OSS/FBI CORRESPONDENCE, OSS WAR SITUATION REPORTS, OSS INTER-OFFICE/INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGES, 1941-1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 2, 1942
• Content Type: MISC

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1, It 1* 0' t
sus t soot t no AOsiaila
at Crete hits WItiot �
brilllaht,
Miilet �AA All * flot t
Juno agiinst the l'itle4 11 INtk
Hitler 4eniiits thePied Illp
1solate/1 India, gain* &an
Destruction oti
of the rleith
dosiinationa roillotAto,
the UniteidAingdos) It ft*s*
West Africa. 4 decisive *lot�
ss an opiate for pool
'42-4),
e
10' 41(
tarrvii ,h31.4
titsit
ovoout Ol wtAt*t-L
But a reinforced tith gh Army and an RAP bal4toKlotlid
United States bombers and tighter) castor sutrielov
force Aomme1,44to a major Wort ta tisldko, th, Nadal.
With his Russianl front du t In for tho wint4ir altIkitur'
find no difficulty in alloOatincto Pommiol 0 M0411$
say to destroy the Eighth A.
RoMmells supply proble il
a, however, wl enormows.
With roughly a hundred Afterie*n boal*Ts, Axis tlipping
,in the Mediterranean have risen from wIttmen per' cAmt to bo-
tween 40 to 30 per cent. Wore we to $on
ed d tttioo or touv hulv
dr heavy bombers to Middls Eastjt RommelPs $upp2io3 would
dry p like a fig.
'Middle East is pre-emitontly an Air thoatro; its
litie! should be exploited to the limit.. DU4 tountalortOlo-
,
, ,
4eather;, heary.boabers are rather inelftotiva during *Int
,
in England. But in Middle test, winter wtathtr it' idepa to
bombing over the Mediterranean. By all mo&ne oar Americazv
H...lii�ComOsid in :Middle East ahould be allocated as many-heaVr
" � 1;:, ' -1;[-: -,,-!.'i,'
bombers ;o are necessary for the winter eftteson.
" , 1
,
.1.,,, In the meanwhile, we sbould 3ond without delayo vatti-
/ iant American troops and equipment to guarantoy thw eocuritt
tof-Xiddle:East.- 'We should provide unite ot Allied troop
Greeks.:P4es, Free French,tugoslitvs 0'4.1. ta letalut
, ,..�0 .0.,
-1 -'
Ea '-
, si, with.adequate equipment.
- ,.; ,, ,,. � �
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f
0114 :" Ls
� 'Woonsidered
from MurtmAsk usasiol
to th Prre.1 h s so 1
MUrmanskio At il1 moots
Idangerous trlAngle,
, The United Nations mittk "miss soa
, a seriii of Iwo, nabe tiWegio: st** stet
southern flank' secured
in North Africa and �the NIOMI.
- force 6,000 miles long *rood itle In 104,
� The 'United- ,Iting:41oat '1,st the anchor.' .:4:1;jr"
United Nations 404 oar tin't*" 1141 014"
the North lies pull this chain taut., It *140,
� of :force will ijolot.Ritier in turope. 1t topu
on'him, the chalhOust be tightened1,
t4;14
Shrinking of this Ohitin ,11/11 it. Ath frost- Africa
clears an east-west ,passagok through t,ho- 1.4iterrAnokr4
available a ring of air hes** abotit.-(44zreatty from *
Onyerging bombing attacks slay 'be, sent against,- the Nottrt tor'
industrial Germany; it secure* besot from which 'the- A.goad*-
,
and _.:Greece can, be :bombed until t.antentiblel it prorirld.",,us-0*-
-'from which Hitler's oommunicatiOn* to the south lusslitak trortt
may be interrupted. From attainable lases in the'lledlterrwle.
.can, Italy can be ;bombed into deitiorsillia:tion.and 1,40*olintts-
, fleet, his last remaining asset, Can be po,iimded Into 11)xiiko,
Shrinking of the. chain _about, Hitler in :Europe- Wert. our
.certain means of' applying effective pressuibia�x0.1704:4Nt
- our -initial moor effort,
. , Fri)* ftnisia- it will be ,possible to .occupy Scrdlnia, *44
'Sicily. . Should we guarantee the territorial intotrity of�
.--
Turkey at the, peace conferences should the Unitedillations' _
-plaice sufficientpower south''of Turkey, thoilt chances Are- Tur
,key will permit our intervoint4On.' If she .rol'uses� Intervene-
, , ,
, ,tion must be made 'anyway.,
-R�egartiliss at ;.,the method employed,. air b443404: in Turk*
'must- b. made available to ,the ,United 'Nations. From tzaq the -
Rod, Army in ,CatiCaielit aunt be Strengthened so as to Duke-
oil supply. in th. Tigris, and '1Ephr4.tes�Ba Sin and Ptorsiati,
Gulf- baei secure.From Iran' comaninication lines, .protecte4-
on the west by the .must be. extended north into
the USSR..: At all costs the Rod , Aray, must be kept !I
,
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"
Once our: chain of lore* contain* .altler- tightl
,
we shall be able to develop rail coammanicationtin_ '
rice's' to -estaOlish east-fwest traffic in: 'the gotta"
' . and ,br .-roUteseast of the Caspian to ,extenit our' 4u
Acations: into ,,Russia. Pressure' on-Hitler in 'rurop-pt
.
, � ._.
openingji4..1 great front from North] Atrictl'i, increase4 lulivIle
: to ,the'Ritt �iArmor , will keep ,Itusele in the" war., Ana -Iilusa4fla vuskt;
" be ' kept- in :the'. war ' to seeure .'il.ctory on terms ao:c. ',table tip:"
the American people.
The objection to the Middle .East Uzeatrit it- t...:, ctifitt-,
.culty, of 'supply-. � There aro- favorable. sup.ply' aspettst
_ .
� , ...
(1) . ' ' Balt, the ,suppliet necessary tor descri, witrt4r* *lbw
'
gas and 'oil; -In.'1(iddle. 'East these. are avallable
' ocally.--liddlo. Best is the. only' ,remainizt *cure*
Of 'oil available; to' the 'United Nations outside-
_
the Western Ileatap.here. ' , -:
(2) - ,To, shift ;the stress of 'thelmerican wain effort;
' itrom Milted Kingdom to kfrica will release. some
. tonnage from: the Worth AtlantA.c.
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,f',:c.,
ho litati_i tt
A. 4_ Alittittik A
to INV itiodttatfatigia .I,
outil toilft ,Afrloot
roither,s; than 'kit* i
t,haiitta. CrOciiittowien.'
the
0,.04l 1tititi,_ ti
th* Oar
- i iterditit,'. so
1.401 -no lomat hip -**: _
.the !poothipion Atriman p.14 'Oath
italtio, ,.
by 'l$
the of .40. -'' ---
thik ;14,41terranitit,0 41,4o-oft t:
for Middle gas t tind. nat.
five pit sent,
.,,
,.. ,
It :,110, therefc40# 01441thict the sm*idnitt
ii4ppity ffirobles. for Major Oitieraticina, In ,IOrth, ,ittelt4
,...'.10inge2. b* alloyed to preclude r'r'
.;. � ,
, ?or major opera tion, fres this thottri.#'
.,
,
That without delay the allood
stiffen its air and_land forces In the Ulddl 144.
to guarantee the security Cr this theatro.
That the War Departmant, by mutual
,agrompment -with our Aillis determine Itt appropriate share
4pr:strategic bases in plotililddie list and'North Africa.
That these bases' be made improgna
,
That the bas *s once secure, be usid
Hitler4n 2Urope,
as springboards 'for tightenitg the chain of stota about;
,:.
i
-
�,4 I
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2
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-Molar
44.
� 14.00:1�14 htioNsiiiioro
�lath voiiithlyi..rn litottried .Asotrilri.losto *hi
Hjn,.the MO4torrio40).-Iviov from, 41,4itioth, per og
40 to 50 jior �moots-- 'woe giant olio* of
Oiod hilOyHtsoaborit:to *a t, iffippu
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�IWQ'4"
' Dottif 0010601 Donoirotht
Boiatiolp I 414 not tioi pq$6A*11 ,A4cAtItmd, 0
,analysii illAssien radial 0100104 . It Nod ovtil:,, 11
elimont troy wr ostiollicto of Ihi, ,Htuttiloh h*Ildoll 'tA17,
yeiterd*Y. There is, hdikiitet., a, dIslit � ti,' :10**: --Ir
I feel is very damegi
� ortaie in Cairo isr*, to iinow Molt:, I -,,tet
Colonol Js:rko Popovitch. I 324iiv who usi �.� t ,
the Ihtelligence Division of the rt4tdil Ilirtfr' ikl . AO( Cut
of Oirmanyta invasion of Yugooelartilao.14, Attlilla,-
Attache in Mosco H. w. came t* Calro I ' ari.. &tow
� Predict, 1
,d the Red Arse* would: not be, defeated.. ' 1 who;#* tio?
repOrs -front Coir,o, wad i a:tabloid the 1144 Atm. Afoul 'oU to sLitrea t Ilegrom intithimaoci tl Po:poit ts- tikotttitottes'..
,c)or .:P,opov.1,tah to be a - - ', laint offlcor41 and owe Wittr, ptt , t
,
..,. . ,nt. places 'great credence to his statements., Popovitoli wass
educated :in Aussie. 'Glows Sta7lin personal:4 anti trItliratell..,
Tn,rayl'opinion he knows more about t.hc Red � Alittr t,himin anr
,
Other prion outside U.S.S.R.
,;_ -'" i i,1 PojDovitch claims that ther entat1onaii: SIalltliz, toympe.--
: mentjiits-milither the stability :nor the stot4f4stness 01' p,
-po'se ,44,ich Ai, to be found In that ofe the tutor,. and �,i%ne.lo:
*- Saitin.1- He leis that temperamentally the Slow Is tncapable�
Of the '`inten a sustained effort -'�demandect try A pl�01,angod
war; that if-t114) Nati pressure on, the Re4Armit its not
alleviated by successes or allied interventtiolk. ror "tolvir --
, Winters: of 1943 and 1944.
' mental- reasons alone ,the Red Ar will not res-Ist beyond the-
many. treah',� t '
-, We muit remember that in 1905
, ops which,had- not been in action when It
3tan Arwr had-
, surrendered ,,ti)` a Japanese army vthich WAS tad.. The
Ruasiiintrisszi:' also quit,:in 1917 I and,hzz.,g -o Revoltxt-lon
� - t, rate a direct- CAUL'S the' Slavia: p alto h tt
temperauiteAt unquestionably had
a, great to do..!:cleskl, with the willingness to sto;p
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- ,
'
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onel
* riidett Spoisatt 'IA
_ilo 04,;;Philippinee,, and in* mj'WI( Vitt
:.
Die:-.464htsiti intense hattrii& r th* nett.p.h.
Sie,,ilt,#ly to aod:Opt, tills Ln4spnt�iri,, a.h1 f1'rwit-
-stiOtinelealgainst tho White mad., Itesidet0A LtIMOolr
.,�:. ,1-_ .,...... . -
, 40::-: ' o' y clistritbod; h* iii' *All Ma: ti,07 .,*broistoOkt*Se, *.r ON
, , ,,,
i Ipinps by radio an4 to sticavtiln, thktr: 41X16,4t.,
�-. .Airfearful'iost they' be misled, by thls. jap*te,--e'promis
I �i_,,
Prom the beginnIng# the JkpaAlkSe h ..-b_oe.A **trim*:
.-iy:clever in their methods or PhillPpit* Odal;*.t104.e, _hsr
brought,with them Japanese Calholio ftlesto-0, Th* C1041011'
riliision,. which is very doom to' the Pi1lpi4o. Is not bolAgt.
i!-; disturbed.' 'Diming' the heavy attaktitsk 0101Alt. corr. ,Idovefi,,
-,-Pliipinos,,from �coupled Sanila came to Corregidor and
, 41.,ticlosed to President Quoson, that the Apth4,8* 0101MO4i
Optative information that the American had, no interttlool of
,
,,.'.--iiending-help to the Philippines. This th* Pillplfto* d1ct
�,,,2,4
.,, :� :-.�., -riet-then believe, but, nevertheless, it ptiolpodi ta be true,.
Thtv Japanese can now appeal to tha PilIptnos
saying that we not only allowed theirs to go down tn, detest;
,
Without making any -effort to reinforce tham4 but,�at ave
isme tiato;-,if sent troops and, supplies to Eirttain: 4,114
41,1ind"v4ira they were riot desperately needed. Vnque*t14004
,
ably,,thO_Japaneeef.,have made * strong appeal sco t4410o.,
-:flicts,dloiipled with the imperialistic threat of::th. white
Man,',,may,AnduteFilipinos to toy with JApenestrpromises,
�'nd
r
p
twFict, st_
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04r Pr�mM iftgli th ObitA4 tit 666w toOlgegid*,
The reaeftt 000*1446d4 V4414Ad*f In lio.h4ft, oii*Moly, illo1.4K
KfAi-tatteiC nor tli:11.4 ett.1011(pCiett OltioAttihottit *MC- Ct igioctif
the Ispanoso etioki *t liftif 14,41* ete".offtried !9 td
Oie OrtiOAtAf
, �( 1010- sA** 01;0 114.,g: to al* l'Ill *
. dormant wail the turope*A Wair taek ollytw.0,, WW ,-
PhIlippine popUlstIOn *hick Mat loat eion*Id4 Or ttii*
test for' Am:rialto tIontrol 4 OonosIttftbIy r 4'mA* , "'-tptao*
' would fitht with law find s greatovs ntambqr.' mIght Pv-Aslitv
neutral.
, Since it gppookr* outs mckStIr milltwev 41T6r
initially *Ill be In tuvorw, exoopt tor the. 3ou0,000311,
Pacific Theatre, payaholovicol rtimtf*re rov fk time. .11-.,
prove to be our only weapon ta tho Orionit�
This prciblOm is of pavmmount Aaltonal Viimatcc
It jeopardises our positIon IA the Ortoat both at- g: Otor
war and the peaoto fohldh fcalowitw PV,41414M qiloto.rt
seeing President Roosevelt at ondo and *All pvloolTt
strongest possible appeal tor asalstancov l'',
a
IT
1
s.
o
It is urgently recommended that rcur aahodul*
for establishing communIcottions *1th. Ow RIIIIpptnot 1,4
given first priority.
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.i;?:;i114,kir;
Pehmery tO4A
MEMAMAK
TOS 00104.1 William it. botavAn
41,k
PROMS BONIer P. Pellet's, &rte. atifnernig
Jd
The rodent speech or Told) pvomIslag lAde'endedaw
to the PiNilippines and i�iroAd ttt grs-tf OtaUWAVA11[41#4-4,
DUO to their intense hetred for the tirmtook, oh* ithrmitoisi
will &Coot this itt4spendenci ahd *III right *IC4 Cho
Japanese against the white man. Pvesident qw*Ao"
is deeply disturbed; he is atudous t4 communIookte wItA
the Filipinos by radio and to AscortAln thotr reactIOnso
Ho is fearful lest they be misleAd b7 this Jrnp,nese promOs**
From the beginning, the Zrapritnese hm. te eXtromww4.
ly clever in their methods of Phpiwt ocqupatioll,* Ttioi
broueht with them Japanese Catholic, :Priests* The catAolto
religion, which is very dear to the Pilipino is not betMg
disturbed. During the heavy attuoks against Covroi4idorp
Japanese from Occupied Manila OKM4, to CovreKidor And d141--
closed to President Quezon that the Japunede clairmgd pa41-
tive information that the American had no intention or
interveaing in the Philippines. This the Vilipito dld not
then believe, but, nevertheless, it proved to be true.
The Japanese can now appeal to the Pilipino by
saying that we not only allowed them to go down la dereat
without making any effort to support them., but, at the
same time, we sent troops and supplies to aritaln and
Ireland where they were not desperately needed. TAlquestion-
ably, ;the Japanese have made it strong appeal and the$*
facts, coupled with the imperialistic threat or the whit*
man, may eau!. loyal Filipinos to toy with Japanese prom149esw
The Japanese now claim they came to the Philipplues
to liberate the Filipino from the White Peril. la rc*turn
for this liberation they unquestion4oly will demand air
and navel bases. In a short time their position tn the
Philippines will be very strong.
V
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,
:prow
Th4i! rosent Calm'
itaisheit�nor StalinPt1lpiik,:WO
tet
, jimpetsiso olokbarthoi
tho
; Xi we allOp ori pi4q04- the . *7 lit#
-dontimi until Ow 'E. 110:41;
populikti iiitct *14* .4.
'legit for Amerlogn toottiola donoriftic -445,*
...would right -with 444*4.44 * groaitet mitotti*
neutra4.
ThlA problem le' ofoIt ramotnt ftaitItIAT Impoliktc14,4
jeopardises our positIon thth* Otlett bdtk cittetw
war and the peaco 'which follow,* lort4144nt C0.10ton 1*
seeiriglrosident Booseirelt al oto* atd:wttitleeett th*
strongest possible appeal for astitt*doe.
It, Is urgently reoommeAdAd that /our satettl* ter
�establishing oomraunleations With tha pine* boP
first pr1�1 ty.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
3/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
Doar Ganoral Denouri:
Olnd fou Are baoW:
The Attached Atud[143 wIll gIvn riAt tt
approximtion of my miaspent life whIlot $otx wetw
Respectful
Brigadier General William JI Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
seibil
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The, Wiwi,or ' ilerifesto tio,dtianetili itholirook*
ropudi,eited, it *Met tal,' 00 Ili idlirtkd $.k Of MI*7111. 6. PO*
A. separate peso* by tliS"S�ft�isposliAblot.
� Soviet losses jay have resohed tistat, rtify
third of Which wore sioldlere,
Russians aro war psrohologioally for; 0,
The 41oviet food end triklitriel attuatIon, tis (settlicisiti,*
A separate peso* would rostor stiv.tot Irdrum,roft tft, 041-Itirc*
Europe and ;the Nikons,
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Cerpathian frontiers would pt s1H It
control 'ROMITilen oil; the ftrti � UkLtna wottld be" r4tilartod,
The 111.5�Solle resents ikstlelo-A.nartioan in:tort:1)11,s olt* Tat
central Europe,
�Stalin ray feel justified in ;mkt � a separitto polkas
because Anglo-Averican pledgee for a, 1,943 mokjor travtA4loa %too
repudiated at the last weshington ocureronoiR.
Aspects of Moscow Manifesto favorable to GoruenT *re:
Strength from :Eastern Front is noYtodo.d to moet the over
increasing Anglo-American pressure end to r.plAcit Itsat*AumIt
incIranoe tits Balkan,.
t , �
POO. with U.S.S.R. would offset tbe blow dealt German.
morale *,r the unexpected ftll of Ruisoila whioh plaoed. hoer%
titre's on Hitler's position.
German peaoe-time eoonomy complements that or the C.S.S.A*
Although Gerram is still capable of torrifia roctallaitory
measures, oontimuktion of Eastern Front means eventual rafevfman
defeat abd dismemberment.
attmenoes,of � Starlit. Nage.
The danger in the Mosoow !Manifesto lies in the fact thet Ito
terra are more attractive than those yet offered by the United Nitloma.,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2
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