OSS - MEMORANDUM ENTITLED, "THE PATTERN OF DEFEAT TODAY"/ASSESSMENT OF MUNICH AS A BOMBING TARGET/POSSIBLE PROPAGANDA FOR USE AGAINST GERMANY, 1943

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 19, 1943
• Content Type: MISC

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
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have come to an end 40 the remit of a short, vehement
:In this ocntury multiP.dimeneional warfare hen ?rested a type of
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Hidefeat which epreada over a ooneiderable period Rnd in which (115tinct
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Stagee are diecerable: tota1 war tondo toward long-rano defaat;
logically and otherwise. The best illustration or this in to be folmll in
, the German defeat in 1918# Certain oboorvations nonoerning it appear
-
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-
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oe defeat todAys There are reasons for assuming that aventm in narmIlly
nt this moment run parallel in norm reepooto to those In 1918 and have
the me porteoatt
The l!inoubation time of defeat in tho last yam oan be recoolized
in ratiegOeot to have oonnieted or the period between tha aummer or 1911
and June 1018. During these montha the destruction of the U-boat menace
alcoved the way for tho mobilization of fteriean pawar in Taropel while
th qerman army exhausted itselt in throe orgenaivo drives without gitininr
strato4c advantage In the aamc wily the ultimate defeat
Her arilty ham boon enitelled from Africa and
ln ninsith while the Uaboat in 4gAin unnble to prevent the
On or Maim power on the other aide of the AtlAntio,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
Po
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that in th mpin :the soldiers feu lt on stabornly until
offthQ viniti. Tht stage of 'N3?110940, 'when it, 04m4,
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;ii_p)rilorftenon oonfined essentially to the home front, though it WAS
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11, -,A 4 41107 bi *4ic1iera and sailors who were in eiene eont4et
it.. Developments took this form in spite of the fact that, compart4
:with the army, Oerman eivilians wore elm to recognize the turn of evont3.
It did not dgwn many, even in \Tory high placeu, until Ludendorff
demanded an grmistioe. flAwarenessa was therefore thrust so suddenty
upon the German pople that they oould not withetand the shook and
"collo:pee followed almost immediately,
In 1943 the oivilian sector of Germany has the dubious advantage
over the front of being muoh more strongly conocious of the inevitability
of defeats Reoognition of the certainty of defeat apponra now to be in
full swing; Thin time it hae etarted at a moment much closer to the
definite turning pointe Oontrariwiee, oonolderably more time is likely
to elapse between the reslization of defeat and mumlnders
Thil io not as piAradoxical as it sounds, tor, however strong the
. Patronage of doom my ba$ powerful counter -agents are working for the
oontincgtion ot the wgr, Among these muet be oonnbcd the very experience
"I` 1
cella)* in the laut war, The Hatab in the back', whiob hi
wepggated f NAZid and nAtionaint rAnati0s3 may hAve
0 an home front inot a quiek ealopoei In the firat
pi*0*V-id= poroono in high positiong in Oermany lost
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120005-6
Po
-
or,
that in th mpin :the soldiers feu lt on stabornly until
offthQ viniti. Tht stage of 'N3?110940, 'when it, 04m4,
'
;ii_p)rilorftenon oonfined essentially to the home front, though it WAS
. ?
11, -,A 4 41107 bi *4ic1iera and sailors who were in eiene eont4et
it.. Developments took this form in spite of the fact that, compart4
:with the army, Oerman eivilians wore elm to recognize the turn of evont3.
It did not dgwn many, even in \Tory high placeu, until Ludendorff
demanded an grmistioe. flAwarenessa was therefore thrust so suddenty
upon the German pople that they oould not withetand the shook and
"collo:pee followed almost immediately,
In 1943 the oivilian sector of Germany has the dubious advantage
over the front of being muoh more strongly conocious of the inevitability
of defeats Reoognition of the certainty of defeat apponra now to be in
full swing; Thin time it hae etarted at a moment much closer to the
definite turning pointe Oontrariwiee, oonolderably more time is likely
to elapse between the reslization of defeat and mumlnders
Thil io not as piAradoxical as it sounds, tor, however strong the
. Patronage of doom my ba$ powerful counter -agents are working for the
oontincgtion ot the wgr, Among these muet be oonnbcd the very experience
"I` 1
cella)* in the laut war, The Hatab in the back', whiob hi
wepggated f NAZid and nAtionaint rAnati0s3 may hAve
0 an home front inot a quiek ealopoei In the firat
pi*0*V-id= poroono in high positiong in Oermany lost
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(-4 .1.04_44App-4E
William 470 Donovan
xis agents
Opotle 70, oss/coust letter of Auguot 171 1942,
2. A copy of this memorandum and the
enolosure have been forwarded to Major Bruce, It
is_ my opinion that this be made a matter of the
utmost importance.
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XL=Ia Infiltration by Ws agents,
24 The Sava ki*tache at Istanbul has reported to
94ka office :that be, has been notiflAid by local informants
the .Azie ow-Aries plan to have their agents employed
the expanding office of the Coordinator or Infonsation.
The appropriate Anterican, officials in Istanbul have been
notified of this. The Naval Attache feel that if the
report is reliable,. it probably 'ap'pli33 to other areas
as well.
It is raggested that this information be brought
to the attention of Colonel Donovan and Major Brace.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19:
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I attik4h five exoerpts on the Gem= and
;t41,isz. press concerning the *Imam oampsigus which
altiu14140 Ivory usefully juxta sed with reports of
present devo1opvents4.
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MORMON
TO Rt. Darnel
e to kr. Sherwood
IRON
J. P. Warburg
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Dees6bor 190 1041
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'SUBJECT Suggested slt4 lime Air oommunives :or ailitary
oomment3 an tbo Simi= trozt*
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2*
FROM NIETZSCHE TO WITOMOs
IT IS REPORTED THAT HITLER mAS HAD TO RETIRE
TO THE SUMPTUOUS CONLIN T 0? B CHTSSGAD
BECAUSE OF PSYSICAL E0' G2
SOLDIERS ON ME RUSS/AN MOUT ARE EVER VMS
EXHAUSTED BUT TEET DOM ME AFT SUMPTUOUS
PLACE TO MOIRE TO. TEET JUST DIE IN THE
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eines Karl Kant was outgo the Herald Tribune's London
t. would it be possible to find on a his original die.-
?0-,44,.bems the P,resident tend it to Stalin with a persona letter?
? Wild Tribune has no such doaument. has the Library of Congress
eny Sancian relies? It would undoubtedly' make a great impression on
.-Atatin. if the President sent him something of this sort.
2. Could we get George Fielding Eliot to writs a piece
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praising Stalin as a military genius and giving hist the credit for what
'i happening in Russia? Eluoh a picas should not be printed here, but
should be cabled to someone like Stool* or Sulsberger in Waco, as a
confidential* message for him to do nothing with for the time being.
IX* OM would undoubtedly report suoh a message to Molotov, who would
then show it to Stalin. It might eventually be released from Moscow.
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TZ, DEPARTMENT CONSULAR REPORTS ON AXIS COUNTRIES
"Conditions in Germany, with Particular Reference
to the Munich Consular District, as of July, 1544111
Prepared in operations Unit
Intelligence Division
Office, Chief Air Corps
October 28, 1041
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.1. of 41,111. . ?i?-? "r? ?- ? 4.-
NUL= Or*I5n N. - Hoonditione in Uermw With Partioular Reference
to the Munich Consulta1717=7;74: u a A :Teae41717537rm
on Consul, Munich.
Mr. Nioloon, in mower to queationn propounded 14 Captaln
DIO5rly Hughes and James T. Lowe in a conforonce on Ocf,ohor 26, 19410
expreased the following opinionoc-
Mr. Nioleon agreed with Ydho general correctneas of the toxt
of the R.A.F. City Doevior on Uunioh, and W40 ablo txt vf5r1fy the,
location of over half of the objectivon nhown on v.A.e. munohen
4nd Dietriot Map No. 33. He know oe no posstbly worth.whllo ob.
jectiveo which wore not shown on thin map, but pointod out that
0.U.3943, the Oberwtotiontold Acrodromo, ma no longor usod for
commercial air traffic and that this was now all handiod through
0.17. 4042, tho Riem airport.
Mr. Niolvon bover41 Limo ompharAzod tho if ortanoo of Vunloh
a* a railroad centre, but minimized its function as an induotrial
(=tor. Av a railroad (=tor) Mr. Nieleon eaid that Munioh merved
a* a (1) terminal for muoh of tho traffic beiween Oermnny and the
Mama; and (2) us th* Main ?enter Cor Itolo-Oorman onnoroo ?
tr. NiAlson laid groat emphallia on the importanoo of Munioh to
ItalosiOeTman tido, Ho ealdithat 4 dieruption of tho extoneivo
w? t401111Aos of Munich 'would in all prob4billty no ourtuil It41(5
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gvp4.,
able to maintain 'Ito mtatue 40 a belligerent, Thtm, Mx
bolievedl wae a highly domirable objective, 44 It would fore4 goroginy
to extend her AVM1A4 of 000upation muoh farther on the oontinent a
Europe, down to the tip or the boot or Italy, to prevent the oountiry
from being 000upied by the Britimh and to 4eop open the main mute
of t.upply for the Oorman troopm In North AXvioa, virt Nielaon eald
that the heavy oonoentration or 04111 at Munich litarAl) y thowRandos
of oarm daily, made thgt plaoo a partloularly vulnerable ob.
jeotive,
On quoatIontng; Mr. Niolaon wao mtrongly dtainolJued
the theory Wat tho olvillan population or ftnioh vorrationtod a vary
profitable bombing objaotivo, AR a rooult of tho raw (dortainly not
mo.ea than oovon) light uLt.aekti while ho wam thoro, tAre Nloition ittt
that he had oboorvod n owipi or panto among Lbo pooplot 'rho otvilian
PoPulaLlonJ no oalitp oxhibitod only ono dorinito roaotion lo t!teie
attuokris . that, or trr-iproboiblo ouriutO,L4. Tharo wao nopan I
thalatad, before, during ov arLer tho hambing cworationv or t1?
In tho arorly part of the warp or tho 1.110.18hp in Lha -tatter part.
M. Nioloon rurthor tnaleted that, If after oontinue0 and prolonged
bombing operatiena the workerm or Munioh (leered to make a wholooalo
exodum they would be prOVOatad from leaving their woxic by the govern*,
yr!, Nialaon maid that if 4 0.0100 hnct to be ift4c3e b?tweent bombing
60010 cm@ wet:141434r area ropimtway; i. ditltri,htlting the attaolf ovw
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a wider -area to destroy industrial objectives scattered throughout
a town the former would have a far more devastating effect on the
civilian Population than the latter. A German Coventry, he intimated,
would have far reaching repercussions all throughout Germany.
Mr. Nielson said that Munich was ringed by powerful searchlights
(at least forty in number) and very noisy anti-aircraft guns (the
number of which he said was impossible to estimate). Rumor had it,
said Mr. Nielson, that Munich had been deprived of some of its anti-
aircraft defences because of the need for them elsewhere and because
of Munich's apparent immunity to large scale or frequent attack.
Nith regard to poisonous gas, Mr. Nielson said that Germany had
apparently awakened very late to the possibility and probability that
it would be used in this war. When he arrived in Lunicli in December,
1938, Mr. Nielson said, neither the people nor the government gave
much thought to defense against air attack. However, he said that
in March, 1939, both the people and the government began to take such
a lively interest in precautions against gas attack that Mr. Nielson
believed that the Gc-rmans firmly expected gas to be used in this war
before it is over.
Mr. Nielson said that he knew of no outstanding examples of the
use of camouflage in or around Munich. He said that the highways had
riot been painted that he knew of no facilities for hiding the w
a2ling yard id railway stations by smoke screen or any other mans,
,apd that the Orai 0170.0110 use of camouflage in Munich was some rather
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clumsy screens around certain sections of some of the airfields.
The only landmarks that might be of aid to an airman approaching
Munich, Mr. Nielson said, were the River Isar, a range of hills
about twenty miles on the side of the Riem airfield, and the cathq-
dral in the heart of town, which had two tall domes.
The people of Munich, Mr. Nielson said, were not seriTER con-
cerned about the unexpected prolongation of the war, nor about any
of the concomitant hardships. He said that the people were all well
fed, adequately clothed, confident in ultimate victory, and willin
to go on.fighting f%ndefinitely. A shortage of beer seemed to be the
major hardship suffered by the people of Yunich.
This favored position
201''
of the Bavarians, Yr. Nielson said, was probably due to the fact that
Bavaria was the main party headquarters, and also because the German
authorities themselves felt that Bavarians had to be treated generously.
In conclusion, Mr. Nielson said that while there was certainly
no unanimity of support for the Nazis in Bavaria, the Bavarians were
patriotic Germans and would stand behind the Fuehrer to the last man
if that were necessary to win the war. British propaganda had been
ludricrous, Mr. Nielson said. In fact, Mr. Nielson expressed strong
doubt that any propaganda could be disseminated which would have any
desirable effect on the German people. If such were to be attempted,
he said, it would have to guarantee (not promise) the German people a
jEat peace. Mr. Nielson said that the Bavarian co,_ception of a just
peace was a Versailles-Germany, plus Austria and the Sudetenland, to-
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--the,with reasontible disarmament; and a guarantee that Germany's
righttul position of absolute parity with the great powors of the
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world would not be quttstioned. Mr. Nielson said he knew of no
practical means of accomplishing this through propagaada. No pro
paganda, Mr. Nielson said, in conclusion, would be far better than
the feeble and destructive attempts of the British prior to hie: de..
parture from Munich.
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