OSS - REPORT ON ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA/POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1943

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 31, 1943
• Content Type: MISC

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INTEROFFICE MEMO
Colonel BUX10321 DATE.
WWI Secretariat
sulAKL Attached Report from John Davies, "Anglo-American
Cooperation in East Asie
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31 Decemb4r 1943 4
1. Annexed is What we believe a highly
important memorandum by John Davies on the position
of the American forces in East Asia. It is of
particular importance since we understand that John
Davies has been appointed by General Stilwell as
political advisor to Oil in New Delhi to integrate
its policies with that of the Commanding General.
2. This memorandum was transmitted direct
by pouch from Major Huteheson to Mr. Katz who
received it about 2 weeks ago. The Secretariat saw
a reference to it in a cable Mr. Katz sent to Colonel
Heppner and asked that Mr. Katz send us a copy of
the memorandum for the Director's information. Mi..
Utz reports that he had sent a copy to General
Magruder with a suggestion that it be distributed
throughout the agency, and that General Magruder had
asked him to make distribution to Mr. Scribner and
Dr. Langer. In addition, Mr. Shepardson has seen it.
The Secretariat believes that distribution should
also be made to the Planning Group, FETO, X-2, SO,
and NO, but in view of General Magruder's request
that distribution be strictly limited, and in view
of Tekhl cable No. 182 of December 20, 1943, attached,
se have thought it best to secure your approval before
sending copies to these offices. Particularly with
reference to distribution to the Planning Group you
may with to consider Whither this might be in effect
the circulation to the Mar, Navy and State Departments
which Heppzter has recommensled should not be made with-
out Davies' approval, We L.LAp.4 SAAAct C.4 ec,tua
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3. We believe this matter illustrates the
necessity for routing all official communications
through the Theater Officers who as staff officers
for the Director can see to it that there is
immediately called to the Director's attention any
matter coming in by pouch about which the Director
should know. This routing is, of course, provided
for in the pending order covering the functionas of
the Theater Officers.
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COOPeraSIOU Niit Asia
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Ws will be able te is ourselves a good deal of
trouble and misunderstanding if at the outset or our parti.
oipation in and contact with the South last Asia Comma ive
slowly distinguish where American and British interests
lise
In as far as the British are fightint the Japanese
sow and seeking to punish aggression, wo are united with
theme But we are not to the sam exteat united with the
liritisie in their attempt to regain their colonial aspire
metlek* American foreign policy and publio sentiment him
midergoss a revolt:timer* Mange yet unannounced in these
distant parts.
'tore still Illadst at home highly vocc.1 and influentill
pabUaimers and min in pablis life idle will be ready to
brsostaar ofilWeerati_ ea with the British in Burma, lialaya?
Lodoolnina and fiventrin;ani snatohing British, Froneh and
Data colonial ehortmats out et the Japanese firs. The
suestims ili be NOM, sew should Amerisen boys die to
ropoomos ealemies for the British sad their French end Duteh
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For us to distinguish in this tkoater the prestos lina
its of our national interests is one of the nowt diffioult
tasks oonfrenting us. no repossession of the British lbw
Are in Asia is merged with the Isar against Japan,
/tory and politioal strategy are so intorninglod that the
diftinstion batmen ths lam is easily blurred. 'Moon the
British and we fight our Iry into Bursas we shall be not only
prosoeuting this war against the 0011111011 snow but also
recapturing a portion of Britain's brim Until we are
able to distinguish juart how far wo should involve our.
selves in the pleas and %Lotions or, our allies, we shall bo
running the risk of finding sursolvss beeauso of a
lswdeblo wool to got tkilsis done in a dangerously false
position*
ha
.sorving to clarity this confusing situation, it
iv be nosed first to it ourselves in this British position,
Ontinating their position in Bast Asia as they se. it.
The pettish et* essgront. id vd.th Vow major tasks in
last Asia. Qs* reessoupatina at their ibittbirast
Asian &pips. he stimisr is the defeat at Jepsui
The Usrvorassmt realises that because of Pearl
luta& said AsOkssin. the *sited fitats feels ssissittod to
ORS distosst 41.41sons? Stitt& lioverannat has bons
abliii to digsond Ayes tips Soviet 14ost to boor tbs brunt at
agninet Geraaay,: as it ligf dopes* Apo* us to bear
1.10 bra* it law Ivor siiot
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That being the ease, the British Gevernmest is not se
impulsive as to piano the defeat of Japan no inespeo.
sive projeet -- as the prinoipal test before it.
The reacquisition and perhaps impansiaa of the Rom
lire is an essential undertaking if Britain is to be fully
restored to the position of a first (*lass power. There-
fere reeoaquest of Ihspire is the paramount task in British
oyes. The raising of the Union Jaek over Singapore is
mere important to the British than any victory parade
through Tokyo.
This British *valuation is revealed by their renarb.
ably dell:iterate tiao-table, their unwillingness to employ
against the enemy remouroos which for same time have been
at their eammend, their military 'motion, present and
past, rationalised ixr the itvooation of Acts or God, and
tWiltelet4s 1o:hi& they Irish to follow in assuidng the often..
sive. This imtworobstioa does not impute heroia qualities to
the British Government; it does imply that it has lost none
of its petal-eel asemes#,
Netters would., at course, be very mush more clear
suitor the British if they *mid confine themselves to
the teak et taking book the apire and delegate to us the
emterprime of defeating the meow outside of the precincts
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ef Sritink Colodes* limadea sad New Delhi, limvorrert mist
*OM into oessiderstios in their planaing thho oempliosAing
testa that (1) the *lied States, in piersuit of vietory
over Jogai, is and will operating 41174111 britisk Negro
loses Into ether parts it r bald by the enemy*
asit (I) tits kritisk levornment is ommdtted to *Aim
racialist the low barna Singapore and bon Reag?
fiesision with regard to the latter sill be deferred
until the issue arises meths or years hemp. American
preeesioein India and plans for joint tett= against
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The Sritish openly adatt that they ars embarrassed
by our prosonoe in Una, 401 ow plans for going into
1141111101 411*- 14"1141# 2914 proaionala and tharetwo clIspleiy of
ritesi military etre** in British eolormiom embarrasses
b. 0 OM 0114 Neatita
tante MA MO *IAA 14-14ria, British offiaels in India
are freak to liOegodk to * very oommidorable extent
ewe fades* petertigiiife
ti
British ars farther berrs by our attitude
I IM4103An1A1 itueotiest. Obvious amerieiln
Siii,001010 aifit4:044 Ositinteriou the Ileorickan r000rd of
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stosedieg remain* sielstlyslyaiiii emus AsiaMils *mile
the gratin belief is Ohba as& lolls *bet imp ere
vairieeeing le British eeleriel eubitivuee
sew affreeieties for ,iver present ensue ea the eakeellik"``'"
luestives the Britisa ars, sevartheless, ttL1esstelir
epprehaveive lest thews Now sass tagesuess imprimis
outburst ea the icubjeet et liberty fir esisaisl peoples
ehisk idght OM to Asistie ears('
Stol1*"17. Us Drab& sre mew ever the presesee
ill
is theater et lawless etva Weirs *Meares Obo.
Itieways "be DMA* ere:. 10101101.11 for isserioan *Oil a4-
1.111 INT IOW **ire* betavver
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oissasplisisod Only by ir 'faro= is the wake. at a
44paseie withdrawal sausoll by' on outflousking of Buraa?
Tims British oussequaiday regard tau. insistent* on prompt
ottonsine **tie* against DOOM as soarooly bettor than
to no awl ham mood or 'ghat we =grudgingly give this,
thaw flea that thoy =at %Int low to dioramas )41
Woos fres gelig into Dania other toss resorting to a
blwat ritual*
Clitises potentialities in the post.war world eau=
tits pm's* *Mob Govszolioda sow ossisty.i It msve.
stow* tbott if Oki= moirgioi:fron this war strong sait usi.
k will (I) srn&fl as a rooms of nationalist
artbuies Artie Ilivires (a) attempt* jars.,
jr.rksirs6 iso=4.14istio omassios of its mks snip
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It is widest fres all of the foregoing, thou, that
the littish arevecmment the Caverraest of Inas flail
themselves in Sit sisditat' .d position with regard to their
Anerie= guests in India. We embLrrass them by our very
presence, for- the fact that it is necessary for us to be
bare refloat& on British prestige. Our good reputation
among Asiatics ant our attitude ?bawd the colonial question
embarrass then. They are nervous lest me attev7b inde.
pendeat adairdstratial in reeecupied British colon..
i.e. Oresoleaver to sake then jots us in a Bursa of..
fassive disturbs and irritates then. Finally, they find
themselves is sipposition to our determination to mato China
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irst,ler pow*
.. Yet they hue to beat Irith us. Itoorause they need our
it ea44 aotterial sad Aar, lend-lese, they Cannot Wort
te pat se eat at India, as they mould like to de.
The 1401iitcasiskisfillarressape from their dilemma
esssilst sans ter bet 41.44ruis (for they have. no alternative),
easselidiate es *IV* theeeelves for *efficient* eooperatioa
wed thins by deigastiag the fategrated partnership, bring
likeldsit. lime !aft Omar raw iitoe
La eii1r4Aligkel the teeth last Asia Oosmand,,
104t Otar.egt it ea* be aitrielgeola thit Chinese
r
'01140 acwillipr,*Villk that 3 rittel mot- British Buren*
Ai U. Suprilio? Ilasmeaddir- in patriot et-lard
ui=oeibiss* *11 at the qualifies oaleulated
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to appeal post to Aserieeas fortbrightness, vigor Mg
glamour, int, aloe* so shall stover bier *tut confidential
writers Rio lordship standee f2111K Kr. Churchill &sips& to
inhibit his natural vigor* unless *vents, porshinas, ocortilves
to suggest that, Ifteallailitsi /tarsi Bountbatten's
British subordinates and Governotont of India ?Metals os-
phaniso their osire to integrate personnel as well as
effort* not only in unitary .affairs but also in matters
have fart.resiallag political implications.
The remain is an appresiation of ths British post-
ties. lin*, then* of the Asiorlean positiont
Oar Idosiuk le (1) te-ilsorease the *what effective-
ness et Wass* foram isr' the war against glipau end (2)
to Want Japes. Xit as British plans 11E4 efforts
?attribute to as tee amis vos will and- 11.11at give that
tial est *Alia*
sr timk Imo Loose duty head to ?moo
pertotte. Ltly to retard sr frustrate tie aosemplinhaost
St etur sissies,
ressumpirtion of-Dritaist "vire in Asia say bo
110.01toti4t sos4e at our
"ill0114 balliMelln is not so 4t1;teu"Ihment in fast as it
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the scope of our aission. And it is an lwaterpriso full ax
potential misunderstanding and easplications for us.
ladle highly sensitive to enbarrascaent by us, the
British whibit a distressing lack of sympathy for the
discomfiture to *doh vs are exposed boo/suss of our titS10.,
(station with then.
If we *mad 'perste in aouthenst Asia independently
of the British and en our cant terms, woo night expeot to
be *welcomed by and have the sooperation of the native pop.
viatica. But begrime are to erwate with. and (in the
ease
of the tenth But Asia Cosmand) under the British,
the people of geotheast Asia will identify us with the re-
isposition at British Colonial rule. This in turn means
that we may *vest mash the so* resistance, hostility and
asm.eeepsration from the native population which will greet
the British. It sanuis that we shall suffer oasualties?
sabotage, troakdamo of pply and administrative ebstruction
whisk we mould net 111114111Witvir were we on our onci.
Oar sellateral imvelvemeat in the Britioth imperial
eaterpriee will attest ow relations net only with ooionial
Adeistiess but also with the trio people. fat Asia. The
Ohinmeelp sad Wier th** Thais, will fool as zany Chinese
atien4 de that we have aliosed ourselves with the
*WA asidiiteieraee-:ter?reimpese.inostera
inn istAilkin. Seek a twain throughout Asia obviously
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has asinsuis implications for the futuro.
Our participation i*Brithints osapalta to recrooto
its ibspire ID* wise pigmies us in a false position with rs..
gard to the imerioan public. It is obvious That more than
say ether imortioan fore* IS are Vulnereble to critielma.
oven if mitinflutted. as being idipos of British imperialism.
It is *vides*, them, frter what has boon. said, thcet the
Anclemilsperioark partnership not only mebarriusies the British1
bost also threatens to diseessfit and eamprosise us. ilswever,
we are soareely more able thsa the Yiritiah to extricate
ourselves from it. to sooemplish r atssic we have as
mush need at the Mritish as they have of us. The partner.
ship eannat be dissolved.
bat thill dew net sigma that we should resign ~selves
saremorsaily to being simpremisted. We are atill able to 40.10,
istrieto* Oh Ogasitiorraidi ..i;14014 of oomtrol ever oar sourish)
70, tissoolgs, so as i retails 0111 as an irtaspeulsrit
ilserieas assethpiss. *sisal warfare 1110oan attsagt
te asur *diet to st Asia 4,21 acr son tams ?
30Stisitheat sittsUiI British. 106 0411 hag* thereby to
milligmbit seek 1404tility to as as win develop among colonial
asod *von lila a larger degree of **op-
en them might etheralse. b forthooming,. Thiessen be
resseagiObeili say it ow psysitslogitrol *Wars prisms pro.
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can still guide our deortiny sowewhat, The British have al-
ready made it clear that they have no intention Of permit.
ting us to exercise independent oil administrative funnw.
lima be true of other .colonial areas. They will, however,
be glad to accept our civil administration officers in staff
positions or possibly in the field, providing they are under
aloes British ?antral. They will do this because, so long
as we are associated, it is to their advEntage to place us
in a position whore ksericals cannot formulate policy but
where iv win 1,. ideutifiettlrith their policy end where
can capitalise am our good reputation in Asia.
tli-oan guide our destiny with regard to civil admin.
istration only if wit temain completely aloof fres it.
Participation in *ten administration in colonial Asia will
plass as In a bass and
oeurso, theAneri'ean and British Governments ars prepared
itiplisseset is Asia Articles II and III t the Atlantic
aiterteri
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POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP IN SOUTHERST ASIA
Summary Southeast Asia is a political vacuum demanding aggressive
leadership. The mad cannot be met by a return to pre-war colonial
paternalism nor by action of the colonial powers individually. If
a common and forward policy for the development of nationalism in
this area cannot be agreed and acted upon by the United Nations,
control must within a few rears pass to others readier to act.
Characteristics: Southeast Asia, including Burma, Thailand, Indo-China,
Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies, is an area rich in population,
resources, and tradition. Its people are, however, fragmentated by
differences of language, religion, and custom. Illiteracy is the
rule rather than the exception. Few of the ethnic groups are by custom
of military temperament and none have advanced modern military training
or equipment. They are economically unsophisticated and have difficulty
in competing either with large-scale technical industry or with the
tougher, shrewder, tighter Chinese. They are untrained in the detailed
operations of a modern national administration either as administrators
or subjects.
These shortcomings have facilitated the survival of colonialism
in Southeast Asia. Until they are overcome, neither Southeast Asia nor
its component parts can defend themselves or play an autonomous role in
world politics. But these people are also intelligent and ambitious and
will make trouble for any regime which does not promise them such a role.
Outside Pressure: British, Dutch, and French rule have differed in various
ways. The Dutch have been more efficient and honest than the French
but. also more paternalistic and more intolerant of native political
organization. The French have shown the greatest racial tolerance but
- . two= gratin areAttietigiifw.-gatiztiatosi 13.4A,fiQe -
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I'-
have been least efficient. The British have made very considerable
political concessions, yet have been racially most intolerant. All
three have been alike, however, in failure to push with real energy
the technical, economic, and political education of the people which
is necessary if they are to achieve an autonomous status. This failure
can easily be :fadged by comparison with what Japan has accomplished
with her own people since 1870, what the United States has done in
the Philippines or that the USSR has accomplished In Outer Mongolia.
Instead of leading their peoples to statehood, the colonial regimes
have dragged along far behind local nationalist leaders.
Japans slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" permit:3 her a more progressive
role. She is encouraging local nationalists wherever possible and within
the limited means at her disposal is giving them access to political,
economic, and technical experience. She has already declared the
Independence of Burma and will declare that of the Philippines soon.
She has increased the autonomy of the states in Malaya and promised a
greater role to the political groups in Java formerly suppressed by the
Dutch. This is strong medicine, even if Japanese control is but ill
disguised. If, following reoccupation a few months hence, the United
Nations revert to the pre-war colonial system, or if Thailand and 3urma
are formed into a, British IcCormonwealth", as has recently been suggested,
Japan may well retain, even in defeat, a political hold over nationalism
in this area which, will be very dangerous in later years.
The U.S.S.R. also, if it had an opportunity, would adopt a very
positive policy here. They would cultivate the nationalists while
ruthlessly encouraging education, religious reform, labor and political
organization, technical training and all the other steps they believe
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necessary before a country can become a full-fledgec member of the
world order they envisage.
China, for a .Cew decades at least, will lack the technical and
peimJnistrative know-how to assume effective political and military
leadership in this area. Under any international regime, however, it
is safe to assume that her merchants would soon achieve an important
economic position which would form the foundation for political control
at a later date should the local populations in the meantime not
achieve strength.
The Need: Under such circumstances a return to the status quo ante is
far from enough. The peoples of Southeast Asia will not remain our
children. They must be trained to become our allies or they will learn
to become our enemies.
Both distance and the racial prejudices of our people will make
it difficult for the United States, Britain, or the Netherlands to
merge these peoples into our own political organization as Japan,
China, or the U.S.S.R. might some day be able to do. They will
eventually rebel if kept under our control without the full privileges
of participation. Left alone in their present disunity, they will
span fall under the influence of larger nei&dbors. The alternative
is to organize them into a group, possibly including the Philippines,
which would be strong enough to stand alone and to count on the
generosity and extent of our political help to keep them in our orbit.
Southeast Asia thus demands a leadership which will ally itself
with nationalism, which will push energetically the equipping of these
people for an autonomous role in world politics, and which will help
them find such a, role. This leadership requires both greater interference
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and greater generosity than have characterized colonialism -- greater
interference with local ways and customs which are today handicaps
and greater generosity in allowing the people of Southeast Asia to
manage their min resources, industries, and administrbtions.
If the United Nations do not provide such leadership, someone
Conclusion: The United States might well initiate discussions of the
future of Southeast Asia prior to campaigns in that area. A convincing
statement of objectives now would be useful to P.W. and would facilitate
reoccupation. Failure to secure agreement before occupa ion will, an
the other hand, play into the hands of those who are planning on return
to the status quo ante and sill make difficult, if not impossible,
development of any sound foundation for long-term American (or British)
political influence in this area.
z A.
A,4A, 4 ?
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