationals to eoaso all roststancoi
2. American, British and otho., Unitod N6tiOns-, arMod
forces nro landing in Europo in 1rgo numbers.
GFRMAN armed forces have laid down their arms,
4. OrgcLnizod resistance has coasod.
Roma)..ning rosistanco ts not part of a cohosIvo
mllry plan.
0. ivcnct that th.t. grat mass of the GERMAN poopio
wcicomc thc ovc;rthrow of th,J Nrtzi boos and Gostapo spios
,2.nd oppressors.
7.
.4to.r war against targc)ts othor than pock.4:.ts oVroLt
ancc has n.utomatically (...as,d, but thc throat still oxi ts.
Objcctivo B.
To mako combat,:nts realls(, it ts th.l.r duty to ceas
rcsistancc.
Thumcs.
1. Rc:sistance is suicidc.. Reststance now is ii1ol. t
is in diance of both GERMAN and INTERNATIONAL LAW, and
thoso who resist arc not soldiers, but crtminals,
,
2. Officers or leaders with a proper sensb of reapt7Insli"
bility to their men have already capitulated; only 4..rre..044
,
. ,
siblo fanatics or guilty consciences are emouragi?'U'th
,
resistance.
:? ,
?
-
- ?.j? -
4?: '
?
o
Ir II I
o
;
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;
'
=
-
Z8OR,t.
t ?
3 gvtabhco of hon '
euta Id and Tit , Aft'
' 'prlsonorts,
4, Central poltticni and mill-tall etut-orititis
have surrendered to tho Unitud NatiOnt (o i
A.) Any Orders purportine to domand fUrtholfro41
forsortes,
5. Th', GERMAN armed forcon have laid dovn tholr'
(Th=c 3, Objoetivo A.)
6, TIL,31.stanco in not part of a ohoi litar
(The. in' 5; Cbjuctive A,)
7. Clirmrny neAs ,0111 hor surviving manpovor for
reconstruction.
(Ju,slings in th, Occupied T.)rritories who famott
cont,?.nucd resist-Aace n.rc traitors in the e-ys or thoir
country. They ar..) using GERMAN soldiers to postpono thoir
punIshmcnt.
21.2.11Lpt...vo C.
To maku combatants realis.? that it is within their
power and In thoir intrest to cease resistance.
1. Tho roprossive forces of the Nazi State which would
previously have taken reprisals against those refuatag to
fight or against their families have boon disbanded and Ita:m.
disintegrated.
2. No lcader has any longer the power or the authoriti"
to mako mon fight.
3. Those who continuo resistancei :invi,te thair-,,, own- ..
?:-., , '.:.:!:?-,i 1?7?. ,-.., ,?1 7..,::,,:i. ',r . , .?,.....
destruction.
, jk i ',-r, 17:.'?.-'..,' 'f',:,,.: ; 1--.. -!:!,'.,-: ''':'t ,-. ' :'-' ,
4. The sooner ordinary GERMAVabli4ierall,c1
, - ' -,?. '- i ',
, ?
the soonor will they reu,.into-thelv it,,t5?,,,.;:i
.
? ,, ? ,
,
, ? . I
111I .1 , -'. ? : , .' ,L . 4,, "i-,'!'..,-.-,,,....,,.
1,f'..,p,..-, .-? '-.. ,1-.,--, ,,,,,,...?,,,..],,, ?
-,.,-,OV!' .--- i ., - , 1,-, ,.....y..,,, . ? 1.-- -;.:,-,,..,,, 5t; t, .,,,s ,,: .; - . ,,,,,i - ' ? ' :. z '' ',. ?iy,.,
1,, ,???i,r :1,..`;.,..
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71,11V.,?
!
TOP SEOggT
Thomos for NON-00pm
44;.t
1. GERMAN ranattcs Aro socking toOtr4k6'
blow to causu sufroring and dostruotion beraro th61 6t6
or/dh:Amcl.
2. Thcs last outragf) dcdays rostorNtion or pt: Wait&
to Europe, it is dortqirvng roltor and rocoastruoti6n,
N.B. Vbilo r,J11.0f and rh.ttbattrttLon tn nre
two chiof alms or th, mAlttqry crimp. tt
not bu possiblo for th tThi NatLons (thrOugh 0R*1.4:
to prov-,0 qunntLti.os of rood and untll tho
mL.).,tary occupation hAa bot,n complott,d.
l'tst outrag,_ LS dclnying tho momont vhon 14114
pr'son,rs 'Ind labour cncr.ptS may roturn hom from a.
t: To nL-.
non-ccmbn.truitn r.,.).11tsc, that they can 'ay a
in ..,ndl.N:;
Thkmc,o.
1. TIT_ disint,gcr.tIon of th,:. 14rmacht a.d of GERMAN
reprosslv,. machincrij itmovos th.., risk which formorly
at .chcd to action ..1.ga'.nst the GPRMANS.
2. Small, isolated pockuts of resistance are prttQ-
lrrly vulnurablo to both active and passivo interferoncco
(c. g., sc.botage and refusal to contribute tla c-nir 'Amy
to last cL.tch resistance).
-
" -
;.1
,
'r 0-, :1
". 441.4n0
.1,47` -
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?
'
.r
TOPSWRET
3.
Even non-combatants far Craft th0
contribute to summary end a retistanva by
stopping the rlov or supplies to tighting uriWi
ceasing work In munition factories obgtvuctin dig-v
couraging possible recruits Cor rotigtergr etdo
.9.112.ativeS.
To male them realise that It is n duty to thetteIge$
to their countries to help put an end to rosistanm,
Themea for GERMANS on 1;;
1. Since the central political and milittry
Reith have already surrendered to pr*seDve GERMANY Cr=
further dtructLon, it is both illegal and immoral to otgAgo
In or support rcsitance.
2. The physical and moral rehabilitation of GERMAN'
depends upon GERMANS taking an active part. The first step
is obstructing and discouraging resistance.
3. Lives needed for reconstruction or GERMANY must not-
be squandered in hopeless and pointless resistance.
4. Resistance necessarily involves the destruction or more
families, homes and workshops and makes more difficult
GERMANY,S task of building a stable society.
Themes for NON-GERMANS
1 Petriotism demands that Non-Germans participate in the
liberation of their own countries. Non-Germans in 1,4,wollit,
are the vanguard of the armies of liberation,
2. German resisters must not be allowed any.19nger%
fight on non-German soli and endappr:non-Ger,man
livI
'
property.
..-..- .,
. ,
..,,
, ....?
?
h,
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4041-
..2
:
TOP 15tCtiTt'
,
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,C?
-
This ]it ait1IMpt by thti 001164h
on non-Germans mUSt be liquidattd,
?
. Ending GERMAN rosi tance is at 1144 4,i- it ;1
. GERMAN resiritance must not be peTMitted toeitOir tho
restoration of NON-GERMAN prisoners of /War and ori
rounding up war criminals.
v
scripts to their homes and families; GERMAN resist=0
be permitted to delay national rehttbilitation.
6. The moral standing of European nations will bo
enced by the degree of activity they havo shown againzt the
GERMANS.
7. Participation or quislings in GERMAN resistance
criminal action and will be dealt with as such.
AIM FOUR (See Annex II, Appendix III or OVERLORD PLAN)
To enlist all possible aid In facilitating the elimination
by United Nations forces; of pockets of resistance.
Objective A.
To demonstrate to the people that their aid ta still
essential to the United Nations.
Themes.
1. The peoples of Europe are on the scene and in 4losItion,
to inflict blows against the enemy at innumerable importaat
places.
,!
2. The peoples of Europe can expedite "mopping up" operatio:r.*:,
by containing and overpowering pockets of enei7,xJ...tti,k.7:9,7-::
pending the arrival of United Na tl ans forces .?;.,,
.: :::::..,:::41:--;',-7:
3. The peoplte,.,:s of Europe can a-tivelr--As3
i:5
tt
':;,:,4-,.;.
!:. .
41x1 supply of- Up,i,tedNat,ions forc6
, ..___
..
fi-:.
L 1
l' ., ., i..r;',;),.,- : ,iL a:,,i, --,?.,:'-',." ''' ':: "
-
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Th,e' ?
opt,.
conditioOs which they eat, 0
Nationo forces.
'sr=
?
-r
. The people or turopo can #$airittiOittyet,
tions by their efforts to implement ffi15' Stet0164*C1
displaced persons.
Objective B.
To show the people or Europe how they an fit thtlAr
actions into the United Notions military programmeo
Themes.
...,..?????.,oweo.
1. Unit(itd Nations militaPy and political instrIxtions
should be listened to systematically and folloved careful
2. Undimsiplined and gratuitous violence has ro part in
United Nations plans. The crimes will be judged by Courts
of Law.
Themes relating to Resistance Groups,
3. Resistance groups will give the lead to the civIliam
population in peaceful collaboration with the United Nations.
In particular, they should be instructed:-
(i) To prevent destruction of road, rail and other
transportation.
(ii) To report with their arms and explosives at th
nearest Allied headquarters for embodiment in authori$ed,
_
-
patriot military establishments.
(iii) To refrain from personal vendettas against GERMAN"-'.
forces and Quisling leaders.
(iv) To lead the way ln an equitabi id1t1biti071:
?
food from indigenous sources.' :
i , .. , C .. "1' ! ,?z 1 '11' .
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I,
:,
lii 4' " ''r? '
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' C= '''? ' ' if,?,; '''''' ' '" .' ' . ',..i''-''::,V '
-- ; , - ..,,-2., ?? ' ' . It ,i9 Ir . -? 1,11
. I,' ''::1-',1.:,''''''-''''*'-1",V.."''''7"
VI' ".;:"7.'"' ' ?,,',''' ' '. 4 H2 31
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
yrri
1
Trxrd.
-0211otive C.
,
L di
To show GER4AN3 it ig in their ifittit607
Nations forces put an ond to resigtan06,1
Themes.
1. The United Nations forces are bringing weder
(Remainder name os for AIM TWO, Objective A(0-
1dhile making full use of the fact that the POur
and the Atlantic Charter are meant for the GERMAN pecnIa*Fgs
for all others, it is desirable at this stage to 4vcitd any
promises that specific benefits implicit in them will apfgy
to GERMANY !,mmediatoly or in the near furure. Specific
material promises, (e.g. foodstuffs) should also be avoid5d.
_
AIM FIVE.
To induce in the enemy orderly compliance wIth the terms
impo:ed after unconditional :3urrender.
Objective A.
To convince the GERMANS that the terms of surretder are
not unduly severe.
Themes.
(The actual terms of surrender will suggest many
explanatory themes)
Objective _P
To inhibit, isolate and discredit elements taterfering
with the -Implementing of the surrender terms.
Themes.
1. There must be no private punishment., vengeance or
destruction. Crimes will be punished by the Court8.
,
2. Trailblimakers are ignoring the interests of GERMANY
,1
i!
...li
t,
t,
,;y, .-:,:,
,.
1 tX
v
their own selfish purposep.
t-
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1,1
77'
to;
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n;?,=',:' ''' ,.- 1.1'; ,..j.li.tri,' ,s.: -;
ii ?1-, 71 2i, !", ' .7' ,T;',
, ,i,-..:?.?.,:i _ ', ''!:"????,....1.,. r
,,,,k,r,-,1?
? ,t, ?,,J ..,..,..- ,:,.,, ..,. '-',, ''..:':
.1,- ,
41% ,414
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ill ? .
7.4
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I 1,
og,
?
The only p eigt Vho are, getik-144 t
,
implementing of the,' surrender teti ire-.1106p?
_.
,
oublemakors1 biro, s_
.t ,
;??.,?
GERMANY into var.
*
?,1 ; 4 r!
?
?
,
j?,'; ?
212.1aEiga2?.
To convince GERMANS that it is tei2 du
3urrender terms.
?
Themes.
1. The surrender by the GERMAN cen,ral militA ansi"
authorities waa in the Ramo or the GIIRMAN peeplt! anl
them morally and legally.
2. Violation of the terms of surrender will infilot
additional hardships on GERMANY.
Also Themes of Aim III: Objective C. (GERMAN6),
Objective D.
To cause the GERMANS to preserve and maintain tho machlner7
of daily living.
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po,!,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
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jJ
4.4
. .?, ?
? "IP114?10, (jet-limns t,hemsiollie44
sabotage cortart:tttod after thst-ArrbAddre:'.'
2. Interference With normal rOutin6 1;
3. The armies of the United NatiOnti br
and servLces sufficient for thei,. omneeds#
. equipment destroyed destroyed is in mall+ the OERMAX p. 14
?
4, Public hygiene facilities must be maintalti6t.' -
and epidemics are to be avoided.
.i?
21219ctive E.
To win GERMAN co-operation in implementin ho surrende
terms.
..m......?????????????"."10,
1. United Nations forces are coming temporarily to AdminisW:
thii country and to preserve law and order. Th( aro not oom'
to wreak Indiscriminate vengeance on the GERMAN people.
2. Unconditional surrender signals the opportunity or the-
GERMAN people to assume the responsibility for their ow%
future.
Also Themes of Objectives A.C. and D. of AimiV
B,
i
AIM SLX.
.,!
?
To promote in all Europe an atmosphere in which tirlajao
? ?
cation of GERMANY and the reconstruction of the'..qatitirie:xla
proceed without expenditure of United Nations force
^
^
Obiss.tjzve A.
To encourage restraint and moderation,, and dissoblar
1
violence in all things, 1
,
0 ,
Themes.
-- -,
7 1
1. The ,tritnsition',..'ffrOm,,,yar.
,
_
and methods , L, L.
civiltzod
standards cf poace
"
-'"
,
14.
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111
;?;.tr et,
1,!
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b thOcoa1'1,1 0
3. Politionl gettlementS Vill 6 ro!Y
without use or fOrCo.
,
4, Tho United Nations aro deteDMindd to a$.,itital,t'
lishmont of justice, order and tranquilti ' ?tutopqi,
;
Oblectivo B.
To Ln3pire the peoples of the former oocuplfid 661111telifdi
to cooporrA., voluntarily as independent membors 6f tha f*Mis
nations.
Thc,mc,s.
1. RoaffirmatIon of United Nations determination; theA e4d11.'
peoplo shall fray choose Its own ultimate form ot government,
2. Vlb salute horoic loaders of tho resistance mOvemott and
call on the: populfIce to follow thoir local loaders LA, mAintAlne-,
ing lnw and orde:17 until the normal machinory of domotraela
governm-nt is ru-ustablishod.
3. wc share and support the common hopos had aspirationa
of th,:: people of tho Occupied Countries.
4. R,J1cognition that the sufferings and axpor1onoo.3. of th$
Occupiud Peoplus haw givk.12 them not only tho right but:tta
compLAenc,: to make an important contribution to tho reorlan
tation of tho post-war world.
5. Full oxplanation, with particular applicability to
each country, of United Nations plans for roller and rehabilt
tation.
6. Thz! determination of the 'United Nationt to; do thalr;
utmost to secure rodress for the acts of apollation.tommitted
by tho enemy in countries undor their occupation itn ith
the United Nations Doclaration of Loot or 5W.Ta4aryl,
:
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C
AIM STEN.
" To_minlmize the effects_ of 'the Dipla(q?,
.
on the -militancipbratidaenvisagod...4hT,, /Oa
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7
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,
Obf,_06ti'Ve_A.
tho dispinced nAilcing
Theme n_4
1. rillo prompt implomentatioA mr pi
rehabilitation require all ptoplos
romtA
until the machinery can be put in Motitine
2. Undiroctod movements thvOiV th?Mititd WI Wide
of lack of foods lack of sholtor and poStibre Intiat
;
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tho GERMANS.
3. Military requirements must como first.
4. t;onditions "at horn'" aro at to be wor o than:, 110M1tro,
peop1s7; arc,
5. Armistice conditions requiro tho GERMAN Central GovorAmett
to maintostin food distribution.
212Istivo B.
To maintain order.
Thcm..s.
1. Hardships, postilcnco, disease aways follow un4ont
movomnts.
4-,
To canalize canalize any movement along selected routes.
,
Thomos.
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1. Koop out of the way of troop movements.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7