THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010015-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 4, 1964
• Content Type: SNIE

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.3-64
SNIE 14.3-64
4 March 1964
The Outlook for North Vietnam
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
4 MARCH 1964
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SECRET
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.3-64
The Outlook for North Vietnam
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM ............................................... 1
NOTE ........................................................ 1
CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 1
DISCUSSION ................................................. 3
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 3
II. INTERNAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ........ 3
III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS .................. 4
IV. MILITARY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS .......... ....... 8
V. THE SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY .......................... 11
VI. THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICIES ...... 12
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THE OUTLOOK FOR
NORTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To assess the strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam
(DRV) and to estimate its probable courses of action over the
next several months.
NOTE
Firm information about North Vietnam is extremely sparse.
Accordingly, analysis of the economic and political situation and
especially of the size, structure, and capabilities of the armed
forces, is extremely difficult, and the judgments below must be
considered tentative.
CONCLUSIONS
A. We believe that the North Vietnamese leaders look at Com-
munist prospects with considerable confidence. In South Viet-
nam, they probably feel that GVN will to resist is waning
and may feel that the same is true of the US. They may seek
to speed the process by a step-up in current Viet Cong tactics
of pressure and terror. We think Hanoi will stop short of in-
troducing sizable DRV military units into South Vietnam, lest
this bring about a major US military retaliation. In Laos, they
will protect the positions they have already achieved and
support Pathet Lao efforts to erode the non-Communist position,
but will seek to avoid initiatives that would provoke US military
intervention. (Paras. 32-39)
B. North Vietnam's external successes have been achieved
despite important internal problems and vulnerabilities. The
DRV faces severe and chronic food shortages and widespread
apathy among the populace and even the lower ranks of the
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Party. The economy is overcommitted to developing heavy in-
dustry at the expense of agriculture and heavily dependent on
Bloc aid. The personal dominance of Ho Chi Minh masks dif-
ferences within the leadership which will be sharpened after his
death. (Paras. 2-15)
C. These problems and vulnerabilities do not threaten the
regime's control at home or materially hamper its present level
of effort against South Vietnam and Laos, nor do they preclude
a somewhat higher level of such effort. However, the DRV prob-
ably could not sustain large-scale military involvement, such as
open invasion, without a considerable increase in Chinese Com-
munist or Soviet aid. (Paras. 16-24)
D. The Sino-Soviet split poses a painful dilemma to North
Vietnam. Powerful motives impel it to avoid taking sides defin-
atively, but events have moved the DRV progressively closer to
the Chinese position. We believe that Hanoi will nevertheless
try to maintain as cordial relations with Moscow as circumstances
permit. (Paras. 29-31)
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DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The resourcefulness and drive which have characterized the sub-
versive efforts of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) in South
Vietnam and Laos are well known, as are the situations in those coun-
tries which invite Communist exploitation. But the recent news of
Communist successes tends to obscure the fact that the DRV is itself
beset by a variety of weaknesses.
II. INTERNAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
2. The popular enthusiasm with. which the DRV regime was received
after its victory over the French in 1954 has long since waned. Since
its accession to power, the Lao Dong (Communist) Party has striven
to "build socialism" in a truncated, predominantly agricultural country
by doctrinaire and, in earlier years, Draconian measures. In 1956-1957,
there was active revolt against certain "land reform" programs. Since
then, the peasantry has shown considerable ingenuity in frustrating
the regime's agricultural policies. The regime has taken harsh meas-
ures against intellectuals, Catholics (who make up about five percent
of the population), and many ethnic minorities. At times, these con-
trols have been tempered and some efforts made to win over these groups,
but they remain for the most part alienated. If economic difficulties
should substantially worsen, and particularly if the shortage of food
should reach wide-scale famine proportions as a result of a natural
catastrophe, there might be local disturbances, but they almost cer-
tainly could be contained. Though the Hanoi regime appears to have
firm enough control over North Vietnam's 17 million inhabitants to
prevent the outbreak of any serious dissidence, the populace seems gen-
erally apathetic to what the Party considers the needs of the state.
3. This apathy even extends into the Party itself, at least to the
lower cadres, who have lost much of their revolutionary elan. It is a
source of considerable doctrinal embarrassment to its leadership that
Party membership (about three percent of the population) is predomi-
nantly urban and intellectual. The stability and cohesion which this
leadership has displayed over past decades is deceptive, since it derives
almost entirely from the prestige and skill of one man-Ho Chi Minh.
Ho is a unique figure in the world Communist movement, truly the last
of the old Bolsheviks. The Indochinese Communist movement was
virtually his personal creation; it has prospered under his direction but,
significantly, faltered and split whenever he had to turn his primary
attention to other matters.
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4. Ho is 73 and apparently has not designated an heir apparent. His
12 senior subordinates who comprise the rest of the Politburo are en-
meshed in longstanding personal rivalries and sharp policy disagree-
ments in which the question of Chinese influence has been an important
element. The "pro-Chinese" group, advocating generally militant
policies, is centered around former Secretary General Truong Chinh,
who himself was forced to resign that position in 1956 because of his
excessive zeal in pushing land reform on the Chinese model. Defense
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap has a strongly anti-Chinese bias and has
long attempted to resist Chinh's encroachment into the military estab-
lishment, over which Giap seems to have maintained at least nominal
control. Another grouping appears around First Secretary Le Duan,
upon whom Ho seems to lean heavily in Party affairs, but its political
orientation is less easily identified.
5. Ho has successfully kept these rival groups under control, but when
he leaves the scene these rivalries are almost cretain to create serious
difficulties within the Party and perhaps instability within the country.
Power within the Party probably will be decisive, although Giap may
well seek to use his position in the military to affect the outcome. The
Chinese and Soviets will also try to exercise influence. At this juncture,
First Secretary Le Duan appears most likely to succeed in view of his
position and the fact that he probably is least objectionable to the
various contending factions, but the succession is unlikely to be smooth,
and might be violent.
III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
6. Basic Structure of the Economy. North Vietnam is an essentially
rural and undeveloped country which does not produce enough even
to feed its rapidly expanding population.' North Vietnam was a food-
deficit area throughout the period of French control, but its deficits
then were easily offset by the transfer of surplus rice from the south,
a solution not now available. The country has many natural resources,
some of which. were partially developed by the French. The present
regime also inherited from the French a rudimentary transportation
network and a modest industrial plant. North Vietnam's industrial
progress is inhibited, however, by small domestic capital resources, a
severe shortage of indigenous skilled labor and technical talent, and
limited experience in management. These problems are compounded by
a doctrinaire leadership, which is prone to pursue symbolic and ideo-
logically satisfying industrial goals conceived with little practical ref-
erence to North Vietnam's domestic resources and economic needs.
'Hanoi has claimed a population growth of 3.5 percent per annum but this
figure may be somewhat high.
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7. Agriculture-The Potential Food Crisis. Agricultural mismanage-
ment, four years of poor weather, a lack of fertilizers and insecticides,
and a growing population have led to food shortages in North Vietnam.
The current picture is apparently bleaker than it has been for the past
five years; Hanoi itself says that the total of 1963 output of food
amounted to less than five million metric tons of rice-equivalent,2 of
which over one-fifth consisted of unpopular secondary food crops (corn,
yams, and manioc). 1963 food output in per capita terms was close
to that of 1957 (the lowest year since the regime came to power) but
without the reserves from a preceding bumper crop. The 1963 per
capita output of rice, the preferred cereal, was about one-fifth below 1960.
8. The regime is apparently endeavoring to import foodstuffs. It
seems to be acquiring only small amounts from non-Bloc sources, and
there are some indications that Hanoi may be having difficulty finding
forms of payment satisfactory to foreign exporters. We do not know
how much food may be arriving currently from the Bloc, but believe
that China, even with its own agricultural difficulties, has a strong in-
centive to prevent dangerous famine in North Vietnam. The regime's
own immediate answer to the poor 1963 harvest seems to be a tightening
of distribution controls, in an effort to stretch limited rice supplies by
ensuring that everyone consumes his fair share of secondary crops.
Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards will probably decline
further in the cities, and critical food shortages may appear in some
of the thousands of villages. Furthermore, prospects for the June rice
crops are not bright, since transplanting seems to be lagging behind
the 1963 rate.
9. There is little prospect of any real resolution of North Vietnam's
food problem, at least for some time to come. Hanoi has explicitly re-
jected the most practical solutions on ideological grounds by giving
heavy industry priority over agriculture. Emphasis on producing tropi-
cal export crops to exchange for food imports (as urged by the Russians)
is considered inconsistent with an "independent socialist economy,"
since this policy would render the economy dependent on foreign markets
and subject to foreign domination. Instead, Hanoi proposes to increase
the yield of existing farm land through investment and technical innova-
tion, and to open up new agricultural areas by resettling ethnic Viet-
namese in the mountain regions now sparsely inhabited by minority
races. Neither of these programs can be realistically expected to alle-
2 Typically, this admission was couched as a boast: ". . . in spite of natural
disasters the total output of food in terms of paddy was nearly 5 million tons."
In 1960, the regime was projecting an annual output of 9 million tons by 1965 to
keep up with its population increase. According to North Vietnamese figures,
performance in recent years has been as follows (in million metric tons of rice-
equivalent) : 1959-5.7, 1960-4.9, 1961-5.5, 1962-5.7.
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viate the basic food problem in the near term. Indeed, we believe the
situation is likely to get worse over the next year or two-drastically
so if the weather should prove adverse.
10. Transportation. Despite Hanoi's considerable investment in
transportation and communications, North Vietnam's transportation
system cannot adequately support the industrialization program. This
is due not only to the rudimentary structure of the system but also
to poor planning and inefficient organization at the national and local
levels, the use of large numbers of unskilled personnel, and the lack
of maintenance equipment and storage facilities. Only those areas of
North Vietnam served by the limited, French-built railroad system have
sufficient and comparatively efficient service. The railroad system is
vulnerable strategically, since the lines all radiate from Hanoi with no
alternate rail facilities available for any one line. Both the rail and
the highway systems have many key bridges. The road system is
poor, and trucks and gasoline are scarce. Haiphong is the only port
that can handle large amounts of general cargo and petroleum in bulk.
The inland waterway system is primitive, and the country has few ships
for inland and coastal transport. There are approximately 40 light
transport aircraft that can provide limited airlift.
11. Industry. In 1957, the Hanoi regime launched a Three-Year
Plan, which conformed to Soviet recommendations in stressing light
industry and the development of exportable agricultural products.3
Industries inherited from the French were expanded (e.g., cement and
textiles), and new ones were developed (e.g., food processing, enamel-
ware, paper, and soap). Production has increased impressively, though
in absolute terms industry remains small.4
12. In 1960, emphasis was shifted in the current Five-Year Plan (1961-
1965) to heavy industry and prestige projects. However, North Vietnam
has neither the domestic resources, the capital, the experienced man-
agers, nor the skilled labor necessary to create extensive heavy industry,'
and the pace of economic development has diminished since the Five-
Year Plan was launched. The Plan itself has faltered, and its goals
'In 1960, light manufacture accounted for two-thirds and mining and heavy
manufacture for one-third of all industrial output by value.
' Hanoi statistics claim that industrial production, exclusive of handicrafts,
increased at an average annual rate of about 33 percent from 1956 through 1962.
This figure is probably inflated, however, and it must be remembered that North
Vietnam began with a small base in 1956. In 1962, the value of agricultural pro-
duction still accounted for about 45 percent and industrial production (exclusive
of handicrafts) for only about 12 percent of North Vietnam's estimated GNP.
? Managerial deficiencies have been a source of concern to the regime for some
time. In 1962, trained technicians and skilled workers comprised less than three
percent of the civilian labor force-and the regime itself has admitted that the
level of competence in this small pool of trained talent is still very low.
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were revised downward in April 1963.1, Considerable construction has
been started and some progress has been made, but the quality of North
Vietnam's industrial output remains low and its real contribution to the
economy is slight. The bulk of the country's heavy industry is concen-
trated within the small rectangle formed by the four cities of Haiphong,
Thai Nguyen, Phu Tho, and Nam Dinh, and the power essential to con-
tinued production comes from a few key plants.' There are indications
that Hanoi is concerned over the strategic vulnerability of the country's
industry and transportation.
13. Trade and Aid. North Vietnam's lack of domestic capital and
technical skills, coupled with the regime's desire to industrialize the
country rapidly, have made its economy crucially dependent on foreign
trade and aid. In the period 1955-1963, the DRV received almost a
billion dollars of credits and grants from the Communist Bloc, almost
half from Communist China. North Vietnam's trade has more than
tripled since 1955 and now stands at about $240 million. About 85 per-
cent of this trade is with the Bloc : roughly 35 percent with the USSR,
30 percent with Communist China, and 20 percent with the European
Satellites, mainly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The
principal Free World trading partner is Japan. The DRV has imported
all its POL, iron and steel, railroad rolling stock, and vehicles, and most
of its machinery and metal goods, spare parts, industrial chemicals,
chemical fertilizers, and raw cotton.
14. North Vietnam has never had an export surplus and most of its
trade deficit (about $60 million in 1963) has been financed under Bloc
assistance programs, which consisted mainly of grants in 1955-1957
but have been largely credits in the years since then. Bloc aid and
technical assistance will continue to be crucial to the industrial develop-
ment of North Vietnam. The USSR has made credits available for agri-
culture and, together with the European Satellites, has provided ma-
chinery and equipment for heavy industry, as well as motor vehicles.
Soviet and European Satellite economic assistance for the current Five-
Year Plan has been scheduled primarily for projects in the fields of elec-
tric power, coal and apatite mining, engineering, chemicals, and tele-
communications. The Chinese Communists have supplied large quan-
tities of basic materials and manpower. They have also constructed a
few heavy industrial plants, assisted in the rehabilitation and expansion
For example, the original Plan called for the production of 500,000 tons of
pig iron a year (60 percent going to steel) and the Thai Nguyen plant was sched-
uled for completion in 1960 with an initial annual capacity of 100,000 tons. Thai
Nguyen's first blast furnace, however, was not put into operation until February
1964.
Six plants account for 91 percent of the electric power supply of the main grid
and supply about 65 percent of the total electric power in North Vietnam-includ-
ing power to the urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
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of North Vietnam's transportation and irrigation system, and made
appreciable contributions to the growth of light industry. Bloc techni-
cal assistance has included not only the loan of foreign technicians and
advisers but also the supply of technical data and the training of North
Vietnamese abroad.8
15. The seriousness of a cessation or suspension of Soviet and East
European Bloc economic aid and technical assistance to North Vietnam
would depend chiefly on Communist China's willingness and ability to
replace them, the speed with which this could be accomplished, and
the concessions that China might demand. A cutoff in deliveries of
machinery and equipment from the USSR and East European Satellites
would disrupt the current industrialization program, at least tempo-
rarily. These considerations almost certainly impose some restraint
on DRV leadership from associating too closely with Peiping.
IV. MILITARY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
16. Considerable modernization of the armed forces, known as People's
Army of Vietnam (PAVN), has taken place since 1954, though progress
has sometimes been hindered by intra-Party political maneuvers and,
more importantly, by conflicts between military and civil needs. The
small pool of Vietnamese technical talent is not adequate for military
or civil requirements, let alone both. During 1958-1960, large numbers
of military personnel were diverted to agricultural and economic tasks.
Such diversions seem to have stopped in 1961 (i.e., at the time when
Hanoi began intensifying its insurgency effort in South Vietnam), but
army units are still being exhorted to grow their own food.
17. The Ground Forces. The core of the PAVN is the regular army
of perhaps between 200 and 250 thousand men. We believe the army
is organized into 5 infantry divisions, 1 artillery division, 5 infantry
brigades, and 1 infantry unit which may be either a divison or a brigade.
There is evidence that the army underwent considerable reorganization
in 1960-1961 and that some of this involved "brigading" units formerly
structured as divisions, but the details of and reasons for this reorganiza-
tion remain obscure. What we know of its deployment suggests a de-
fensive posture: Four of its five accepted infantry divisions and its
'The total number of Bloc technicians sent to North Vietnam is unknown, but
the number of foreign advisers and technicians (excluding laborers) in the coun-
try at any one time probably has been about 1,000. Estimates of the number of
Soviet technical personnel present in North Vietnam at any one time range from
200 to 300. The number of technicians from Eastern Europe in North Vietnam
at any one time may be as high as 100 to 200. Estimates of the number of Chinese
personnel in North Vietnam are larger than those for Soviet personnel, but the
two are not comparable: Chinese personnel in North Vietnam may total 3,000
to 5,000 a year; some of these are technicians, but most are laborers whose levels
of skill may not be much higher than those of North Vietnamese workers.
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only artillery division are believed to be stationed in the Red River
delta area around Hanoi and Haiphong. Since about 1958, army train-
ing has laid primary emphasis on conventional warfare. Nevertheless,
guerrilla tactics continue to receive attention, and we are aware of
special courses for the training of prospective infiltrators to South
Vietnam.
18. The strengths of the army lie principally in its experienced and
loyal officer corps, its disciplined and tightly controlled organization,
and its reputation as the conqueror of the French. Unlike the Lao
Dong Party, the army is primarily of peasant origin. Its individual
infantry soldiers are inured to hardship and highly adaptable. Many
have had or are receiving combat experience in the Hanoi-directed in-
surgent movements in Laos and South Vietnam. Recent evidence indi-
cates that the army has generally adequate stocks of conventional equip-
ment, thanks primarily to Chinese assistance. The PAVN has aug-
mented its holdings of light artillery and medium antiaircraft artillery
weapons through Soviet and Chinese Communist sources in recent years,
but it continues to hold only modest quantities of medium artillery and
is not credited with any heavy artillery. There are some indications
that limited numbers of Soviet tanks (T-34s and PT-76s) have been
received to augment the small number of captured US and French
armored vehicles known to remain in the PAVN inventory. Neverthe-
less, it is unlikely that the PAVN has yet created a significant armor
capability.
19. Supplementing the regular army is an armed militia of perhaps
200,000 which, in turn, forms part of a trained reserve which may con-
sist of around 500,000 in all. These figures are based on assumptions
rather than evidence. There is also an Armed Public Security Force
under the operational control of the Ministry of Public Security and
used primarily for internal security functions. This is conjectured to
have about 30 battalions and to contain something like 15,000 men.
20. The Navy. The Navy is a small coastal defense force with no
significant deepwater capability. Its principal equipment is 28 or 30
Communist Chinese Swatow-class motor gunboats, 12 Soviet motor tor-
pedo boats, and 4 submarine chasers. The Navy guards against smug-
gling and illegal entry or exit, conducts some minelaying, and participates
in some clandestine operations in support of the Viet Cong.
21. The Air Force. North Vietnam is not believed to have any combat
aircraft at the present time, though the foundations for the creation of
an air arm have been laid. Headquarters, maintenance, and support
organizations are being developed, and much work has been done on
airfield improvement and construction. The North Vietnamese efforts
in this regard derived considerable impetus and benefit-in terms of
equipment and practical experience-from the Soviet airlift into Laos,
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which began in late 1960 and extended through October 1962. When
the Soviets withdrew from this activity they left most of their equip-
ment behind, including 28 transports which more than doubled the
DRV aircraft inventory. There have been consistent but unconfirmed
reports over the years that Vietnamese pilots have been receiving flight
training in China and various Eastern European countries. It is pos-
sible that China could provide fighter aircraft for a small North Vietna-
mese air force on short notice.
22. North Vietnamese Air Defense. The PAVN's capabilities in the
field of conventional antiaircraft artillery have improved over the past
several years. Defense against modern high speed aircraft is still rela-
tively ineffective, but against helicopters, transports, and propeller air-
craft PAVN capability would probably be good. Similarly, the present
North Vietnamese air control and warning system has a limited opera-
tional capability against a modern air threat. There is a radar net of
about 29 early warning and fire control installations situated through-
out the country, but the radars consist of obsolete RUS, DUMBO, WHIFF,
FIRECAN, and modified SCR-270s, with a few older type KNIFE RESTS.
Mainland Chinese radar also covers North Vietnam, though so far as
we know it is not at present coordinated with the DRV net. North
Vietnam is not known to have any surface-to-air missile capability.
23. Communist Bloc Military Assistance. The PAVN's program of
standardization and modernization has depended almost entirely on
Soviet and Chinese Communist technical assistance and provision of
materiel for its successful implementation, though no reliable breakdown
on such military aid is available. Reports of the presence of Soviet-
design small arms, artillery, tanks, and trucks have been received over
the past nine years, but the proportion of these which may have been
supplied by the Chinese has not been established. It is probable that
Soviet aid in the form of artillery and vehicles was predominant until
1960, but since that date Hanoi is believed to have looked increasingly
to Peiping for supply of such items-as well as for ammunition of all
types. All the mortars and recoilless rifles, other than those captured
from the French, are believed to be of Chinese Communist manufacture.
Similarly, the stock of small arms such as SKS 7.62 mm rifles and
K-53 and 54 7.62 mm machineguns, although of Russian design, was
probably supplied by Communist China. Because of Peiping's difficul-
ties in supplying its own national needs, it is probable that North Viet-
nam will continue to depend upon the USSR and the East European
Satellites for heavier and more complex items (e.g., armored vehicles,
heavy artillery, and perhaps aircraft). POL appears to be provided in
part by Communist China, with the remainder coming from Soviet or
East European sources.
24. North Vietnam's Military Weaknesses. North Vietnam's major
military weaknesses derive, directly or indirectly, from its deficient tech-
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nological and industrial base. The DRV can produce only limited quan-
tities of mortars, bazookas, grenades, mines, small arms, and ammuni-
tion, but does have some capability for arms repair. Major deficiencies
include inadequate supplies of modern heavy equipment; a shortage of
trained specialists, technicians, and qualified instructors; low levels of
education; and present lack of air and naval support and insufficient
armor for conventional operations. Despite the PAVN's efforts to
standardize with Bloc equipment, considerable quantities of Japanese,
German, French, and US armament are still in use, greatly complicating
maintenance and logistics support. These various weaknesses and defi-
ciencies would not be likely to hamper Hanoi's support of or engage-
ment in insurgency-type operations. However, we do not believe that
Hanoi could sustain a large-scale military undertaking for any consider-
able length of time without substantial continuing assistance from ex-
ternal sources.
V. THE SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY
25. South Vietnam. Infiltration from North Vietnam has long pro-
vided the Viet Cong with political and military cadres and technicians
who are usually dispersed upon arrival to lead existing Viet Cong units
or serve as nuclei for new or expanded units. We have received occa-
sional reports of infiltrated units remaining together as such, but this
seems much more the exception than the rule. Available evidence sug-
gests that personnel infiltration is primarily of significance in providing
leadership and technical skill rather than contributing appreciably to
gross Viet Cong manpower. The Viet Cong get virtually all their food
and nonmilitary supplies locally.
26. The bulk of Viet Cong ordnance continues to be obtained by cap-
ture from Saigon Government forces, by drawing on reserve stocks
cached prior to 1954, and, to a lesser extent, by local Viet Cong manu-
facture. However, the increasing amount of heavier equipment now
being captured, together with the apparent steady improvement in the
armament of Viet Cong forces, suggests that in recent months more ma-
teriel has been coming from outside South Vietnam. Most of this, we
believe, comes from PAVN stocks rather than directly from Communist
China. Until the past year or so, it was believed that most equipment
brought from North Vietnam was carried overland, mostly through Laos,
and perhaps some through Cambodia. There is evidence that some
materiel is now being shipped by sea, either directly to southern coastal
areas or to be smuggled in from Cambodia. Hanoi's strategy seems still
that of winning control of South Vietnam by subversion and insur-
gency, but there are some signs of Viet Cong units of a more conven-
tional type being created throughout South Vietnam, particularly in
the central highlands. If such units were established, more equipment
would probably be forthcoming from Hanoi.
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27. So far, the cost to North Vietnam of its support of the Viet Cong
insurgency has been relatively slight in comparison to the results
achieved. Hanoi could almost certainly substantially step up the infil-
tration of cadres and introduce PAVN units of up to battalion size.
Hanoi could also probably furnish a certain amount of additional ma-
teriel. However, if the nature of the war came to require major items
of military equipment, to provide this would probably interfere with the
PAVN's own needs and require access to foreign supplies.
28. Laos. In some respects, it has been less troublesome for Hanoi to
i' support insurgency in South Vietnam than in Laos: The DRV has to
supply food, the Pathet Lao are not nearly so resourceful or able as
the Viet Cong, and PAVN units have been put into the field and in some
cases more or less permanently stationed on Laotian soil. We believe
that Hanoi can continue the type of activity and support it is now
engaged in, and perhaps increase the quantity of troops and equip-
ment involved.
VI. THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICIES
29. North Vietnam's Orientation. The Sino-Soviet split poses a pain-
ful dilemma for the present Hanoi leadership. Except during the period
when it was protected by French arms (a period which coincided with
Chinese weakness), Vietnam has never been able to ignore its huge
northern neighbor, by whom it has twice been occupied, once for a
thousand years, and with whom it has traditionally maintained a client
relationship. Considerable evidence exists of continuing antipathy for
the Chinese in the DRV. For nationalistic as well as doctrinal reasons,
Ho Chi Minh would obviously prefer a unified world Communist move-
ment more or less directed from Moscow to any polycentric system in
which nearby China could dominate the DRV. Ho has long been a lead-
ing advocate of unity in the world Communist movement and has used
his considerable prestige in every way possible to keep the breach be-
tween Moscow and Peiping from widening. Yet it has widened, and
the DRV has found it ever harder to stay on the fence. Hanoi cannot
ignore China's propinquity and substantial assistance, nor the fact
that China's policy is more consonant than Soviet strategy with Hanoi's
immediate interests in acquiring control of South Vietnam. But it is
equally impossible to ignore the longer term disadvantages of opting
definitively for either disputant, since either choice could involve not
only the loss of important outside aid but the risk of becoming a Chinese
satellite.
30. For the past four years this dilemma has plagued Hanoi, and ap-
parently generated considerable bitter strife within the higher councils
of the Party. For a while, Hanoi sought to avoid a decision by compro-
mise and gestures toward both sides. In 1963, Hanoi became more
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concerned about Moscow's policy of detente with the West and inclined
more and more toward Peiping. The test ban treaty threw up a concrete
issue that could not be hedged, and North Vietnam refused to sign. The
communique of the December 1963 meeting of the Lao Dong Central
Committee, issued after a month's delay, comes down on the Chinese side
on most doctrinal issues, but does not join Peiping's direct attack on
Khrushchev himself. Instead, the Lao Dong document carefully dis-
tinguishes "Yugoslav" revisionist heresy from the erring doctrines of
brothers who should be kept within the fold.
31. So far, Moscow appears to have appreciated Hanoi's dilemma, for
there is no sign of curtailment of Soviet and East European trade or
aid. We believe that Hanoi, though continuing to side with Peiping on
most issues, will maintain as cordial relations with Moscow as circum-
stances permit and will seek to avoid too close a Chinese embrace.
32. The Conquest of South Vietnam. DRV leaders almost certainly
view Communist prospects in South Vietnam with considerable confi-
dence, and believe that their program of increased pressures since 1960
has offset both earlier GVN progress and subsequent US massive assist-
ance. The DRV apparently estimates that it can wear down the South
Vietnamese will to resist by harrying GVN forces, demonstrating their
inability to protect the villagers, and exploiting legitimate grievances
against Saigon officialdom.
33. A number of factors since 1960 have greatly aided these Commu-
nist endeavors. President Diem's government grew less effective, and
South Vietnamese grievances and vulnerabilities rose. DRV-sponsored
gains in Laos provided secure routes for infiltrating additional arms
and cadres into the South, and the Laotian settlement of 1962 raised
doubts in South Vietnam about US determination. Despite increased
US support, the GVN has not yet shown itself able to cope with the
political-military Viet Cong threat. The South Vietnamese have over-
thrown Diem, but the effectiveness of the present successor rule has yet
to be proved. Finally, French championing of neutralism, and the
impression in Saigon of growing defeatism within the US, have rein-
forced Hanoi's confidence.
34. The French Ingredient. The Indochinese picture has recently
been complicated by French initiatives. Hanoi would not consider any
re-establishment of French control or dominance in Indochina, but would
certainly prefer French presence to American. It may view France as
a possible provider of economic aid, especially if the Sino-Soviet quarrel
eliminates the USSR as a source. For the moment, Paris, Hanoi, and
Peiping seem to share the common objective of eliminating the US
presence in Indochina, but so far the Communists have apparently not
given the French neutralization idea much encouragement. At a mini-
mum, we believe the Communists will make whatever use they can of
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French gestures and initiatives to confuse Western opinion, and to
increase popular sentiment in the South for neutralism and negotiation.
35. Neutralism and Negotiation. Hanoi has exhibited little interest in
an international settlement guaranteeing neutralization of South Viet-
nam. Its official posture has been, and remains, that the South Viet-
namese struggle is a purely internal affair, though it is in sympathy
with the aspirations of the "National Front For the Liberation of South
Vietnam," which is completely controlled by the Hanoi-directed Viet
Cong. Hanoi's minimum condition for settlement (withdrawal of the
US presence) has not changed, but its tactics are probably shifting and
becoming more flexible. The "Front" may try to capitalize on its gains
and on war-weariness in South Vietnam by attempting to generate a
coalition "neutralist" regime in which it plays a key role. In any event,
Hanoi would almost certainly consider any form of "neutralist" settle-
ment as simply an interim step toward complete Communist control,
and, whatever agreements are signed, we believe that the Viet Cong
apparatus would not be dismantled.
36. DRV leaders probably believe that the GVN will to resist is waning
and has been further reduced by the current surge of neutralist talk.
They may feel the same is also true of the US. Hanoi may try to speed
the process by further increasing the pressure. If so, we believe DRV
action would be confined to such steps as increased Viet Cong aggressive-
ness supported by better and heavier weapons, and by heightened Viet
Cong terrorism in the cities. Thus they would hope to promote a situa-
tion where the US would have to accept a face-saving formula for retreat,
or be asked to withdraw by a neutralist South Vietnamese regime. We
believe that Hanoi will not undertake an invasion or even a major covert
commitment of DRV military units; we see no indication that the DRV
leaders are disposed to stimulate drastic US counteraction.
37. The Situation in Laos. Hanoi's goals in Laos have been in many
respects more limited than in South Vietnam. North Vietnam already
controls enough Laotian territory to further its objectives in South
Vietnam. Until 1959, Hanoi, while working to build up the Pathet Lao,
was satisfied to see an independent, though weak and complaisant,
central government. In 1959, Hanoi seems to have decided that it
needed sufficient control in Laos to protect North Vietnam's western
flank and to secure lines of communication into South Vietnam for the
real insurgency Hanoi was about to start there. These objectives have
long since been achieved.
38. More recently, North Vietnamese involvement in Laos has been
largely concentrated on protecting their investment and bolstering the
position of the Pathet Lao. When the Pathet Lao has gotten into
trouble, some increased, if temporary, North Vietnamese participation
has often been necessary. For example, the recent FAR/Neutralist
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capture of Kam Keut and Lak Sao was followed by an effective counter-
attack once Vietnamese reinforcements became available. We view the
North Vietnamese commitment in Laos as being, in their view, something
of a sideshow, but one paying dividends in combat training, border
security, and secure access to the South. North Vietnam will probably
introduce whatever PAVN elements are required to maintain the present
Communist position in Laos, but the Communists will seek to avoid
initiatives that they would consider likely to provoke US military action.
However, the Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese assistance, can be
expected to strengthen its hold in Laos and continue to erode the politi-
cal-military position of the non-Communists.
39. At the moment, the situation in South Vietnam and Laos, coupled
with increasing international interest in a negotiated settlement in Indo-
china, seems to be hastening the achievement of Hanoi's goals. This
may be so, but for reasons indicated above, we do not believe that North
Vietnam is playing entirely from a position of strength. A decade after
Dien Bien Phu, Hanoi is still waiting for the full fruits of victory. The
North Vietnamese people have seen the bright promise of independence
fade into a drab existence, worse in most ways than under French rule
and enforced by more onerous controls. The population is rising and
the food supply declining. The Party has seen brave plans founder, and
current development efforts require conditions for success which may
not obtain if present pressures continue. We do not anticipate any
imminent collapse in North Vietnam, but the eventual departure of Ho
will probably introduce severer strains than any the regime has yet faced.
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