FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010016-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 2, 1965
• Content Type: NIE

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CO
SE
LLED DISSEM
NIE 22-65
2 June 1965
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 22-65
(This estimate supplements NIE 22-63 and NIE 22-64)
French Foreign Policy
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF 'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
2 JUNE 1965
SEC
off
ED DISSEM
CONTR
N? 37
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, AEC, and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being
outside of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
d
hibit
.
e
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is pro
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 22-65
(This estimate supplements NIE 22-63 and NIE 22-64)
French Foreign Policy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 3
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 3
II. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY .... 3
The Mainsprings ................................................. 3
Europe ......................................................... 4
The Alliance and NATO .......................................... 6
Nuclear Weapons ................................................ 7
The US ......................................................... 8
The USSR and East Europe ....................................... 9
Communist China and Southeast Asia .............................. 10
The Third World ................................................ 11
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY ........... 11
IV. AFTER DE GAULLE ........................................... 13
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SECRET
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the main lines of French foreign policy under de Gaulle
and how these might change after his departure from office.
CONCLUSIONS
A. De Gaulle views France and the US as competitors for the
leadership of Europe. Most of his recent policy initiatives, intended
to enhance the position of France, have widened the areas of differ-
ence between France and the US and weakened the fabric of unity in
the Western Alliance, but they have not as yet brought him nearer
his goal of European leadership. (Paras. 4-8, 24, 25)
B. De Gaulle considers it essential to join France and Germany
in a common policy in order to achieve his objective of a French-led
West European political grouping of sufficient strength to negotiate
European issues on equal terms with the US and the USSR. If, as
appears likely, there is no significant early German movement toward
French foreign and defense policies, the downward course in Franco-
German relations is almost certain to continue. (Paras. 4-12)
C. Recently de Gaulle has moved away from his earlier view that
Soviet policy was too rigid to permit any kind of meaningful discus-
sion with Moscow with respect to Europe, and he will probably con-
tinue to probe the possibilities of political understanding with the
USSR. He almost certainly considers that he must be circumspect
in his dealings with Moscow, particularly because too rapid movement
would reduce his chances of establishing French leadership over
Western Europe. (Paras. 27-30)
D. De Gaulle's assault on NATO and his step by step disengage-
ment from it are almost certainly intended to gain leverage on the
US and the other NATO members. We believe that he will, at the
very least, insist upon major structural reforms in NATO, but his
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antipathy to NATO as it is now constituted may be so strong that
even such changes would not satisfy him. He almost certainly pre-
fers a series of bilateral alliances among the US, UK, France, and
West Germany, which would involve relatively loose arrangements
for coordinating military operations in wartime combined with a
small amount of coordinated planning in peacetime. He probably
seeks eventually to reduce the US role to that of a nuclear backup to
Europe's own defense arrangements under French preeminence.
While his terms for staying in the Alliance are probably not yet clear
in his own mind, they will be high. If he is not satisfied he will
probably withdraw from NATO and ultimately from the Alliance.
He almost certainly will not leave NATO before the French presi-
dential elections in late 1965; but he has stated that he will not permit
troops or installations on French soil after 1969 that are not under
French command and control. (Paras. 19-20)
E. De Gaulle advocates the establishment of a regime in Vietnam
which would be neutralized with respect to all outside powers. That
such a regime would probably be Communist would in de Gaulle's
view be of incidental importance, on the grounds that the strong
nationalist feeling of the Vietnamese and their historic desire to resist
domination by China would prevent the Communists from ruling
Vietnam as instruments of Chinese policy. In any event, France
will certainly be unwilling to participate in any way in the defense
of the area against Communist takeover; moreover, France will not
invest military or economic resources to bring about or defend a
settlement. (Para. 33)
F. The longer de Gaulle is in power, the more likely his policies
are to shape the political conditions, institutions, and relationships in
Western Europe. If de Gaulle leaves the scene during the next two
or three years, his successor initially will probably make little change
in the fundamentals of present French foreign policy. However, no
other leader will have the degree of freedom from internal restraints
that de Gaulle has had in shaping French policy. Lacking his stature
and his authority, de Gaulle's successors will be less effective and less
decisive in conducting France's foreign affairs. It is possible that
successor governments will come to be less fixed in their attitudes on
European and Atlantic matters than de Gaulle has been, and, as time
goes by in the post-de Gaulle period, the sharp nationalist edges of
French policy may be blunted. (Paras. 40-44)
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DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. President de Gaulle has now dominated French affairs for seven years.
During that period the French economy has prospered, the nation has experi-
enced important political and social changes, and France has become a nuclear
power.' Recent French achievements are not due entirely to the General, but
he has made his own the cause of national rejuvenation and the achievement
of economic and nuclear strength. His dominance has provided France with
the governmental stability conducive to progress and growth.
2. French foreign policy is the personal creation of General de Gaulle. His
closest advisers often appear uncertain of his specific positions until he makes
them public. No internal political pressures restrain or impel him to any signi-
ficant degree. His authority soars above opposition groups. The General is
eloquent and relentless in his pursuit of grandeur for France, majestic in his
disdain for detail, and aloof from the humdrum problems of day-to-day imple-
mentation of policy. Over the years, his style and his broad foreign policy
objectives have remained unchanged.
3. Above all, General de Gaulle strives to establish France as a major world
power and the leader of Western Europe. Ultimately, he hopes that France
will be the spokesman for Western Europe in negotiations with the Soviet Union
for a grand settlement of European problems. But in de Gaulle's view, a num-
ber of intermediate goals must be achieved first: France must develop a credible
nuclear power of its own, France must strengthen its position among the powers
of the Western Alliance, and the role and influence of the US in Europe's affairs
must be reduced.
4. Since the settlement of the Algerian War in 1962, the pace of French policy
initiatives has accelerated, and some aspects of French foreign policy have
undergone significant change, particularly with respect to the Communist
powers. Most French initiatives, beginning with the exclusion of the UK from
the EEC in January 1963, have widened the area of difference between France
and the US.
II. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY
The Mainsprings
5. There are two prerequisites to the achievement of de Gaulle's broad foreign
policy objectives. One is to induce West Germany to adopt common policies
'For a broader discussion of internal trends see NIE 22-63, "France Under de Gaulle,"
dated 26 June 1963.
The French nuclear program is analyzed in NIE 22-64, "The French Advanced Weapons
Program," dated 18 November 1964.
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with France. De Gaulle is convinced that France cannot become the leader of
Europe until France and West Germany are working together toward shared-
i.e., essentially French-goals. Together, in de Gaulle's view, the two would
form the nucleus of a larger European grouping, initially the Six, which would
have the economic and political resources and the military potential necessary
to rank with the US and the USSR. The second prerequisite is to prevent any
possibility of a European settlement between the US and the USSR without his
concurrence. De Gaulle has long feared that the two superpowers ultimately
would compose their differences, including those concerning the future of
Europe. He has seen significant movement in this direction in the recent period
of detente and in the nuclear test ban treaty. He seems to feel that a US-Soviet
agreement would perpetuate the division of Europe along present lines of Soviet
hegemony over Eastern Europe and of US ascendancy over Western Europe.
6. To fulfill either of these prerequisites, de Gaulle feels there must be, first
and foremost, a drastic reduction in the role and the influence of the US in
Western Europe. The close US-West German relationship is the principal
obstacle to achieving the kind of relationship with Germany that de Gaulle
desires. The only sure way, in his view, to prevent the US and the USSR from
deciding the future of Europe is for France to become Western Europe's leader
and spokesman. In de Gaulle's mind the proper role for the US is to stand
aside holding its protective nuclear umbrella over Europe.
Europe
7. De Gaulle's objective is to organize Western Europe into a loose associa-
tion of powers led by France-a "Europe of Fatherlands"-which would have
sufficient strength and coherence of policy to negotiate European questions on a
more or less equal basis with the US and the USSR. His concept of the Europe
which would emerge from these negotiations-"Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals"-is quite vague in both content and timing. It does seem to include
a mutual and reciprocal withdrawal of the US from Europe and of the USSR
into its own boundaries. The Eastern European nations would recover their
independence from the Soviet Union, though Communist regimes friendly to
Moscow might remain in power; and the nations of Western Europe would
become less subject to US influence, although some type of defensive arrange-
ments might continue.
8. Germany: The achievement of de Gaulle's aspirations for Europe depends
upon what he can accomplish with West Germany. He retains a considerable
measure of traditional French distrust of Germany. He therefore considers it
important to anchor West Germany to France or to some broader grouping
under French leadership in order to head off any possibility that the Germans
might embark on a unilateral course adverse to French interests. He also
realizes that his objective of a French-led West European bloc strong enough
to stand up to the US and the USSR would be impossible to achieve without
the added increment of German strength.
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9. De Gaulle is almost certainly disappointed by the downward drift in
Franco-German relations since the high point reached with the de Gaulle-
Adenauer agreement of January 1963, even though much of the deterioration is
attributable to his own actions. To be sure, the drift has not been altogether
downward; the Germans have met French desires in a number of matters,
both political and economic. But de Gaulle has not been able to shake the West
German Government's confidence in and desire for US support for the defense
of Europe, and he has not been able to frighten or cajole the Germans into
moving toward his idea of French political ascendancy on the continent.
10. De Gaulle is fully aware of the importance that the West Germans attach
to German reunification, and, although he has diverged from them by his
early public recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, he has been careful to give
them reason to believe that he favors eventual reunification. De Gaulle prob-
ably would view the emergence of a united and powerful Germany as a chal-
lenge to French ascendancy in Western Europe, but he almost certainly sees
very little possibility that reunification will come to pass in the foreseeable
future. He probably regards the issue as a vehicle for international politics,
rather than as a goal to be sought.
11. The Germans, on the other hand, have become increasingly suspicious
of French intentions toward the USSR, and they fear that a Paris-Moscow agree-
ment at German expense may be in the making. They are apprehensive of
de Gaulle's intention to minimize the US role in any settlement of European
problems, including the reunification of Germany. Many Germans also suspect
that de Gaulle intends the French nuclear force more as an instrument for
French political domination of Western Europe than as an instrument for its
military defense.
12. If, as appears likely, there is no significant early German movement toward
French foreign and defense policies, the downward course in Franco-German
relations is almost certain to continue. Over the long run, if de Gaulle cannot
persuade the Germans to go along with his basic European policies, he will have
to reappraise his objectives and strategies.
13. The UK: De Gaulle considers the UK an impediment to realizing his own
ambitions for France. In his view, the UK is a handmaiden of US policy in
Europe, and seeks to cling to its special relationship with the US and to its
Commonwealth interests rather than to cast its lot with Europe. Consequently
he excludes the UK, for the present, from the European political grouping that
he hopes to build and lead. His policy has been, and probably will continue
to be, to exclude the UK from the European Economic Community and to
prevent the UK from increasing in any way its position or influence on the
continent. At the same time, de Gaulle is willing to undertake certain projects
with the UK, such as joint production of aircraft, and there are signs that he
has not entirely given up the hope of converting the UK to a European con-
tinentalist approach. Indeed, in the long run, a French tie to a converted UK
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could provide an alternative policy in case of a failure of Franco-German
relations.
14. The European Communities and Integration: De Gaulle was not in favor
of the treaties which established the existing European communities when they
were first adopted. Since returning to power in 1958, he has accepted the
European institutions which have been created and has followed policies that
allowed them to grow, while seeking to make them serve French economic
interests. The beneficent French policy toward the European economic com-
munities, in spite of their integrative effects, seems to some extent to be at
odds with the hostile French policy toward political integration. It appears
that de Gaulle has become increasingly apprehensive of late about the possible
loss of sovereignty in the economic field that could result from further progress
toward integrated economic institutions. Hence, he is likely to resist continued
evolution of the communities toward more integrated forms. In the political
sphere, de Gaulle has excluded any approach going beyond the creation of a
loose political grouping of European nations with extensive consultative ar-
rangements but with no supranational institutions.
15. De Gaulle desires an agreement among the Six for the coordination of
their foreign and defense policies along French lines. He has emphasized
his insistence on including defense problems among the subjects the union
would deal with to the exclusion of the US. If negotiations are resumed on
European unity the French will probably make some kind of proposal for
coordinating European defense programs independently of the US and NATO.
But the smaller countries are reluctant to enter into a consultative arrange-
ment of this sort lest it tie them to French policy and lose them the balancing
support of the US and the UK.
The Alliance and NATO
16. In de Gaulle's view, alliances are created for specific purposes; they should
have the same life span as the conditions which called them into being, no more.
General de Gaulle applies this simple but rigid concept to the Atlantic Alliance.
He sees it as a transient relationship limited not only in time but also in area,
structure, and competence. It is useful and proper only so long as the threat
continues which brought it into being-the possibility of a Soviet attack on
Western Europe.
17. It is not likely that General de Gaulle will change his basic convictions
concerning the nature of alliances in general or the Atlantic Alliance in particular,
but in practice his approach may involve temporizing. Although he almost
certainly believes that a Soviet military attack has become highly unlikely, he
does not claim that the Soviet menace has permanently disappeared, and this,
together with the political consequences of a French decision to withdraw, prob-
ably continues to justify French participation in the Alliance for the time being.
In de Gaulle's view this participation binds France only to those specific obliga-
tions France agrees to and does not require France to support the policies of
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other participants on nonmilitary matters or to assist them with their problems
in other parts of the world.
18. In the past, General de Gaulle has drawn a distinction between the
Atlantic Alliance and the organizational structure which has grown up around
it-NATO. While he continues to accept the Alliance for the present as a
necessary defensive undertaking among independent nations, he is opposed to
NATO. He believes that it provides an institutionalized framework for the
perpetuation of US (and British) influence in Europe. He is determinedly
opposed to the concept of integrated NATO forces and command structure.
As he views it, such integration removes French forces from French control
and places in foreign hands the decision as to when and how to defend France.
This is, in de Gaulle's view, a clear and inadmissible infringement of French
sovereignty. The General is also opposed to the US views on a proper strategy
for NATO.
19. We believe that de Gaulle will, at the very least, insist upon major struc-
tural reforms in NATO, but his antipathy to NATO as it is now constituted may
be so strong that even such changes would not suffice. Clearly de Gaulle;s
assaults on NATO and his step by step disengagement from it are intended to
gain leverage on the US and the other NATO members so that, from a position
of maximum strength, he can press his views on such questions as reorganization
of the Alliance, French "status" in the West, and perhaps US-French nuclear
cooperation in some form. As far as West European defense is concerned,
de Gaulle almost certainly prefers a series of bilateral alliances among the US,
UK, France, and West Germany, which would involve relatively loose arrange-
ments for coordinating military operations in wartime combined with a small
amount of coordinated planning in peacetime. He probably seeks eventually
to reduce the US role to that of a nuclear backup to Europe's own defense
arrangements under French preeminence.
20. De Gaulle's terms for staying in the Alliance are probably not yet clear
in his own mind. Although his current statements almost certainly contain an
element of bargaining, his terms in negotiating NATO matters will be extremely
high, and if he is not satisfied, he will probably withdraw from NATO and
ultimately from the Atlantic Alliance. If he does withdraw, his timing will
depend upon the state of French relations with the USSR, the US, and West
Germany, and on de Gaulle's estimate of how best to advance his views con-
cerning the future of Europe. He almost certainly will not leave NATO before
the French presidential election in late 1965; but he has stated that he will
not permit troops or installations on French soil after 1969 that are not under
French command and control.
Nuclear Weapons
21. General de Gaulle regards the possession of nationally controlled nuclear
weapons as an indispensable political asset, both for the achievement of great-
power status and for his campaign to replace US leadership in Europe with
that of France. A nuclear weapons capability confirms French confidence in
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the destiny of France. In political and psychological terms, a nuclear capability
gives France a decided advantage over West Germany and provides France
equal status, at least, with the UK.
22. General de Gaulle also considers that France's nuclear force will have
military importance. French military strategy is based on deterring a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe rather than on actually having to resort to military
action to combat it. The General is opposed to the US strategy of "flexible
response" for the defense of Europe because he sees it as permitting a Soviet
advance deep into Western Europe with a resultant destruction of much of the
area. His plan is to maintain firmly the threat of the immediate use of strategic
nuclear weapons against the population centers of the USSR in response to
any but the smallest border incursions by Soviet forces. The French assert
that this posture will be so convincing that the nuclear force never will be used
in actual hostilities. The General will almost certainly continue to support the
doctrine of instant nuclear response since this gives the small French nuclear
force 2 its overt rationale. He probably is not particularly worried about having
to implement it and face the consequences, since he regards a Soviet invasion
of Western Europe as highly unlikely. In any case, the French believe its
potential as a trigger for the US strategic nuclear force would probably maximize
the political impact of the force in both Washington and Moscow. Conse-
quently, de Gaulle opposes efforts within NATO to reach agreement on force
levels and plans for the implementation of the strategy of flexible response which
is favored by the US.
23. Gaullist spokesmen have suggested that the French force should be re-
garded as the first step toward a European nuclear deterrent. Such suggestions'
probably should be interpreted in the light of de Gaulle's belief that the French
force should be accepted as European simply because France is in Europe. We
do not believe that de Gaulle would ever give up control over the French nuclear
force or that he would agree to associate the French force with a European
nuclear force in a manner that would dilute French control.
The US
24. De Gaulle now views France and the US as political competitors pursuing
divergent goals in the reorganization of Europe. The expressed purposes of
US policy in postwar Europe, as de Gaulle sees it, have been achieved-the
continent has recovered economically and politically from the effects of World
War II, and the European nations have reached the point where they are again
capable of conducting their own affairs. He concludes that neither US nor
European interests are served best by continuation of a major US role in Europe.
25. In addition to these general considerations, de Gaulle regards many
specific past and present US policies as contrary to French interests. Past
instances include the US refusal to assist the French nuclear weapons program,
2 By the early 1970s, France will probably have a submarine-missile force of three sub-
marines and an IRBM force dispersed in hardened sites.
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the negative US response to de Gaulle's 1958 proposal that the US, France,
and the UK establish a tripartite directorate to concert policy in all areas of
the world, US opposition to France in the Suez affair, and lack of support in
the Algerian War. General de Gaulle has little confidence that in a future crisis
the US would give full attention to the views or interests of its allies. He
supported the US on the Cuban missile issue, but he has since cited it as illus-
trating US readiness to make unilateral decisions affecting the interests of
the nations of Western Europe.
26. Until recently France solicited US investment; it has cooperated with the
US in various arrangements to alleviate difficulties with the US balance of
payments. But de Gaulle now regards many types of US direct private invest-
ment in France as a threat to French economic independence. Since late 1964
he has taken measures to curtail US investment and has sought (so far un-
successfully) to rally the other EEC nations behind a similar program. The
recent French decision to convert into gold those dollar earnings in excess of
franc-area payment needs was related to the investment issue in that it will
increase the financial pressure on the US to curtail the flow of dollars to France.
Although the decision on gold was partly motivated by economic and financial
considerations, the manner in which it was handled by the French Government
revealed substantial political purposes. The investment issue has quieted down
as a result of voluntary restraints by US investors, but the principle of French-
and European-economic independence remains a sensitive matter.
The USSR and East Europe
27. De Gaulle is confident that Russian national interests and Russian na-
tionalism have become more important than Communist ideology in determining
the course of Soviet foreign policy. This does not necessarily mean, in his
view, that Russia. will cease to be a disruptive or dangerous force in European
affairs. It does mean, however, that the Soviet leaders will see in a more realis-
tic light the advantages of political and economic association with Western
Europe, and that they may become more amenable to negotiation along tradi-
tional national lines. De Gaulle regards such changes in Soviet thinking and
orientation as an evolutionary process, probably already under way, and he will
be alert to any opportunities to advance this process.
28. During the past two years de Gaulle has moved away from his earlier view
that Soviet policy was still too rigid to permit any kind of meaningful discussion
with Moscow with respect to Europe. He has taken a number of initiatives
calculated to probe the possibilities of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. De
Gaulle's view of the Vietnamese situation coincides in certain respects with that
of Moscow and the French have made some attempts to concert the Vietnam
policies of the two countries, but without success. More recently, the departure
of Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov from Paris provided the opportunity for a
number of extraordinary expressions of warmth and understanding between the
two governments. De Gaulle took part in and stimulated this unique treatment
of the departing Soviet ambassador. Soviet adoption of the French color TV
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system as the basis for joint research and production has also been treated in
France as a major step toward closer relations with the USSR. These develop-
ments, and Gromyko's visit to Paris in April, probably foreshadow further politi-
cal contacts, for it is certainly de Gaulle's intent to expand the areas of political
understanding between France and the Soviet Union.
29. Yet de Gaulle almost certainly considers that he must be circumspect in
his dealings with Moscow. He is restrained by concern that too rapid move-
ment would reduce his chances of establishing a common policy with West
Germany and French leadership of Europe. He also believes that the quickened
pace of military developments in Vietnam has injected a new and unfortunate
element into the situation. In his view recent events in Vietnam have put
pressures on the Soviets for increased militancy in order to minimize Moscow's
political losses to Peiping, have clouded relations between the US and the
USSR, and have slowed down recent tendencies to reduce the role of ideology
in Soviet policy.
30. As de Gaulle views the likely unfolding of events in Eastern Europe, the
Communist regimes will eventually become more nationalist than Communist
and Moscow's hold over them will continue to decrease. Until the summer of
1964, he avoided any initiatives in Eastern Europe, although it is an area of
considerable interest to him. Apparently he now believes that he can intensify
French contacts with these countries without offending Moscow. At least for
the near future, de Gaulle's policies in Eastern Europe are likely to be more
economic and cultural in content though political in purpose.
Communist China and Southeast Asia
31. One of de Gaulle's most conspicuous diplomatic actions in disregard of
US susceptibilities and policies was the recognition of Communist China in
January 1964. The French maintain that recognition of Peiping was logical
and inevitable once the wars in Indochina and Algeria, in which Peiping op-
posed France, were past. De Gaulle probably believed that recognition of
Peiping would provide France some additional leverage in dealing with Moscow
and widen French opportunities to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moreover,
he was certainly not averse to demonstrating his independence of US wishes.
However, he probably was guided primarily by his conviction that Communist
China is destined, by virtue of its size, location, and potential power, to play
the dominant role in the Far East, and by his hope that he could influence
Peiping's attitudes and policies. Thus far recognition of Peiping does not appear
to have paid France any substantial political or economic dividends. But de
Gaulle will almost certainly continue efforts to cultivate good relations with
Peiping as one means for increasing French presence and influence in the Far
East.
32. French policy toward Southeast Asia, and particularly toward Vietnam,
diverges markedly from that of the US. De Gaulle considers Indochina within
the natural sphere of influence of China. Although he acknowledges that US
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air and sea power will continue to exercise strong influence over the Western
Pacific, including Japan and the Philippines, he regards US efforts to sustain
pro-Western regimes on the mainland as bound to fail over the longer run.
De Gaulle also genuinely fears that a Sino-US war may develop in Vietnam
with negative effects on his hopes for Europe. Hence, he has sought to be the
peacemaker, calling for negotiations and for neutralization of Vietnam. France
retains economic and cultural interests in Indochina and is the only Western
power which has regular political contact with both Hanoi and Peiping. De
Gaulle probably still hopes to be able to use these links to bring about a resolu-
tion of the Vietnamese war, though rebuffs from both the Communist powers and
the US have lately reduced French activity. His decision to reduce the role
of the French SEATO representative at the May 1965 ministerial meeting was
probably intended to increase his flexibility in seeking a solution in Vietnam,
partly by dramatizing his dissociation from US policies in the area and partly
by avoiding unprofitable disputes with the US.
33. De Gaulle advocates the establishment of a regime in Vietnam which
would be neutralized with respect to all outside powers. That such a regime
would probably be Communist would in de Gaulle's view be of incidental im-
portance, on the grounds that the strong nationalist feeling of the Vietnamese
and their historic desire to resist domination by China would prevent the Com-
munists from ruling Vietnam as instruments of Chinese policy. In any event,
France will certainly be unwilling to participate in any way in the defense of
the area against Communist takeover; moreover, France will not invest military
or economic resources to bring about or defend a settlement.
The Third World
34. France continues to have close political and economic ties with its former
African colonies. Relations with Algeria are especially important to France
because of French interest in the Saharan oil deposits and at least for some
time to come in the nuclear test site. However, France also considers its rela-
tions with Algeria as important in demonstrating that, unlike other Western
powers, France can work closely with a regime of radical social and economic
orientation. Paris hopes that advocacy of independence from both power blocs
will attract many uncommitted and underdeveloped countries into a loosely
organized third world under French leadership. De Gaulle's relatively good
relations with Israel and many Arab states reflect a clever balance of French
responses among highly complex conflicts of Middle Eastern interests. De
Gaulle will continue to seek to expand French influence and prestige among
the third-world countries, and appeal to those who dare assert independence
from the "two hegemonies" of the US and the USSR.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY
35. De Gaulle's foreign policy, particularly during the past two years, has had
a profoundly unsettling effect on relations with the US and on Western Europe.
De Gaulle is firmly convinced that with the recovery of Western Europe, the
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fading of the Soviet threat, the Sino-Soviet split, and the advent of nuclear
proliferation, the world has entered a new era. More than most national lead-
ers, he has sought to accelerate the process of change and to guide the new
trends toward his own objectives. In many instances the pace and the directions
he seeks to set are incompatible with the ideas and desires of the US and of
Western Europe.
36. In particular, de Gaulle has challenged the entire organizational concept
on which European defense has been based since the establishment of NATO.
He has brought this issue to a head much faster and in a much more acute
manner than any other West European nation would have done; he has moved
the problem to a point where the consideration of basic alterations in existing
organizational arrangements for the defense of Western Europe is becoming
unavoidable.
37. To an increasing extent, de Gaulle's policies are beginning to force the
Western European nations, particularly the NATO powers, to choose between
France and the US on political and military issues. West Germany is especially
vulnerable to this pressure because its national interests require close ties with
both the US and France. At times, de Gaulle has been brutal in his treatment
of Bonn on sensitive issues, such as French-Soviet relations, European integra-
tion, and his own relations with Chancellor Erhard, in spite of Erhard's exposed
position owing to the German elections scheduled for next September. The
harshness of de Gaulle's moves vis-a-vis Bonn does not, in our view, indicate
that he is losing hope of bringing West Germany into line with his own policies.
Rather, they are probably a reflection of his own view that he knows the best
way to handle the Germans and that this involves an alternation of carrot and
stick. Clearly, however, his methods as well as his purposes tend to antagonize
the Germans, even though so far he has often gotten his way.
38. De Gaulle has invoked French nationalism not only because of his own
convictions, but also with the intent of bolstering the French sense of destiny
and self-confidence. His moves to assert French national interest have already
contributed to the loss of momentum toward European political association, and
there appears to be substantial concern among Europeans that de Gaulle may
frustrate the various steps toward economic integration planned for the near
future. Indeed, among Western Europeans in general, his policies are causing
a great deal of irritation with France because French policy so often appears
to them to be high-handed in the pursuit of grandeur at the expense of their
concepts of European unity, cooperation, and security. At the same time many
Europeans do appear to share de Gaulle's belief that the time has come to
depend less on US leadership. Thus, overall, de Gaulle's policies have not only
widened the areas of difference between France and the US but also stimulated
divergent thought among Europeans. For the present, however, the dominant
European reaction is to hold to the idea of solidarity with North America, and
to postpone hopes of European unity.
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39. Another consequence of de Gaulle's policies is that they give the USSR
opportunity to try to widen the fissures now evident between France and the
other North Atlantic countries. This in itself is sufficient basis for Moscow to
give the appearance of interest in any negotiations with Paris for a political
understanding. The USSR has no more reason than the US to expect that de
Gaulle can be manipulated or worked with very easily. However, for its pur-
pose of weakening NATO and Allied unity, Moscow does not need to manipulate
de Gaulle; it need only go along with him.
IV. AFTER DE GAULLE
40. For seven years it has been General de Gaulle's intention to set France a
course which, in its grand design and basic purposes, will not be altered after
he leaves the scene. Although his policies are unpopular with many, his impact
on French attitudes toward foreign policy has been substantial and in many
respects probably long lasting. The longer he remains in power, the greater
this impact will be. This is so not only because of his effects upon French
attitudes and the momentum his policies will achieve with respect to future
French policies. It is also true because the longer he is in power, the more
likely his policies are to shape the political conditions, institutions, and relation-
ships in Western Europe.
41. The foreign policies of the initial successor government will depend to a
great extent on the time and circumstances in which de Gaulle leaves power,
as well as on the situation then prevailing elsewhere in the world. If de Gaulle
leaves the scene during the next two or three years, his successor initially will
probably make little change in the fundamentals of present French foreign
policy. For example, the desire for first class power status and for the leadership
of Europe will almost certainly continue; and the idea will persist of a French-
led Europe seeking its own destiny between the two super powers and attracting
to its side nations of the third world. The attitude of the successor government
toward the organization of European defense will remain under the influence of
the actions de Gaulle will have taken on NATO.
42. The French advanced weapons program has probably already achieved
such momentum that any likely successor government almost certainly will con-
tinue it. In view of other requirements upon the nation's resources after de
Gaulle, a successor government might reduce annual expenditures for the ad-
vanced weapons program and spread the plan out over a somewhat longer
period in order to step up social welfare programs to win political support.
The difference between the US and France arising from US anti-proliferation
policies and French determination to build a nuclear force will continue.
43. De Gaulle's departure from power will give new impetus to the conflict
in France between those who believe in his vision of French nationalism and
French preeminence in Europe and those who are attracted to the ideal of
European political integration. This will be only one of the large issues that
will come to fore on the reawakened domestic political scene. It is possible,
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however, that successor governments will come to be less fixed in their attitudes
on European and Atlantic matters than de Gaulle has been, and, as time goes
by in the post-de Gaulle period, the sharp nationalist edges of French policy
may be blunted.
44. Yet, even if governments after de Gaulle share his general attitudes and
policy, no other leader will enjoy the degree of freedom from internal political
and economic restraints that de Gaulle has had in shaping French policy and
implementing it. His successors will be subjected to the pressures of special
interest groups to a much greater degree than de Gaulle, and they will probably
be forced to give greater heed to public opinion. Lacking his stature his suc-
cessors will almost certainly be less effective and less decisive in conducting
France's foreign affairs. Moreover, and perhaps above all, his successors will
lack his particular mystique, authority, and imperious self-confidence when they
appear on the international stage. They will be neither so credible nor so
formidable as de Gaulle. When de Gaulle speaks, all nations listen and some
tremble; this will not be likely with a M. Pompidou.
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