SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, DATED 15 JULY 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010007-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 16, 1966
• Content Type: SNIE

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CONTROLLED DISSEM'
SNIE 10-2-65
16 September 1966
Memorandum to Holders of
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 10-2-65
Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy
and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle
East and South Asia, dated 15 July 19b5
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
16 SEPTEMBER 1966
Authenticated:
ECUTIVE SECRETAR , IB
SF
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D_
N?
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the AEC, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Dr. Edward W. Proctor, Acting CIA Member of USIB
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Brigadier General Richard W. Whitney, for the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SNIE 10-2-65:
SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY
AND TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, dated 15 July 1965
NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders stems from a request for a review and
updating of SNIE 10-2-65, in connection with current policy discus-
sions. It was not undertaken, as is normally the case with a Memo-
randum to Holders, because of a feeling in the intelligence community
that the important judgments of the original estimate required sig-
nificant revision. Only those portions of SNIE 10-2-65 bearing on
the Eastern Arab states and on the Cyprus question are considered.
THE ESTIMATE
1. Soviet and Chinese aims and tactics in the Middle East remain
as described in SNIE 10-2-65. Political developments in the area
over the last year have not given either Communist power the op-
portunity or incentive to alter its approach to the area in any basic
way. Soviet programs of military and economic aid, political and
propaganda support, and clandestine activity continue to aim at deny-
ing the area to the West, and eventually at promoting the ascendancy
of political forces committed to identification and alignment with the
Communist states. For the Chinese, there are not only these general
Communist aims, but also pursuit of Peking's political-ideological war-
fare with Moscow for predominant influence among radical movements
worldwide.
2. Moscow's general political line in the area currently emphasizes
the necessity for "progressive" forces to join together in a common
anti-imperialist front. This theme is pushed in propaganda on the
Vietnam war aimed at enforcing political isolation on the US. There
has been a certain improvement over the last year in the USSR's rela-
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tions with the UAR, Iraq, and Syria, but this has been due rather more
to local opportunities than to Soviet political initiatives. The Chinese
continue to have little impact in the area as a whole, though they are
still active in Yemen and are supporting the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization with some arms and training. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jor-
dan, and the small British protected states around the fringes of the
Arabian Peninsula remain cautious about relations with the Commu-
nist powers.
3. In the Eastern Arab world there have been no new recipients of
Communist economic or military aid in the past year. The UAR,
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen continue to receive a large share of the re-
sources the Communists have devoted to foreign assistance. These
four countries now account for about 35 percent of total Communist
economic and military aid extended to all less developed countries since
1954, and in the year ending in June 1966, they received about one-
fourth of new Communist economic aid commitments, while drawing
about $142 million against credits extended earlier. In the same pe-
riod, Moscow also concluded agreements to supply them with military
equipment worth $203 million, representing about 55 percent of new
Communist military aid extensions.' Pressure from recipients for
ever more sophisticated equipment has led the USSR to offer such
advanced items as the MIG-21 FL all-weather fighter and the SU-7
fighter-bomber, which are being provided to non-Communist countries
for the first time. While the cost to the Soviets of their military aid
programs may thus be rising, such progressive modernization of weap-
onry is probably seen by the Soviets as unavoidable if they are to main-
tain the position they have won through military aid.
4. The USSR has tried to exploit the resurgence of intra-Arab ten-
sions, and has urged a close working association of the "progessive"
states of Algeria, Iraq, Syria, the UAR, and Yemen, directed against
the conservatives. The Soviets apparently recognize that such a bloc
is not likely to emerge soon, but they continue to give material support
to Arab efforts to eliminate special Western positions and interests in
the area, by supporting so-called "national liberation struggles," espe-
cially Nasser's efforts in Yemen and South Arabia. On the other hand,,
the USSR does not wish intra-Arab quarrels or the Arab-Israeli dispute
1 There was also an arms agreement between the USSR and the UAR in late 1964, the
amount of which (an estimated $200 million) was not known when SNIE 10-2-65 was
issued in mid-1965.
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to deteriorate into armed conflicts which might test their support for
certain Arab states or which might entail active US intervention.
5. The UAR continues to have a broad congruence of interests with
the Soviets, especially in foreign affairs. Soviet influence probably
has been enhanced in the past year as Egyptian relations with the US
have cooled. Premier Kosygin's visit to Cairo in May 1966 signaled
no startling new developments, but it did consolidate the relationship
and relieved Nasser of any concern he may have felt over the fall of
Khrushchev. Though Soviet naval vessels have made several calls
at Egyptian ports during the past year, and the UAR may permit
Soviet port calls from time to time to take on fuel or supplies, we do
not believe that Nasser has any intention of agreeing to the establish-
ment of a military facility under Soviet control. For their part, the
Soviets for political reasons would probably not wish to press for such
facilities.
6. Nasser's suspicion of the US is currently reinforced by his belief
that the US is supporting Saudi King Faisal's sponsorship of the Yemeni
royalists and efforts to establish an Islamic pact. Nasser is now prob-
ably more sceptical than ever of the prospects for establishing any
profitable association with the US. Even though the Egyptian econ-
omy is in serious trouble and is chronically short of foreign exchange-
particularly in view of the need to purchase food-Nasser has publicly
written off the prospects for an early resumption of PL-480 aid from
the US. The possibility of moving toward greater dependence on the
USSR is thus posed. It is unclear for the present whether the replace-
ment of the Muhyi al-Din government signifies a move in this direc-
tion. Although Nasser almost certainly remains wary of too close
an embrace by the Soviets, economic pressures may force him into a
greater involvement with the USSR. With respect to food, however,
the Soviets are probably unwilling to make supplies available regularly
and in quantity, and for this reason have apparently advised Nasser
not to worsen his relations with the US irretrievably.
7. Nasser's policy toward the UAR's domestic Communists con-
tinues unchanged. The Communists are not allowed organized ac-
tivity, but a number of individual Communists are prominent in the
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which during the last year has gained
increased importance under the leadership of former Prime Minister
Ali Sabri. The role of the Communists does not appear to be a matter
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of contention with the Soviets at present. The USSR apparently be-
lieves that at the present stage its aims will be better served by influ-
ences exercised on the state-to-state level and by individual Commu-
nists than by organized Communist Party activity.
8. In February 1966, the extremist wing of the Baath party in Syria
seized power and sought Soviet support. The new Syrian regime
has taken a number of steps favorable to the Soviets. Damascus has
recognized Hanoi and Pyongyang. It has echoed the Soviet call for
closer cooperation among the progressive Arab states, but it has done
little itself to promote such cooperation. For its part, the USSR has
given political support, offered to negotiate further arms sales, and
agreed to provide a $133 million credit for a Euphrates River Dam.
Altogether, the atmosphere of relations between Moscow and Damas-
cus is very cordial at present, though the Syrians are far from adopting
a subservient attitude.
9. At least one Communist and several others who may be close to
the Communists have been included in the Syrian cabinet, and some
Communists have been given second-echelon government positions.
Soviet officials have advised Syrian Communists to support the regime.
The Syrian Communist Party has not been given legal status, though
the party leader, Khalid Bakdash, has been permitted to return.
10. The Soviets probably will continue to show some caution in
developing their relations with the radical Baathist junta. They are
conscious of its precarious hold on power and aware that its pro-Soviet
posture stems in considerable measure from its need for Soviet support.
The present government in Damascus is the result of the most recent
of numerous military coups over the past two decades. It has little
popular support, and is opposed even by many members of the Baath
party. There are almost certainly officers-Baathist and non-Baath-
ist-plotting its overthrow. There is a better than even chance that
over a period of time one of these efforts will succeed. In view of the
increasingly radical tone of Syrian politics in recent years, any suc-
cessor regime is likely also to be radical and hence favorable to Soviet
interests.
11. In Iraq, neither the internal political changes of the past year nor
the conclusion of a new Soviet arms deal point to any change in the
judgments of SNIE 10-2-65. Iraq and the USSR retain good state-to-
state relations, especially since the Kurdish cease-fire, but Moscow has
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not been able to end the suppression of the Iraq Communist Party.
Nonetheless, the Soviets, through their recently concluded $178 mil-
lion military aid agreement, remain virtually the sole arms supplier
and retain a substantial presence. In the short term, the USSR is
likely to attempt to use its limited leverage to ensure that the recent
Iraqi-Kurdish truce will remain in effect.
12. In the Arabian Peninsula, the Soviets and Chinese are carrying
on significant activity only in Yemen. Here both are engaged in eco-
nomic assistance programs, and rivalry with the Chinese seems to be
impelling some increase in the USSR's direct economic aid. Commu-
nist countries remain unrepresented, and hence do not exercise overt
political influence in either Saudi Arabia or in the British protected
states of South Arabia or the Persian Gulf.' Subversive activities
through small Communist groups and front organizations carry a poten-
tial for the growth of Communist influence. Withdrawal of the British
from South Arabia will undoubtedly offer additional opportunities for
Soviet and perhaps Chinese entry into this area. The USSR has been
making some efforts to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf through
its representation in Kuwait, but Moscow is unlikely to exercise a major
influence there for the foreseeable future.
13. The Cyprus controversy itself has changed little in the past year
or so. Moscow has continued to follow an even-handed line as be-
tween the Greek and Turkish interest, unlike its support of the Greek
Cypriots in the early phase of the crisis, and has in consequence been
able to sustain improved relations with Turkey. This, as well as
Moscow's opposition to enosis, has caused some political difficulties
within the large Cyprus Communist Party, which draws its membership
exclusively from the Greek community. Moscow seems content to
draw profit from the strains within NATO caused by the present
Cyprus stalemate; it is not encouraging Cyprus President Archbishop
Makarios to step up the level of confrontation. If the Turkish-Greek
talks now under way should fail, the Soviets would undoubtedly seek
to exploit the resulting increase in tension and to turn both Greece and
Turkey against the US. However, the USSR would probably take
pains to avoid moves which would entail the need to choose one coun-
try over the other.
2 A more deailed treatment of South Arabia appears in NIE 30-1-66, "The Outlook for
South Arabia," dated 8 September 1966.
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