OSS - REPORTS ON GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA/ORGANIZATION OF THE GREEK HOME FRONT/BALKAN SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECT, 1943

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 108
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 19, 1943
• Content Type: MISC

; . ? - ?
?
- e _ . .
1
;
t.'zt-t? .?t
?"?,!.?!.e.
t1:1. ? e
?
" s ? . ? ,
? ...
. ? .1 1
' 1 ?
???1'. ?
-;
. ? ? ?
rrt.TF
. _
-'17?3?14.'
?
. '
S.?
!??? ?
? -
___ ?
-0; ?-?".t;:.?
,
? .
:-L1 ? . ? 4,
??
? .
JP, - . ?
a - .
71???
? .?
. ? .; ?
? .,-
c4.?L'-'74-3n?
'Pc ''`i ?
,P7c'..ft!",' ? ?
?;,.1?A; ????? i ?
? ?
--1????-', IL"; 1? ' .4. -1-1 '
(???? ? 1 ? ? ? .. 1-
-A
-? -
-
? "I?
i;?????
,?'1!Es?-
t?
??a.'
!
,? ? .
. ? ?1. .1?;:
t:
?
?
thsc
'1
_
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
2
?
4
. ?
? .
-
I
I ;
! -
-
` 4:0 ?-1 ?
????--
? P. - ? : ?
- 41t."
r.tre".? ,ryt
? r..t
???
?
:?
-.4
?
, 3.? ?
ML
-Z*
-3Lirtlf-
-
F7":;?:
? .1
s'ir??tir.
. ?
:?ift
?
LA.
R.1
A,P"---.-7-41 '? ?
??11',',21..
; , ? .. ?????4.1:
7-- ?:=
- ? 2^.
- --;?;=i1
. ??-?
1: ?et-
'?? ?
?.?1
sie
?
t ? .
t, ?r-
' ' ?"a. ,A
?
rt'??
?
?
;
;.; .
I
? 1
N.
zs'N ?
?
-
?
?
?
*4!"; ?
'
1-11r,f
-Lir"14:;?
A
to
?
' ?
1
'?ef?,:???t
? ? ?
1rrIZI?F Lg;tsit_?4"...
.? -4' ,X6f;%'.+qt,
"t. V*,
:
-?'11
?
4
. ? .
?
a
'
1
?
????
t ,C
?
L ? "
1
?4z?
? ?
, ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
'
. `r. ? 1.11-
1 ? r?
?
?
?
_
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Ihitney Sbmpardson
Ulius L. AMOSS
The following reports were written at the request of General
Donovan and copies are enclosed for you:
A779.1210.1
A i4uick10. *my of the facts briefly
reported are docutented in ay earlier
essays and cables.
'?
BP-grstmftatiral
A few high sot o of the present Greek political
situation. I am much worried over the fact that
the White House and the State Department are in
apparent ignoranee of $ome of the present (Greek)
facts of life. flew% cap.
C-Tbg Auth9r 9 ,a
A hitherto *reported tap auat on of ow Professor
Saushofor it the MOsuppecttng parent of the late
Greek In.* wr Projects
statement of our lack of awareness
ioslaw developments.
* I* OA!
It ?
Domovanss expressed opinion that
Usigned to Operations this memoram
Ww. But / still believe you can use
hi* '4e s?s. t and, under Macfarland, guide him
to the poirst *bier* he can make a major contribution.
id?
w4441 - kA44. IA 11, -,t:.2.
es of v binge tiat happened
Greek Irregular
Ons as to the future.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnnni nr-monn
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
-2-
2, Recommendation is here made to you that the Special
Intelligenee Project continues, reporting directly to you.
Mecfarland should head the enterprise with Edwards acting
as his administrative assistant and Caskey as the Izmir
secret deputy. Maddox should be the representative in
ionlicn. Captain Melas would be invaluable if he reported
only to Macfarland and Edwards. His men are still on the
job en Greece; can communicate,
3. The existence of this enterprise should be hidden from all
except the officers assigned to it. It should not be mixed
with any other 0.S.S. activity In the Middle East. Fruits
of its activity should be reported through existing S.I.
channels, but no other S.L. officers in the M.E. should be
informed of the project.
It desired, I will attempt to turn over what can be turned
over to 'Macfarland.
'
e ?
?_. ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Greece is in ferment. But as Greece always is in turmoil
it is only necessary to pick up the strands of old prejudices and
No one political nor one military figure appears or even
threatens to be dominant. Greece is a land of antis; when a
leader dares appear, unity is achieved when all opposition joins
to tear him down.
Greece is united today against the occupying enemy--and
against the King. Foreign attempts to line up all factions
under George II merely solidify the opposition, rouse resentment
against friendly foreigners and diminish operative action against
the enemy.
PlayIng on this known Greek characteristic is the German
an the one hand and the communist organizer on the other. Greeks
are being told by the German propaganda machines that their King
had made a deal with England for the cession of Greek territory
And for the monopolistic control of air routes and communications.
The Communist agents are saying that Britain proposes to re-enthrone
George and perpetuate 'the racist regime of Netaxas.n
Until recently the valiant but quarrelsome resistance leaders
were saying, 'But America is in this war; the United States is
disinterested in our local politics; Roosevelt will let us decide
ogr own political fate and will see that me are permitted to choose
our own leaders.' A combination of circumstances has changed such
Wife into ems of cynicism; Greeks have been told that the United
***tem bas 4oined England in a plot to force George on then. They
to4d that their choice lies between German dominion, andAnglo-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000loomonlf1-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
American plan to reestablish national Fascism and a Communist-
Democratic state nprotedtedu by Russia.
The Greek distrusts all three and Greece is in a ferment.
Following the shock of German occupation, the Greeks remained
completely inactive for about six months.
The GrIteks divide and sub-divide under the following leader-
1. Middle class
2. Workers
3. Democratic Party
4, Anti-democrats
5. Remnants cf old parties
1. 114141g.91An4 The Middle Class remained generally inactive
for more than mix months. Many in this class, for a short period,
attempted to collaborate with the Germans. Senior Army officers,
statically disposed toward the Tsolakoglou puppet government are in-
cluded in this class. They, consciously or unconsciously, were
of service to the forces of occupation. Later, many who had col-
laborated commercially with the forces of occupation and who had
profitted thereby, attempted to join one or another of the rational
resistance groups.
The Chief Officers, belonging to this group, who did not cot-
Itsborste with the enemy are those who had been retired by Metaxas
ator the 19,5 insurrection, the failure of whilh had brought
dietstershi to Greco*,
2.4. UAW Th* first organised and effective reaction against
Declassified and Ap roved
For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001Ronn1nnnqnni 7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
enemy occupation sprang from this class. It was from this class
that the &AA. (National Liberation Party) was built.
The Communist Party was not slow to seize this organization.
As early as mid-1942, four Russian agents arrived in Saloniki to
organize the E.A.N. after the pattern of the Yugoslav Partisans.
(This was reported by the Greek Irregular Project at that time.)
The Russian organizers completely copied their successful program
IA Yugoslavia. Non-Communists were encouraged tA:, join this "the
only effective resistance group", Democratic, Liberal and Popular
Front ideologies were preached; Communist propaganda was held to
a minimum, At first, the E.A.M. took the lead in every Anti-
German activity and it was the first to create operative guerrilla
centers. Finally, the strength of the E.A.M. grew to such an extent
and the noes-Communist members were so many that it divorced itself
(for 04 long period) from the Communist Party. At this point,
leaders of the Middle Cass and of the other political parties
started negotiations with the B.A.M.
Workers and peasants of the E.A.M. were joined by Middle
Class and wealthy patriots and continuous, though unplanned,
sabotage was enthusiastically committed in factories, ships and
on railroads and bridges. Parallel to the E.A.M., a number of
democratic sub-parties Joined forces in another resistance organ-
isation. Those sub-parties cooperate with the E.A.M., but wish
to remain independent, as B.A.L0 after vainly appealing to
Britislt amd American sources for help, turned again to foreign
COmmgoist leadership. Datil Nay 1942, Occupied Creece remained
isolated from the GovernmPwlf-im-Exile and intense hatred of the
Weldiros Government grew. At this time British agents spirited
trA
?
? ? ,"g?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X0onni Pnnn nr1(r-It-1-1,3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
c
36:1
Kanellopoulos from Greece to Cairo and Tsouderos was induced to
make him Vice-Premier. Thus, Occupied Greece tacitly recognized
ithe Government-in-EIlle and accepted its leadership--but with
reservations that have grown in volume.
3. krasszattsjtaaya. Under the several political sub-
divisions of the Democratic Party, resistance groups operate in
Epirus, on the slopes of Mount Olympus, in Western Thrace and on
the Island of Crete. There is no coordination between these
groups and there is intense political rivalry. At this moment
the great military leaders of the Democratic Parties are asking
for *antral guidance from Venizelos. These groups will be directed
by Veniselos after the arrival of Bodosakis in Cairo. This man
is the power behind the Venizelos throne; his money finances
Venizelos.
4.Aps*Pvats, The Anti-Demccrats nave concentrated an
the creation of organizations whose aim is the preservation of
their coalgtrties and the seizure of Army-Naval cantrol after the
mar, MOSe men fear a national general court tar tial in the event
an Allied victory, and voty few have participated in action
against the -enemy. (A, notable exception id Theotokis, son of the
1st* Master of War, oho now has joined the democratic resistance
' forces.)
Leaders of the rem-
Mu of Obis01144cal panies hale participated sporadically in
Uttial Stettin the enliply and from time to (AM have cooperated
lath $11. Until now, they have remained aloof from
OTNan1404 NY1010* OOdoris, leader of a party of considerable
2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
.5. 4616
17461*
strength has large potentials in organized resistance, but
distrusts the E.A.M. and resents British support of the King
whom he blames for tle fascist dictatorship of Metaxas. His
Chief lieutenant, Captain Alexander Melas, presently is in ths
United States. (Melas was a secret OSS agent in Greece until
March of this year.)
A090mtollshments of t4e Greeks.
Under their own initiative, the Greeks established secret
radio sending-receiving stations and a calque ferry service
between the mainland and Turkey. Both of these services have
been taken over by combined secret services of the British--
much of this against the wishes of the Greeks. in the meantime,
groups of patriots forms raid and break up. The most vigorous
resistance groups are based on Crete and repeatedly have announced
that they await American leadership before they take the field as
an army.
lat1imass.a.4lls4.22Euls.
Greeks are influenced variously by Russia, Britain and the
United States.
10 linss/g. A small percutage of Greek resistance 'troops
are influenced and elated by Russian victories. The larger per-
centage fears Russian successes as bringing communist influence
and Russian control into Greece.
2. 2ritiskInf24eEm tmmediately after invasion British
Intelligence (S.I.S.) and British Sabotage (S.O.E.) tried to con-
tact occupied Greece. In the beginning and middle of 1942 certain
iNglish officers commissionee a number of dubious Greeks and
i Declassified and Approved For Release 2013109/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
-
Levantines whose activities in Greece brought panic :o he
resistance groups. Until the middle of 194.k it proper to say
that English secret service aetivities in Greece yielaed nehing
but disaster. After the middle of 194 he Laglisr. .,ervices
worked in closer harmony with the Greek Government-in-Exile and
conditions improved, but net to a satisfactory dcgree. iftr
March 1943, the British undertook the financial Lupt)ort of l'imt
one, then another Greek rusistance group and, througl'. their
power to give or withhold funds, have maaaged to coutrol many of
the Greek patriotic groups but with rather poor results. Guer-
rillas and saboteurs acted without a counting of the cost atc
vast reprisals were visited on the people of Greece. .0. the same
time, it was announced in Greece that the British would impose
the King on the people. A reaction has set in and Greece,
ditianal admirer of England, is showing dangerous signs of
distrust and even hatred.
3* riajbak164?.14113.
From every corner of Greece and from
every island, the people clamor for evidence of American parti-
cipation in Greec*,Almast every fugitive from Greece has been
*barged by those vtgritay behind to try to get the Americans to
participate at 'mitt on equal terms with the British. The notable
bombing of SalOniki and Athens airbases by the United States Ninth
Air Force was greeted the whole population of those cit es
raaniug met to it)* streets to cheer othe Americans?' while the
&trams 404 Italliam ottmpation troops took shelter.
la tremmaiis *eel* inspires fears of internal disturbance and
1a04, of 420110itati9140 Th* Xining American efforts in the
V
F4
Declassified and A
proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X000ni Rnnni nnn,znr11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
1 )
1
liberation of Greece -- under American leadership -- will allay
Greek fears of our two Allies and diminish the rising opposition
to them.
ResistucGzDsad Chief
Greece presents no great movements such as those t)f
Mihailovitch and liTito'. Nor has Greece any single leader whose
sway is as great as eiLlher of the two Slav generals.
The most noted, Colonel Zervos, is a small-time leader
pared to to Tito. The E.A.M. has no outstanding general. A group
of more than five hundred Cretans formed by Kapitanios "Y" call
themselves NDonovants Bands, and three hundred Andarti in Lpirus
call themselves the 'American Legion.'
This is both an asset and a disadvantage. But its promise
is great. A single American officer, trusted by Kapitanios "Yw?
and another endorsed by Captain Melas can raise e levy of thou-
sands who will act--in distlpline--under orders from the Middle
East General staff.
The operation can be repeated in every resistance center of
Greece. It can be executed under combined Anglo-American Auxiliary
Group Control. It will be dispersed, divided and one group will
be set against another under present S.O.E. command. Cooperation
and planning with the British Advanced 'A' Force is indicated
Under the leadership ,d authority of the Director of OSS, the
American ?beater Comnomnd and the British Middle East Commanding
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
41,
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
GREECE,: P010;TICA4
14.69,36fie eectipo le
The Tsouderos cabinet is now unanimous in opposition to
immediate return of Xing George on invasin. Tsouderos deserted
the Xing and signed the secret manifesto demanding plebiscite
before restoration. The Xing had a apolitical illnessa tnat keeps
him oat of Egypt and prevents him from countersigning the Cabinet
manifesto.
British political interests ase conbidering abandonment of
George. A. deal has been proposed to Venizelos who has not accepted
it.
The power behind the political throne of Greece will be Bodo-
sakis who, through the ministers, controls the Greek Army, Navy and
Air Force. Venizelos? Admiral Voulgaris and Karapaniotis take his
orders.
If Bedosakis is assasinated, a munity will break out. Com-
1st agitators are assisting.
It would appear that the White House is nat fully advised,
else the President's telegram to Ambassador Kirk re the King's
attitude toward the guerrilla chiefs might have been held back for
further study* (It may be that the State Department is receiving
edited intelligence from tie Middle East.)
MOM Caution: A deal say have been made -- despite full Intel-
ligemse4--but steps should be taken to see that the State Department
and late souse Sig have complete information, unedited.
??-?:-.-.4,FP? ?
A '
-1 0
.74.M7"
oatt???-?
j=7
?
y?
Declassified
A4.10 3
41'
kr!
and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030n1f1-7
4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
German Staff and Nazi Party drew their blue-prin for
World conquest after the plans of Professor Carl Hauofer.
His Geo-Politik profoundly affected every civilized man, woman
and child in the World.
Professor Haushofer placed Greece highest among Balkan
States; Greeks throughout the World as important to German plans.
These things he told me In 1922. These things I had in mind when
the Director of Strategic Services (Then Coordinator of Infor-
mation) took me into his service 16th December 1941. It may be
Interesting to note how this present ruler of German policy has
Influenced 0.6.5. activity; how his somewhat indiscrete talks
with me gave us an insight into future German activity and enabled
us to use his ideas and *forestall his plans.
In September, 1922, Greece had sustained an humiliating
defeat; a million and a half Ionian Greeks had been forcibly
ejected from Asia Minor, the land they had occupied since pre-
history. The Turks were threatening the Greek mainland. The
Prime Minister, Gounaris, and the Minister of War, Thew.okis,
afraid of mutiny had dischasged the entire army, and the Turks
were massing for an invasion.
Revolt came anyway. Colonel Plastiris, who had fought his
way through Turkish line's, refused to be demobilized. The Prime
Minister, the Ministers of War, Interior and Foreign Affairs and
the Generalissimo were caught and executed. Greece, badly wounded,
was in the toila of bloody internecine warfare.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
It was against this background that the even then famed
Professor Raushofer asked me to name
Yugoslavia
Rumania
Turkey
Bulgaria
Greece
Albania
Greece
Yugoslavia
Turkey
3ulgaria
Rumania
Albania
used to disaster and will turn this one into a blessing. The Asia
Minor Greeks will bring new strength to the mainland; will intro-
duce new skills and trades. Competing with them, the "Old Greeks"
will have to step-up in enterprise. A wave of patriotism will
sweep every Greek community In the World."
nature abhors a vacuum," Professor Raushofer continued,
ii
Miley frog Greeks and friends of the Greeks will pour in from the
corners of the Earth, Many Greeks from many lands will return to
their ancient homeland. They will bring new points of view and
jill strengtten the ties between the Motherland and her sons formerly
"Greece is important to the future plans of Germany," the
Professor said, *I'll tell you why and something of how we will
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
From the Professor I learned -that he and the policy shape's
of Germany considered Gtteece to be the Key to Eastern Europe. At
every crossroads of the World; in jungle, at the ports and in the
teeming cities of every continent, Greece plays a role in commerce,
in foreign trade; Greeks play a part in politics and in espionage.
Greece is the most important nation in the Balkans. The
countr7 of Greece provides the land bridge between Orient and
Occident; its peninsula projects into the Mediterranean and like
a policeman, rules traffic fast and West. Greeks had lived for
generations everywhere. They were Tiobserverel par excellence.
Their history, tradition and aptitudes made them ideal secret
agents.
Professor Baushofer proPOsed to traduce certain leading
Greeks in Greece and, through them, appoint agents throughout the
World. Greece itself, in th.9 coming war, would be forced in on
Germany's side. One day there would be another revolution in
German
Greece: this time it v04:24 be iaspired and directed by
7itr
secret agents.
The Professor felt that in the last World War,
Achilles heel had been Greece. In the new war, Germany would not
?avast tor INUtake. The sub3ect Interested me; 1 talked with
Witish atents, wittefixericr 4tPahmats and with French officials.
The Prof* ors idillas were laughed off. But 1 also talked with
BaroirSOienck, who in the First World War had directed Psychological
. /
'' ' 4 a
Wart I fidi 11.1.3 lath iliaiasilicifinext; German spy-master in Greece
and with Dr. rabri'Aus who later became the Nazi Minister to Rumania
and under tbose trieW leadarship Rummia deserted her old Allies.
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
I also talked with Madame Hadilazarou, the former Countesr, von
Stein, second cousin of the Kaiser.
I talked with Dr. Streit,,the Bavarian-Greex who was King
Constantine's advisor; with Queen Sophia and with many others.
The Germans and the Germanophiles did not discount a new war,
though they were vague as to the prospective line-up.
When Colonel Donovan called me, the old conversations came
back to haunt me. Had what Professor Haushofer told me nineteen
years before taken place? I considered it my first duty to in-
vestigate Greek officials and their history during that period.
I discovered that a number of the Metaxas officials were still in
places of power; that the dread, Himmler-appointed Chief of Secret
Poll' 1 Maniadakis was in Buenos Aires, on the .'7reek Government's
pay roll- openly consorting with German agents, conspiring with
pro-German Argentinians.
The Black list I compiled is a matter of record and has
influenced the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. But other Greeks were questionable. King George had been
faithful to his battle pledge to the British. But the Liberals
blamed him for the pro-German Metaxas dictatorship, a dictatorship
established forty-eight hours after he had promised the Liberal
Chiefs that he would not do so. With his father, be had been
expelled as pro-German during the FLrst World War. His mother,
Queen Sophia, was the Kaiser's sister and she hated the Greeks,
admired the Germans. George himself despized his own subjects.
And, even in exile, he had Xept in office a number of Germanophiles.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xoonni Rnnni nr1rr-v1.1,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
7.tv-
Admiral Canaris, chief of the German Intelligence Fervice
was a Greek. His third cousin was in the United States as a Greek
official. Tsouderos, the Prime Minister; had had a peculiar po-
litical history. We had to discover where the German line into
Greece led; to whom it was linked. And this we did; dozens of
documented reports are on file over C.O.I. or O.S.E. signature in
many Government departments.
We discovered that beautiful, red-headed Irene was not the
wife of Prince Peter of Greece as the Prince pretended sbm was;
that she was a 'White Russian adventuress who lured AmeTican and
British officers into indiscretions, who had communicetions with
Nazi ftletter-drops.'"
When we had separated the evil tools of Canaris and Rimier,
we were able to recruit Greeks safely. We reached behind German
lines and appointed courageous patriots as our agent-correspondents.
Ve used Raushoferls plan and appointed Greeks in several parts of
the World without revealing to them that they were O.S.S. agents,
and reports flowud in; reports that affected not only the Balkans,
but also other parts of Europe.
We watched the suspects in many countries for German pro-
paganda and we were able to counter much of it. But we had to do
in haste and in war and in enemy countries what Raushoferls pupils
bad
had long years to do in peace and in quiet. The task is not
yet fiaisbed, but it is under way.
IA the 'midst of these activities, another influence shoved
itself. Early in 1942 we reported the arrival of Communist agents
is Sao 4, , they attempted to form a Greek Partisan Army,
Declassified
and Approved
Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001000300
Declassified and Ap
4
a carbon copy of the then not so important Yugoslav Partisans.
The E.A.M. resulted and I am able to report that we have penetrated
this organization and know its plans. The Greek Brigades in Syria,
visited by Communist agitators uniformed as British and American
soldiers and purporting to represent Soldiers' Soviets in the
British Ninth Army and the U. S. Forces in North Africa spurred
the two brigades to revolt against the Government. How the O.S.F.
played a leading role in putting down the rebellion is a matter of
history; and how O.S.. thus stopped the disastrous
propa-
ganda line into Greece, where the starved patriots were being told
that British troops were murdering Greek L,o1J'iel:: J.: also a matter
of happy record.
How the Greek Cabinet furnished us-exclusively-with minutes
of its secret meetings; how Greek officials in all parts of the
World sent their reports to us is also in the book.
Our painstaking investigative work was responsible for the
tribute David Bruce, then Chief of S. I., payed the Southeastern
European Section of Q.S.S. when he said that our intelligence
exceeded in volume and value all the production of all other sections
Other Balkan countries were not neglected. We agreed with
Professor Baushofer in that Yugoslavia was next in importance tp
Greece But our large production of Yugoslav intelligence; our
Influence on Yugoslav secret activities is another story.
Professor Haushofer was right. By the careful selection of
Greeks, a world-wide ospionate network can be built quicKly,
irely, The Professor was right; Greece was the Achilles heel
-
.e ? ,
?
-
.H
1;4
' I
1.11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 :
Declassified and A. proved For Release 2013/09/1
7: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
of Germany and the Professor's disciples' were lesc; than able--
for Greece is still the chink in the Nazi armor and 0.F.F. hac
the right to claim much credit for the frustration of the Pro-
fessor's plans.
this is written, the Greek Government has re:-,igned.
Germany has not yielded the Greek arena. German influence ag:lin
is playing Britain against America and Rusia again:t the
The Greek cannot be abandoned for his name legion; he
everywhere and in every land he wields sone thfluence. For the
official of psychological warfare the Greek is an asset; he can
be a threat.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 :
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
/laming Slav passions make the itgoslav mess almost insoldble?
General *Tito* and General gihailovitch are irreconcilable. The
Serb considers the Croat and Slovene past traitors and future
dangers to a South Slav State. The Croat and the Slovene,
coatents for a thousand years, bitter critics of their Government
fmg the last twenty, are no nearer reconciliation now.
'Into the dispute is introdwed the Communist agitator who
terms the Serb a rescist; who claims that gibailovitch plots
a toelOpAttarian state of old Serbia and Bulgaria with himself
Mrs% as authoritartan president of council; later as Xing*
The Government-in-Exiles target of Communist and of Croat,
i.,!loomposed of modiocracies; is ruled by Dowager Queen Marie
(ilimantan Marie's daughter by a 'Rumanian cavalry captain)?
Mbytes stoutish, plain and ordinarily affable is still run by
theatatejevitch 'brothers, the opportunist young men who, at one
Ube* tptroduced the boy king to rather unattractive clatter
prettitutes and to dope,
O1 oll silitary sat hive been scuttled by the ambitious
T ? e
20044Mitat clan, IsavingliebNI uaisportant officers and bewildered
loniperrissai agad * #Oattering of others such as Lieutenant-Colonel
1001141Gbieh, SW aide to tholcing and Colonel Savitch who, the
404.4 mots is sloyal, butlimegy; victim of numerous crack-
sir sad Oaths ground and of numerous bumps on the
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
'31
lbtitch, Ambassador to the United States, is the cleverest
of all Yugoslav statesmen, but his character is under gravebt
assault and his blood relationship to YUgoslav quislings adds fuel
to the flames of criticism.
The most brilliant; perhaps the most serious of Serbs in
exile is Colonel Popovitch, the trusted confidant of General
Bonner Fellers; a man I have found honest, able and informed..
perhaps the best of all intelligence operators in Eastern Europe.
But, the ftejevitch brothers consider him a personal danger and
Lord Menconner lost no opportunity to isolate him.
*Ore serious - from one point of view - than the above is
the attitude and activity of British S.O.E. toward the Yugoslav
mess. It is the opinion of many skilled observers that S.O.E.
meddling and their misinforming of other British departments is
Largely responsible for the present chaotic condition of affairs
in Yugoslavia. Up to my departure from the %addle East it is
highly doubtful if 8.0.30ts Colonel Bailey bad seen or contacted
ilhailovitch for more than half a year; it is suspected that
111hailovitch1s radio messages were forgeries.
Adding suspicion to doubt was the severe attempt on the
part of S.O.I. to prevent O.S.S. direct and independent in-
telligence contact with Mihailovitch; their determination to
block any American direct reporting of conditions in the
1111011oviUh 'area.*
lbile I was on duty in the Middle East o I attempted to
send two reporters ldtobelleved they could use their own means
Inh making contact with the MihallovitCh Headquarters. One an
Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X000niRnnninnn,w14,,
? ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Is presumed lost; the other, after a rugged and diangerons trip
from 1%MmIgr, through Thrace and Macedonia, was turn et back at
tholontenegran frostier and eventually made bin way through
Greece proper across tho Aegean to Turkey, finally etriviug in
Cairo* This agent aet Whallovitchts nen who reported thut
their forces were an the rump seeking shelter; never able to
stay long enough at one spot to establish headcuarters. They
claimed that Partisan sympathizers were reporting their N.Wilt?
moats to occupation troups? Anked if any British officers zero
attached to Mihallovitchls staff, they said there tore none.
lbs agent said the trip was denmous; he would not repeat it
because of his fears of being turned in by Partisan sympathizers
Cl even by Chetnikris
It is doubted If we beve the present means of giving criginai?
factual and correct intelligence concerning conditions inside of
ihnosIavia even Mouth we now have men there.
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
1. The subject has the respect of the
Cretan Guerrillas. He was the companion, guide
and mentor of itKapitanios '7111, during tYat daring
leader's visit to the Middle East.
2, it is recommended that Underwuod's presenc
*Greek Irregular Project* assignment be torminated and
that he be designated to plan for and operate in Crete
under 0. G. direction.,
3. It is recommended that Underwood Lave a
thirty-minute appointment with the Director.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Jfi
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
,?
Some of ou
of w
rience ort
the most excing stories of the war may be
ti
vTitten about the expes r mon vhommanned the calques.
For example -- a load of grenades, boMbs and a..>ed side arms
vas taXen directly to the Port of Pireaus, overloaded vith
Mattetll produce. The Italian authorities toolt the cheese,
olives and unload the
other food and helped our men
ips were made, always
Winitt,Ans -- ill broad daylight. Several tr
with. the same resat. veneraIre
Breton gives me the ecret
time
and if you wish.will try to write n lectu to
a series of s
human tmterest stories that may serve you whering
Wroups.
2, Upitanioe wry the great Cretan guerrilla chief, has
erj g
taltelk Sad% cloth bac3t. to Crete where he expects to have made
a tilos feniform for his 40,errillas Whom he calls nonovanis
NOV., tas WA* )30 ISwen used . ou e was a party
trageously by fiaot who de-
feated on eti4014gieriflo to 0%11 and to which h?
,?
for fartble inforoatfola :see Valor Beir, Captain Maas and con-
Sat litteforlitnat all to assi
of whOmCwere brought in by me st in
tbe orpnizatiOn. of wtoto intelligence today, the
group. Buot mai ntains
ttWillf be aarlocal importance whereas he is,
?..,
egittialibe fiTure on Crete. (See reports an loPts
OttVitiOs tl VOSItelost hiO4elf a Cretan, and by ?Li Vinister
me
So d
Oretan,#) Feeling between an british
(FS* is laet-SOOde, It is een him and
good bet' the hdvanced
*0 fore*,
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
3.The Epirote guerrillas are controlled by ournO
Alex Melas; will tate orders through him from you;
sUbject themselves to S.O.N.. command.
Eubean guerrillas are controllel by our or Elias,
iced in Cairo, awaiting our orders. They will not
oU
accept 6.0.E. command. They would act under aoint American-
Advanced nAlg Force COMMaild. Elias is a political lieutenant
of Alex Melas. Elias is willing to act, temporarily, on an
intellS,gence mission. (Ile is an old agent of the late Greek
Irregular Pro3ect.)
Elias,W an telairtrust Macfarland; like Edwards.
They will not aOcept leadership of any other officer presently
in OSA' 1104145 Bast, unless:that officer works under the di-
?
rection of myself or Macfarland. Elias dominates the island
of %boa poliftiOalTf#
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Contention is made.that Balkan intelligence presently
flaws frau cortrolled sources; that original intelligenge
is scaflt
of bal
it is further contended that no independent source
Information exists. (Exception: lacfarland, througll
of the old Greek Irregular Project plus several new sources,
does receive some valuable intelligence which he channels through
Cairo.)
It is submitted that a comp"?etely secret system under the
direct orders of the Director of his Deputy is required for these
purposes;
1. Check am amtbentipity of intelligence presently received
Friendly foreign sources.
2. Veintatm an independent reporting.systea.
54, Save a bigay 24011e organization ready at once to
secure ;ntelligence which, in emergency, may be required
by the Presidsittt-IX0*. Chiefs Of Staff, or by
ankiflg cabinet
orfieers.
each a aystea exists. It has performed and has been proven.
Apart of the system has been liblownn. A major part is completely
.L14001000 either to our allies or even to OSS officers except the
td4riy
and his itonediate lie+utenants.
14040a provided 086 with its first original inteiligence
0'40 ti**10 wooly lines atigir at a time viteti absence of a directive
ely:Wfrose operatiOns. This system had contacts in
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Greece, Germany, lastria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Swizerland,
Spain and Portugal. All these points report from 4%ime to
tine and these reports were disseminated through regular C)::
sairces without disclosure of their irregular source.
Types of Intelligence reported were: Aerial target
information; Morale of civilians and troops in Central urope
and in occupied countries; Political moves in Germany, Greece,
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
This system suffered the first OSS casualties when four
of its agents were elmeated in Athens.
Though it is unknown to our British allies, it was
activities of agents of this system that the British caique-
ferry service between Greece and Turkey was established, manned
and operated -- and, until March 1943, controlled. (Captain
Zangss, R.S.N. and his staff.) This caique service, operated
at virtually DO cArt to the United States was thea ten over
by combined British agencies.
Russian intelligence was reported by this system through
regular OSS channels.
Through this systrl the Chief of the German intelligence
system was contacted and (inadvertently) the British P.W.L.
enabled to frame him before Hitler.
Through this system Greek morale has been held high despite
fallni and vestilente by the uninterrupted preachings of its
agmato that the might of America was gafhering and soon would
b* felt.
TuFaugh this systeo, the Commanding General of U. S. Army
;.;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
a
_ and Approved For Release 2013/09217: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
_3_
Forces in the Middle East received information tha' led him
to bomb airfields in Saloniki and Athens for the dual purpose
of inflicting military damage and raising Greek morale.
Through this system the Greek Brigades were penetraed at
the request of the American Commanding General who received
resulting intelligence as an emergency service of OSS. (These
reports were also filed with OBS, Washington.)
Through agents of this system, OSS was able to stop a
revolution, prevent further bloodshed between our allies (Greek
and British) and to stop the damaging German propaganda line
in Greece.
Through this system, the United States Anti-Submarine
command received valuable intelligence.
The volume of intelligence was great. Dissemination was
through regular 08$ sources -- t /lout p.scp.pLIt sto
It is submitted that this system should be preserved; its
confidences protected; itirsoperations executed in super-secrecy.
This system taps--and can control--five separate and com-
pletely indepemdent chainsofIligents. This system has its own
g
trained agents in the Balkan States waiting instructions.
There is only one WS official presently in the Middle East
even remotely capable of directing these activities and only one
equilloped by experience to assist him, And the writer is the only
persmable to turn over thite activities.
AecOmseufttion is Made that the writer turn over tc Mr.
*Worland as much of.-these OPerations as can be given him
itth the content of the key -aides.
'""""-",..sgoko41,4g-r44,' - ? -
17"77.*'"
T1P.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 :
e-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
October 21 191.,:
?
1. Attention is called to the changed tone of .%mitt-JsiAL,r
rirk's cabtes,
2. His original position was that George 41 Juld be
returned to Greece by the British v.ith Ame,:ic,An :zup,or- and
there was nothing any Greek could do bout
3. 4y tti,:ny reports carried the oppOsi:e _ad
warned tha.: British 6.0.i., policies in Greqce cre...e
disastrous situa'Aon.
4. Attention is c4il1ed'to the fact that my aciv1zie4; -
under criacisa to you by Major /Mot hz,d maintainel relative
calm In Greek Govermeat circles -7, and in Greece un&I Crete.
Cessation of these activities have allowed the cuerri_la id
Government-in..Exile 0444tioua to get out of h:and e,'; I fore.
048t to you on the eve ai your departure for tk,e diddle Last.
5= It is submitted that during my tour of duty in the
giddte Eavt, my activities were retorted to Waf-hington in
detail and a directive was asked ror; not received.
6 Winether Tot *et morfielal influence is decJired
seep:a figfitleiCally rigIttInf it is here maintained thc.t
arglOor r Uires, potitive informon ezpertJ.y given.
-
4
441
?
4414
"
'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17:
-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
7. It is submittedithat present sources or Greek
f -
intelligence are inexpert, inadequate, sometimes fallacious
and, therefore, dangerous.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Amaimminumunn
?*6
General W. J. Donovan
Ulius L. Amoss
Greek Politics
0C+.oher 21 1?44J
I. AtteLtion is called to the changed tone of Ambassador
Kirk's cables.
2. His original position was that George II ,ould be
returned to Greece by the British with American sup.or and
there was nothing any Greek could do about I.**.
3. my many reports carried the opposite intelligt-nce and
warned that British E.O.E. policies in Greece vould create a
disastrous situation.
4. Attention is called to the fact that my activities -
under criticism to you by Major Huot . had maintained relatiiJe
calm in Greek Government circles - and in Greece a.m. Crete.
Cessation of these activities have allozed the k.uerrilla und
Government-in-Exile situations to get out of a!; I fore-
cast to you on the eve of your departure for the Middle
5. It is submitted that during my tour of auty in r.he
Middle Masts my activities were reported to Wasilingtan in
detail and a directive was asked for; not received,
6. Whether or not unofficial influsnce is iieLired to
keep a figrting ally fighting it Is here maintained that he
Dimmor requires positive information eipertly ;i'en.
_
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/1
7: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
7. It is submitted that present sources of Greek
intelligmce are inexpert, inhdequiAte,
-
.44-4!?1'
?
?????,Er+s, 1 .44
?
? 4 '?
,
;
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Fe;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
ab ?4 wr A 4,11+11.
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INTEROFFICE MEMO
DATE: 9/14/43
Today 14 September 1943, I had lunch with General BRERETON and
his aide Colonel Hobbs.
General BRERETON and the entire general staff of the Ninth Air
Force are en route to England where they will activate the new
invasion air force, the tables of organisation of which were
drawn under the direction of General aANDEE and shown me there
during sprItayvisit to London. General CANDEE will be under
General Brerstonla command.
For the consideration of yourself and General DONOVAN / suggest
the possibility that I might be of some service to the director
of our European Theater Office if I were to be given a short tour
of duty with General BRERETON in England.
9/1 / 9-3 ,14"' lA.c044.1
? ?
? ? 1.
? , 4 "_4?,:.4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
-A?LtLc.,?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7r
/ 7 I I
,L.1
eci ( 4
4--
tlf*
General W. J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Administration Building,
26th and E Streets,
Washington, D. C.
Dear General Donovan:
Greek Maritime Minister Thoofanides, under date of 18 October, 1943,
1. "General Donovan arrived in Cairo the latter part of September while
wrote as follows:
I was in Alexandria. I did not know of his intended arrival nor that
he was in Egypt until after his departure.
"On my- veturn, Colonel Vest called on MB, and gave me a verbal message
2.
to the effect that the Greek Irregular Project was to be dissolved,
but would be revived under another cover; that the General would detain
you in Washington; that he expected to be in Cairo later when.he would
sta longer.
"I asked Colonel Test to convey to the General my thanks for his message;
y
3.
to tell him I regretted not seeing him, and that I look forward to his
forthcoming visit to Cairo. I ask you, Ulius, to convey to the General
how irnxch I really regret having missed him.
4. "General Donovan was the foremost American who with such deep conviction
preached in the United States that moral forces would defeat the material,
and pointed out Greece as an example. In the most critical neriod of aur
Albanian campaign, he held out hope for and confidence in Greece, when
almost DO one else in the war had but prophecies of doom.
"I have always felt that the ease with which the General can penetrate
the psychologies of whole peoples and nations should give everyone the
deepest confidence in the prudence of his judgment on great and vital issues.
With each a: complexity of conflicting interests and ideas with which the
rtreat as w611 as the small nations are beset, it gives persons like myself,
ministers of the governments of allied nations, confidence that Americats
waitht will b.S. felt at the conference tables - and that weight for the good
ar all mankind; a greater hope that our abused world at last may expect
a durable neace.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
'
Vrof
?
nhen the time, comes, Gieece again expects to hear the voice of
General Donovan- and we, the people who did not fail his predict!_ons
And his trust, will be glad.
Tce remembered that -even during the evacuation, the General foretold
the behind-the-lines role which Greece would play despite starvation
and ruination; that that moral force in which the General placed such
confidence eventually would turn' the tide.
?I am inexpressibly glad and proud to have made his acquaintance, and
am happy that, with you, I have never lost confidence in the greater
roles the General would play, particularly in the Balkans, where his
knowledge of us and our faith in him rides so high.
9. 41 do hope to see the General soon in Cairo; it was almost a heartbreak
t6 - me that I' missed_ him on his last trip.
10. wAfteyOur :departure I saw almost nothing of Paul West. And the
discontinuance of the Greek Irregular Project has saddened me, for you
and I know the' contribution it has made, and could have continued to make
in ever:.;,,expanding scope. - I hope that some other "cover" soon will be
gi'Z.STI:J--io-.;tbat- its impartial and valuable services may continue to the
benefit of all the, United Nations. - But there is no one here who can
place you and your knowledge and understanding- of us.
,
presence-s,here,Creekted-.that,,confidence to 'necessary to full
-collaboration'on the, part- Of a 'po6P1e. who,- by historical compulsion, ,
have such deep-rooted and general distrust of .everybody and every plan.
, 4 , ,
Your long Service in and, many kindnesses for Greece make it impossible
_f,Or:there:td-be any _other substitute for you. And so, for this reason,
_and' because I w your- faithful friend of so many years standing, I can
wish: nothing-,better f,Jr-- us - than seeing you among us soon at this period,
--' ? -- -- i'-:-..,,,- ,,,,
h-e, .eve-Or somany:imPortant events for Greece.
12, *Meese extend my kindest regards to General Donovan, and tell him for
? me that we need him to visit us ..atain. Also, please give my best wishes
to Colonel Buxton, whose sober and penetrating judgment is another and
- : .-;;-, ', Wortant reason why I have such faith in 0.S.S. And, also, please
s- remeetere td Colonel Bruce, who, as I understand, is again in Washington.
A:: g
bless ybou, your great leader and all your associates.
F
you have recognized, Mr. Theofanides is an important person for 0.8.6.
,It, is suggested that You acknowledge his sentiments.
1,1Theoanidee, Captain Alex Maas is important to us. As the tide
rsikk politics flows, Melas assumes more and more national importance.
-,. , . ,
Th Eptrrte1-eitierilles still are rsubject to his control. He still exercises
, erable_ inflqpnee,on- the Island of Eubia and some influence in Attica.
,A.
, , c n
744
Declassified and Approved
For Release 201
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Ulius L. Amoss
Melas has not been well used by us. After hevine served O.L.
behind enemy lines; after having been wounded in American sereice,
both the Assistant Military Attache, Lt. Col. 1Rasbas, end eur
Lt. Col. Paul West fell into the political trap set by Melasf
enemies, and associated themselves with the Royalist camoaign to
discredit him. I respectfully point out possible unfnrtlinate cnnseegences
of our disloyalty to a soldier so loyal to us. His resentnent aeelnst es
and things American would be a natural consequence nf a continled ant4-"felles
attitude in O.S.S. in the Middle East. Melas certainly will be a member
of the Liberation Parliament. He may be a member of the Libel-, tion Cabinet.
But, besides the future, it is important to have the benefit of Melast
continued cooperation now, since he controls an important intereieence
net-work originally put together for the discontinued Greek "Irregular"
Project. I have recommended to Ar. Sheperdsnn that Melas repo-t tn
Yr. Macfarland, since Macfarland hes the confidence of Meles - and that
the salvaged parts of the Greek "Irregular" Project be handled by Macfarland.
In the interests of success for an independent O.S.S. operation, I
respectfUlly, but etrong)yl urge favorable consideration of this proposal.
15. James Underwood, by his own motion, secured dismissal of the case nendinr
against him, James Curley, Donald Wakefield Smith and three other former
directors of the Engineers Group, Inc. He is, therefore, free to return
to our service. I rate Underwood at the top of all 0.5.5. operatives I
know in personal courage coupled with physical ingenuity. He is a
nio-
and a great expert in firearms. He is the one man I would choose tc be
with me behind the lines, for his physical proficiency is superb, and his
loyalty to yourself is unshakable. He can submit to torture without
revealing:anything. (Proved by his record in China.) He wants to be sent
behind the lines in Crete or preferably-Yugoslavia. It is recommended
that he be notified now that his services are required. If you, at any
time, need a personal party, Underwood would be a story-bnok aide.
16. On this, the eve of my departure for my new assignment with General Brereton,
I wish to thank you for the opportunity I have had of serving you, and to
state that, so far as will be consistent with my new duties, I stand ready
to be of any assistance possible to you or your deputies.
?
. .
A
4.;
L
- ' ? - ?;^-7/.1"0:1`
?
?
41W-
?
Declassified and and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
? Ai
Declassified and _Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
mummemmi
Re: Caloti2in Alexpnder Yelas
Please attach the enclosed letter from
Col.Amoss re the above dated Aug.27
with the report which you are going to
submit to General Donovan.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
immiswin
1'8
?
-
a
.P
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
tOINIMINEMOlmnar?
INTEROFFICE MEMO
TO: Colonel Edward G. Buxton
FROM Ulius L. Amos
SUBJECT Captain Alexander Melas
DATE: 27 August 1943
1. The following cable was received. "We recommend
that Captain Ilexander Melas be retained in the United
State e and not returned to OSS in Cairo. We make this
recommendation because of his generally poor standing with
the Greeks here. Lieutenant-Colonel Richards will offer more
detailed information on the subject."
2. Captain Melas was the first agent repkined by the
Greek Irregular Project back of enemy lines. He directed our
operations there. Ho was wounded in our service. He escaped
from Greece and reached Cairo early in March. He was employed
by the Greek Irregular Project as our Liaison with the "Revo.
lutionaries" and our "bird dog" briaging escapees for us for
interviews. He later was appointed as Liaison Officer for the
Greek Armed Forces with OSS in particular and the T.!. S. Army
Forces in the :Middle East in general.
3. Melas is a bitter enemy of the King and !rine Minister
Tsouderos. We have other Greeks in our employ who are friends
of the King and of the Prime Minister. It is not possible to
get any one Greek to represent both sides. It is necessary to
draw from beth comps. The King himself fully understands this
and told me he had no objections to our employ:Lent of Melts
who rendered the King yeoman service in aiding me to stop the
March Revolution against the King and his Governmert.
4. For 17 years Moles has been a member of Greek Parlia-
ments. Ho is the confidant of Banister for Navy, Venizelos
and Minister for Air, Admiral Voulgaris.
5. One of the chief reasons for bringing Melas here was
the urgent request of the Prime Minister who has followed his
usual pattern in attempting to cut the ground from under the
feet of people" that he dispatched abroad.
6. Melas a national hero and an OSS hero has won the right
to expect support. and applause from the Organisation he has
...u..04.0.........???????????mc.e.......e? ??????
F
7
II "
"s*
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001 0o0nnlf1-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
served BO well. I will take the same stand toward representatives
of the ring who have served us if and when they are attacked by
the Veneziliets.
7. Colonel West he no personal experience in Greece. Greece
is not a field for amateurs. I am able to command the respect and
adherence to my requests by all sides in the Greek political arena
because I have never run out on the support of my friends an any
side and because I ha7e fought with one group to save the lives of
their condemned advTsrsaries and have fought with these adversaries
when they were in power to save the lives of the late governors.
If we want to lose all hope of holding the most astonishing con-
fidences of ali Greek political leaders then we must run out on
those who have served us loyally.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
`v.
,r?
14.*
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
ite
4
41,
MY'
150(110ORGAIMATION 0? ITHE rREKK rfOE ?RAT
To expel the enemy it is necessary to organize the "erek 'rt
as a secret army. To succeed it is necessar., to euvOyze tee folleneez
factors: task, enemy, battlefield, and means.
Task:
The task is the continuation of the struge:le of the creek te
battle by the side of his Allies. The task reluires the orf-Anizat'en of
an .SZTlys but, since it is impossible to eobilize end eusiele er orthodox
military force, it is therefore neeeseary to use tee peo:Ao of lreece to
destroy communicatiors, t'ace, air-eields, duepr, and factories. Sech ees-
truction must be underteken only after coordination with t'le :lens sf the
Allied 21anners. Such ectivity is an instrument ef war and the operaeiens
must be viewed as a part of the rand stretelef of dla oar. The eellowing
actions can be organized and cen spread throu]hout Greece and an operate
according to a plan. The forces of the Greek peoi,le have the eollowing
capabilities:
A. To strike hard; to steike with all the elements cf surprise; quick with-
drawal. There forces must be highly mob3le.
.1?.. The volunteer Irregular Forces of the Greek 2eople must he provid3d with
special armament allowing them to move freely but powerfully enough to
in!eict heavy loss.
C. Thome forces oust be enabled to act simultaneovsly in various parts of
the country.
D. Supplies must include specially prepared explosives to be utilized for
mines and demolition charges effective in a wide variety of sehotage.
E. All forces must have constant contact with each other.
F. They must have the means of supply without drainin7 the communities
from whieh they stem.
Jo Materiel of war must be supplied continuously and regularly.
H. General direction of the campaign must come under the control of the
'eneral Headquarters of the Allied 9'orcee in the Hddle Fast.
The enemy is the orgarized force of the Axis. It is equipped with the
most modern equipment; It has at its disposal all the resources of the
eountry. The destruction of soh forces is possible only by the opposition
of an equal and similarly equipped force, but it is always possible to
maintain harassing operations. Such action will contain many units of the
Fcr.
jr.
SECRET
g
Tor
141k1Arri27.77-
;AL
?
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13xonnnl Pnnnl nrmonn
?4
,
t
4,
?34'
J
V..
.e
1
4
?
:
T
???????
'
I 1.
?
???
:4-40
ete
144,
t.4
41A
19Z ? .......,...kracrJee ?
Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
- 2 -
SECREt
Organization of the Greek Home Front (continue)
enemy; well require their dispesition of rerious forces to restrain the
activities of the Irregelars. An example is the occupation (se tea-es
Italian divisions which were reeuired to deal with three euereilla eetenh-
meats whose total strength was not more than 100 men and who opereted in
the following mountains: Parnassos, Chiona, and Oete. Such operetions
not only obstruct commaflications and render supe' dieficelt but combined
with a withdrawal of:the enemy such guerrilla activity will inflict
serious losses en him.
The Battlefield:
The battlefield for the people of Greece is the whole of Greece. The
terrain is distinguished by its broker eround, high mountain and forests
and rivers and streams. Communications are precarious and there is an
abundance of highland villages inhabited by Greek patriots; its fishing
tawns and its innumerable coast and island groups. It is on this erouna
that the Irregular %roes of the people of Greece will be celled to operates
Greece from a general strategic aspect is a point of land projecting
at considerable length into the Mediterranean. It is the second communicaticn
land route from Europe to Africa, the first being Italy.
For an enemy operating from north to south, I.e., from Europe to Afr4ee,
who has not mastered the Mediterranean and who has not adequate naval means,
tais peninsular communication toward Africa diminishes the sea distance end
enables him to effect surprise. being near Africa, enemy air forces are
strengthened by these near air bases. The groups of islands and the multi-
shaped coasts provide cover and concealment for naval transport. Besides
all this, Greece is the main arch of the great artery which flaws from the
Mediterranean to Central Europe through the Vardar valley to the Danube and
to the doors of other secondary roads which leave through the Struma Valley
and the Maritia to the Sofia area and therefrom to Central Europe. On the
other hand, the Greek peninsula, bordering on Turkey, may serve as a basis
for operations from west to east against Turkey.
The enemy in operating against Africa makes use of Greek soil, of Greek
communications, harbors and coasts for the transport of troops to Africa.
The enemy, in the event of action directed at him from the south, will
secure the doors leading to his interior. If ope-nting against Turkey he
will make full use of Greece as e starting poiut. For the enemy Greek
territory is enemy territory. For this reason he has to maintain serious
forces for his security.
It is necessary to study this territory first from the point of view
or communications and, second, es a center of supply bases. From the first
point of view Greece has not a thick web of communications. It has one main
artery and several secondary arteries:
*-.111- ? "-N....
SECRET
-
I
? ,
Declassified and A
1 ? ,t
proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnr-mi
rr
-
?
`4??
? ? .
?
?.?43- ; "
th
:
? -
-4?;;;?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
From north to south:
(1) The main railway line from north, i.e., from Central Suroi,e throv-,1. the
Vardar ITallez* leading to Salonika, Larissa, Laria, Athens and therefrom another
one to Pelopponese, Calamas. This is the main rail line used by the emery.
(2) The road from Salonika to Kozani, Florina, Monastiri, re- Salonika,
Edessa, Florina, to the Vardar Valley, Scoria, Danube or Korani, Larissa,
Athens.
(3) The rail line through Maritza Valley and nearby the road from Dedatz
(Alexandroupolis), Dhidhimolikhon, Mustapha Pacha, Phi lippopolis (Plordir)
to Sofia. This line ir bound to play a considerable role in case of
operations against Turkey.
(4) The road line through the Struma Valley from Serres, Koula to Sofia.
(5) The road line from Komotini, Koussouk, Kayak to Philippopolin.
From east to west:
(6) The rail line from east to west, which from Salonika leads to
Alexandroupolis. This is the main line which the enemy, in case of op.irations
directed eastwards to Thrace, is bound to employ on the Greek soil.
(7) The road line from Salonika to Serres, Drama, Konotini, klexandeoupolis
near the railway line.
(8) The road line Volos, Larissa, Trikkala, Kalambaka, Metsovo, Yanina to
Prevega, Aeta or Valons. This road is used by the Italians transporting
their forces from Italy through Adriatica.
The most important of these communications is that which runs through
Yugoslavia and the Vardar Valley to Salonika, Larissa and Athens; the
unique artery from Central Europe to continental Creece and the Pelopponese.
These communications are vulnerable and a proper subject for destruction.
They extend over high moantains, on broken country, passing across rivers
and stliams, over and through I,ridges and tunnels and other features easily
destroyed. Under the menace of destruction, the enemy will he compelled to
guard these works with considerable force. These guards are those which the
Irregulars will have to strike by surprise.
The enemy uses Greek ports as his bases; his administration, stores,
dumps and factories are to be found in Piraeus and Salonika. Volos, Patros,
Prevega an Larissa are of secondary importance.
In the two large cities, Athens and Salonika, he has naval bases and
headquarters, and his stores and factories as well.
..///aPraffShItilifiediteliS72.4.1?14.051.4WPW.tr...,,,
!, el%i',1/11r
? ? If LI' ? ,
?
? ?
" - 4
? ? ,s
,
4
? ? _
? ; .;,14. ? ;:
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
e
r.
-
:11
. -
I r
1.:
14 ?
? -. I 1-
- ,.
-?
4
'4:22
eee.44.-
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
?4
MEI
Organisation of the Greek Home Front (centinued)
SECRET
These must be destroyed. While disruption of commueications in the open
country has to be carried on by Irregulars, demolition in the eities 7-10:
be performed by saboteurs.
Examininp: the terrain from one point of view, we se-- that, as it is
covered win forests and broken ground, it favors concealment of eovement
and action by surprise. The inhabitants and 'reek patriots will hely and
contribute with their knowledge of the terrair, its iaths and hidine pieces.
The highland villages can always be centers of supyl: and signal.
Eteamining the ground from the point of view of the distribution of *asks,
it can be see-e that it provides the poss;Iiility of dispersing tasks over
large areas so that in every area the eontrol of detachments could he exer-
cised easily, as well as liaison between the detachment?. The areas could
be divided as follows:
-
4
Cr,
r.
w.
71-
,
? ;
(1)
The area surrounded by the mountains of Orthrys, Jet?, liona, Parnasses,
El ikon, %;hlomos.
(2)
The area surrounded by the mountains of Olympus, Pieria, KaTVOUTIlls east
slopes of Pindos, Chasia, Orthrys.
f;?..
(3)
The area including Epirus and the Aeta and Carpenisei area.
(4)
The area including Western kacedonia.
(5)
The area including Centre.' Eacedonia.
?'
(6)
The area nclueing Eastern Yacedonia and Thrace, with Pag;aion and the
south slopes of hhodopi as a basis.
????
(7)
The Pelopponese area.
The guerrillas operating in each of these comlbartments should be under
the same command and these commands should be directest from -Lie center in
Athens. The territorial independence of these areas will easily allow the
command the supplying of its detachments.
The restrictive measures taken by the enemy for the use of communicstioes,
and the scarcity of the.means of communications themselves, present e great
difficulty In supplying the detachments with wer materiel from the center.
Only the dispatch of money and other similar material eoald be -arried out
from the center to these areas. In this case, the means of supplying the
detachments through another method should be considered. This method should
be either from the air or from the sea.
Suplay from tile air should be carried out aircraft dropping war
materiel on spots previously appointed by commanders of the guerrillas the
center to ol Wormed. 3esides this ;lectern Macedonian area, all the other
areas are surrounded by the sea and therefore provided with coasts and
shores, so that it is always poskible to establish secret beach operations
for various craft or submarines coming directly from Egypt or Syria threrezh
Tnrkeys carrying necessary equipment and war materiel, to unload it on
these beeches end therefrom, through covered approaches, transport it to the
interior. The Western Macedonian area supply should only be maintained by
air, but the possibility of supplying this area through the Olympus and
Central Masedorian areas by sea should also be considered.
SECRET
-*----..r.,,r.r7rerryonntne-nr7ernahrnernerron AngrolC.IPaLitilinracrinM?ranint.nc....- no-rnn-errnSi....59 ?
r 4
e.lbr"r?
?
14:4 X
41-A ?
a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
1
Is .
? ?
-::1
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
For action we need maapower and more materiel. the neans available
in Greece is both physical and spiritual; of these two the letter IR most
important. The Greek people are faithful to their history. They lave fouott
through the ages to maintain their freedom. Enslaved more than once, they
have a tradition of breaking their bonds. Veither persecution, imprison-
ment nor execution - not eeen torture - has ever stopped the Creek striggle
for liberty. This powerful impulse, bred in the very fibre of the Greek.,
offers assurance that there is no Greek who is not ready to offer himself
as a sacrifice for his country*
Besides the will and the courage to fight, the Greek has manpower. The
extraordinary task ahead requires men highly endowed with special military,
physical, and mental and :-oral ebility sn that (a) No one will nesitate to
face any danger but will look forward with eagerness to hezerdous saei:nrents;
"h) Everyone must have such initiative and intelligence so that each will to
able to operate alone, making the best decision under every eireumeteace;
(c) Physical toughness rill allow them to stand the hardshirs they must face.
They must be able to march through mountain passes, ravines, forests; to leee
sleep and be without food for days.
The officers end men who will form these Irregular Nuclei will be se-
lected beforehand. Native Greek ine;enuity and intelligence are round in
both city and country. The rtral Greek is tough and frugal and is able
to cover great distances on foot with poor rations. He has been inured
from boyhood to hardship and privation. The high and tough qua2ities re-
quired for these dangerous operations are common in Greece.
Mobilization of this manpower should be carried out in the areas of
operation so that participants are familiar with the terrain in which they
will function, but tnough the highly fitted manpower is available in quantify,
war materiel is scarce.
Armament: Following the destruction and surrender of Greek arms by
certain Tnrings and the enemy's energetic search for hidden weapons, there
is a dearth of :suitable arme. Many rifles have been hidden by patriots but
the concentration of these arms is difficult. The actual zun s availahle lack
ammunition. The rifles vary in type and pattern and render ammunition supply
o difficult problem. There are a very few automatic weapons such as Hotchkiss
light machine guns but, again, very little ammunition. A few pistols of
various makes and calibre are found but are also without ammunitten. There
are no grenades. Amdunition which has beea dropped lately from the air was
not deposited in the areas agreed on due to inefficiency cf liaison and sig-
Clothins Clethes and shoes ere scarce. The price for such materiels as
can be oun is exorbitant. The present Irregular organizations heee no funds.
Small and sporadic purchases of shoes and trousers have not been serious
enough to be of any use.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000lnn1gnn
' ? ;
? / .
-
-r??4
rz?
44,
=p,
?.?
? ?r
?
.A.0
: ?
. ;.-
44.
?
??
?
????
?
,;AtTo,
(????'????
?
Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
-4--7
Crganizatian or the Greek Home Front (continued)
SECRET
Food: Food is supplied locally. The people of the count:7 nave fed
and WTTrfeed the Irregulars, but the lamentable condition of r'ireeee :re.
vents really adequate food supply since vast areps face stervation con-
ditions. While the peasant supplies what food he has, it is a hc,rdsh3p
and Irregulars have no funds for the varchase of fond. coald lead to
eventual problems and some dissatisfaction on the part of the si.pplyng
peasants.
Liaison and Signals: The present liaison between the field IrregiAlao
detachments is inadequate - so sketchy that it eannot be taken into aeoount
seriously. The same deficiency applies to signale.
CONCLUSIONS
ifter the above examination the following conclusions are drawn:
I. Organization. The fighting forces to be employed to continue the battle
of the Greek people against its enemy, thereby contributing to the united
effort of free nations, should be divided into two forms:
A. Organized forces for operation in open country to engage and
strike the enemy and to effect destruction or the enemy's
communications and supply columns.
Organized forces of sabotage for operation in the cities for
the purpose of destroying headluerters, harbor installations,
stores, dumps, factories, etc.
To distinguish between these two forces we refer to them ap "Trregolers"
and "Sabotage Parties'.
2. Irreulars. War establishment, organization and control. As has been
pointed out, Irregulars should operate all over Greece in liaison and
collaboration with each other under the direction of a central general staff.
The general staff' must have at its disposal all of the necessary means of
communication and signals. It should be situated in Athens or wherever
conditions indicate, and should direct and control the entire Home Front,
maintaining closest possible touch with Allied GHQ in the Middle East. The
Greek general staff will receive all its orders and directions from ',Hied
In each area Irregular chiefs will order the operations of their men and
Will provlde for liaison with the general staff and for supply.
in each area there should be more than one detachment according to exlst-
ing possibilities. The strength of each detachment should not exceed 30 or
40 men. When larger forces are needed the area chief should have the pOS3i-
ilit7 of concentrating as many detachments as 'are necessary.
SECRET
111461141441,14.12=4.44130oetkioArArSi.,A/44
?4.p.
Declassified and Ap
dig
- ?
roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001Ronninnnqnni 7
???
(4,
'
,;?? .7.:
.711
'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Armanent. The Irrezulars must have adequate firepower so ee to be eeie
to inflia as much loss on the enemy as possible and so es to have the eeans
of defense. At all times they must be light and mobile. They sneele be
equipped with small and shoulder errs Rnd with grenades erd explosives.
There should be a number of automatic slell arms including sub-meres!nes-ens
and light maceine guns. Each detachment of from 30 to 40 men saould borie
three subemachine or light machine :ems. All other men must be supplied nit?,
rifles, all of the same calibre, and a pistol and erenades. 'or lossible
major operations undertaken by the area chief, there must be at nis iiseesal
a number of medium machine guns, light artillery end mortere.
.Clothing. Only as a last expedient should Greece be depended epo-i for
the supply of clothing and shoes.
Retions. As as been pointed out, fooi condit
The enew seizes all food supplies it can. There r
villagers can hide. Supplying. the Irregulars with
Each detachment snould be supplied with some money
but they should also be furnished with tinned food*
ions ie :reface are lamentable.
emains only the lit"e the
food is not an easy task.
for the iurchase of food,
Liaison and Signals. Closest liaison between the Irreeulars and eFZ
Uiddle East must lpe maintained at all times. It is not necessary to bo greatly
concerned with morale, since morale is high and loyalty toward Great Iritein
and the jutted States is unshseeeable. Owing to certain conditions in ereece,
communications must be carried out by radio and couriers. Between ereek he-e-
luartere and GHQ Middle East, messages will be sent by radio (lee couriers, ane
also between Greek headquarters and area chiefs. Two radio installations of
large power are required; one for immediate use and the other to be held in
reserve. A number of smaller sets are required for liaison between Greek
headquarters and area chiefs and between the chiefs themselves. For proper
efficiencse each detachment should have e smell wireless set.
Supply Bases. In each area there aeould be several sea bases at which
material can be unloaded and dispatched through covered approaehes to the
interior. There must be also several pre-selected places in each srea where
euppltes can be droppsd from the air.
Sabota e Parties* Sabotege Parties should be formed by 'reek petriots
rest ng intectes and the parties will vary in number acnordinr to the
task assigned to each. Those in Athens and Piraeus should be leder the control
of the center in Athens but those in Salonika should be directed by a represen-
tative of the center. Representatives of the center therefore should be
supplied not only with the necessary material but also with necessary wireless
comrunications. The Parties must be well trained in the 4136 of explosives are
sabelace materiel, and each member should De armed witn sidearms.
NOT1 BY ME AUTHOR. (The writer of the asove is the Operetions Officer of a
0.1431=i743747171.1tee in Athens.) 1 have only one wish - that the 'reek -ere
?rent should be organized immediately. Organization end supply will take time.
lreek patriots are impatient to operate against their hated onemy. Trusting
their Allies with complete enfidenee, they still crave assurance that the fieht
goat on so Awe they can offer themselves for their country and the common ideal
Of liberty.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Colonel Ellery C. Huntington,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Ellerp
Herewith are six photographs of the Headquarters Staff of the
Cretan Irregulars, all but two here in Cairo, all re-equipped
by OSS. The blurred photograph is a picture of "Kapitanios"
Y, the C. in C. of Cretan resistance. The photographs are
sent through you to General Donovan with the respectful com-
pliment of Kapitanios Y. I would be pleased if you showed
the photos to Dave Halliwell, Watts Hill, Lane Rehm, Wes How-
land and to the members of my old section staff. (Due to the
orders of Mr. Shepardson I cannot write of Irregular Activity
except through you without having the possibility of many eyes
-. seeing very dangerous material. I am sure that you will agree
that true security is had when only those concerned know secret
matters - with no exceptions made.)
You will be interested to know that we have re-equipped these
men and that by the time you receive this letter they will
be back in their caves in Crete - where I expect to join them
for a brief morale visit at a little later date.
Without exception, every man pictured has lost even female
young and aged relative by execution or torture. They are tough.
My most difficult job is to prevent their ordering an immediate
massacre. They say that life is not worth living and that they
won't wait Ch. before "killing the bastards."
Sincerely
(sgd) Ulius
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
? sr
?
'
? 2
t
LJ
- ?
?
t
? -
?
_J
4,1
-I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
22 April, 1943
Colonel Ellery C. Huntington
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.
Dear Ellery:
The following are activities we have under way.
INTELLIGENCE
Reports from three of our agents now in Greece. Reports from
Acting Chief of Caique Operations, Izmir.
OPERATIONS.
Organizing of maintenance gang and crews for calque operation
from Izmir to Eubia, later operation to mainland to Greece.
Dispatch of agent to Yugoslavia. Organizing of P.T. service
from Cyrenaica to Crete. Arraagements with Ninth Air Force for
dropping bodies into Yugoslavia.
COMMUNICATIONS.
rxangernens A.T.C. signal system to receive and send mes-
sages for occupied territories and for any other points. (Mac
farland and Edwards). This arrangement is sensationally important,
secure.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Visseminatien of rumors to Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Asmara,
Crete and Athens. Broadcasts by our officers in cooperation with
Leete performed before leaving, Mocarski is performing
and other officers not with OSS are speaking.
arations are made for dropping of ten thousand T.N.T. charges
in the vicinity of Athens. Otherwise no immediate plans are made
pending authorization of JCS, but surveys are being undertaken
so that the S.O. program can proceed without delay.
--,,gwesokommisiess4?????.....44-..4 ~4.'4,44 S-444104441 W444% 4:.'11 rals
?t.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
I.
???
-tt
.e
V
r y
4
414
?
- ? .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7."::
MILITARY OPERATIONAL GROUPS.
We have discussed plans with the "Xapitanio" or Chief of Cretan
Guerrillas and his headquarters staff. We have equipped these
seventeen men for their return to Crete and we have trained and
are sending back with them a competent radio opera Lor. This group
has sixteen thousand skilled fighters partially armed with German
guns captured from the enemy. Larger numbers can be mobilized if
equipment is provided. If and when coordinated with theatre stra-
tegy. an airfield can be seized and the greater part of the occupy-
ing troops can be massacred. (I write the above in chunks, de-
tailed plans are in hand.).
We have traded out an arrangement with the former Chief Operations
Officer of the E.A.M. now Chief Operations Officer of the new
E.D.E.M. which has split off from the Communists. The E.D.E.M.
is composed of the Sociali-I Party, the Plastiris Party and three
small parties. (It is believed that the strong Cafandaris Party
will join). The officer is ready to return to Athens and to comm-
unicate with us. We will send with him our trusted major E. Who
has just recently escaped for the purpose of coordinating his
plan with us. I enclose a free and hastily made report made by
this Major which at least gives the-apirit of the wishes of him-
self and his organization. We are making arrangements for the
Major to return to Athens.
ARMY COOPERATION
ISTEWsupport of the Army continues. Hank Wild, Adjutant
General of USAFIME and I are almost inseparable friends and on
more than one occasion he has told officers - "It's the General's
wishes, whateve" OSS wants they're to have without argument." Day
before yesterday I had a little lunch mi for King George at my
flat with General Strahm, Gus Guenther and Pack Macfarland attend-
ing. Strahm is still glowing - especially since the King signed
his Short Snorter note. I'm continuing these little luncheons -
Prime Ministers, Ministers of War, etc, and good will is a'building.
But we would like to see you again - and scon.
With the regards and affections of all.
Sincerely,
(sgd) Ulius
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
.
Dear lIrs. Sieber:
This is beinc; dashed oef in a very reat hurry ss t pouch Oc3es
and the L:ommandine General wants to see me (lucky fellow) tot'-. qt Lhe
same time.
znclosed you will find a paraphrase of a telegram which I wish you
would s'r.ow in secret to Duke Shepardson - and, if thcr:ght desirable,
to Colonel Donovan. I send lt as R first hand exhibition of what we are
doing in the Irregular Project with the help of the Greek Navy, (un-
officially) and Generel Brereton. :his business probably will be handled
by Theofanides and we will not appear in At. Here, on; Generals Strahm
and 3rereton knai what's going on, and Colonel uuenther, of course. This
means that we will have a full blown calque service between Turkey and
Greece just is the Rritish do - end we will take over the former 3reek
service and direct it completely. This does not preclude Aegular activity.
It does not come under the 1-ritish - since it works out from furkey ard
it is not an S.C. activity. It is not even O.S.S. - it is Greek ,Jovern-
went - which explains why I have worked so hard to keep the Greek revolu-
tionists and the Government together and to have Theofanides ke2t in
office Its a request - or rather a demand by both sides. It looks now as
if I have succeeded. The in will probably accept some modified ter-is
of the revolutionists and the new government will be made up 1)0:!, of
close friends of oars from both sides.
This should all be communicated to those in hashington and New York
who are interested. But ceation every one that the Irregular Project HAS
to stay incognito or it will run into trouble instead of success as it is
now having.
With regards to ail.
Sincerely,
(Si&aed) U. L. A.
-
c.. ,
4c
-T11,4L- ?-,v2-4,t..
\
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
?arapl-rase
(From: Zangas, For: Boyotas)
This must not be repeated to any Greek or other officer as it is
personal and secret. All our files, especially those of personal letters
and information, orders to the centers and bulletins of information,
must be discreetly removed to the American Consulate from the orfice in
the British Consulate at MERL. Until my return Blase, PAITNAACTC" "Ind
all my ?etty Officers must remain at their posts. Even though 3ritish
have proposed dissolvement of our service, retention of contact with
occupied Greece is my general purpose. Even if DIAMANTOPOULOS is not
at 73ESME, arrange posibili*.y to pass to all personnel secret orders.
contact with KAM and all our personnel must urgently be insured
by DIAMAIWOPCULOS througl, FAPASTEFANOU and MINIOTIS Brothers. Must be
advised of all departures and arrival of KAIKS at once. Agents money IS
tomh:cming. Also in order that we may communicate by phone, liaison with
IIESME should be arranged. Above message will please be urgently commurv,ca-
ted through IZMIR Naval Undercover Observer, Williams.
(SlOsti) Brereton
ssa,wilowleididarr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xonnni Pnnnintinorw,
n
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
?,?
paOMNOofeei*ffie
Cairo March 16, 1943
We now have more agents in Greece amd one each touring Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria. The Greek political pot boils so furiously that I haven't
time to set down events is they happen. At the momeat of this writing
it looks as if things might be patched up. I am in touch with leaders of
both sides and have spent many hours with them and if this thing blows
over, tie O.S.S. will have Leen responsible in that its local half
colonel has
I. Tamed the King.
2. 4uieted the Prime Minister
3. Had the Liberal Leaders pull in their horns temporarily
4. Induced military commanders to return to their posts.
5. Kept the Greek S.I. operatives at their jobs and kept
that service from slitting into groups working against
each other.
On the Irregular side, I will have a report to make as soon as a few more
pieces are fitted together.
I have tho full support of British P.W.E. and of all its branch end depart-
ment heads. I hive not been in recent touch with S.O.E. Glenconner is al-
wayf ill or out of the country and It seems to me that he is purposely
delaying coming to grips with our matters. I have been warned by ranking
British officers that all British sections comOain that Glenconner refuses
to be pinned down and that by these tectice he finally manages to write
his own ticket - meetings being called finally when other interested
parties are uiavailable. He has a very bad name for this sort of thing in
S.L.S# and P.M& and requests have been forwarded to London asking that
he be recalled. But we'll see - at least on the surface our relationships
are extremely friendly - but I judge relationships by results - and there
have been no results.
We need a strong counter-intelligence section here - and quickly. Our
enemies are extremely active and in most subtle ways. Their present
method is framing and black mail and undermining of confidence. Unfortunate-
ly, they work through officers and secretaries 'who are either all . or
in part gullible or traitoriaus. lighispers are started and stories circu-
lated involving the character and deportment of important officers. They
have been so successful that one or two very important links from here
to the Balkans are under serious question by their chiefs. Fortunately
their is net enough impetus to do more than annoyance - because when the
charges were investigated, no subatantiation was found . but It has had
the effect of arousing resentment in the part of really heroic agents
that they should hove been doubted for a moment. One Chief British agent
went so fox es to return his decorations and refuse to accept them even
though an apology was forthcoming; in most abject terms.
*.
Declassed and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RD1p13Xnnnn1Drinni rw,?
v. ?
Declassified and Ape.......rove_d For Release 2013/09/1
. 2 .
This thing will catch up with us sooner or later depending on haw
good are our results and I want to prevent it long before it happens
and, selfishly, I dont want it to happen to me. I am extremely asreful.
I go nowhere at night unless in cowany with another officer. But here
is one weak spot that I would play on if I were working on am.
As I have written. I have been at least partially successful in having
matey of the Greek Liberals call off their dogs from attacking the King. They
understand my motives and agree - BUT . what a perfect set-up for a rumor
to circulate that I am supporting the Jiing and am trying to help him retain
his throne. I am watching for this type of attack - and have warned my Liberal
friereis of the possibility. But while I have anticipated (adequately, I hope,)
this attack . there must be many other innocent and useful activities - (and
there will be more) that could be twisted.
I am particularZy careful in my relationships with the British. When I
hear criticisms about them, 1 present the British side of the picture and at
all odds refuse to allow myself to be jockeyed into a position where I could
be quoted . though just a listener. Aad I am very careful when I talk to
the British because I have reason not to trust their security. (As a matter
of feet every one out here is too casual about his gossip and far too much
is bandied about . and the enemy has no trouble in hearing of the most
secret discussions. So I insist that we need a strong C.I. section FAST.
Then . I have a very strong suspicion that we are not in touch with
the real British secret intelligence. I doubt if it works through S.I.S.
I an almost morally certain that they have their awn irregular activity;
that S.I.S. is merely out in front and can afford to be generous with
information. The other evening I was invited by a lady with high connections
in Greece to meet the "President" of the International Red Cross. The Swiss
Colonel was conveniently lute and three British officers, also guests corn-
ered me and in a delightfully clever way tried to get me talking about many
things. I have tried to investigate, quietly, the role played by these
officers in the British scheme of things. One is nominally attached to the
Aga Khan - but no one has an assignment at which he works - so there must
be assignments that do not appear at which they work. They do not play in
British Security or C.I. precincts . and I n guessing that they are a
secret C.I. crowd. love noticed other things that don't quite fit together -
and I believe we should know what wa are facing - and if it is harmless,
okay - but let/3 know.
We need FAST - an
AIRGRAFE RECORDER - MODEL C with reproducer and all equipment.
It is manufactured by KODAK and is used for V Mail. We need it for repor-
duotion of documents I sm "borrowing" and which have to be returned to files
and for a flood of reports now starting to coma in from our own channels.
It Is probably expensive tut it is very necessary if we are to function
properly.
s'17 f,b1116.?3?41,... S. ?
?
17'774
'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDPtl)(nnnn
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
This is inside dope on the personal set up here. I think you should
make this available to Jr. Shepardson, and Mr. Halliwell - and let Jimmie
Murphy know that it is available in case Colonel Donovan ix interested:
G2
USAFIME is staffed largely with man from SOS sne partly by Ninth Air Force.
The pcitvre resembles this .
The arrows stem from the organization to which an Officer belongs and
point to smother post he also holds. It will be seen from the chart that
the SeadquarteTs of all Our Forces is intermingled with the headquarters
or the sdbdrdinate bodies. The Air Foca C. G. is Main HQCQ. he Air Force
C or S iS Main HQ C of S. The S.O.S. G5 is main Hq G 3. Through this
curious bastmrdy partyl controls the Air and the Air partly con-
trols S.O.S. and main U.Q. controls Amobo4y. Many S.O.S. Chiefs are
sklbordinste (prestoltly) in rank to their Air opposites whom they control
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
?4?0 ;
r?-
,
?
?7.
S
-
? :'4,1
?430O.
-o
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
- 4 -
as chiefs of main H.q. sections.
it does not take a further diagram to indict-o tno oosz.ble jealoosies,
some of which Ofect us beuause we deal with all the I's ana mile, else. Lome
of the serious (for us) jealousies are
SOS 02 M A A2TH(.G2
Macclanahan vs. Moore and Cram
Macclanihan, so far as I can make out has no personal ambitione. he
wants to work with us and we have to work with him. But he is on Loore's
blacklist and Crom rather favors Moore. We have and want to play with
Moore - who is also a very good egg and is (Der friend. ee must nlay with
Cram. No one of them cares for us to see the other too much.
Sibley is 04 of S.O.S. and of main H.. Jr nates him. osr of S.O.S.
dislike him, We nee l hin. The er.Ciooer.= esch other - so do the
Signals.
Much of this stems - not only from the 'Inwise set-up - l'it Flso - from
the debris left by General Matwell. He left not of his own volit,on and
his "boys" are not popular. Poor old Colonel Chickering should be a B.G.
He is on the level. He is sound and competent. But he is to be relieved
as S.,O.S. C of S because Maxwell liked him - even if he didn't care for _ex-
well. And so on.
Naw - the British have their varrels too. Thoy have personal feuds
and are divided into personal camps. But most serious with t-em are tl'eir
inter-departmental fights. SIS doesn't like SOE. S.O.E. sneers at S.I.S.
?.W.E. distrusts SOE profoundly end openly charge Glenconner with being
a personal ornortunist who cannot see the war for his own ambitions.
Now - I do not put Corth the above example as an unusual phenominum
of war - it is usual as we know from the organization history of other
wars. But is may help clarify the thinking of you fellows back home if
mad *len we run tnto difficulties. It is but a repetition of the Yugoslav
and Greek fights except that we fight within our ranks and do not start
revolutions when we're licked.
*****************
I hope to have an interesting translation for you before the po.uch
closes . the proclamation of Admiral Sakellarf.cu of which I will have ad-
vised by ce)le.
Also I am now getting direct reports from Greece. Our translating
department does not exist and :or a time I'll be plow getting this hot
stuff to you - but I'm giving it at once to G2 and the M.A.
I au enclosing the small and unimportant report of the Egyptian police
an Xeaos. They do not like Xenos here at all - none of the Greeks and not
any ef this Egyptians who know about him. He would be up against amazing
'?;;r1.
tairikdO61.4O110.111,Sitreswoo..... sr.
.4.1M0114M geaViCANPWAino 11.1Ao.? ,V. ?.?
-
.4
-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001oon'Ann1?1-7
?
,
?
4
, X. -4 "
CO.
Vt. 4
-
? ?-?,--1`,,
F.V4-' ?
?
?).
V-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
opposition he-e . and I ma not sure ' it would be wise for him to come
here - but I'll still keep on the tr.._ of the proposition here. (It's
damned hard to write here - our few offices are pilbd up with people - two-
three- four in each one and one office half the size of Mrs. Sieber's has
seven - two pretty girls - one American civilian code clerk, one C/reek
civilian bird dog and three sergeants - with four other sergeants who
drop in for instructions.) Every minute or so same one sticks his or her
head in the door aid shouts "Hey Colonel," So, forgive the disconnected
stuff. *********************
I am also enclosing a copy of the vicious proclamation of Ldniral
Sakellariou. I was able to hand it to the British P.W.E. - They haven't
received it yet and are very pleased with us for being on the job. The
Greek Prime Minister has called and I am having lunch with him privately
today - British Fa and I have struck the only formula that can save the
Xing his throne even temporarily and I ma charged by the British to dis-
cuss it with the PM and the King - privately and p rsonally as the only
old Anglo-Saxon friend they trust with some confidence as to the wisdom
of recommendation regarding their awn internal affairs. Ole are not con-
cerned about the regime in Greece now or later - except as we stop short
any disturbance that hurts the war effort. Ls you know the Germans are
making very effective propaganda here - and some communist propaganda
The pouch is closine . and I must call a halt. As soon as it does I
has appeared)
go over to General Brereton for a general discussion of our program.
All the best to all of you.
Ulius
F. S. Please oto attached slip from Edwards. Please try to get this
for Us in a burry.
U. L. A.
Declassified and Approved For Release 201
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
GREEK PEOPIllt OF EGYPT
A great, a terrible, an indescribable calamity has struck our be-
loved Yatberland. A band of anarchist leaders or our Army, seeing their
approaching end, owing to the firm decision of His Majesty the King to
replace some of them as being responsible for the wretched state of the
army and for the new national split created out of noth:ng, has REVOLTFD
against our HEROIC KING,the Tsouderos Government and the law-abiding
officers.
The two Brigades which our new officers, the law-abiding and indus-
trious, created with so much sweat, have been completely DISSOLVED. The
heroic Greek Army of Alamein NO LONGER EXISTS. The anarchist Colonel
ladjistavris who was, awing to the many scenes he created against law-
abiding officers, ordered to hand over his Battalion to Major Athanassiou
REFUSES TO DO SO.
At his instigation the hapless Major is MURDERED. The Divisional
Commander, General Zigouris, who tried to go to the mutinous camp, is
arrested by the anarchists and THROW OUT. Our much atvertised Vice-
President, Canellopalos, who summoned-W3istavris to Beirut, instead of
having him shot on the spot began to implore him on his knees to stop the
revolt. Blithe, on being allowed to go free and to return to his camp,
officially proclaimed a revolt and is followed by the Commanding Officers
of the other Battalions,?KiTTIoris, Stavroulakis and Konstas.
The unfortunate law-abiding officers, who composed almost the tot-
ality of officers, faced with this lamentable situation are handing in
their resignations en =zee. hieantime and in a similar manner, the I
Brigade also revolts. The Brigadiers who are apparently indifferent
FORMENT THE REVOIXTION0
The anarchist revolutionaries demand:
That the Government should be reconstituted and comprise Boudares,
Ketsotas, Bakirdjis, Sophoukis and the dishonourable Alexandrian, G.
Roussos, who is the instigator of all this revolt.
Meantime BRITISH soldiers who have been sent for service reasons to
the mukinous camp are killed.
Thus the Commanding Officer of the IX Army, in view of the inability
of Canellopoulos to impose order, assumes command and orders:
"The mutinous must lay down their arms before the morning of the
7th of March, 1943, otherwise the Brigade will be bombarded by the R.A.F,"
And now Greek people, 1001- with admiration on your lace-President
and the leaders of the Army who are so skillfully chosen by him in order
to start against a r/volt and not VAR. Look with admiration at your un-
fortunate children oarded by t&-.71.A.F. like common criminals. Look
with aair 3onaE your heroic Greek Army, the creator of the Albanian
miracle, admire it now as the author of the disgraceful deed, of a new
ASIA MINOR DISGRACE.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13Xnnnni Pnnni nr-monn A n
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Greek people, you are GUILTY. You are the murderers of your child-
ren because although you knew that events were coming to this pass, you
did not seek to prevent the dishonoyrable creators of this material
calamity.
AND NOW TAKE HEED: Put to death the dishonorouable Roussos who,
although he is half in the grave, does not forget to soak Hellenism
in blood oven as he did in the past. MAY GOD DAMN THIS DISHONOURABLE
MAN and demand an immediate reconstitution of the Government and the
removal of those repponsible for the disaster. THE GREEK ARMY MUST BP
REWADE AM) MUST FIGHT AGAIN JUST AS OUR NAVY IS FIGHTIW UNDER GLORIOUS
ADMIRAL SAKELLARIOU.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
311
1111.1111111reclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
SECRET p
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
U. S. ARMY FORCES III THE MIDDLE EAST
Colonel Willim J. Donovan,
Directors Office of Strategic Services,
Ni! Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Colonel Donovan:
10 March, 1943.
Cged iot Kaa7;04,,,,
I suppose you have been getting my reports, especially those
regarding alleged Russian activity in Southeastern Europe. I mu
wire that the line taken in these reports is consistent with
what Nati propagandists wish to sow. But 1 believe they are
worth further examination. I summarize the intelligence as re-
Torted together with questions and comments and :secret reference
to tatborities quoted.
1. Bu1geia
Propos t o s If and when Russian troops reach the Rumanian fron-
tiers the Bulgarian Agrartan and Communist Parties will expel Ring
Boris and declare Bulgaria a republic within the framework of the
U.S.S.R.
?
Author ities2 Greek Irregular Agents "D" and. "S".
Colonel Popovitdhs reporting intolligence
sent to him from Serbia. Britidh PONE.
Major. Dr, Dimitroff, Agrarian leader -
but with the exception that this will
happen only if the United Nations refuse
to guarantee Bulgaria's present frontiers
including Greek Thrace and Mecedonia.
S., Greek WR.,ot$ in S? ia,
Prop on: seream r o s were fomented by Communist agents.
Authoritlet Greek Irregular Agent "m". Greek Agent "P".
QUestlou: -IS the "communist" charge an attempt of the present
Greek Governisant to disorsdit the moveusnt?
ttloameents A revolt in an army at war is a mutiny. The intelligence
rititeivad plus rumor pluA deduction drawn from facts known make the
*barges. Seim jtwitifieds,
Parrtiaans
E: Irrairialists have token oveT, or will take over, in
it responsible ha* exploiting the personal ambitions
ir *loaders* JUI order to. discredit the existing
04444 rills 041 OO etfectives, the balance having
?
4
4
r?i5'
???,,
'1.7.?j?
?
P".17777'9,-7&
fr
.41111MC?s6 ? ? ? ?
-
fi-ru-
- '
"?-?
011.0?3111;6....?.? ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-R0I013X00001R000100030013-7
?
SECRET
To Col. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943.
gone over to the Partisans; (C) No British agent is In touch with
Mihailovioh.
Authorities: (A) Reports I filed earlier in Washington.
0.8.5. Weekly Survey, February 4-11: 1943.
(B) Greek Secret Service report shown me,
but not filed with the British.
(C) Colonel Pcpoviteh. Greek Irregular
Agents "M" and "S".
? . ?
? ) ? 01
cr1?10 A1,???' ?.)"
?
Question: Are these reports inspired by Nazi propaganda? Or by
Greek and/or Serb jealousy?
Comment: I have sant a Greek Irregular Agent into Serbia to bring
back evidence or refutation; unless caught he should be back ir
Cairo by the end of March.
4. British S.O.E.
Proposition=l1f S.O.E. in the Middle East is badly managed and
1,1303 questionable agents. (2) One agent, a British officer, in
Greece recently gave away the entire show, turning in 21 chief
agents to the occupation Hathorities in exchange for his own life.
(They were shot.) The Greek head, Captain Alexander Meisel managed
to escape and has roadbed Cairo. (Melas is in my employ, ;ithout
salary, as an Irregular Agent and is a cousin of L.C.M. whom you
know as one of our men in Nom York.) (3) Lord Glenconner,
perrona117 acibitious, will attempt to dominate 0.8.8. in the Middle
East and also gain control of I.S.L.D. (S.I.S.) and P.W.E.; he is
some improvement over Mr. Maxwell - but not much. (4) Because of
*11 of the above, Commaast group leaders are telling resistance
groups that they can have no confidence in British subversive
leadership; that the British support and handsomely pay former
Fascists and that they csn have no hope of assistance. Many Liberal
groups in Greece have joined the Communists, as they have in Serbia.
Authorities: (1) Colonel Xenon. A Britl.sh Major, former
S.O.E. in Greece, now a member of the W.O.
Armistice Committee. Prime Minister
Tsouderos. Colonel Putnik, C-in-C of Free
Yugoslavian Forces, Captain Melas, Major
Saunders, PAX. Colonel Quilliam, former
Da#1, of G.Z.Q., now P.W.E. Greek Irregu-
lar Agent "S". (2) Captain Melas.
(Z0) Colonel Quilliam. Major Saunders,
(4) Captain Xelas. Greek Irregular Agent
S. British PALE. Major "X".
eatiou: Should we accept Glenconneres proposition that all our
tprisee should be joint operations, our operational groups
xed and 01.4con3or and his Chief Operations Officer, Colonel
4 trieotars of our operations?
? ?
_ t? ? -1 ? ?
-
_
Declassified and Ap roved For Release 7: CIA-R np
4*.
.;
74-2:2r-
ugg:"I and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030013-7
SECRET
To Co].. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943.
Comment: To confound German propaganda, and to withstand Communist
sniping and to win the war - and the peace - wa must maintain a
united front. But it will be better for the British as well as for
ourselves if the embittered enslaved peoples see a show of
American interest at least parallel t,), though coordinated with,
the British.
Mote: We get along excellently with Glenconner - but no matter
what the discussion, his minutes always reflect his own wishes.)
5. Admiral Canaris.
ProparETEEr Admiral Canaria, expatriate Greeks supreme head of
German Secret intelligence, now convinced that German) has lost
the war and that he is in personal jeopardy at the hands of
Himmler, has joined the Vaterland Movement, has move el hts H.Q.
to Berne and is willing to make a "deal" with 0.5.3.; invites us
to beet him in Turkey; invites me to meet him in Dresden or
Switzerland (under pledge of secrecy and safe conduct) to meet with
other Vaterland leaders.
Authorities: Duke of Wurtemburg (Father Odo). Greek
Irregular Agents in the U.S. and in the
Middle East. (Colonel Duke in Washington,
and Major Pearce in New 'York, are follow-
inis this.) A Near Eastern Secret Police
Chief.
Question: is this an attempt similar to that of Hess to split the
Allies from Russia? Could it be an attempt to burrow in the 0.S.S.?
Is it possible that they would try this expedient in order to lay
bands on an 0.5.5. officer? Is this a chance to aid a secret
uprising in Germany? What guarantees would be required if, as
suggested, Canaris would order his men to massacre a large number
of Nazi party leaders and hand over the Military Government to
General Beck?
Comets We can only discover these answers by having the first
meeting in neutral territory.
9.7.7.1.1.1.10.4.411.9.67 ns.
Doss Russian insistence an placing the Second Front in the West mean
that oho intends to reserve Eastern Europe to herself? (See my old
memory:tett= reporting my aonversations with Major General Chu and
with officers of the Soviet Naval Mission which stated that the
secret Soviet view at that time was:
1. After the war three great world powers would be left:
the V.S4p Russia and China.
2 Within the next five decades China waild fight Russia
wit 4 the U.S. helping China.
SECRET
- -5 -
151.-