OSS - FIELD REPORTING, 1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 2, 1945
• Content Type: MISC

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ffice Memorandum Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GoVEA
1-tet 01. re?
TO Acting Director
DATIL r 945
PROM SOCrOtariat
k CY-cx
smuscri Field Report of Lt. Tom Stix, 8I/MiodT0
I. Lt. Stix was stationed on the IsUnd of Bubo**,
the point from which SI and MO missions were infiltrated
into Central Ureece,
2. He atates that no attempt was made to train his as
an individual for a specific Job. Lt. Stix suggests that
more emphasis be placed on compatability of members of a
field team and that SI missions be continually supplied with
equipment, food, etc., if they are to get maximum cooperation
from guerrilla forces.
Attachment
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DATE:
23 march 1945
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The principal difficulties (pages 2, 3, 4, 5) encountered
by Lt. Stix involved training, personnel and supply. His
mild oritioisms appear to be valid. In reply, it is fair to
state that the experiences of Stix and others have proved
invaluable lessons to SI and because of these experienoos
numerous delinquencies mill be avoided in the future.
dlat$'`
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1. Personnel and Itinera2. ry
Summary of Mission Activities
3.
Specific Difficultiel Encountered in the Field mhioh
Might be /*proved
a. Training
b. Personnel
o. Operational
(1) Supply
(2) Liaison
4. Unique Charaoteristios of Greek SI Desk
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IITANDAM POW NO, SI
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STAT,ES GOVERNMENT
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Direotar, 088
TO
Through Chief, 81
nom Tom Stix, 1st Lieutenant, AUS
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions
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1. Personnel and Itinerary
The original personnel of the mission consisted of a
radio operator, an interpreter, and myself. Two months after
reaohiug the field I was joined by a civilian agent. The mission
left Alexandria 28 May 1944 by oaique, and after delays at Cyprus
and Smyrna, reached the island of B4booa on 6 July. W. cosi.
tinued to operate on the island until 12 October 1964.
2. 8w.ms7 of Mission Activities
The island of Buboes was used primarily as a point from
which SI and MO missions oould be infiltrated into central
Orem,. and mail brought in and out. Two Amorioans went to the
island several months earlier to lay tho ground work for this
zotivity and then came out again. This was followed up by a
Greek agent working for our services, but because of diffi-
oulties in relations between the Americans, the British, and
the local andartes, it was thought advisable to have a 'Pico
Amerioanw mission on the spot. Our mission immediately con-
taoted and established friendly relations with the Mead/quarters
of the 7th ELA8 Regiment, 'and with their help established a
base, and secured transport and guides for future missions.
Mail and money to and from Athena, Karpenisi. and Mt. Amasses
was handled and the later agents were cuooessfully passed three*.
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In lidditiO4. 44 observation post was set up on the Buboes
Channel to relay shipping intelligence by radio. During the
period
we were there, we travelled aver most of the island,
sending back:military, political and economic reports to Cairo.
3. S ?int) Difficulties Encountered in the Field which M1 ht be
My training consisted of five days at the Middle East
School and three weeks close contact with the Greek desk
reading back files and familiarising myself with current
conditions in Greece. From a practioal standpoint, the
time spent at the school was largely wasted. The instruc-
tion was general and directed at ths *lowest common denami.
nator.* There was no attempt to train me as an individual
for my specific job. Although Mi. Young, Captain Else, and
Captain Edson of the Greek Desk could not have been more
helpful in answering specific questions and solving specific
difficulties, they did not have tito give as adsquate
Individual briefing mid I was too ' .perienced to bring
Up certain problems which later arose in the field. Among
these were the past orpsrfeaces and difficulties of British
and American missions in Ervia, the general areas of political
intelligence which while new to me were *old hat* to the
office, the specific form to be used in shipping intelligence
and what types of ahips to look for in the Aegean, and such
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small items as the preferred forms for radio messages. None
of these matters in themselves were serious handicaps but
advance briefing on them would have improved my reporting
considerably.
b. Personnel
Since neither the interpreter nor operator selected
for my mission were in Cairo, I had no opportunity to moot
then before the mission got under way. Mben I reached
Turkey I discovered that the interpreter felt it mould be
dangerous for him to stay in EAU territory because of his
associations on a previous mission and my operator had been
allocated elsewhere. Since I was anxious to avoid further
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delay, I accepted the only man available an the spot
and started off. This proved to be a mistake. The inter-
preter was a rabid communist whose loyalty WA to ZAK rather
than to the U. S. linen he discovered that the mission mak
not going to act as an organ to propagandise America for ZAK,
he deserted. The radio operator had already failed on two
previous missions and his ptrsonality VOA unsuitable for
field work. Although the office in no way insisted on my
taking these men and they only became part of the mission
by force of circumstances, their previous records were mph
that in my opinion they should not have been permitted to
go into the field, even if I were willing to take the ohmage.
From this experience, I believe that in the future more
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emphasis should be placed on compatability of members of
a field team - Living under isolated and difficult con-
ditions, congeniality and a willingness to work together
can often overcome technical deficiencies, but technical
ability alone can not insure a successful mission.
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(1) 1..../psati
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The chief operational difficulty WKS that
calques could only land at one port sn4 I had to meet
each one. This necessitated droppAng whatever I was
doing at the time and sometimes involved round tripe
of as much as 100 miles. Often calques would be de.
'eyed and several days would have to be wasted at
the port. The arrival of Mr. Calvocoressi September 1,
greatly ameliorated this situation, as it enabled us
to "trade off" when calques had to be met. Calvocoressits
abilities as an intelligence officer and his knowledge
of Greek and Greeks proved invaluable in accomplishing
the latter part of the missionti work.
(2) Liaison
The chief obstacle to successful liaison with the
andartes was the question of supplies. Local ground
rules f2rbad4 el adrsions to d!stribute
No. 1 guerrilla priority - Naturally, it was difficult
to justify this policy, even though it was made
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perfaotly ?Liar to the Andarte leaders at the out.
advt. To oomponpat*, it won dotoratood to mood 14
shoes, ?lathing, modioine. and food all of ohiob
ware urgently wooded. The firat calque brought in a
good aupply and was onthusiastioally received. As 4
result, the arrival at an Amorioaa oalque Naomi" 4
rogimental 'vent. Consequently, when the next two
oaiques arrived virtually empty, thoro was groat
diaappointment and it mad* It oorrespoodingly more
difficult to ask favors from the regimont. T do not
wimh to infer that Amerloans wore not weloons for
their own sake, but the military and looal population
were desperately short of biota neoossitles, and we
were their only hop* of s'ouring thorn. Th. Andartos
nevor fallod to supply the mission willingly with
guidos, and *von boats when requested, 4404
they not unreasonably hopad for matorial return.
fano* American propaganda oantinually stressod tho
vast supplios going ovorsoas. it 1,44 hard to oxplaii
whY itywna so ditfloult to seoure oven a few hundrod
Pair. of ehoee or * surgical kit. If $I mission* wish
to got tha most 04t of gwarrilla Pore's they ahould not
roZy stood 011 *low, but should be ItElAssually
oupp:ied. Regularity is oven more important than
Quantity.
4. Uniqua Charactoristios or Crook la Doak
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The nucleus of the Greek Desk was ? group of 1140 who had
been friends before the war, respected each other's abilities
and were deeply interested in Greece. Newtoners were indoctri-
nated with this feeling of mutual loyalty and whether it wits
Cairo, Cyprus, Izmir, or Athens, the spirit was catching and
immeasurably contributed to the successful operations of the
Greek Desk.
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FaTITT
STAN'DARID FORM NO. 64
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES G
TO General Donovan
FROM : Secretariat
SUBJECT: Field Report of L. Cabot Briggs
DATE: 3-4m 1945
1. Attached is a report from Mr. L. Cabot Briggs who was
recruited by the Security Branch and later worked for SI in
North Africa. In this report Mr. Briggs describes his work
in organizing agent chains and the coverage which they achieved.
In addition, Mr. Briggs discusses his relations with various
French and U.S. agencies.
2. Mr. Briggs makes the following recommendations concern-
ing conditions in the field:
a. expanding coverage in the field using two or three
men'in Algeria, one of these men to be "open.01
b. setting up a financial and supply service.
c. more care in providing for the families of agents.
3. Mr. Briggs was apparently inconvenienced by not being
paid for some time. (In a covering memorandum Mr. Boulton
notes that this was due to the delay in returning Mr. Briggs
to this country.)
4. Mr. Boultonts memorandum recommends that Mr. Briggs
be transferred to SI and returned to Algiers by the beginning
of May.
Attachment
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W. B. antack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer
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Field Report ? L. Cabot Briggs
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I TANNANN PONM NO, IN
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Office MernorandaFtc*''Er
? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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Chief, SI
TO l via fteoutive ()Moor. SI
PROM Divisional Deputy, SI, Afrioa Division
SUBJECT; Report on Field Conditions by L. Cabot Briggs
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DATR: 21 March vow
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1. Shortly after the subjeot arrived in Algiers he was leased
to SI for an indefinite period for operational purposes but retained by
Security for administrative purposes. This was incorporated in a written
agreement of 28 November 1944 between the SI Branch and the Security
Office.
2. With referenoe to paragraph 10 in the subjeot's report, no
operational funds beyond those advanoed by Leland Rounds, Oran. were sent
him, since orders for his return were issued by this offioe on 16 January
1945. The lag between issuance of orders for his return and his arrival
was due, AS you know, to failure by Caserta to effeet cabled instruehiens.
3. During the subjeot's ref:lent residenoe in Algiers. he filed
reports of increasingly good quality. These reports, as well as reeomr
mendetions from Leland Rounds, to whoa the subjeot was responsible. to..
'ether with conversations which I have had with the subjeot, make it
evident that he has available in Algiers ? number of very useful ?outsets
capable of being organised into a well integrated, produetive chain.
These oontaots resulted from his underoover work in North Africa for the
Security Office durinr the previous year.
4. It is r000mmended that he be transferred from the Security
Office to the SI Branch and returned to his station in Algiers to arrive
about the first of May. He would have open SI statusi
similar to
that. of Leland Rounds, with oommunioations via the Amerioan Consul. Sub-
ject's relations with the American Consul are apparently on ? firm basis
due to services rendered by subject to the Consul.
5. In view of recent developments in Algiers and the importanee
of this post, it is imperative that it be covered at once and this solu-
tion represents the most practical way of doing this with the minimum of
delay.
R. Boulton
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Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
holograph
Paragraph
Pnrfigrtlph
Paretraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Preliminary Groundwork.
Coverage of Arab Hationalist
Movements.
Coverage of The French Administration
Coverage of the D4aok 4orkot
Transactions In genuine and
Counterreit American paper
Currency and Uold.
Coverage or the Economic
My operating Procedure.
Improvement of Coverage.
Improvement of Servicing the
Gonoral Difficulties In the Pield.
Personal Difficulties In the Pleld.
Stranded Pamilies or Trench SI
Permonnel
Sitp..goa onn for the Future.
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hei,ort on Pield ActIvitton
l,rom my arrival in Alutopn tu Ontobor to my
dopnritmolyiyi l'or the landinv :::;outhern
Prance, I wmo (-mbar,* tn tocuvity tn the
course of which X hunt up a ,,,eneral inrormation
Cl ain in Al glet,s for the purpose of detecting, leaks
or information concerninp; contemplated operations,
nolo, when I bai:fin ntrvijit 1 work in December 10440
nnder the direction of Lnlond Polinds, I hnd n 1,00d
foundatIon on whicb to bel_in bulletin-. Mace the
of Ltio year when 1 rocelvod formal notice of
my trannfav on Ion t rrom ::;ecuriLy to A.11, iiorth Af-
rican L;octioh, bava devoted most. or lay efforts to
1)111101.hr my 0)1111115 mhd oxpandilhe my coverstre.
81nce the WO' 1011:3 Arab NatIonalint movements are
renewal ty cA?nn Llered the taint, Onit pr oh)
()PI , .1 rivon t.nom pnioptty thus ran. AB a
rosnl HOW 1.1 a 1)(181tioti whore L know at
lenot W:oan mn,....11 about Llie question PO do the
ivonch anLhorities nnd Lhero, in matters that must
inovitably coom to Choi!, attention sooner or later,
I am on the nvern.e, a ,00t.1 wOc:k ahead of Uham. On
the other hand, my eoveraPj) to still uneven among
Hie dIrterent r,roups, especially in their braLches
in the interior. Thin condition can be cleoren, mt
le,ot 111 Its brooder outlines, in another six months:
it lo only a matter of time. Tho American
60nern1 in AlEjers ban boon can inc', on mr,heavily a
late for informntlon rep,ardint7, the natives and the
'ipench Administration, and has expressed both com-
pleto satisfaction witn the help I have eriven him
thus far, and the aope that I will be able to carry
on no soon as posoible along the samo lines.
The trench Covernment in fortl, Africa is still in
Uhe 6tate of flux with mnny collaborationists and
opportuniats remaining in pow tip, lit pite or the
foot tnat it in dominated by men drawn fro;-1 tho tree
Pronoh. I hove establishoa contacts throwh vOhich
I am in extremely close touch wit the davolopmonts
in this quarter.
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Ono of Oteme men ahould be "open ,..that im, he should
make no attempt to conceal him #AildWiraa a represent-
ative or the American Uovernment and/or the Armed
Foroea, although hie oonnection with 032 might well
get the moft pedal. Some :sort of known official
conneotion ta easential, if only 40U door opener. I
believe that my preaent woAcfor 028 is quite unknown
to the French, who think I have been left behind to
clean -tp loose endm left by our departing any. The
aecond man ohould be obriotly undercover, either in
businona or in the oonaulate: it ahould be very advan-
tageoua to have both. All three should have their
Headquartera in Altera. One or two of theme men
ahould set up chains with nub-agenta or out-outx in
important soots o9t3ide the city of Algiers such aa
Blakra, Aumale, Med6a, Blida.
U. The other important improvement would conslat in
aetting up financial and aupply nervicea* upplIea
ohonld include ouch items as liquor, cigarettes,
clothing, flaahlight batteries, shoeo, etc., to be
umed as presents for people who cannot be paid in
money (as mont of mine cannot), aa well am the umual
office nupplien, UMW # automobile aocesoories,
electrio light bulba, etc. Some of the latter are
urieful alno at proaento, being unobtainable locally.
9. I wan aware of no diffioulties in the field from the
general 31 point of view, except that progress toward
a clear out program wail slow in Waahington, and I was
alowed up In proportion. Relations with the 0onsu1ate,
the Prench (both official and unoffiolal) and the
varioua Allied military establiahments were excellent,
with all cooperatino; to the fullest extent that could
ba reasonably expected.
10. My permonal difficulties were mostly financial. I
have received no pay ainoe September 1944, and only
000.00 in operational funda which were given me by
Leland Hounds. On this and my personal resources,
I have done the work above outlined and maintained
myself, my small office, a oar and a chauffeur (an
excellent man who bas worked for ua sine(' before the
lending in North Africa). Alao, I woe unable to
draw any army rations (except PX supplies) because
the military ooinnand forbade the opening of new
accounta at the ration break.
VI. A aerious problom exists in the form of wives and
ohildren of 110.,or;ts who remained when their husbands
were parachuted into France, and are still there.
Tho French Desk, 31, promised them that they would
be sent to Prance ns soon am possible arid that pay-
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ments to them would continue in the meantime. Pay-
ments were stopped as of 31 December 1944 by order
of Captain Crockett, acting on instructions from
Mr. Hyde through 2nd Lt., Sickle-1. However, the
women in question were never warned in advance no
were they ever told why it was done. Thus, they
find themselves high and dry and in exceedingly un-
friendly state of mind. I have reported this
situation to Captain Crockett, Mr. Hyde and Major
Crosby, but it's worth repeating so that steps can
be taken to avoid similar occurrences in the future.
12. In my point of view, we have gotten off to a very
good, if somewhat slow, start in Algeria. I would
recommend thnt we continue along the same lines with
improvements as outlined above. I believe that
quick action in speeding up the servicing of our
service there will pay dividends in proportion. It
would be helpful to know just how big a machine we
want to set up and how long we intend to keep it
running.
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try40600 PIM OA 04
-,0ffice Memorandum ? UNITED STATESC(Y1?11/1!:
GO ERNMENT
;AL
?
TO I Director of Strategic Bervicee
PROM Vial Chief, R Al A, and Mecretarilt rwrah 23 March 1944
?apt. William A. Salont (.0, a. f
supown Report on Pield Conditions
CY..? 44.ci trL
?enthral order No. 03t
The following report to submitted in accordance with
,4
1, neocri tam of Overlies* ssi nments. ? f 0-0
_
(a) Dates', P4 Nov 1042 - 20 Nov 1943.
Place: London, gngland
Assignment: Xnemy Objectives Unit (XOU),
Hoonomio Warfare Division, Ual. Malmsey.
DkaiORt Strategic Target Analysis for 8th A.A.P.
(b) Dateet 2 Dec 1043 31 Aug 1044, and
22 Sept 1044 ? 18 /Nob 1945.
Places La Maria, Tuniela, and Caserta, /tall.
Assignments Attached to Roadqt4rtera, Mediterranean
Allied Air POPOOS*
!MAASS: Strategic target analysis far MkAr and
15th A.A.P. Work included frequent
consultation with A-2, 15th A.A.P., analysis
or strategic targets and target systems,
direction, through intelligence requisi?
tions, or sourotho of primary intelligence
on atrategic targets (photo rem', prisonerm
of-lwAr interrogation, and oecret intelligence),
and liaison with XOU, London,
Dateot 1 Sept?21 Sept 1944,
Placot buchareet
Astagnmenbt OS$ R & A Intelligence gathering Um*.
Duties: Procurement of intelligence on bombing
of Ploesti oli refineries and other air
force operations in Rumania, and other
intelligence of operational value to
Allied military forces.
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Director of Strategic Services
23 March 1946
Page Two
2.
,
kpoki$ .
Conditionn in Pie/d.
Conditions in field were, in general, excellent,
and no improvemonts affecting operation of target analysis
groups aro suggested. Working relationn of those groups with
air forces in the theatre were close, harmonious, and mutually
beneficial.
With respect to other OSS activities in the theatre,
the writer in able to tentify from personal experience to
the validity of n principle that is already well known: that
activity of branches procuring military intelligence should be
genred an closely an possible to tile armed forces operating in
the theatre. In the field of strategic target intelligence,
as in other fields, the usefulness of an intelligence source
is immeasurably increased if the source receives adequate
direction and guidance. As members of OSS who make use, in
their daily work, of all types of target intelligence and are
thoroughly familiar with target intelligence requirements,
the target analysis groups have been in a peculiarly fortunate
position to submit requests to OSS intelligence sources and to
observe the results. They have been repeatedly impressed by
the superiority of directed over Undirected intelligence, and
by the improvement that was observed whenever a previously
undirected source received adequate briefing.
3. Specific Difficulties.
No speoiric difficulties were observed.
?41:-
CONCI1 r t%!T1AL
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Dirootor of Stratogic sorvioos
Tias Chief, RIs A, and Sscrotariat
Capt. William A. Salant
Report on rs?1d Conditions
amoral Order No. 63t
Ths following report is slubmIttod in accordenso with
1. Desert tion or Overseas ssi nts.
(a) Datoss 24 Rov 1942 - 28 Sow 19416
Places London, Ragland
Assignments Enemy Objootivos Veit
Romanlo Wartszbo Division, U.S. libaamy.
Duties*. Stratogia Tarot Analysis for 9th. Ao40.
(b) Detoss 2 Deo 1,45 - 31 Aug 1944, and
22 Sept. 1944 - 18 Pob 1.9454
Places La Varga, Tunisia, and Caserta. Italy.
Assignments Attached to Roadquarters, Roditommansam
Allied Air Par000.
Duties: Stratagic target anal Ws for MAP and
15th A.A.P. Work inoludod frequent
consultation with A-S, 15th A.A.F.4 analysis
or stratogic targets and systems.
dirootion, through.in'auximnes roquinis
if mires. of primary LntalltgOmlis
on strategis targets (phoWrooso,
*Sugar intorrogeticm4 ant "arab la
and liaison with Rafklienden.
Dates* 1 Sopt - 21 Sept 1944.
Places Busharest
Assignments ORS R A Intelligemoo gathering :kill.
Dutio?s Procurement or intolligonso cm hinhinig-
of Plooati oil refineries and other AAP
tore* operations 1,41 bawds's, smd ether
iatellisomso of operational wales to
Allied military formes.
CONFIDENTIM.
?Joe, .e.-5
SS Mari* 19411
( a )
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CONFEIENTIAI
Director of Strategic Services
23 March 1945
Page Two
2. Conditions in Pield.
Conditions in field were, in general, excellent,
and no improvements affecting operation of target analysis
groups are suggested. Working relations of the.. groups with
air forces in the theatre were close, harmonious, and mutually
beneficial.
With respect to other OBS activities in the theatre,
the writer is able to testify from personal experience to
the validity of a principle that is already well known: that
activity of branches procuring military intelligence should be
geared as closely as possible to the armed forces operating in
the theatre, In the field of strategic target intelligence,
as in other fields, the usefulness of an intelligeneo source
is immeasurably increased if the 'cures receives adequate
direction and guidance* As ambit* of 088 who make use, in
their daily work, of all types of target intelligence and are
thoroughly familiar with target intelligence requirements,
the target analysis groups have been in a peoullArly fortunate
position to submit requests to OM intelligence source to
observe the results, They have been repeatedly impreseid by
idle superiority of directed over tad/rested intelligenee, am*
by the improvement that was obeerVed whenever a previously
undirected source received adequate briefing.
3. Specific Difficulties.
No specific difficulties were observed.
CONFIDE
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fiThIOAND MOOMI Mk 04
? n.V.,?"On'IMIZIALIPIFe'lr.WrrPliPtrAtr*e11.
CONFIDENTIAL
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
I
Maj. Gen, William Donovan
Via: Dr. William A. Langer
Lt. (j.g.) B.M. Bowie
Report on Overseas Service
DATE: 20 March 1946
104 j 17
4,444. itf 41, e ''f
1. The following comprises an itinerary of my tour of duty
overseas, with description of the type of work performed at
each station:
1
A
(a) Arrived at Algiers, 8 December 1943. Was briefed
here for further duty in Italy.
(b) Arrived at San Severo, Italy, 27 December 1943, via
La Marsa in Tunisia. Was assigned to the Mediterranean Allied
Photo Reconnaissance Wing, the headquarters of which was at
San Severo, to act as a liaison officer between 033 and MAPRW.
My responsibilities were the coordination of air and ground
intelligence in an attempt to preclude OSS agents or other
informants risking their lives to get information more easily
and more accurately gathered by photo reconnaissance. I further
handled OSS requests for photo cover and saw to it that OSS
intelligence reached the proper persons engaged in photo inter-
pretation. This liaison work was substantially completed by
February 1944.
(c) Arrived in Caserta, 20 February 1944. Assigned to
the OSS group working in the target intelligence section of
the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, whose HQ wrs at Caserta.
Also did a certain amount of target work for SO on objectives
in Northern Italy. My main job, however, consisted of regular
airforce target analysis .gathering and interpreting secret
intelligence on airforce objectives, examining and "laying one
photo reconnaissance, and writing recommendations on target
priorities and policies.
(d) Arrived at Bari, 8 July 1944. This move was to join
the target analysis section of the 15th Airforce in Bari. The
work was very similar to that we performed at NAV, though on
a somewhat more operational level. Liaison continued to be
maintained with the other OSS nen at MU?.
(e) Arrived at Bucharest, 29 August 1944. This novo was
undertaken by me to: (1) gather target intelligence from German
and Rumanian documents; (2) interrogate German and Rumanian
prisoners and officials for target information; (3) examine
Ploesti and other airforce targets in Rumania for bomb damage
assessment; (4) assist in the evacuation of Allied airmen. As
CONFIDENTIAL
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???
MaJ. Gen.
0 March William Donovan
2 1945
Page Two
1lb
CONFIDENTIAL
I remained tn Rumania until February 1945, I als o do
o came t
a certain amount of political,reporting as well.
(f) Arrived in Washington, D.C., on 20 February 1945.
2. As to "conditions In the field that might be improved",
I have no rocommendationeKto make, since those with which I
1,448 MOSt immediately concerned were good. I was aware of a
certain amount of disorganization and confusion in silled fields
Of OSS work In Italy, but since I was not personally involved
in this work, but spent nearly all my time with the air forces,
I do not consider myself competent to make any analysis or
suggestions for improvement. The conditions of our work with
Amor, MAAF, and the 15th Airforce were always, physically and
socially, unexceptionable. In Bucharest, oSS conditions, morale,
and efficiency were generally high.
3. As to "specific difficulties encountered", X recall none
Of an organizational nature. I do not believe that the nature
or value of the work our group was doing with the air forces--
specifically, the achievements of Lt. Coombs, Lt. Derr, and
Capt. Salant--were ever either well understood or much appreciated
by the command in /taly; but at least we were allowed to operate
without interference or intrusion, Rnd In general were permitted
an unusual freedom of action which was both welcome and usefUl.
,
'Sor
B. M. Bowie,
USNR
CONFIDENTIAL
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.,, ;.
Maj. Geno William Donovan
Via: Dr. William A. Langer
Lt. (j.g.) B.M. Bowie
Report an Overseas Service
CONFIDENTIAL
....,04010?1,4100.41.
20 Misch 1946
1. The following comprises an itinerary of m/ tour of duty
overseas, with description of the type of work performed at
each station:
(a) Arrived at Algiers, 8 December 1943. Was briefed
here for further duty in Italy.
(b) Arrived at San Severe, Italy, 27 December 194$, via
La Mersa in Tunisia. Wes assigned to the Mediterranean Allied
Photo Reoonnaissanoe Wing, the headquarters of 'which was at
San Severo, to act as a liaison officer between 038 and MAPRW.
X/ responsibilities were the coordination of air and ground
intelligence in an attempt to preclude 088 agents or Other
informants risking their lives to get information more easily
and more accurately gathered by photo reconnaissance. I further
handled OSS requests for photo cover and saw to it that 088
intelligence reached the proper persons engaged in photo inter-
pretation. This liaison work was substantially oompleted by
February 1944.
(c) Arrived in Caserta, 20 February 1944. Assigned to
the OSS group working in the target intelligence section of
the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, whose HQ was at Caserta.
Also did a certain amount of target work for SO an objectives
in Northern Italy. My main job, however, consisted of regular
airforce target analysis gathering and interpreting secret
intelligence on airforce objectives, examining and *laying on*
photo reconnaissance, and writing reoommendations on target
priorities and policies.
(d) Arrived at Bari, 8 July 1944. This move was to join
the target analysis section of the 15th Airforce in Bari. The
work was very similar to that we performed at MAAF, though on
a someWhat more operational level. Liaison continued to be
maintained with the other 035 men at MMF.
(e) Arrived at Bucharest, 29 August 1944. This move was
undertaken by me to: (1) gather target intelligens. from German
and Rumanian documents; (2) interrogate German and Rumanian
prisoners and officials for target information; (3) examine
Ploesti and other airforce targets in Rumania for bomb damage
assessment; (4) assist in the evacuation of Allied airmen. As
? "*.441011.0.?
CONFIDENTIAL
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Decla_ased and F.
to
Maj. Oen. William Donovan
20 Marsh 1946
Page Two
V1D
I remained in Rumania until Pebruary 1946, I also cams to do
a mortain amount of political;reporting as will.
(f) Arrived in Washington, D.C., on go February 1048.
2. As to "conditions in the field that might be improved",
I have no recommendations to make, mina* those with which I
was most immediatoly concerned sere good. I was aware of a
certain amount of disorganization and confusion in allied fields
of OSS work in Italy, but sinos I was not personally involvod
in this work, but spent nearly all my time with the air torsos,
I do not oonsider myself compstent to mak* any analysis or
suggestions for improvemont. Tho conditions of our work with
MAPRW, M&A?, and the 18th Airforce were always, physically and
socially, unexcoptionablo. /n Duaharost, 053 conditions, morale,
and efficiency were gonerally high.
3. As to "specific diffiouItios encountered", I reoall none
of an organizational nature. / do not bolieve that the nature
or value of tho work our group was doing with the air foreeo--
specifically, the achievsments of Lt. Coombs, Lt. Derr, and
Capt. Salantw-wore ever either well understood or mneh approciatod
by tho command in Italy; but at least we were allowed to operate
without intorforionco or intrusion, and, in general were permitted
an unusual freedom of action which was both welcome and useful. 1
8. U. EWK 0
Lt. (j.10,4) WAR
*
CONFIDENTIAL
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Maj. Gen. William Donovan
Via: Dr. William A. Langer
tit. D.M. Bowie
Report on Overseas Serviee
CONFilfdi u.
20 *welt 10411
1. The following comprises an itinerary of my tour nf duty
*wormiest with description of the type of work performed at
each station:
(a) Arrived at Algiers, 0 Deosober 194$. Was briefed
here for further duty in Xtaly.
(b) Arrived at San Severe, Italy, 27 Deeember 1943, via
La Maras in Tunisia. Wes assigned to the Mediterranean Allied
Photo Reoonnaissance Wings the headquarters of *thigh was at
San Soveros to act as a liaison officer between 038 and WM.
mr responsibilities were the coordination of air and !;:r
intelligence in an attempt to preclude 088 agents or
informants risking their lives to get information more easily
and more accurately gathered by photo reeonnaissanse. I tr
handled 058 requests :or photo cover and saw to It that 088
intelligence reached the proper persons engaged in photo inters,
pretation. This liaison work was substentially sompleted by
Pebruar/ 1944.
(c) Arrived in Caserta, 80 Pebruary 1944. Ass to
the OSS group working in the target intelligenee seotien of
the Mediterranean Allied Air Perm's, whose HQ was at Caserta.
Also did a certain amount of target work for 80 on objectives
in Northern Italy. main job, however, consisted of regular
airforce target analysis gathering and interpreting secret
intelligence on airforee objectives, examining and "laying ose
photo reconnaissance, and writing recommendations on target
priorities and policies.
(d) Arrived at Darts 8 July 1944. This neve was to join
the target analysis section of the 16th Airforce in Mari. The
work was very similar to that we performed at MAY, though on
a somewhat more operational level. Liaison oontinued to be
maintained with the other OSS men at MAP.
.410
-
(e) Arrived at Bucharest, 29 August 1944. This neve was
undertaken by me tot (1) gather target intelligens* from Oarsmen
and Rumanian doeuments; (2) interrogate German am* Rummell*
prisoners and officials for target inforttonJ (8) examine
foloesti and other airforce targets in Rumania for bomb awes,
assessment; (4) assist in the evacuation or Allied sinless, AS
CONFIDENT,
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Maj. Oerk?Mauls I novan
90 March 1946
Page Two
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060u04-Li
CONRINTIAL
X remained in Rumania until Mobruary 1946, I also oame to do
a oortain amount of politioal.reporting as well.
(f) Arrived in Washington, P.0** on 90 robruary 1049.
2* As to "conditions in the field that might be improvoe,
I have no reoommandations to make, sinoo thesis with whish 1
was most immodiately oonoorned were good. X was aware of a
certain amount of disorganisation and contusion in allied fields
of 003 work in Xtaly, but sin.* I was not personelly involved
IA this work, but spent nearly all my time with the air forum,
I do not consider mysolf oempotent to mak* any analysis or
suggestions for improvement. The conditions 0 our lork with
WNW, UAA10, and the lith Airforso were always, physioa117 and
socially, unomeptionablo. Xs* Dueharest, 08S oonditions, morale,
and offiolonoy were amorally high.
3. As to ssposifio diffloulties onoountore0, I recall none
of an organisational nature, X do not believe that the nature
or Talus of tho work our group was doing with the air forces***
spoolfloally, the aohievements of Lt. Combs, Lt. Darr, and
Capt. Salantemiwore *vow either well understood or mush approotatod
by the oommand in Xtaly; but at least we were allowed to egoists
without interforesum or intrusion, and in moral were pormitted
an unusual froodom of action which was both woloome and usoftle
11.1 U. Bowie,
Lt. (i.840 tm
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irtArowiretriroogm P.n. 14
ce Memorandum
TO
PROM :
^ 4MVMPlit
?
CONFIDENTIAL
? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
/oft:
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
via Dr. William L. Langer and Secretaria
Wilfred MalenbaumAst_
' t?.
1r - ? .1- A 4,
SUBJECT: Report on Field Trip - 14 December 1944-11 February 1945
(Prepared in conformance with General Order No. 63 Revised,
14 March 1945)
A. This trip was undertaken to facilitate R & A activi-
ties overseas in the field of food and aEriculture and to improve
the effectiveness of the use of material in this field in operating
programs to which R & A contributes in Washington. This mission
was advocated by MP. H. W. Parisius, Director, Office of Food Pro-
grams, PEA; it was also supported by officials in WSA and UNRRA.
Its specific objective was to consult with various G-5 groups
operating in the field, to indicate to them the kinds of information
needed for operating purposes in Washington; to arrange for coordi-
nated work by American personnel, of whatever agency, in order to
improve the reporting and servicing in the food and agricultural
field.
My time was spent in the following ways:
1. 15 December-31 December -- London: working with
US Group CC and the Combined Working Party. While there I prepared
a preliminary appraisal of the 1944-45 crops and food prospects for
European countries on the basis of all information available to all
research groups, US-UK and other governmenta (in London).
2. 1-5 January; 9-12 January -- Paris and V,..sailles:
In consultation with G-5 SHAEF (Main), G-5 Com Z, British, French,
and US agricultural, food and shipping officials. Avrangements were
made for continued coordinated reporting on current French food de-
velopments.
3. 6 January-8 January -- Brussels: in consulta-
tion with G-5 SHAEF, Belgian Mission: Belgian, British, Dutch ag-
ricultural officials. Material was collected here for the prepara-
tion of an analysis of the current Belgian food and agricultural
prospects; similarly for Holland. Arrangements were also initiated
for continued reporting for general ftshingcon availability of cur-
rent food and agricultural developments.
4. 14 January-24 January -- Rome, Caserta, and
Naples: in consultation G-5, AFHQ; Agricultural and Food Subcommi-
sions, ACC; Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Food, Italian
Government; UNRRA officials. These discussions covered problems of
jood and agriculture in Italy and all the Balkans. Arrangements
CONFIDENTIAL
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Were made for currant coverage of developments in these rields in
Italy, particularly non-liberated Italy, and in the various Balkan
countries. Preparation was made for sending certain personnel into
the Balkans to facilitate in this assignment.
5. 25 January-29 January -- Nancy and Epinal: in
consultation with 0-5, Third and Seventh Armies. Discussions in-
volved civilian supply programs in areas In Southeastern France and
in preparation for the program in Germany. Arrangements were made
for flow or material via Paris to London and Washington.
6. 29 janunry-3l January Paris: completed dis-
cussions with General Scowden and the US Embassy officials for col-
lection and flow of material.
7. 1 February-0 February London: reporting on
observations and accomplishments to OSS, WSA, UNRRA, and MEA. nis-
cussions with British and American agencies on continuation of Com-
bined Working Party program; arrangements with US Group and UK
Group CC for use of additional professional personnel in this field
to be supplied by OSS and Fn.
B. On the trip, I noted no conditions in OSS that might
be improved, nor was I aware of specific difficulties. It should
be pointed out that the bulk of my time was spend away from OW
establishments.
G
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CONEDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C
Tot General William J. Donovan , Director OB5
, ?
I
y .1Aft
II April 1945
Thrus Deputy Director Services & Chief Finance Branch
From, Frank P. Bishop, Chief Civilian Personnel & Fiscal Soction,ETO
The following report is submitted in accordance with instructions
contained in General Order 63 issued 14 March 19451
Writer has been serving in the capacity of Chief of the Civilian
Personnel and Fiscal Seotions ETO sinoe April 1944, Responsible
for maintainenoe of voucherod funds a000unts and budgetsecertifioation
and expenditure of vouchemd funds, and handling of civilian personnel
and related activities in the ETO.
In performing above duties writer has experienced excellent 000perOdon
and valuable guidance from the ETO Services Offioer, Personnel Officer,
and Special Funds Officer, and satisfactory cooperation from 1mmnek
Chiefs and Branch Administrative Officers in ETO.
Finance
VEW-WiT4ice,cooperation and guidance reoeived from the Washington
Finance Branch ham befm matinfactory in every respect. Routine
fiscal matters have been handled effioiently and on a ourrent
basis and this Branch has been prompt and oonsidorato in answering
correspondence and giving decisions and advice whenever problems
were preeentod.
Personnel
tri7Tairibout three months ago some difficulty was exporionood in
the ETU in connection with routine matters pertaining to oivilian
personnel, duo primarily to the slowness of the Washinston office
in takins actions, and the apparent lack of 000rdinstion between
civilian and military personnel activities. Since the establish-
ment of the present Personnel set-up coordinating military and
civilian personnel activities the situation has improved and it ...
believed that At present civilian personnel problems are being
acted upon currently and satisfactorily.
Detailed problems pertaining to finance and civilian personnel
activities in the ETO have been previously set forth in periodic
semi-monthly reports from the theater. All pending problems have
been discussed with the interested officials during my stay in
Washington.
CONFADENTIAL
? ;,
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is felt that conditions in the ETO might be improved by,
1. Establishment of ETO budget ?oiling' oovering operations
in the theater during the fisoal year 1045-46.
2. Establishment of a conmistent classification system in
ETO for civilian and military personnel.
3. Continued review and analysis of p.rsonnel requirements
in the ETO to obtain better utilisation of manpower and
Physical facilities, with a view to releasing personnel
and equipment for use in other theaters.
4. Close liaison 1.4th U.S. 4mbas5ies and Legations in
allied, liberated and neutral coubtries on matters
Pertaining to civilian affairs with a view to stabilising
and strengthening the position and assuring the status of
the OSS as a oftillan agency.
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.41KAW4grafOgOts-1,201,kftts,r1.4.,,..4.141., T?stsitiOdlleltrnir;
DAM 1 Aim 190
Secretariat - Reports Off ii.
Returnee Reports
1. From April to November 1944, traimer amd organiser
of SI field detachments for the First and Third.Aries amd the
12th Army Group, and worked with the Fremiii, Belgian, and Out&
Intelligence Services.
2. Suggests a table of organisation for collecting,
Strategic Intelligence at Army Group and Army *levels.
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Pield Report . Major Trafford
A copy, of tho attached report by Major Klots has
been brought to tho attontion of Lt. Comdr. McBaine,
Acting Divisional Deputy, Par East, SI, with the thought
that certain of Major Klots' suggestions may be of
interenting value to our ort7anization in the Far East.
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Tho attmosed flold report from Major Trafford
P. Klets oontains several exeellent suggestions. It
ii reoommended that Sootion3 Pap 8. be given
serious oonsidaration with the end in it,, of
adopting the suggestions. Booties lo Page So pertain-
ing to a suggested T.O., 400114 to MO to be a workable
idea.
Attaohmont
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_
WW.?04.1,,Att:
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WAOHINOTON SO,
Major Trafford P. )(lots
1. On Ail PI 1 1t.1 1
to join the) ui iici Detachment
Virdt JJir *MI itndr the 004111011d
loft the 1st Infantry Livision
thot was to be attoched to the
of Lt. Co]. Downs.
AlY rirnt esmioment woo the troinink, and organi-
sation ot. Viola Deteobments ror First Army, Third Army, and
Twelfth Army aroup. On May 16, 1944 the First Army Unit wen
roody and the lieteohment reportod to the 0-2 yir at Arm et
Hristol. On D plus 3, the morninb or Juno 9th, the advent,e
perty, oonsistin4 of Lt. Cu.. Downs, myself and two enlisted
men, landed on Omaha Deaoh. This advence party was tar too
small to s000mplish the various types of intellionoe work
demanded. This small $1 deteohment spent the majority of its
time dsoodinE OUS0eX messages instoed of conteotin6 and working
with the Fronoh Underground. Presnuro wen brought to bear on
Col. Dicknon end the remeindor of the ootoohmont joined us
inolnuing the French liaison orrioftr, who would have been of
6reet nee hod he boon with us initially.
norore the breakthrou4h many *onto were put
throuGh Om linen, but duo to the tiGhtnoss or the front, great
diffioulty WAS enoonntered end little intelli?.,enoe was gathered
by thiu meonn. The Army. Corps, and Division 0-10s were
extremely anxious to 6et enemy information in a AORO approxi-
mately forty miles to their imadieto front. As we were getting
little intelligenoe from the infiltration of ag.tits, a pla*
we nubmitted and agreed to by the London ?Moe that OM *6011t
be dropped in the violoity or Avranols.e (Normandy) to orgwaiso
members of the underground to oxfiltrate through our lines,
Approximately five of these soonts came through the avatar
where Lho breakthrough was to be, and their information MS
of tho tyeetont value AN the limed foroes at thkt time had
practioelly no intellionoa to speak of on this Zone.
11;7;1'2 ? z.1...t ri A nnrrluPd For Release 2013/09/2 . CIA-
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It is my opinion that If a front Is tight end hae
been stable for sow, time eafiltrstion id the only aeons to
gather intelligence needed by tho An in this foortreille Ofte
Just beforo the breakthrough Mejsr Gale of thi Piro*
Infantry Division (now with Cas organisation) aekei Col. Deans
and myself for * terrain study 'Led any egaillf Latorwatiem we oeuld
give the First Division on the Coutauosi arose ?Wows. a rusk
order as the attack was soheeuled the tollowing morniamp With
the help of two Frenoh ()Moore this information was obtained
by interrogating civilinns who had Just 'eft this ores. The
terrain study and the enemy information which nes gathered was
placed on a map. These documents were immedi*tely ru$hed to
the First Division and oame out in the First Division 0.4 periedis.
Cols Diokson thought this periodio such ? fine eomple of Intel-
liGenoe that he sent it to Leavenworth as an example. The !first
Diyision felt that this information conttibuted muoh to the
success of ths breakthrough.
On August 2nd the Field DotcohmeLt was withdraws
from First Army and attaohed to Twelfth Army Group. I mmained
with the Detachment until November 12. During this.period the
Detachment put *gents through' the lines and worked with the
French, Belgian and Dutoh Intelligence Bervioes.
2. On our return to Paris complete history of the
Field Detachment wuo written by Col. Do4n5 and myself and sub-
mitted to Co],. Bruce in Puris.
3. I am submittine, the following suggestions.
a. Members of any resistance groups in
foreign countries should not be allowed to come out
in the open. This epplies espeoiolly to leaders of
the realstanos movements wearing urm bands. 00., as
their services an be of grout assistnnce to this
organisation again. On certain occasions these
leaders who hnve organised the looal underground
could be used in operations behind enemy limes in
re-organizing units which have been broken off due
to military oper*tions from their main ohannel of
oommand. Men of this calibre are rare and it takes
many we to train this type of personnel.
b. Army channels should be strictly adhered
to, under no donditions should 088 personnel be allowed
to go to lower units without permission of 04 at the
Proper echelon.
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Declassified arycl.ear14\4171FoovrRelease 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R00,0100060004-4
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Tot Diractori
Proms George L. Piday
Subject: Field Report.
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fraleptierrossowsk.
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On June 22nd, 1944 I left Washington for Cairo. While wait-
ing for transpormation at the Port of Embarkation, (18 days) my
orders had been changed to Italy. Arrived there on July 10th,1944,
reporting at OSS mile at Caserta. After ten Days Mr. Warner, Chief
of MO, sent me over to Rome. I stayed there 8 days, after which I
was sent to MO-Bari, reporting to Capt. Fielding, who assigned ma
to the Hungarian desk.
My job was to keep ()lose liaison with MB, Hungarian Section,
and to attend the weekly rumor meetings, also to submit our own
rumors to the board. At those meetings the rumors were chocked and
discus:led individually, and the ones which passed the board wore
sent to London for dissemination. I do not know what methods were
used to got the rumors in to the respective countries. However one
thing was evident, the rumors hit the spot. The Hungarian news-
papers were screaming their heads off, cautioning and threatening
the population not to listen to or beligv, in those rumors. It is
my firm belief that rumors are one of the best MO weapons; it is
easy to get one started from a neutral country or by agents inside
in the enemy oountry and has a very damaging effect on the army
and on the civilian population.
End of August MO-Cairo moved to Bar,Mr. John Vistore taking
over MO-Bari. With him came Mr. 40111 1U44,r, who was the head of
I
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The attached report of Sjahotm is, on-the, ivfi,C149
accurate. BUt it ie not "puffed'Up" or too pictureevelsi
Aotival4 Sjaholn provided kind 'of "cover"
-
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vhieh others Could ,operate; under? Thereforojaholm
did more than be kneor oould hive known. Our,type of
work and our pattern of contacts necessitated close and
intimate ro/ationshlp .with Swo&Ash ,and refugee labor
on a
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I hare recently returned tree Sweden whore 7 W6itesidiaw'ai
for the Labor Division, SI, since 7uli19431 ripailr
on my activities, progruct of Wurtifind-"iiiiticiie forliiprowargitii
the field.
FIELD ACTIVITIES:
I contacted-Sweieh labor graWand refeas'4.?triadeinistojteem
occupied and enemy ocUitries: I attendeileboroEjItjj Of the' ,
various Swedish labor unions and also attended regular eesalmsofthe
local labor meetings; Alta SpOikOr agony international meetimis-4144i
with others, usually trades-unionist refhgees; acted4ellster Of '
Ceremonies at several Swedish labor celebrations.- I Met 'mod dined with
Sweden's top governmental officers, including the 'Prismelliadatirt inter-
viewed and was entertained by Madame Kollantey, Reislan Anbeseadreee
Sweden; and was entertained it the home of the Osedhoilowak Manlater to
Sweden, Dr. Vladimir Kuoera. I represented the Uhlted States Mallow
Labor at the Swedish, Quadrennial Convention Which had aa4,te
Norwegian, Danish, Finnish delegates.
I maintained an apartment in Stockholm, whichwas the nesting plaeo
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON. D. C.
Strategic
3,1 &haat
Field Clonditlice
or rather one of the meeting places for agents worlds& tor,114,uto,w11,doh
material wns delivered and sent oat. Meetihgo of foroigs rofOloole
held here; and Swedish labor and political leaders were eatertataed hero.
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,
There is attached the field report subaitted by
Frederic* J. Otaider oft his activities la Owitsericad.
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?
Report mubmited by Fradoriok J. Staldor
Thh attaohod field report, mubmitted L; Frederiok J. 3taidor
,
i te an abridged a000urit or tVis individuall* bxtremely via.
uable aotivitlea in Switzorlard, ro did not feel *t 111,,orty to ro
into chit .1 without porminmion of him immediate Walt, 110.
Re WAR the finnan(' OSS roprs?entative, under Stat* Department
00vor4 Lo oporal,e in Perna, Speaking German )1ke a native, and
prenoh and Ituhan with fitenoy, he worked ror mono than two year'
ao Chief of the Code room at Porno in additlon to handling numerou.
0 *rent gontaoto. uo Wfiff 4100 reloponalb)e for the 000r4ination of
wor2c and preparinr many 0 me5wea.
Pia ountribotiona
"invaluable",
to 03$ o1er*tiou been dn k---
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SECRET
10 April 1046
TO4 Pr, B. H. Hall
1.%,*.V4 Frederick J. Stalder
A
6t1t)Wri Activity Report of Frederick J. 15falder
from Auguat 6, 3942 to Arell 13, 146.
Upon arrival in Bern, Switzerland on Augumt b. 1942, I reported
to ivr. Charles B. Dyer, Financial Attaoh4. Until the middle of November,
when 110 arrived, we two were the only OS$ employees in Barn and did all
the coding and handling of infornation, Shortly after llOts arrival, we
moved to a new builditg shared by OWI and engaged local help., Fly that time
my aotivitiem extended to oontAmting peraonal agents,and noding and ebstraets
Ing ST information. Permanent agents were emtablishod in various othor
Swiss cities und I acted as liaison man between Bern and the sgente, These
eotivitios 0011t1ritled with omphatis on Battle Order information until tho
middle of 1043, v4.en the coding problem became very *outgo for look of Alf-
flotort personnel. 110 was finally able to obtain four interned medioal
flier& torethor witl one American medical studert (Frederiek S. Caftan),
to whom I Ylould turr over all the co r:.) work and norcentrate upon our various
eontaotsand ahstreotinr Ratt]c Order information. In view or my knowlscito
or the local languapes, l also handled all the administrative and person:291
problems in conrnotion with our offloo. .
Surrlierizirr hy activities up to the time of my departure to
USA, 310 considered me as Battle Order expert and Administrative Offi(...4,,
also using we for special secret miseloAs from time to time,
athere whatever duties 110 will assign tO Me.1j4expecte d to returr to Pern shortly after May lb and resure
SECRET
'WM
4
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Kr. Reser Nall, ohlof of SI-
French Desk, has copy of report
in his file and will send
additional oopy te 101.
Office of the Secretariat
Reports Off toe
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8818 Detachment la its work.
? ,..x ?NaVtits lw INviiszeft,144k04,-4 41A+f,a4d-Mk is ,
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sirfmosmommosmukft
DATNI
stiaji1CTI
t; nit Cond I Lionn. ntibfattted
Lt. Nil Liam nufr
It ejArtifl W8 pinfistArm to transmit uodoat and valuable
report by an able yottnG orfLoor who oontributed grof4tly
to the nu000nn of' the 41i ;:ss Town.
A oopy c.q' thin raport lug) been havariled to 00101101
(iambi?, tt olv ha n been nont to TA. Con:dr. Potter, OBS
Ilintory f;ootton, and ft oopy hnn N.on brought to 1.he attffn.
tionP Lt. Onniclre Yloi3t.tne9 with the thon,-,.ht that hi. Dufffn
analynia will be of value
akttaohuent
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON SS, D. C.
' Attached is a rather lengthy but highly
interesting field report from Ind Lt. Willimn Duff.
It is quite evident that Lt. Duff has kiddies his
own ?amendable operations, and has leaned over
baokwards in an effort to turn in an umblased report.
has not attempted to color successful operationas
neither does he drag red herrings across failures.
The final paragraphs on Page 23 should net
be allowed to go unheeded.
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44
Report on tho 45 Div S$S team A'
eetacv*e.c..
/
,
There Is f? ?Of
attached for the attention of yourself, Comdr. Potter,
Col. Gamble and Vaj. Crosby a report on the activities of the
45th Div SSS team. SiLce it has been writton
mem-
ory it may contain several inaccuracies as to dates but it-is
believed, apart from this, to be reliable.
Emphasis has been placed on an analysis of methods employed rather
than upon the enumeration of places, people and events because it 0
is believea that some records already exist of the latter and that
the former will prove more useful to you.
Should the approach adopted be unsatisfactory it will
ated if you will indicate what additional information
and an effort will be made to supply it without delay.
;?.$,,r?
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,a4411/WAWOONWITLIKCItS6721V,A1,0111,41*W
II - Vethods or gathering information
A - Diescmination and Recruiting
Civilian reconnaiusanov
0 - Chains
E - Additional servioes rendered to
III - Examploa or aunceserul oporations
A - Civilian reoonnaissanoe
A - Radio lino-tapping teams
11 - Individual Arent with small
et
V - (3orman oomLat intolligonce activity in the
seotor
VI - Suvreated relation of $SS Activities with Army G.2
VII - Eva3uation or Team's work
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,".!0?4: ?
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irMth,VIAM-4tatrA131:1Mwe-Pm?.,4?715-$,,,,.,,,
OSNERAL OfllioNOLWICAL WiTARY
The Yediterranean invasion of Frame took place on 16 August
)944, with some of 7th Army 0-2 910 personnel lanlinr, on D-1411. A
short time afterward tho polioy was put into effeet of aosigning on
SSS team to each Div 114 rather than one large tear ts Aroy B140.
The first tear chief assigned to tho 46th Div was Frank 3ohooss.
maker, who WRR aiied by Lt. Wither+ Fitzgerald, Sgt. Peter Hoguet,
FPI U. Gaston Roux, Anne Wade Ribaud Lnd Gilbert Pierrel.
tr. Sohoonmaker was relieved at Grenoblo about 2/' August 1944
by Dewitt Clinton, who wits assisted by Sgt. Hoguet, Cpl. William
Clark, Pvt, John Ffoulke, two radio operators and myself, along with
French personnel including. Lt. Roux, Vile. Ribaud, Dominique Porghi?
Tony, Lucius Men' and Roger Yloolay.
Upon VI-. Clinton's departure for the ,Wttes, about 1 Oat 1944,
when the team was based at pial, I took chaly,e, sssisted,at various
times, by Lt. Uoguet, Cpl. Clark, Romeo Paloguer, Captain Robert
itrux (formerly of SFU4), Sgt. 1,arvin Gellis (also from 3FU4), LUOIAID
Nastman, Ensign John Garnett, Pvt. Samuel roleto and two radio opor%.
&tors, French personnel working with the team at this time included
inet (Andre Peau), Lt. Roux, Plle Ribaudo Annie Thinesse, Pornerd
Gout, Ginnette, louts henta, tarcol, Jaoquel, Gilbert PiArrrel, Holloott,
Denise Boileau, Joby, marruerite Tousaaint, Simoneolirard do Pallet
and Andre Petronat.
?
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Aftor 11 Po4 1?;(01, wholn I Wk. WOUTOftd# (OrsTmtictr be the tOOM
);"4140d to Dont Putrldx,wh oorriol on with Mgt. Gellia, Pvt. Poleto,
noguet, r,Ltotmon witi some of the FreTioh personnel lilted in
tho praosding nerArroph, The t4Am woo finally OssOval *bout IS
Oth Div SU hello woo uau lly looetod nom. the Div OP but apart
from it, Oonbeot with Div 104 meintainod through a pormenont liaison
offioer from the tom, who 1ive6 et the Div ON This position was held,
at yellows timos, by Lt. lloguet. Unsign Oernott? Yr. Wastmen end sr.
self. Aftor Oronoblo tha SOVIi WKS based suooessively at Uumm.les-
V000lours, Vorool, Romein, lit. Loup, Xertigry, Npinal, Ougnteeourt,
nodwanil-Ansis end tha Vormo de Orammont, beer Moos.
rot, rollowinr to e-groet extent tha movamonts or the 45th Div OP and
lotor thot of tho 100th Div.
tcNT1OD4 OF OAT1INRINI IVFORATIOV
4 =IMMIX i',Arinki OPM01111.11
Up to al)out 1 Oot 1044 the team gatherod information :rom many
souroos, inoluding the qivilians, the Frenoh end Wee 314 the
fiORA end our OWP operetions, anksubmitted it 144) Div 0.2 with the ovum
indioskted but under the U33 letterhead. Jator this dote, at the perti-
nent ourgostion of Capt. Austin Greene, chief ot the 34th Div 3$4 teem,
who h*d * ohorb time before been Wooly shamed with submitting /11040
ourAto informetion about Germen ertillery strength in his ***ter. the
polioy woo Adopted of submitting under our lettirrhead only ist?rakti418
reoeivod from our own agents. This polioy grextly improved theAmality
?
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4,r
, ."tPiPt
4
Of our information and its prelatic? with Div.
:
I .
. ' ?,,,tt ? -???
?
4/Mt 1 r011 trout .8,14/:
The team's rooruiting WAR done el
mol_ .
who had workod with tho.orgamisation before the 1.,4j, or *POD U 1.
T'
longing to the resistatoe groups. Plve types of pireonsel sm.
,
,
,orultods
,
1 . Guides or.passeurs, who lived near the looalitythromek-
*doh tho operation was to se . ose agento. oithor_moi or
,
women, who sometimes owned Lend on the front linos, know
:tt
ovary foot of their sootor and were able to arose it
ilsafe4
...4A
even under diffioult oonditione.
,
,
2 - Radio nonsurs. The teem po11oy wasii for oeourity.reaeone, H WI
InvOMMI
:
to send radios aoross the lines apart from the ngents who '
Wt e to operetta them. Thi, neoessitated a passeur as.in,(1)i
but who we strong enough ,ndqourageous enough to Garry 48_,,
lbs, of hot equiment to a safe house well within Germnn ter,
ritory.
Pausseuro. or agents who were equipped to provide tali, idea...
tity papers to other agents and pesset,rs.
4 - Agents. Thema were trained in gntelligenoe obsorvatioe oval.,
motion end reporting and possessed in addition a hatritd at
the Germans and a flair for their speoial typo er work.
6 - Other Frenoh personnel who aided in reoruitin;. building ap
I system of safe houses and atl! or in,t4e-,414:
administration of thq tio4M,
_
44-
4b.
1;;..1eNe, q741i'
_
)
? ;_ -
j -7'3 -
(
. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
?
33'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
piv. 0U) ond (g) were (Illy temporerily etteehed
to tho Loom, hoosume their noefulnoe. endol with the liheretion nt their
l000lity. Tho otherq won) mord? or 1044 parmanontly attoohed to tho
Servioo with bho ook:, Cor kross). papp2.50., ilf4,4, an 4 voluntary
is. No solary or honuo, othor Lhan WrOn4444 W4d 10400 4,
tIMO Or 0104gomenb, bt w4vh tbo work o he tooth hail been eempleted.
bonuses wers distributed in proportion to the usonaness of the wort por-'
formed by 040 individual, It is believed that this policy did mmoh
oliminote the dongor of double Agents and of faloe information whioh
might have boon oubmittod 4044 in tho hope of a stipend,
eivilion Reconn Jomonoe
This Witti Oft V1r4 knd oimploot mothod of operation, Zn s000rdenee
withs dirootive issued to tho tby Div 0-11 an anent W44 4010 on foot
to oro oo tho ]lnss And roturo with tho naoossor information In time fOr
* ?
it to ho uoe/U1 to the Army* Ahbough this southod At timss rovo rood
rosults it olIsn provod to he unnsossoorIly clangorous end. espeelelly
durinp our rapid advonoe from 4411 Tropos to Upinol, too olww?
Finding A bolo ln the linos woo one of tho moot diffioult and le*
portant parts of thin or any 0th or method omployed by the team. Al the
first *top in thio'pr000so a +duly %AO mad* of tho oltuation mope ei
Olv 0.4 to dtiocvor 4 seetor *tore activity W44 apt to be slight, mesh
is on 4 QOPM41) divisionol boubdory, Location. of minefloads amd herbed
wire wero noted and 411 effort was made to pootulate where the Norma**
might have plowed other suoh obstsol?s. it postale eeetor appeal%
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
%,40.1441,.
- ,5tymErt..0.comettprrt5g-Ert. Tra9.11V, V7. TIFIVIttm
0.1
Russian troops was chosen,
were then made to Regt and
h guide was then found who
oross it. This was usually done by recruiting a eivilian who had re-
oeutly come from Uormat 000upied territory, who often had himself *owe
very good tips on safe route across the lines, or by getting in touch
with the local resistanoo organisations. As final ?heck the team kept
in contact with other Combat intelligence organisations in the seater,
such as the other G-2 SSS teams, Co]. 9ooth's BORA team and Capt. Rage's
SR team to find out where they had been successful in running ope. After
following this procedure we were reasonably certain of having found a good
spot for a passage of the lines.
for they proved easier to penetrate. Visits
Bn CO* to study in detail the likely seater.
know a desired sector and who was willing to
False documents were provided for agents if necessary. These were
made by the team fassour if they purported to be from a German occupied
town or, if for liberated territory, by the local authorities. They 00MP
silted usually of cartes dlidentito and certificate de travail. In some
oases arrangements were made for a mayor in occupied territery to deliver
to the agent a eertificat de rlisidence for his term, to be nied in eon.
junction with a arte dlidentite issued in liberated terrttory.
wars1M.S?????? ,N.O.1???501.?.**rat4( 4.1??????
Passeurs and guides were given little briefing. They were 14014 to
observe carefully, report aeourately and let the team drove its ewn ewe.
elusions as to what had been observed. Agents, however. were embjeete
to an intensive course of study in reoognising German Army uniforms. units.
and equipment, especially artillery and tanks. They undoretood the 'OAP_
SEORET
40, . ?
..ticaotic4.4.5f.f.mOggec
$5%
'V !?.s!, .
:,41. ?
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
- ' , f
-
Of a 64PMan infantey diVisidn and wipt'e trell advainted with etkpatWitdihg
and the lute or doofdinates ih t'epOrtint6
4Ptet findifir a pasicage in the lineti rectuitihg) doei*Ohting 101,4
briefing the agentS) the OHbler t*Oltitihe,, Of hinnihg the OhOPitiOh
emodthly and tafelyi The beet plan Poi4 doing thit *te Pfthd tie be ad
PoiloWse Di* R41 wns notified of the intended operatiOni giieh the th0h*.
tit of the aget a concerned And the eegialehtal Seeto te be Uteri,' At
trty sugueetidn Div IN adopted the policy, khont 2t. Odt offi I:saving b. OAS
eh onerationi to be delitrefed by a teah hehber tb the Tito 41=2
thfourh
who tedtOf the ope,fation mie to pasts this policy efteeti*Oiy
dohthilled the humeroue *ildcat OneratiOns whid4 ha' forerivJey bOeh fdh by
k vilde Vafiety of individnals okha Whidh had been ft nenaCe to teetiFitys
Frtt Di* Al the planning- of the op as takehi durihg the hOwee or diqw.
light to rito and platoon, and at each leirei-kdditiona) ihrdeMiSs
tion waa obtained concething the State of the Pf.ont and feeent ktti*itstf
thet-e, A tendee,vOUt *ROI Stranged with the PiatdOn ddriSrandei., gnt1 itb,
Per Aohe tihe late ih the aPterneoh of the same de:y th- de *as thoh
tkkeh difectly to the tibei kt thekg.reed tit*h thiis ictibitiihit his
preSenee at Many Of Oti ce cOhAefving hie ehettyi? thO 'tight*
Pefo-re daft the tei,kaih td be odtefltd was atudledb tke ***WIp
With the kid OP field tiksdee aid slept) end a tibia PoUtit Oki 464011
the light of all the ihfotisatlbh githere4 OP ichoft kIshit tka **fib mid
the diapoilition Of Ciefinell thbbp: *id defehOei in th, itietilfi the pirty
theh 140tid to k ear* Olate hekkby wild did hot etatt Out Witil kftlit
hidhitht) bedeUtie Okpekienee /led geoten that bilit*,eh 0100 ifi4 0466 deft*
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
patrols were relatively inactive. The orossinp was
that with oven slow progress a sofa house eould be
nide or the lines berore daylicht. The Joe, after
an hour or two at the
(
usually planned ea
reached or tne other
crossing, slept for
safe house, Rot up and continued toward. the Oormon
rear aa an ordinary olviliafl..
OPS on dark niRhta
mmall noises,
hegirLillr by
that no Joes
It should be added that an effort ems redo
when there wa$ a slight drissle whioh covered
.This method of runninr operations, used almost from the
the dbth 1)1v SSS team, is largely responeible for the fact
orployed by tho team were either killel or wounded io 'cross.
ing the lines.
Early in the
campaign the agent Was instructed to oiroulato as muoh
RU possible behind the lines and to return after two or three days with
Later, teams of agents were sent cut to operate on a
On in German territory the team endeavored
to recruit a courier l'ohind tho linuu and sand him back with a report
on the rirst day after their passage of the lines. On the seconl day one
of the agent: returned with an,ther report and a oopy of the report
xor
the previous day, On the third day the remaining aren't returned with his
report and copies of tLe reports (or the two previous dayi. This method
or operation Was intorded to result in I greater volume and continuity ot
information, but Was subject to all the criticism* applicable to ordinary
oivilian reconnaissenoe.
Still later a third manner of operation wee atteepted. Arrangements
were made for Uinette, who we in German territory at Powearet to drop
messages into the ;keurthe river at 0500, so that they might be pieelled
e.
;,
?
SFORET
-9Ar'
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
f?1
at,out (17W atil.wkvAtTp14, pa the sector
of
410 Olteaagea were never reoeive4 '45/444, *lt.44040A
E!aooaratioC4eipvioroe porLoyiti too griatid0!oatt?tax4M1
flooded about tho time Pi' the experiment and ilIMP:t erlItT PI!" 11;t4-10440,
the
meeagGee. Untler other cireliak**POtti
i'ad boon a.Pt tlic to receive
however. this method of communication might prove to be prile044041
Beeauatt the preceding methods of 9perati01 were sle!fir and ;Tioorta4.#1
a oharAce W44 MOO tq the use of chains of Nients organized !r144 r,440.
commUnications beiTA0hePPPrlarl 11n0q. 41.1 Wa; tt,e mft44 1:41,011P4f4Y
used by sj fpr gathering strateg4 intelligence, except that !I short
rango, frequency modulf419n, .144m-of-sight radio set, the 4rry pOi /14
pa* 4p 'place of the long range aterace kittery seta peel for senqip;
from rance to Africa.. Tr 044110 were planne0 by 4b Div $Sbt
4,
only one of these was actually ppt 41to operation. They ?ter? tO. PRT4r*
reoppotivoly, the Cirey-spr-111eue paccarat - liaon 1!:E-pa ,r spolt
to 4cp 1INtape - Cello - Senonve 7 kpy4moUtler 94P,r f:44 447
4ogle rormed I?Y St, 041,, 4PPP(1,1 fal4 Po.mgiputior. 441241Y. i4tff 7!!;T1
oompi4A and verifiedor houses a!ld zolp.:1! do Olgto ip 4t41, ffor
tora. Doole trprlopos
9Pciqf we"7? memPriz,4 137 41 9f141,14, lirg
qoattpod to truvamit apq they "1,4 Pqq,m9 41,1i;4r tkl.pplIttpf P,
the 300 radio, a vo03 set 9,1pg the Fru r h telaphppl9 NP*14-177;
Alpho4ao, 1,arthet Charleu Per44P Itc!! The ra4lp flpf, ti4i1,4
wilb 0 radio P, !,44r and di1P0P4ted 14 #, w51! plkeei #t
4oquo2t4 00(04 pp 11'thetr444,0Itipg fsgo!4_ oF "45/, !tit pcmpt11,004
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Declassified and At 'roved For Release 2013/09/27 . CIA-
.
P13X00001R0001000600u4-4
him to aid iv gathorinrinformation. At first, oontaets were sohoodoleC:
at dawn and dunk but later the sender was able to transmit every two
hours at his option. Two reeeiving stations were set up on high spots
as near as possible to the sender and arrangements were msde, in addi-
tion, to receive from artillery observation plane., which could contact
the ZOO on KS frequency zero, in Oki* oontacto with the reoeiving stamp
This method, while difficult and dangerous, because of the need
for reliable oontaots ir enemy territory and the risk of transporting
the set, proved to be highly efficient and indeed the only practical
way at present of gathering tactioal information by the use of agents.
If it works et all it is probable that it will work oontinuously and
well. It was employed successfully by 45 Div SSS late in 00teber and
early in Ivovember, tit a time when the front had become so tight that'
reoeipt of information fromagents had dropped to a minimum.
The 45 Div $SS used a German prisoner as an agent on only one oe.
(lesion. About 26 Oct 1944 a German soldier under the news of Josef
Kleinschrot was oaptured by the in int Regt of the 46 Div. Re ips)mn
tarily gave much information of value concerning his unit and thili
placed himself .At the disposal of Col Cruikshank, CO of 100 legts as a
guide for combat patrol*. His work resulted in the capture stpart st
. -
the staff and records of a German RN CP and of a German mortar some
dump, On a tip Oron POW Interrogation Imo made an inquiry and disaiorod
that the man was willing to work for M. motivated probaqy by 10 Allem'
sir a to bring his wife to the United States after the wAr sed ik atonal**
.r4my4g1
_
c,sr PolA2se 201-3/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R0001000600
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
the Nazis ocoasioned by the fact that he was half Polish. if. was an iniu
fantry sergeant and a veteran of five years' fielting, intelligent enough
to gather information but not intelligent enough to make a oonviteing
double agent. With the approval of Col. Quinn, G-2 7th Army, and of 0.1.
Reichmann, G-2 45 Div, he was picked up at the BQ of YU500 at Bains-los.
Pains and transported blindfold to the team at Badm.nil-aux-Bois, where
he was confined to one room. During the afternoon h. was briefed by
Sgt. Peter.Weil of the 46 Div OB section to bring back m4s and documents
and information on the projeoted German line of defense hebind tho
Yeurthe river as well as incidental information on enemy units and mini.
fields. The operation was run in the evening from a point about 2 kma
SouthOf St. Benoit with the understanding that Yleinsohrot should rejoin
his unit, get the desired inforwation and return within six days. For
unknown reasons he did not return, but it is thought that he way have
rejoined his unit and been transferred with it to a rear area. It would
be useful to check with the War Department to determine whither he re-
turned to another sector of the front and was again taken prisoner.
In spite of the failure of this mission, this method, if good re.
cruits are found and prcper security measures are observed. should prove
extremely useful in obtaining documentary and other inside tactioal end
Early in the oampaigt 46 Div SSS was obliged, aside from these efq. -
forts to obtain information to render certain services to the Diva.; ,
ol, Reichmann, in order to :tonvince his of our ussfUlnesi, lb assum4;)_fr
SECRET
Ind anri Annroved For Release
27 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4 ???
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
Prom the beginning a largo part of the responsibility for dealing with
the Intelligence division of the FFI, a task which took a groat deal or,
time and did not produce much aoourate information. VC were expected,
from time to time, to interrogate eivilians, either as interpreters or as
collectors of intelligenoe. The team member assigned to Div CIP was often
asked to translate reports from French to English, eapecially thOse.from
the SR team of Capt. nage (known as Capt Humbert). Ho .leo bore the
trunt of handling relations with Cart Hag? and his aides, who were sup-
posed to work through us but who soon began to work direetly under Div
0-2, in spite of the fact that they did not in most oasis speak English
0-2 received copies of all 8R reports for the 7th Army front, many of
which aid not apply to the Div sector and were blown-up to seem more,ra-
mentous than they actually were. Our man at Div CP, nevertheless.twas
expected to translate all those reports.
In addition, the team was asked to supply FPI officers to the units
of the Div down to regimental level to act as civilian interrogators and
intelligence operators, This was done by yr. Ballaguer, but the plan
worked badly beoaune English.speaking FPI men oould not be found. After
two weeks" duty the FFI personnel waa let go and Div 0-2 adopted the
policy of pioking up English-spoeftking Frenchmen to act as interpreters
and intelligence operators, after what seemed to us to be *a Anouffielest
During the early' days of the campaign 45 Div al performed almost all
of the services requested by Div 0-2. A3 the Army's comfidemee 1m our
work increased, however, we were able to avoidisoet web om Us.
ground that we wore understaffed and that they interfered with these-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
? 17-170009000 1-00011-0000X?1,c1C11-V10 L/60/ eSeeiei .10d panaiddv pue Pe!PsseloeCI
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atod00
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pictomim 4411-141.4etiormod uo od.tolop 1044, %iv/ow:wady pit).
4410 4044 WOJj 4.04444401) NOtfig tpikit 410.00 46461o4 Aufillitwo 401/0V
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pfallep-644 4%rot U4n404 vUo Optofj VUrp4h04JheeqNO 41 do imao0,1
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
V.
?
,
PIM 010
..141?
sg.
Lore aPi oover the NO end 311 mootione or Peume. Mitrionne, V mo. and
* proached the oity direotly taross the fields trope the Alest, Yany of
Its buildinrs were in (limes *rid Amerioan artillery woks interdietine
the road to Luro 4111 W44 440 rklling on the WS section of the eity itself
Pr000tilnr eau4too41y we entor'd the to over oraen Ails end die.
oovered bootie whioh 4howed 0, 0,001W or light. The oncupants proved to
IM lirofloh, old people 4Pd ohl1dron, hnt they were so upset by the shelling
that thoy oota0 toll us nothinr about the Uormans, txoept that there were-
troops kt the hospitkl, Wo laft them ond continued to the hospital neer
the center or the town, where Morionne entered the buildirr, spoke with
eome Oerman eoldiers 4nd MAO and owe hook with the information that the
town' rrieop ooesisted ot twelve mon and non-coms billeted at the
hoopitta and Pow' oPfloors and a tow enlisted mon at the ikommondentur a
row blooks awey, Whrao ntandinr in the street diseussing our next move
we netilf)ed A tiArMiWY sontry about two yords bohlwl us, but he took no ex.
oeption to onr oresetoe,
After Airier ingoirles we wore ablo to got book without being oho)*
longed to Oeorpla Oo OP and to report the followinr firdings to MN,
1) The garrison aotoally 1i the town rombored about
twonty mon.
0 There were no tan'As in the town,
We reeommerdod thot * patrol be sent in to capture the twenty men, end
tho 00, Ool C;ruiksh*nk, erreed to this proposal, stipulatinr that the
patrol shoold start from Fox Co OP ae soon os possible. Oy toot nnd jeep
we arrivod at Fox Oo OP shoot 04116, but had to welt until 0000 Were
tho p4trOl W401 ready.
_ _I A
8E0PR:fir
o.,Ver4Tar
1-4.414a4-14v. lotar.1Nli101,41-
47.
;-?
et;
IS
3
Jif
r
!--
A4
?
"t=s
r,
I.
Pnr Release 201-3/-69/27 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060004-4
`41
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CI.A-RDP131X00,00,1173,0re01 0r,:7-4
-?mmwmaimMV7-7
r
Leadinr the peteol across the memo tields W4 entered 81%440 as Ita,
wax breaking. Two Oarvave were 400n in thr street but 'Oil 'seeped t4oh.
rore they could bo shot, karlann*? AilIst *Ad resohed the hospital *ewes
diatom's *heed or the reluctant petrol and Marianna again ontorod tho
hompihal, thim time nhakinp, the Ciermana out of their /sleep end toelliag
thaw to ourrendor Por the Agierioann hed errivea, They did. Yinet and I
turned the primonern over to the petrol end startled up Horoh weer**
oarrier whioh had e, 20mm nak p:un in tow. Since it Willi thfkm entimay.
limht, it NAd jUdVAlti LOO dttlJgOV0144 to stay in the town, whieh was *pee
from the North, or to take the time neoeniary to capture the Xemmendattur.
and orders wore conpoquently issuod'to the petrol to return to Pox Co CP
4
with the prioonere, We hod no diffioulty in drivirr the weapons oerrior
hsok to ths Amerioat, linos, whers we immediately reported the additional
information that the Oermand had tank and troop concontretione about 4
kmo Porth of tlAume on the road to Lure, Casten 4nd Rorer returned few
houre latar with additionnl dotal's on thee* conuenti.ations.
The mlenion won tt sueooes 4n1 Paume was token throe days latir, It
in nevertheleas evident thet the minnion WaS ion, OtAil4tinr and too
clangorous for valuable personnel. It wee, LI faot. * mission which should
have bean performed by the Army but which the An was, at that time, 111-
equipped to perform
P Chatu Vethod
At., the oopture of Epinal 46 Div 333 adopted a polloy ot operatiag
so)oly by Means of chains formed behind the enemy linos, thus avoiding
the greater reletive risk or oivilian rsoomiaissonoo a;;11 obtaining,better
-
results. A4 sn oxoopplo of this method * dosoriptior follows or
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t the the time of this op the lines in our seater were fairly static
and ran from Olonville, a Fronoh outpost west of Baccarat through
reuil-sur-Belvitte to Jeanmenil, west of Ramblrvillor. Jacquot of
OronAviller and Louis Uentz of Baocaret carried the set from Glonville
to a spot in the forest North of Bertrichamps, a small town on the
Yeurthe between Baooftrat and Ram l'Etape. They performed the mission
by crossing the leurthe at night 600 yards East of Aserailles, contin-
uing behind Gelaoourt to kerviller, where they awaited daybreak. Early
in the morning they put the set in a wheelbarrow and walked with it
through Baocarat to Hertrichamps, where they obtained help from a V.
Gilles, t garde forestier, who directed them to a safe place in the
forest North of town. They were both able to roturn safely to our
lines.
In the meantime 4 chain had been formed to feed the set. Follops
had been trained in double transposition, and Gillette had been briefed
as an intellirenoe aflent, sine, she hud been in BsocerAt the previous
week and had not only formed her own ohain, but was in relation with
others already in existence. Louis Bents, acting As W uid.,00M 1 tcod
the team which was to cover the Ra000rat Cirey-sur?Vosouse - Raton
l'Etape triangle.
They left from a French outpost at the edge of the forest toeing
Buriville (N4 of Bacoarat) with a 163041 guide named Pierre lotto know
that sector better than Louis. Pierre proved to be a bad gamble, Po
he led the party into a Oerman patrol and then escaped to the Freneh
lines. The three were oantured and held by the German unit io the
SPOPIFT
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sootor for delivery to the .E.W2!erheits4 not at Padoneillor. L0041
had him own identity earl from Deocuorat, and Oinetto sad Aellope hod
N144 01100 from the IMMO Pity. Their story 1444 thet they hed ell
orossed the lines Vroa: Dapearat to Olonirille three days bet,, hes
041144 they had wanted to get awmy from the oermens, but thet*they had
Noon pipked up by the lorennh outposts and held for guestimated' et
Olohvill.. Atter being questioned they were held at 010,1.111., Ise0e
refused a laisser.passer by the Vreneh CO and were suspeeted ty the
olviliah population there of Wring Oerman spies. Their pesitica at
OlOnvilio WAN thus unoomfortable and eventrillhtening tor gush yeuar
people (they were ell under twenty) Ind they rosolted therefor. to
return to Banoarat and their families, but were eaptured by the
M0414 on the way back.
The atory worked. The Sioherheitsdienst at Badonviller sent
them with a ?omen plainclothesman to Haoosret to find out It they
really lived there. This presented no ditrioulty Nocuous. Louie,
who did live in the pity, indioated to hie rrienrho that they should
aot like old aoquaintances of Oinetto ahd Hollopm. The pollemoman *pa
parently did not think to ?hook et the Pairio to see If all the id sm.
tity cards were voolid. At any rote tbey were oltimte/y releosed
dor surveillanoe at Dadonviller and put to work in Au ()often bar.
Oinnette suomoeded in evoking violent protestations of love frosothe
?hist 1,,Ivestigat0r tor the SO and Hellops 000upied himeelt with too-
effeotive oarpentry work in and abowlt the IAN Louis. with the help
or the others, began organising an intelligens* chain among his
1'11000 At nAdODVillOr.
At our base we reosived no awes of the three, exoept
1a4 been ooptured by the ()omens. 4eparictione were made
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to send Minot in to get information *bout the three asd to Nod out
intelligonoe. He, guided by Georges, went hi from tho 30 Di, Sister
some twenty miles to the South. The sector used for the operations
whioh was held by Russian troops' was SI ot Bruyeres. Georges lived is
this locality, about 2 kmi behind the lines, and had just close) frosshiS
home when he was reoruited for the job. Crossing the lines at zight
he took Minet to his house, and the next day Minot set out on toot,
,
making Coroieux, St, DIE, Rao n l'Etape and Bertriohamps without en.
countering any diffinulties.
At Bertriohamps-he sound 014e's and looated the radjo.
the next day to Bacoarat he disoovered from Louis /lintel family the
fate of Louisa Oinette and Rellops. las next step was to get a job as
the driver of a German truck which evaouated olvillano froo Baccarat
to Oirey.sur-Vexcuse. and he was thus able to visit his three oollogguis
at Radonviller and get the information they had gathered. This, along
with his observations as a truck-driver, he radioed book to our Use,
For about a weak he wee abke to operate in this manner. Will* 440
the network of mate houses and intelligenoi personnel whioh had been
prepared for him before his departure. Be sent in all twelve messages
*Joh oontainsd excellent and very complete intelligenoe for his *estop
Ool. Repiton, 0-2 of the 2nd Prenoh Armored Div, was highly impressed'
by his work, as Wita COL Reichmann of 40 Div.
At-the on of the week, the 4?renoh 2nd Armored Div advoimeed from
Olonville,
to Paocarat and Portfichamps and rendered impossible tho
fUrther utilisation of the set, whioh was then situated right aajth4 -
German front lines. kinet was able to get back to our base without
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difficulty. Louis, Ginette abd liallope, who ere Still at DOdenwillor''
when the Prenoh advanced, found thexsolvoa abandoned by tho flooring
Sioherheitadienot. Louie and Uinotto got beak wily, but Ifollops-Ift,
picked up by ()amen troops near Rertriohamps on his way baok-to our
lines. It wee later learned that he W401 taken to eadowallor and Allarb
Mont by the airman polioe, but by 1 Ear 1046 no fUrthor traoo of hiss
had ,ieon found, fic le the only toam member reported missing in all our
operationa from 28 Aug to 20 Nov 19441 and ohanoos are good that he le
unharmed. It is suggoated that an ofiort be mad. to follow up his 04010
and to compensate hie femily in case he is foynd to havo boon emoeutod or
disabled.
IV - UNTRIED AIETPODS
A - Radio line-tapping teame
Two othor methods 01 gathering information hyr moans of *pants were
not tried by 45 Div SU, beoeuse of leak yr equipment and of personnel.
The first method ia that of tepping enemy telephone lines. For
effeotive operation one Germen-apeaking agent would bo required to tap
4
the wires end one looal passeur to carry a radio and transmit to bases
A good procedure would be to looate the top'on A MAIA lino and lision
for f)eriod of three or four days, living on eoneentrated rations. The
r*dio would be looated * short distanoe away from the tip and woUld -
transmit at agreed interval* during the day or night. This method
is dangerous, beoause it ie impossible to namoutlage offeetivol tbey
radio and tapping equipment, but if it should work it would proms-
a
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extremoly erreotive.
The other method is thot of sending every agent in with a 0P011
ton lb. rsdio, which would have the semi range *4 the present Army 11004
It was never tried because tho radios, which were promised to us by
Conumnicationn, were never donvered. II sueh a sot wore mrailcble it
would bo roluttvoly easy to camouflage during tranaport and to hid, at
a 44r0 spot and would enable, tomb agent to operate inde!Andentay and'
yet meintein oontinuous commnioations with base. Reception from A?til.
Ivry obaorvation nikno* might groatly ino'rwaso the rant:, of suoh sets5
in addition to those) moans of communication it is almost certain
that toohnologioal improvements iv thia tiold in the future will make
thlo wort of work ot once easier and vastly more important.
V . 04RPAN 001t4PACylVTY TILti_p_fcT0R
-
Alt J61-101 X"42 la bettor Wormed ft this subjeot than 45 Di, ill
a briar not ov what wa know *bout it may be usetUl.
It sooms that the Oorwans wore much more active than ws in thio
ragard
ono o tho tronehmd b000me steEllised around Rninal. The 0.-8 of
tho 2nd French Armored Div roportod a Gorman plan to dispatch 600
acro thoir ]in oa In 4 wok, About two weeks later it 40. roo-
npontm ss
Por ted by one of our agents that the Uormans at St, Dia, the MQ at that
time for Oormsn oombat intelligovne, wore offering Pr. 100,000 to aay
mgo/it who would cross the linos tor the411 At that price 46 Div4S8'
would havo boon bukrupt after its ioirst wowk's operations. It lessAw.
pooaiblo to vority the truth of those rumors, but 'Norther inquiry Nay
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tp?
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show them to hAve been oorrect. It is oertain that Gorman spies. !Ips,
captured in our meotor disguised ea orlecte and even dressed ilk 411,0$0
,
;WOW uniforms.
Ono reason for believing that 6erman activs were not extensive
Is Mat it waa difficult for them to reoruit satisfactory. personnel. ,
There seemed to he very Pew Frenohmen who were ideologioallyin afreso
ment with the Uermens and oven these usually demanded money for their
work, Other irenahmon who disarreed with the Germans and even disliked
them would uot am events, but their price was higher.
The
of working with this type of personnel is apparent. Our problem in
diffioulty
thia regard W44 muoh simpler, for ninety per cent of Prench eivillans
were with us and it was miwply A queston of findirf porsons of the
necessary courage and intelligcroe,
On the; other hand, a reason Por believing that (normal! operation*
were larger than was auspected is that the Germano vire continually
retreating and had only to leave agents plante4 behind them with radio-
sets. Control In Al1ied-o0oupiod territory was furthermore much lese::
striot than
in Oformml-onaUPlod territory, The Germans wwre.thus spared -
bwo of our main difficulties, namely fitting soros1 the lines ame
inn them move all)ut ilittely on they got there.
VI - 8tja014TRO RN 4TioAr OP 0-2 448 ACTITITIS$ TO OXV
Tho 46 Div (1-2 S?oti
ligsnce funotions vuoh
OR, RedIo Intercept, Ar
mating of this
ard oth
on, exolueive of $33, (tarried on nermal lattelow
as recon and omb*t patrols, PON raterrogatiox.
tillery observation and the reoording n,01 Atroa
or inforMAtIOD rilOottid from military (44 040
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sources. The reoon patrols left in gon061 much to be desired. and
information WO6 Vary cater) not delivered in time to the unitO where
it would hay* been usefUl.
Divioional intolligenoo work, exoluding that of 388, ehould kayo
been improved and extended. Div should have had interrogation teams'
to.question oivilians who grossed the %nee, to rather rokd and river
dote and to got forest maps from the locel poachera or game wardens.
Reoon patrol work should have been better. 8abota1re teams sivuld helve
been sort out frequently with instruotione to observe and report on
theJr misaioflo. Tho wire-t*ppinr teams, mentioned above should be under
tho direot jurisdiotion of the Army. Interpretors and general Intel-
ligence handymen, familiai4 with the looal languor?, should have been
attached to the $.2 of eaoh unit down to Co, thus eliminctinr the se-
curity risk or piokinp up unknown civilians to aot in those oapealties.
Thin plan of orrianizatiol,, ir udoptod, would leave future 88,
to free to oonoentrate or building up taotical intelligence py the
ohain method and strategic intelligence from Army base in the same my,
SS$ would thun be relieved from performing all sorts of miseellaneous
duties for Div 0-2 and the Army would be certain to profit by better
performanoe from SSS.
VII - EVAIJATTOP OF ThE TY.A03 40RE
The record of 45 Div 33,3 could have been bettor, but it ms neee06h
ihele40 good. With more experience we woull have saved tie* brim*
learning the hard wuy; but we did learn the herd way' old got results
whioil wore pruiood by Div 0-2, the Commanding General. ei 48 Div and the
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"OOPIF
,4s
ony lhould ha nntod Oihil 1- ell our operations Cram
(.rauolda to araohourc, wa had no mail killa,t end only ona wemodod ord
reported wianiur, AL 0 110ViirMd at if; MM. kfid
69"il1P@nt the
tohm prudhoed 0 fair quwitity of intellirahoo wbtob wmita Of 0011100ibtikl
141noVii4 to tilt, tilTanilivanuo0 or tilb Arr,Y#
la auferbate0 Wit 00160 dreOrt 10 fiAlia to .t.):ht.k cid ronompewi
the mahy I anohman who aided tifi in our work, ir -lartftir oases by evillirdw
thr military danortstorld and in others by giving 1"1116'1 or ifirtie TM.
ahou)d if po4nihie LH dont hy peroua who were on the aot when ths
individuola onroarned rendered thatr oontrilution to
Lba oakum/,
toeution ahould not ha omittad.ih this report of those whose work
onotrihutad MObt hakvily to the atwoaae of the iffomtk, erdaavors Lt,
Patar floroot* Romao Polomar* Ionian Eaatmen, Andre Peau, dilbert
Pie rr?t 1 Aint? Naria Nihond, J410quot or orahdvinsr ond Louis Hants,
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