FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHURCH REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10S01820R000300540001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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K4j r'+"
BOOK I
FINAL. REPORT
OF TIM
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITII RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGE'I'IIER WITII
ADI)ITION_AL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VI M ITS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL. 14), 1976
WASHINGTON : 1976
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington .,, ""?^^ ., . ----
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XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Senate Select Committee's inquiry into the in-
telligence activities of the United States has been to determine what
secret governmental activities are necessary and how they best can be
conducted under the rule of law. There is unquestioned need to build a
new consensus between the executive and legislative branches concern-
ing the proper scope and purpose of foreign and military intelligence
activities. Allegations of abuse, revelations in the press, and the results
of the Cormnittee's 15 month inquiry have underlined the necessity to
restore confidence in the integrity of-our nation's intelligence agencies.
The findings and recommendations which follow are presented in.
that spirit. They are, in essence, an agenda for remedial action by both
the legislative and executive branches of the United States Govern-
ment. There is an urgency to completing this schedule of action. This
task is no less important to safeguarding America's future than are
intelligence activities themselves.
The Committee's investigation and the body of its report seek, with-
in the limits of prudence, to perform the crucial task of informing the
American people concerning the nature and scope of their Govern-
ment's foreign intelligence activities. The fundamental issue faced by
the Committee in its investigation was how the requirements of Ameri-
can democracy can be properly balanced in intelligence matters against
the need for secrecy. Secrecy is essential for the success of many im-
portant intelligence activities. At the same time, secrecy contributed
to many of the abuses, excesses and inefficiencies uncovered by the Com-
inittee. Secrecy also makes it difficult to establish a public consensus
for the future conduct of certain intelligence operations:
Because of secrecy, the Committee initially had difficulty gain-
ing access to executive branch information required to carry out the
investigation. It was not until. the Committee became responsible for
investigating allegations of assassination plots=tliat many of the ob-
stacles were cleared away. The resulting access by the Committee was
in some. cases unprecedented. But the Conirnittee's access'to documents
and records was. hampered nonetheless in a n?A - inber 0f other instances
either because the materials did not exist_'or-because the executive
branch was unwilling to make them available.
Secrecy was also a major issue in preparing this report. In order to
safeguard' what are now agreed to be' necessary. intelligen~e'activities;
the Committee decided not to reveal publicly the full and complete pic-
ture of the intelligence operations of the .United States Goverrunent.
The recommendations as a. whole have not been materially affected by
the requirements of secrecy, but some important findings of the Com-
mittee must remain classified in accordance with the Committee's
policy of protecting valid secrets. In this connection it should be noted
(423)
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 can public should know remains classified and has been excluded from
the report at the request of the intelligence community agencies. Only
the Senate will receive the full version of the Committee's Final Re-
port in accordance with the standing rules of the Senate.
In trying to reconcile the requirements of secrecy and open demo-
cratic processes, the Committee found itself with a difficult dilemma.
As an investigating committee, it cannot take affirmative legislative
action respecting some of the matters that came to its attention. On the
other hand, because of necessary secrecy, the Committee cannot public-
ly present the full case as to why its recommendations are essential.
This experience underscores the need for an effective legislative
oversight committee which has sufficient power to resolve such funda-
mental conflicts between secrecy and democracy. As stated previously,
it is the Committee's view that effective congressional oversight re-
quires the power to authorize the budgets of the national intelligence
agencies. Without such authority, an oversight committee may find
itself in possession of important secret information but unable to act
effectively to protect the principles, integrity, and reputation of the
U ited States.
LThe findings and recommendations which follow are organized
principally by agency. There are, however, common themes in the rec-
ommendations which cut across agency lines. Some of these themes are :
.: guarding against abuse of America's institutions an
I ensuring clear accountability for clandestine acti j
effective management of intelligence activities; ancf'reating a frame-
work of statutory law and congressional oversight for the agencies
and activities of the United States intelligence community:]
The 'Committee's recommendations fall into three categories: (1)
recommendations that the Committee believes should be embodied in
law; (2) recommendations to the executive branch concerning prin-
ciples, practices, and policies which the Committee believes should be
pursued within the executive's sphere of responsibilities; and (3)
recommendations which should be taken into account by the executive
branch in its relations with the intelligence oversight committee(s)
of Congress.
R. GExmm.~i, FINDINGS
The Committee finds that TTnited States foreign and military intelli-
gence agencies have made important contributions to the nation's secu-
rity. and generally have performed their missions with dedication and
distinction. The Committee further finds that the individual men and
women serving America in difficult and dangerous intelligence assign-
ments deserve the respect and gratitude of the nation.
The Committee finds that there is a continuinm need,for an effec-
tive system of foreign and military intelligence. United States inter-
ests and responsibilities in the world will be challenged, for the fore,-
seeable future, by strong and potentially hostile powers. This requires
the, maintenance of an effective American intelligence system. The
Committee has found that the Soviet KGB and other hostile intelli-
ge.nce services maintain extensive foreign intelligence operations, for
both intelligence collection and covert operational purposes. These
the United states and its allies.
The Committee finds that Congress has failed to provide the neces-
sary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry
out their missions in accord with constitutional processes. Mechanisms
for, and the practice of, congressional oversight have not been ade-
quate. Further, Congress has not devised appropriate means to effec-
tively use the valuable information developped by the intelligence
agencies. Intelligence information and analysis that exist within
the executive branch clearly would contribute to sound judgments and
more effective legislation in the areas of foreign policy and national
security.
Che Committee finds that covert action operations have not been
an exceptional instrument used only in rare instances when the vital
interests of the United States have been at stake. On the contrary,
presidents and administrations have made excessive, and at times
self-defeating, use of covert action. In addition, covert action has
become a routine program with a bureaucratic momentum of its own.
The long-term impact, at home and abroad, of repeated disclosure of
U.S. covert action never appears to have been assessed. The cumula-
tive effect of covert actions has been increasingly costly to America's
interests and reputation. The Committee believes that covert action
must be employed only in the most extraordinary circumstances
Although there is a question concerning the extent to which the
Constitution requires publication of intelligence expenditures infor-
mation, the Committee finds that the Constitution at least requires
public disclosure and public authorization of an annual aggregate
figure for United States national intelligence activities. Congress'
failure as a whole to monitor the intelligence agencies' expenditures
has been a major element in the ineffective legislative oversight of
the intelligence community. The permanent intelligence oversight
committee(s) of Congress should give further consideration to the
question of the extent to which further public disclosure of intelli-
gence budget information is prudent and constitutionally necessary.
At the same time, the Committee finds that the operation of an ex-
tensive and necessarily secret intelligence system places severe strains
on the nation's constitutional government. The Committee is con-
vinced, however, that the competing demands of secrecy and the re-
quirements of the democratic process-our Constitution and our
laws-can be reconciled. The need to protect secrets must be balanced
with the assurance that secrecy is not used as a means to hide the abuse
of power or the failures and mistakes of policy. Means must and can be
provided for lawful disclosure of unneeded or unlawful secrets.
The Committee finds that intelligence activities should not be re-
garded as ends in themselves. Rather, the nation's intelligence func-
tions should be organized and directed to assure that they serve the
needs of those in the executive and legislative branches who have re-
sponsibility for formulating or carrying out foreign and national
security policy.
The Committee finds that Congress has failed to provide the neces-
sary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry
out their necessary missions in accord with constitutional processes.
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In order to provide firm direction for the intelligence agencies, the
Committee finds that new statutory charters for these agencies must be
written that take account of the experience of the past three and a
half decades. Further, the Committee finds that the relationship among
the various intelligence agencies and between them and the Director
of Central Intelligence should be restructured in order to achieve better
accountability, coordination, and more efficient use of resources.
These tasks are urgent. They should be undertaken by the Congress
in consultation with the executive branch in the coming year. The
recent proposals and executive actions by the President are most wel-
come.' However, further action by Congress is necessary.
C. THE 1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND RELATED LEGISLATION
The National Security Act of 1947 2 is no longer an adequate frame-
work for the conduct, of America's intelligence activities. The 1947
Act, preoccupied as it was with the question of military unification,
failed to provide an adequate statement of the broad policy and pur-
poses to be served by America's intelligence effort. The Committee
found that the 1947 Act constitutes a vague and open-ended state-
ment of authority for the President. through the National Security
Council. Neither espionage, covert action, nor. paramilitary warfare
is explicitly authorized by the 1947 Act. Nonetheless, these have
come to be major activities conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency, operating at the direction of the President through. the
National Security Council. In contrast, the 1947 Act's specific charge
to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to coordinate national
intelligence has not been effectively realized.
In addition to this broad concern, the Committee found that the
1947 Act does not provide an adequate charter for the Central In-
telligence Agency. Moreover, no statutory charter exists for other
key intelligence agencies : the National Security Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Nor does the Act, create an overall
structure for intelligence which ensures effective accountability, man-
agement control, and legislative and executive oversight.
Finally, the 1947 Act fails to establish clear and specific limits on
the operation of America's intelligence organizations which will help
ensure the protection of the rights and liberties of Americans under
the 'Constitution and the preservation of America's honor and reputa-
tion abroad. The need for such limits is a need for legislation. Theneed
is not satisfied by the President's recent proposals anti Exiecutive Order.
Recornnnendatians 3
1. The National Security Act should be. recast by o.i .uibus legislation
which would set forth the basic purposes of. national.. intelligence
activities, and 'define the relationship between . the Congress; and
the intelligence agencies of the executive branch.'This revision.should
be given the highest priority by the intelligence oversight commit-
tee(s) of Congress, acting in consultation with the executive branch.
'Executive Order 11.905, 2/18/76.
2.50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.
'See recommendations on this subject in the Committee's Report on Intelli-
gence Activities and Rights of Americans.
and entities in the United States intelligence community. It should
establish charters for the National Security Council, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the national
intelligence components of the Department of Defense, including the
National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
all other elements of the intelligence community, including joint orga-
nizations of two or more agencies.
3. This legislation should set forth the general structure and proce-
dures of the intelligence community, and the roles and responsibilities
of the agencies which comprise it.
4. The legislation should contain specific and clearly defined prohibi-
tions or limitations on various activities carried out by the respective
components of the intelligence community. -
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
The National Security Council (NSC) is an instrument of the Presi-
dent and not a corporate entity with authority of its own. The Com-
mittee found that in general the President has had, through the Na-
tional Security Council, effective means for exerting broad policy
control over at least two major clandestine activities-covert action
and sensitive technical collection. The covert American involvement in
Angola and the operations of the Glonzar Explorer are examples of
that control in quite different circumstances, whatever conclusions one
draws about the merits of the 'activities. T:ne Central Intelligence
Agency, in broad terms, is not "out of control."
The Committee found, however, that there were significant limits
to this control :
1. Clandestine Activities
-The degree of control and accountability exercised regarding co-
vert action and sensitive collection has been a function of each partic-
ular President's willingness to use these techniques.
-The principal NSC vehicle for dealing with clandestine activities,
the 40 Committee and its predecessors, was the mechanism for review-
ing and making recommendations regarding the approval of major
covert action projects. However, this body also served generally to in-
sulate the President from official involvement and accountability in
the approval process until 1974.5
-As high-level government officials, 40 Committee members have
had neither the time nor inclination to adequately review and pass
judgment on all of the literally hundreds of covert action projects. In-
deed, only a small fraction of such projects (those which the CIA re-
gards as major or sensitive) are so approved and/or reviewed. This
See definition, p. 141.
Appendix D. Senate Select Committee Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 230.
In 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22 USC, 2422, section 662) was enacted.
It provides that no funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act or any
other act may be expended by or on behalf of CIA foreign operations other
than for obtaining necessary intelligence "unless and until the President finds
that each such operation is important to the national security of the United
States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation
to the appropriate committees of the Congress ..."
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Ulillli- V1-1. - JUlill Ul- -".. - -v- l/i
tually no staff, with only a single officer from the Clandestine Services
acting as executive secretary.
-The process of review and approval has been, at times
only gen-
,
eral in nature. It sometimes has become pro forma, conducted over the
telephone by subordinates.
-The President, without consulting any NSC mechanism, can ex-
ercise personal direction of clandestine activities as he did in the case of
Chile in 1970.
-There is no systematic White House-level review of either sensi-
tive foreign espionage or counterintelligence activities. Yet these op-
erations may also have a potential for embarrassing the United States
and sometimes may be difficult to distinguish from covert action opera-
tions. For example, a proposal to recruit a high foreign govern-
ment official as an intelligence "asset" would not necessarily be
reviewed outside the Central Intelligence Agency at the NSC level,
despite the implications that recruitment might pose in conducting
American foreign relations. Similarly, foreign counterintelligence op-
erations might be conducted without any prior review at the highest
government levels. The Committee found instances in the case of Chile
when counterintelligence operations were related to, and even hard to
distinguish from, the program of covert action.
-The President's proposals to upgrade the 40 Committee into the
Operations Advisory Group and to give explicit recognition to its role
in advising the President on covert activities are desirable. That up-
grading, however, will strain' further the Group's ability to conduct a
systematic review of sensitive clandestine operations. Under the new
structure, the Group members are cabinet officers who have even less
time than their principal deputies, who previously conducted the 40
Committee's work. The Group's procedures must be carefully struc-
tured, so. that the perspective of Cabinet officers can in fact be brought
to bear.
0. Counterintelligence
-There is no NSC-level mechanism for coordinating, reviewing or
approving counterintelligence activities in the United States, even
those directed at United States citizens, despite the demonstrated po-
tential for abuse. Both the FBI and the CIA are engaged in counter-
intelligence, with the CIA operating primarily abroad. The Com-
mittee found frictions between the two agencies over the last thirty-
five years. The so-called Huston Plan, discredited because of its
excessive scope and patent illegalities, was justified in part as a re-
sponse to the need for improved CIA-FBI coordination. At the same
time, the Huston Plan episode illustrates the questions of propriety
and legality which may arise in counterintelligence operations con-
ducted in the United States or involving American citizens.
3. Coordination and Resource Allocation
-The Director of Central Intelligence has been assigned the func-
tion of coordinating the activities of the intelligence community, en-
suring its responsiveness to the requirements for national intelligence,
and for assembling a consolidated national intelligence budget. Until
the recent establishment of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
(CFI), there was no effective NSC-level mechanism for any of these
purposes. The Committee believes that the CFI is a step in the right
direction and is to be commended. However, the language of the Presi-
implemented. "Manage" and "coordinate" are terms that, are general
in nature and have proven to be so in matters of intelligence. Because
the CFI was formed only recently, questions remain about its operation
and its relation to the DCI's current responsibilities and to the existing
authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Moreover, the Committee notes that a major collector and consumer
of intelligence information, the Department of State, is not repre-
sented on the CFI. It should be. Other agencies with an important
stake in intelligence, such as the Department of the Treasury, the En-
ergy Resources Development Administration, and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency should play an appropriate role in the CFI
on an ad hoc basis.
.1. Executive Oversight
-The Committee finds that Presidents have not established specific
instruments of oversight to prevent abuses by the intelligence com-
munity. In essence, Presidents have not exercised effective oversight.
-The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
has served Presidents as a useful "Kitchen Cabinet" for intelligence
and related matters. It has carried out studies that have resulted in
useful changes in procedure and emphasis within the intelligence
community, as well as in the adoption of new technologies and tech-
niques. At the same time, the Committee has found that any expecta-
tions that PFIAB would serve as an independent watchdog have been
mistaken. The PFIAB has been given neither statutory nor Presi-
dential authority to serve such a function. For instance, when the
Board became aware of the Huston Plan, it asked the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Director of the FBI for a copy of the plan. That request
was refused, and the Board did not pursue the matter with the White
House.
-The Committee finds the President's recent establishment of the
Intelligence Oversight Board to be long overdue. In the Committee's
opinion, however, this does not eliminate the need for vigorous con-
gressional oversight. Moreover, the Order is broadly phrased and at
some points ambiguous. The effectiveness of the Oversight. Board, as
well as the rest of the President's reforms, will depend in large meas-
r.ure on the details of their implementation.
The Committee makes the following recommendations (concerning
the National Security Council and the Office of the President. These
recommendations are designed to support and extend the measures
taken recently by the President.
Recommendation
5. By statute, the National Security Council should be explicitly em-
powered to direct and provide policy guidance for the intelligence
activities of the United States. including intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, and the conduct of covert action.
6. By statute, the Attorney General should be madean advisor to
the National Security Council in order to facilitate discharging his
responsibility to ensure that actions taken to protect American na-
tional security in the field of intelligence are also consistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
7. By statute, the existing power of the Director of Central In-
telligence to coordinate the activities of the intelligence community
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should be reaffirmed. At the same time, the NSC should estanllsn all
appropriate committee-such as the new Committee on Foreign In-
telligence-with responsibility for allocating intelligence resources
to ensure efficient and effective operation of the national intelli-
gence community. This committee should be chaired by the DCI and
should include representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.G
8. By statute, an NSC committee (like the Operations Advisory
Group) should be established to advise the President on covert action.
It would also be ein owered, at the President's discretion, to approve
all types of sensitive intelligence collection activities. If an OAG mem-
ber dissented from an approval, the particular collection activity would
be referred to the President, for decision. The Group should consist of
the Secretary of State, the, Secretary of Defense, the. Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central In-
telligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director of OMB, as an observer. The President would
designate a chairman from among the Group's members.
9. The chairman of the Group would be confirmed by the Senate for
that position if he were an official not already subject to confirmation.
In the execution of covert action and sensitive intelligence collection
activities specifically approved by the President, the chairman would
enter the chain of command below the President.
10. The Group should be provided with adequate staff to assist in
conducting thorough reviews of covert action and sensitive collection
projects. That staff should not be drawn exclusively from the Clandes-
tine Service of the CIA.
11. Each covert action project should be reviewed and passed on by
the Group. In addition, the Group should review all on-going projects
at least once a year.
12. By statute, the Secretary of State should be designated as the
principal administration spokesman to the Congress on the policy and
purpose underlying covert action projects.
13. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should be re-
quired to fully inform the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Con-
gress of each covert action ' prior to its initiation. No funds should be
expended on any covert action unless and until the President certifies
and provides to the congressional intelligence oversight committee(s)
the reasons that a covert actor is required by extraordinary cir-
cumstances to deal with grave threats to the national security of the
United States. The congressional intelligence oversight committee(s)
should be kept fully and currently informed on all covert action
projects, and the DCI should submit a semi-annual report on all such
projects to the committee (s).
14. The Connnittee recommends that when the, Senate establishes an
intelligence oversight. committee with authority to authorize the na-
6In effect, this recommendation would establish the President's proposed
Committee on Foreign Intelligence in law but would include a representative of
the Secretary of State. It would also empower the DCI to establish intelligence
requirements. See Recommendation #16, p. 434.
A covert action would consist of either a major project, or an aggregation of
smaller projects meeting the standards of this paragraph.
f,IUli241 Luclilt,u.a~,v va.ub.. "7 ?'-- --. ___- -'/
2422) should be amended so, that the foregoing notifications and
presidential certifications to the Senate are provided only to that
committee.
15. By statute, a new NSC counterintelligence committee should be
established, consisting of the Attorney General as chairman, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the FBI, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Its purpose would be to coordinate and review for-
eign counterintelligence activities conducted within the United States
and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence within the United
States, by both the FBI and the. CIA. The goal would be to ensure
strict conformity with statutory and constitutional requirements and
to enhance coordination between the CIA and FBI." This committee
should review the standards and guidelines for all recruitments of
agents within the United States for counterintelligence or positive
foreign intelligence purposes, as well as for the recruitment of
IT.S. citizens abroad. This committee would consider differences be-
tween the agencies concerning the recruitment of agents, the handling
of foreign assets who come to the United States, and the establish-
ment of the bona fides of defectors. It should also treat any other for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence activity of the FBI and CIA
which either agency brings to that forum for presidential level
consideration.
EXECUTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL/INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Intelligence
Oversight
Board
E
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Operations Advisory Group
-Sec State
-Sec Def
-Asst to President for
Nat'l Security Affair
OCT
-Ch. iroon/JCS
'Attorney Curcio
Director/O718 (observer)
National Security Council
?Pres -Sec State
.Vice Pres. -Sec Def
AG*
Conmittee en Forei Intell ence
?DCI (chair)
-Deputy Sec Def (I)
-Deputy Asst to Pres for
Nat'l Security Affairs
-Designated Representative/
Sec State*
.y~{?CnAoet rthtellgettc'e
NSC Counterintelligence
Crnmittee*
Attorney General (chair
-CIA Director
-Director/FBI
.Asst to President for
Nat'l Security Affair
?Dep Sec Defense
I .Sec State
Sec Def
OCT
'See related legislative proposals in the Committee's Report on Intelligence
Activities and the rights of Americans.
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E. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The 1947 National Security Act gave the DCI responsibility for
oordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government de-
artments and agencies in the interest of national security.," In addi-
on, the DCI as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser
as given responsibility for coordinating and producing national intel-
gence for senior policymakers. However, the Committee found that
iese DCI responsibilities have often conflicted with the particular
terests and prerogatives of the other intelligence community de-
artments and agencies. They have not given up control over their own
ttelligence operations, and in particular the Department of Defense
id the military services, which allocate 80 percent of the direct costs
n? national intelligence, have insisted that they must exercise direct
)ntrol over peacetime intelligence activities to prepare for war. Thus,
bile the DCI was given responsibility under the 1947 act for intelli-
,nce community activities, he was not authorized to centrally coordi-
ate or manage the overall operations of the community.
Coordinator of the Intelligence Community
The Committee has found that the DCI in his coordinator role has
yen unable to ensure that waste and unnecessary duplication are
voided. Because the DCI only provides guidance for intelligence
)llection and production, and does not establish requirements, he is not
t a position to command the intelligence community to respond to the
telligence needs of national policymakers. Where the DCI has been
)le to define priorities, he has lacked authority to allocate intelligence
sources-either among different systems of intelligence collection or
Hong intelligence collection, analysis and finished intelligence
,oduction.
The Committee supports President Ford's objectives of enhancing
to stature of the DCI and establishing a mechanism such as the Com-
tittee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) with the DCI as chairman to
)ntrol the allocation of national intelligence programs resources. The
ommittee questions, however, whether the CFI can be effective with-
it some appropriate modification of the peacetime authority of the
>cretary of Defense. In order to strike an appropriate balance be-
aeen the requirements of national and tactical intelligence, the intelli-
;nce collected by national means should be readily available to the
iary commanders and vice versa, and the Secretary of Defense
rd the military services should retain direct control over the opera-
ins of tactical military intelligence. Nonetheless, the DCI needs
e right to review tactical military intelligence operations in
der to make budget choices between tactical and national intelligence
tivities. Moreover, to carry out his coordinating role, the DCI needs
retain control over major technical intelligence collection systems
hich service both tactical and national intelligence requirements.
Producer of National Intelligence
In the area of providing finished intelligence, the Committee dis-
vered that the DCI, in his role as intelligence adviser, has faced
stacles in ensuring that his national intelligence judgments are objec-
-e and independent of department and agency biases. The Committee
has been particularly concerned with pressures from both the White
House and the Defense Department on the DCI to alter his intelligence
judgments. One example of such pressure investigated by the Com-
mittee occurred in the fall of 1969 when the DCI modified his judg-
ment on the capability of the Soviet SS-9 system when it conflicted
with the public position of Secretary of Defense Laird. After a meeting
with staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director Helms
deleted a paragraph from the draft of the National Intelligence Es-
timate on Soviet strategic forces which stated that within the next five
years it was "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would attempt to
achieve "a first strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise
attack against the United States with assurance that the U.S.S.R..
would not itself receive damage it would regard as unacceptable."
The Committee believes that over the past five years the DCI's
ability to produce objective national intelligence and resist outside
pressure has been reduced with the dissolution of the independent
Board of National Estimates and the subsequent delegation of its
staff to the departments with responsibility for drafting the DCI's
national intelligence judgments.
In the end, the DCI must depend on his position as the President's
principal intelligence adviser or on his personal relationship with the
President to carry out his various responsibilities and to withstand
pressures to compromise his intelligence judgments. Consequently, the
Committee has been concerned that the DCI's proximity and access
to the President has diminished over the years. Since 1969, at least
until the confirmation of Mr. Bush, the DCI has rarely seen the
President except at NSC meetings. The influence a DCI could have
from a close relationship with the President has generally been
lacking.
While President Ford's Executive Order is a step in the right
direction, the Committee believes that the DCI's responsibility over
intelligence community activities should be enhanced and spelled out
clearly and in detail in statute. The Executive should not continue
defining these responsibilities alone as it has done since 1947 through
Executive Orders and National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs).
The Committee believes that the Congress, in carrying out its re-
sponsibilities in the area of national security policy s hou ia.ve access
to t Ie full range o rn e rgence ro uced by . e _ nite__tates int eIli-
gence community. The Committee further believes that. it should be
possible to wvor out a means of ensuring that the DCI's national
intelligence judgments are available to the appropriate Congressional
committees on a regular basis without compromising the DCI's role
as personal adviser to the President.
Finally, the Committee has found concern that the function of the
DCI in his roles as intelligence community leader and principal in-
telligence adviser to the President is inconsistent with his responsibil-
ity to manage one of the intelligence community agencies -the CIA.
Potential problems exist in a number of areas. Because the DCI as
head of the CIA is responsible for human clandestine collection over-
seas, interception of signals communication overseas, the development
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and interception of technical collection systems, there is concern that -_r b defined by statute.'?
the DCI as community leader is in "a conflict of interest" situation c. In order to carry out his national intelligence responsibilities
when ruling on the activities of the overall intelligence community. the DCI should have the authority to review all foreign and military
The Committee is also concerned that the DCI's new span of con intelligence activities and intelligence resource allocations, including
trol-both the entire intelligence community and the entire CIA- tactical military intelligence which is the responsibility of the armed
may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed supervision forces."
of clandestine activities. d. The DCI should be authorized to establish an intelligence coin-
Recommendations munity staff to support him in carrying out his managerial respon-
16. By statute, the DCI should be established as the President's sibilities. This staff should be drawn from the best available talent
principal foreign intelligence adviser, with exclusive responsibility within and outside the intelligence community.
for producing national intelligence for the President and the Con- e. In addition to these provisions concerning DCI control over na.-
gress. For this purpose, the DCI should be empowered to establish a tional intelligence operations in peacetime, the statute should require
staff directly responsible to him to help prepare his national intelli- establishment of a procedure to insure that in time of war the relevant
~rence judgments and to coordinate the views of the other members of national intelligence operations come under the control of the Sec-
the intelligence community. The Committee recommends that the Di- retary of Defense.
rector establish a board to include senior outside advisers to review 18. By statute, the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
intelligence products as necessary, thus helping to insulate the DCI gence for the intelligence community should be established as recom-
from pressures to alter or modify his national intelligence judgments. mended in Executive Order 11905. This Deputy Director should
To advise and assist the DCI in producing national intelligence, the be subject to Senate confirmation and would assume the 1)('i's intel-
DCI would also be empowered to draw on other elements of the ligence community functions in the I)CI's absence. Current provisions
intelligence community. regarding the status of the DCI and his single deputy should be ex-
17. By statute, the DCI should be given responsibility and authority tended to cover the DCI and both deputies. Civilian control of the na-
for establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the na- tion's intelligence is important; only one of the three could be a career
tional intelligence budget, and providing guidance for United military officer, active or retired.
States national intelligence program operations. In this capacity lie 19. The Committee recommends that, the intelligence o~ ersight com-
should be designated as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee, inittee(s) of Congress consider whether the Congress should appro-
such as the CFI, and should have the following powers and respon- priate the funds for the national intelligence budget to the DCI,
sibilit.ies: rather than to the directors of the various intelligence agencies and
a. The DCI should establish national intelligence requirements for departments.
the entire intelligence community. He should be empowered to draw 20. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should serve at
on intelligence community representatives and others whom he may the pleasure of the President but, for no more than ten yeas.
designate to assist him in establishing national intelligence require- 21. The Committee also recommends consideration of separating the
ments and determining the success of the various agencies in fulfilling; DCI from direct responsibility over the CIA.12
them. The DCI should provide general guidance to the various intel-
ligence agency directors for the management of intelligence operations. F. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
b. The DCI should have responsibility for preparing the national
intelligence program budget for presentation to the President and the 1. The Charter for Intelligence Activities: Espionage, Coun.terin-
Congress.' The definition of what is to be included within that national telligence and Covert Action
intelligence program should be established by Congress in consultation The Committee finds that the CIA's present charter, embodied
with the, Executive. In this capacity, the Director of Central Intelli in the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, and the
gence should be .involved early in the budget cycle in preparing the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, is in-
birdgets of the respective intelligence coin nuhit.y agencies. The Direc- adequate in a number of respects.
the pro-
amon
ch
fo
i
g
oosing
r
ty -
tor should have specific responsibil
graXns of the different collection and production agencies and.depart-
m0ents and to insure against waste and unnecessary duplication. The
DCI should also have responsibility for issuing fiscal guidance for the
allocation of all national intelligence resources. The authority of the
s [The DCII shall : Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI. (Executive Order 11905,
Sec. 3(d)iii.)
10 "Reprogramming" means shifting money previously approved for one purpose
to another use; for instance, from clandestine human collection to technical col-
lection or covert action.
"In contrast to President Nixon's 1971 letter to Director Helms which asked
the DCI to plan and review "... all intelligence activities including tactical in-
telligence and the allocation of all intelligence resources," President Ford's Execu-
tive Order 111905 states that ". . . neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have
responsibility for tactical intelligence."
12 See discussion on pp. 449-450.
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While the legislative history of the lv4r Act makes clear Lim, uiiu
CIA's mandate would be limited to "foreign intelligence," the Act it-
self does not so specify. Covert action, in the past a major CIA activ-
ity, is not, mentioned in the 1947 Act, although the Act contains a vague
and open-ended authorization for the National Security Council. to di-
rect the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to
the intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from
time to time direct." 1$ No explicit authority even to collect intelligence
is provided the Agency.
The restrictions on domestic activities in the 1947 Act were not
clearly defined, nor was the potential conflict between these limits and
the Director's authority to protect "sources and methods" of intelli-
ggence gathering resolved. Neither did the 1947 Act set forth the
Agency's role in conducting counterintelligence and in collecting
foreign intelligence.
The Congress' confusing and ill-defined charge to the Agency in
these areas resulted in conflicts of jurisdiction with other govern-
ment agencies. The lack of legislative specificity also opened the way
to domestic activities such as Operation CHAOS 14 which clearly went.
beyond Congress' intent in enacting and amending the National
Security Act. In sung, the Committee finds that a clear statutory basis
is needed for'the Agency's conduct abroad of covert action, espionage,
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection and for such
counterespionage operations within the United States as the Agency
may have to undertake as a result of the activities abroad.15
Foreign Espionage
Espionage is often equated with the slightly broader category of
"clandestine human collection." Although "clandestine human collec-
tion" may include collection, of public information by a covert source,
espionage centers on recruiting and handling agents to acquire "pro-
tected" or "denied" information.
Espionage on-behalf of the United States Government is primarily
the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency's Clandestine
Service which operates on a world-wide basis. The Clandestine Serv-
ice-officially, the Directorate of Operations-is responsible for CIA
clandestine human collection, espionage, covert action, paramilitary
operations and counterintelligence. The CIA also has special respon
sibilities. for coordinating the military services' limited espionage ac-
tivities abroad.
By CIA doctrine, espionage should be aimed at securing informa-
tion: others wish to conceal and not at collecting information available
through diplomatic channels or from public sources, such as the press,
television and radio.
The Clandestine Service regards espionage, rather than covert ac-
tion and other such activities, as the essence of its mission. Indeed,
the Committee. found that clandestine human intelligence collection
is often considered It prerequisite as well as a precursor of successful
covert action. paramilitary activity, and counterintelligence.
13 Appendix B. Hearings. vol. 7, p. 210.
" See the Committee's detailed report on Project CHARS.
See the Committees Report on Domestic Intelligence. Part I1'. for recom-
mended limitations on such activity.
Espionage targets vary, covering political, military and economic
information wherever we perceive a national interest. Espionage in-
volves a variety of techniques, ranging from technical surveillance,
break-ins and theft, to human reporting by controlled agents, paid and
unpaid of protected information. It is generally illegal in the countries
against which it is aimed, but its widespread practice by nation states
makes the status of espionage under international law ambiguous.
Covert action, which is designed to have an impact, differs from
clandestine collection and classic espionage, which are designed to ob-
tain intelligence without affecting the source or revealing the fact that
the information has been collected. In practice, however, covert action
and espionage overlap, since they rely on the same CIA officers, for-
eign intermediaries, and sources of information."
The Committee believes that the United States cannot forego clan-
destine human collection and expect to maintain the same quality of
intelligence on matters of the highest importance to our national secu-
rity. Technical collection systems do not eliminate the usefulness of
espionage in denied areas (essentially the communist countries).
Agent intelligence can help provide valuable insight concerning the
motivations for activities or policies of potential adversaries, as well
as their future intentions.
Nevertheless, the Committee found that there are certain inherent
limitations to the value of clandestine sources. Espionage information
tends to be fragmentary, and there is always some question as to the
trustworthiness and reliability of the source.
The Committee found that over the last decade, the size of the Clan-
destine Service has been reduced significantly, particularly in the field.
However, there remains the question of whether the complements
abroad and at headquarters have been reduced sufficiently.
The Committee found that the CIA's clandestine collection effort
has been reoriented towards denied areas and away from internal po-
litical and security developments in the Third World. The Committee
believes that this changed emphasis is desirable and welcomes it.
The Committee found that, while internal supervision of espionage
within the CIA appears sufficient, there is inadequate external review
and control over CIA espionage activities. There is no effective ma-
chinery to ensure that the Secretaries of States and Defense and the
Assistant to the President, for National Security Affairs, who are
knowledgeable about. the value and limitations of espionage, systemat-
ically participate directly in decisions concerning such issues as how
large our espionage effort should be. the relative priorities. risk assess-
ments, and possible duplication of effort between overt and clandestine.
-human collection.
The Committee notes that the duplication between the CIA's Clan-
destine Service and the State Department's overt Foreign Service
reporting appears to have diminished in recent years. However, Wil-
liam Colby when he was DCI voiced concern that the problem had
not been solved. The Committee notes that increased collection efforts
regarding economic issues may aggravate the overlap problem.
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The CIA engages in both overt and clandestine activity within the The Committee notes that due to the recent revelations about CIA
United States for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection. The activities, some foreign intelligence sources are shying away from co-
Domestic Collection Division (DCD) is responsible primarily for operation with the Domestic Collection Division, thus impeding this
overt collection, while the Foreign Resources Division (FRD) man- division's most important function, namely, the overt collection of
ages clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. Both divisions are foreign intelligence.
currently within the Directorate of Operations. Formerly run and The Committee also questions the recruiting, for foreign espionage
staffed by the Directorate of Intelligence, the DCD was moved to purposes, if immigrants desiring American citizenship, because it
Operations in 1973 and now has many clandestine services officers might be construed as coercive.
assigned to it. Foreign Counterintelligence 19
The Domestic Collection Division openly collects foreign intelligence Counterintelligence is defined quite broadly by the CIA. It includes
information from American citizens on a wide variety of subjects, the knowledge needed for the protection and preservation of the mili-
primarily of an economic and technological nature. The Domestic taffy, economic, and productive strength of the ITnited States, as well
Collection Division currently maintains contact with tens of thousands as the government's security in domestic and foreign affairs, against
of American citizens who, on a confidential basis, volunteer informa- or from espionage, sabotage, and subversion designed to weaken or
tion of intelligence value to the United States. The Committee notes
that the Central Intelligence Agency is overtly in contact with many destroy the United States.
members of the American academic communit to consult with them Counterintelligence Counterintelligence (CI) is a special form of intelligence activity,
y aimed at discovering hostile foreign intelligence operations and de-
on the subjects of their expertise. On occasion, at the request of the stroying their effectiveness. It involves protecting the United States
academic concerned, these contacts are confidential. Government against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as control-
The Committee believes there are significant benefits to both the ling and manipulating adversary intelligence operations. An effort
government and the universities in such contacts and that they should is made to discern the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence serv-
not be discouraged. The Committee seen no danger to the integrity of ices and to deceive them about our own.
American academic institutions in continuing such overt contacts. The Committee finds that the threat from hostile intelligence services
The Domestic Collection Division operates from 38 offices around the is real. In the United States alone, well over a thousand Soviet officials
United States and lists itself in local telephone directories, although are on permanent assignment. Among these, over 40 percent have been
it conducts its business as discretely as possible. identified as members of the KGB or GRU, the Soviet civilian and
The Foreign Resources Division (FRD) performs its functions in a military intelligence units, respectively. Estimates for the number of
more traditional operational manner much as it is done overseas; for- unidentified Soviet intelligence officers raise this figure to over 60 per-
eign nationals of special interest, located in the United States, are en- cent and some defector sources have estimated that 70 percent to 80
listed to cooperate secretly with the CIA abroad. FRD's activity. percent of Soviet officials in the United States have some intelligence
which takes place throughout the United States, is carried out by some connection.
of CIA's very best personnel. In the performance of its job, FRD main- Furthermore, the number of Soviets with access to the United
-tains contact with a large number of Americans who are witting of its States his tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. In 1974, for ex-
m.ission and willing to be cooperative. There are also a number of ample, over 200 Soviet ships with a total crew complement of 13,000
Americans 2vho are not aware that they are in, such CIA
y participating officers and men visited this country. Some 4,000 Soviets entered the
activities." United States as commercial or exchange visitors in 1974. In 1972-
The Committee believes that the activities of the Foreign Resources 1973, for example, approximately one third of the Soviet exchange
Division and the Domestic Collection Division make an important students here for the academic year under the East-West student
and useful contribution to the overall intelligence effort; however, exchange program were cooperating with the KGB, according to
there are significant problems. the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Committee found that the Domestic Collection Division, sub- Other areas of counterintelligence concern include the, sharp in-
sidiary to its overt role, supports the clandestine components of the crease in the number of Soviet immigrants to the United States (4,000
CIA. It provides such services as re-settling defectors, and, by drawing in 1974 compared to fewer than 500 in 1972) ; the rise in East-West.
on DCD's extensive contarts in the U.S., reports leads regarding for- commercial exchange visitors (from 641 in 1972 to 1.500 in 1974) ;
eign nationals who could prove useful abroad or U.S. firms whose and the growing number of officials in this country from other Com-
o ffices abroad could help the CIA. munist bloc nations (from 416 in 1960 to 798 in 1975).
The Committee is eoncerncd that this kind of assistance provided Both the. FBI and the CIA are engaged in counts rintelli? c nce work.
by the Domestic Collection Division, if not closely watched, could The CIA operates primarily abroad. Within the, ITnite,d States the
lead to an exploitation of cooperating Americans beyond that which
18 Ibid.
'B See also the Select Committee Report on CHAOS and the counterintelligence
recommendations in the committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Part IV.
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f
counterintelligence mission is conducted by the FBI, except when
the CIA, in consultation with the FBI, continues activities begun
abroad.
Defectors are an important source of counterintelligence. Within
the United States, the interrogation of defectors is primarily the re-
sponsibility of the FBI, though the CIA may also participate. Some-
times, however, the bona fides of a defector are disputed between
the CIA and the FBI and there is no established interagency mecha-
nism for settling such disputes-which may last for years. An in-
cident in which a defector was held in so-called "incommunicado
interrogation" for two years was, in part, a result of the lack of such
a mechanism.20
Liaison among the various U.S. Government counterintelligence
units at home is particularly important, because counterintelligence-
with all- its intricacies and deceptions-requires coordination among
agencies and sharing of records. Unlike the totally unified KGB
organization, the American intelligence service is fragmented and
depends upon liaison to make operations more effective.
Coordination between CIA and FBI counterintelligence units is
especially critical. The history of CIA-FBI liaison has been turbu-
lent, though a strong undercurrent of cooperation has usually existed
at the staff level since 1952 when the Bureau began sending a liaison
person to the CIA on a regular basis. The sources of friction between
the CIA and FBI in the early days revolved around such matters
as the frequent unwillingness of the Bureau to collect positive intel-
ligence for the CIA within the United States or to help recruit
foreign officials in this country.
In 1970 an essentially minor incident resulted in an order from
FBI Director Hoover to discontinue FBI liaison with the Central
Intelligence Agency. Although informal communications between
CIA and FBI staff personnel continued, it was not until the post-
Hoover era that formal liaison relations were reestablished. Today,
there is still a need for closer coordination of FBI and CIA counter-
intelligence efforts.
The Committee believes that counterintelligence requires the direct
attention of Congress and the executive for three reasons: (1) two
distinct and partly incompatible approaches to counterintelligence
have emerged and demand reconciliation; (2) recent evidence sug-
gests that FBI counterespionage results have been less than satis-
factory; and (3) counterintelligence has infringed on the rights and
liberties of Americans.
Disagreement over the approach to counterintelligence affects all
aspects of this activity-compartmentation, method of operation, se-
curity, research priorities, deception activities, and liaison. The Com-
mittee found that there has been no high-level executive branch review
of the classified issues surfaced in this important disagreement.
The Committee also found that there is no system of clearance
outside the CIA or FBI for sensitive counterespionage operations,
rom
uespuue ane uimculLy or uisi,inguisning suiiie 01 these operations
covert action.
On the FBI contribution to counterintelligence, testimony before
the Committee reveals that the Bureau has given insufficient priority
to discovering and controlling foreign agents within the United States.
Insufficient manpower in the counterintelligence field, especially highly
trained analysts, appears to be part of the problem.
Recommendations
22. By statute, a charter should be established for the, Central Intel-
ligence Agency which makes clear that its activities must be related
to foreign intelligence. The Agency should be given the following
missions :
-The collection of denied or protected foreign intelligence
informa.tion.23
-The conduct of foreign coiulterintelIigence.24
-The conduct of foreign covert action operations.
-The production of finished national intelligence.
23. The CL1, in carrying; out. foreign intelligence missions, would
be permitted to engage in relevant activities within the United
States so long as these activities do not violate the Constitution nor
any federal, state, or local laws within the United States.2J The Com-
mittee has set forth in its Domestic Recommendations proposed re-
strictions on such activities to supplement restrictions already con-
tained in the 1947 National Security Act. In addition, the Committee
recommends that by statute the intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress and the proposed counterintelligence committee of the
National Security Council be required to review, at least annually,
CIA foreign intelligence activities conducted within the United
States.26
24. By statute, the Attorney General should be require
Congress any intelligence activities which, in his opinion; "
Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provision of
law and the actions he has taken in response. Pursuant to the Com-
mittee's Domestic Recommendations, the Attorney General should be
made responsible for ensuring that intelligence activities do not violate
the Constitution or any other provision of law.
25. The Committee recommends the establishment of a special com-
mittee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to review all foreign
human intelligence collection activities. It would make recommenda-
tion activities. (See the committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Part IV.)
U.S. clandestine human collection operations and choices between
overt and clandestine human collection. This committee would be
2 'This would not preclude the NSC from assigning appropriate overt collection
functions to the CIA.
The CIA would be excluded from any law enforcement or criminal investiga-
tion activities. (See the Committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Part IV.)
Ibid.
For recommended review requirements for covert action operations, see
p. 26 ff.
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the other statutory members of the CFI, and others whom the rresi- ference between an intelligence ialiure auu a policy failure. The
dent may designate. United States had intelligence on the possibility of a Turkish invasion
26. The intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress should care of Cyprus in 1974. The problem of taking effective action to prevent
fully examine intelligence collection activities of the Clandestine Serv- such an invasion was a policy question and not an intelligence failure.
ice to assure that clandestine means are used only when the information The Committee has received evidence that on some subjects, such
is sufficiently important and when such means are necessary to obtain as the current capability of the strategic and conventional forces of
the information. potential adversaries, U.S. intelligence is considered excellent. But
27. The intelligence oversight committee(s) should consider in other areas, U.S. finished intelligence is viewed by policymakers
whether: as far from satisfactory in light of the total resources devoted to
-the Domestic Collection Division (overt collection opera- intelligence. On balance, the Conimittee found that the quality, time-
tions) should be removed from the Directorate of Opera- liness, and utility of our finished intelligence is generally considered
tions (the Clandestine Service), and returned to the Direc- adequate, but that major improvement is both desirable and possible.
torate of Intelligence; One issue examined by the Committee is whether intelligence coin-
-the CIA's regulations should require that the DCD's overt munity elements responsible for producing finished intelligence re-
contacts be informed when they are to be used for opera- ceive adequate attention and support.. Production is, in the words of one
tional support of clandestine activities; observer, "the stepchild of the intelligence community." Since finished
-the CIA's regulations should prohibit recruiting as -ents intelligence is a principal purpose of' all ITn it.ed States intelligence
immigrants who have applied for American citizenship. activities, the Committee finds that this neglect of finished intelligence
.
28. The President of the United States, in consultation with the is I unacceptable resources for or the tbe, f tttuarercoverwhelmingly devoted to intelligence
intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress, should undertake a collection. The system is inundated with raw intelligence. The individ-
classified review of current issues regarding counterintelligence. This ual analysts responsible for producing finished intelligence has diffi
review should form the basis for a classified Presidential statement culty dealing with the sheer volnune of information. Policymakers
on national counterintelligence policy and objectives, and should want the latest reports, and producers of finished intelligence often
closely examine the following issues: compartmentation, operations, have to compete with the producers of raw intelligence for policy
security, research, accountability, training, internal review, decep makers' attention. In a crisis situation, analysts tend to focus on the
tion, liaison and coordination, and manpower. latest piece of evidence at the expense of a longer and broader view.
9. CIA Production of Finished Intelligence Intelligence Community staff saw this tendency as one reason why the
Intelligence production refers to the process (coordination, collation, Cyprus coup in July 1974 was not foreseen.
n: The Intelligence Community staff in its post-mortem on the 1974
b P_ ? _,_ ?______" _
nt
roblem
al
i
a
p
c
..-----
........ yt.
w `f`JV orme " Cyprus crisis noted another gener
genre is transfd i nto finished" intelligence for senior policy involved in the failure to anticipate the Cyprus coup and the Arab
s. The finished intelligence product includes a daily report and
summaries, as well as longer analytical studies and monographs on attack on Israeli forces in October of 1973: "the perhaps subconscious
particular topics of policy interest. In the CIA, finished intelligence conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will
is produced by the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek
Science and Technology. sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men."
Certain problems and issues in the area of CIA intelligence produc- An additional area of the Committee's concern is that analysts are
tion have come to the Committee's attention. The Committee believes often not informed in a timely way of national policies and programs
thees problems deserve immediate attention by both the executive which affect their analyses and estimates. In its examination of cases
branch and future congressional intelligence oversight bodies. These involving Cambodia and Chile in the 1970s, the Committee encount-
problems bear directly on the resources allocated to the production of ered evidence that the analysts were so deprived.
finished intelligence, the personnel system, and the organizational Another issue uncovered by the Committee is whether the highest
structure of intelligence production. quality personnel are recruited into the CIA analytical staff. Among
The Committee recognizes that it is not the primary purpose of the problems raised :
intelligence to predict every world event. Rather, the principal func- -Analysts tend to be hired early in their careers, and stay
tion of intelligence is to anticipate major foreign developments and in the Agency throughout their careers. The nature of
changes in policies which bear on United States interests. Intelligence their work tends to insulate them from other useful
should also provide a deeper understanding of the behavior, processes, experiences.
and long-term trends which may underlie sudden military and political -The analysts career pattern rewards most analyst by
developments. promoting them to supervisory positions thereby reducing
the time available to utilize their analytical skills.
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-Some analysts complain that there are too many steps in
the process for reviewing finished intelligence-too much
bureaucratic "layering" in the analytical components. With
each successive level of review, the analysis and commentary
tend to become increasingly derivative.
-There has been little lateral entry of established analysts
and intelligence experts into CIA ranks to leaven the out-
look, interests and skills of the Agency's intelligence
analysts.27
A final issue raised by the Committee's investigation of intelligence
production is whether the new organizational structure proposed by
the President will assure the appropriate stature for the Directorate
of Intelligence to help overcome existing problems in the production of
finished illtelligciue. Instead of report.ncg directly to the DCT (who
is still to be the President's chief intelligence adviser), CIA analysts
may well report, through the Deputy for the MA. Experience indi-
cates that the new Deputy will need to devote the bulk of his time to
managing the Clandestine Services and the Directorate for Science.
and Technology. At t lie same time, the DCl may be preoccupied wit It
greater community-wide management responsibilities. Without some
further restructuring, the Committee believes that the production of
finished intelligence may be lost in the shuffle.
Recommendations
29. By statute, the Director of the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI)
should be 'authorized to continue to report directly,to the Director of
Central Intelligence.
30. The Committee recoinniends that a system be devised to ensure
that intelligence analysts are better and more promptly informed
about United States policies and programs affecting their respective
areas of responsibility.
31. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence oversight
committee(s) of Congress should reexamine the personnel system of
the Directorate of Intelligence with a view to providing a more
flexible, less hierarchical personnel system. Super-grade positions
should be available on the basis of an individual's analytical
capabilities.
32. The Directorate for Intelligence should seek to bring more
established analysts into the CIA at middle and upper grade levels for
both career positions and temporary assignments.
33. Greater emphasis should be placed on stimulating develop-
ment of new tools and methods of analysis.
34. Agency policy should continue to encourage intelligence analysts
to assume substantive tours of duty on an open basis in other agencies
(State, Defense, NSC staff) or in academic institutions to broaden
both their analytical outlook and their appreciation for the relevance
of their analysis to policymakers and operators within the
Government.
27 In FY 1975, only 18 out of 105 analysts hired by the DDI from outside the
CIA were at grades GS-12 to GS-15.
3. Covert Action and Faramitatary uperarzons
Covert action is the attempt to influence the internal affairs of other
nations in support. of United States foreign policy in a manner that
conceals the participation of the united States Goverjimilent. Covert,
action includes political and economic action, propaganda and para-
military activities.
The basic unit of covert action is the project. Covert action "proj-
ect's" can range from single 'assets, such as a journalist placing propa-
ganda, through a network of assets working in the media, to nna]or
covert and military intervention such as in Laos. The Agency
also maintains what it terms an "operational in:frastructure" of
"stand-by" assets (agents of influence or media assets) who can be
used in major operations-such es in Chile. These "stand-by" assets
are also part of oil-going, most often routine, projects. There are no
niaeltive assets.
(,'overt A `tuna,
The Committee has found that the CIA has conducted sonic 900
nrc.jor or sensitive covert, action projec' s linos several 1Ilolls:111d smaller
projects Since 1961. The laced to in'iurnliiiii secrecy ski`l`ls covert Iction
projects front the rigorous public scrutiny and debate necessary to
deterinuie their compatibility with eslrihlished Aniericun foreign
policy goals. Recently, 'a large-scale covert paramilitary operation
in Angola was initiated without any effort on the part of the execu-
tive branch to articulate, 'and Will public support for, its overall policy
in Africa. Only public disclosure has allowed the nation to apply its
standards of success or failure to covert action projects arid then only
in retrospect, often without the benefit of the, details proncpt.ing the
original choice of covert rather than overt, action.
The secrecy covert action requires means that the public cannot
determine whether such actions arc consistent with established foreign
policy goals. This secrecy 'also has allowed covert acstions to take place
which are inconsistent with our basic traditions and values.
Some covert operations have passed restrospective public judgments,
such as the support given Western European democratic panties facing
strong communist opposition in the late 1940s and 1950s. Others have
not. In the view of the Committee, the covert harassment of the
democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile did
not command U.S. public approval.
Even if the short-term consequences of covert action are consistent
with stated policy and accepted standards, the Committee has found
that the continued use of covert, action techniques Within or against
a foreign society can have unintended consequences that sometimes sub-
vert long-term goals. For instance, extended covert support to foreib n
political leaders, parties, labor unions, or the media has not always
accomplished the intended objective of strengthening theta against
the communist challenge. In some cases, it has both encouraged a de-
bilitating dependence on United States covert support, and made
those receiving such support vulnerable to repudiation in their own
society when their covert ties are exposed. Furthermore, prolonged
covert relations and the resulting dependence of recipients on con-
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tinued CIA support seem to encourage the CIA to extend its ties
to means of controlling the recipients in other respects. Covert ac-
tions also have, over time, developed a bureaucratic momentum of
their own that often surpasses the original need for covert action.
Paramilitary Operations
Covert paramilitary operations are a special, extreme form of covert
action. These operations most often consist of covert military assist-
ance and training, but occasionally have involved actual combat activi-
ties by American advisers.
Because military assistance involves foreign policy commitments, it
is,'with one exception, authorized by the Congress. That exception is
covert military assistance which is channeled through the CIA with-
out being authorized or approved by the Congress as n .;whole.
Covert U.S. paramilitary combat operations frequently amount to
making war, but they do not come under the War Powers Act since
they usually do not involve uniformed U.S. military officers. American
military officers engaged in CIA-sponsored paramilitary operations
are "sheep-dipped" for paramilitary duty-that is, they appear to
resign from the military yet preserve their place for reactivation once
their tour as civilian in paramilitary operations has ended.
The Coainiittee finds that major paramilitary operations have often
failed to achieve their intended objective. Most have eventually been
exposed. Operations, as in Angola, recently, and Indonesia in the late
1950s are examples of such paramilitary failures. Others, such as Laos,
are judged successes by the CIA and officials within the executive
branch. The "success" in Laos, however, must be seen against the larger
American involvement in Indochina which failed.
Paramilitary operations often have evolved into large-scale pro-
grams with a high risk of exposure (and thus embarrassment and/or
ome cases, the CIA has been used to undertake paramili-
failure). In some'
tary operations simply because the Agency is less accountable to the
public for highly visible "secret" military operations. In all cases
considered by the Committee, command and control within the execu-
tive branch was rigorous. However, all such operations have been
conducted without direct congressional authority or public debate.
In recent years, some have been continued in the face of strong con-
gressional disapproval.
Recently, however-apart from Angola-United States paramili-
tary activities have been at a very low level. The capability for these
actions, residing jointly in the CIA and the Department of Defense,
consists of a cadre of trained officers, stockpiles of military equip-
ment, logistic networks and small collections of air and maritime
assets.
Review and Approval of Covert Action
Given the open and democratic assumptions on which our govern-
ment is based, the Committee has given serious consideration to the
option of proposing a total ban on all forms of covert activity. The
Committee has concluded, however, that the United States should
maintain the capability to react through covert action when no other
means will suffice to meet extraordinary circumstances involving grave
CIA-RDP1 OS01 820R000300540001 -0
threats to iJ.S. national security. iveveruin;iass, covert action should be
considered as an exception to the normal process of government action
abroad, rather than a parallel but invisible system in which covert
operations are routine.
Absent some ineans of assuring public. participation in assessing
each covert action, the mechanisms of executive branch review and
control and of legislative intelligence oversight must serve as the
restricted arenas in which such standards a.re applied to covert, action.
The Committee's examination of the covert action record over the last,
25 years has underscored the necessity for legislative reinforcement
of the executive branch's internal review process. This is necessary to
assure that all covert action projects are reviewed, and to establish a
system of formal accountability within the executive accessible to
congressional intelligence oversight bodies.
The CIA has not, been free, however. to c.a.i?ry out. coA ert, action as
it sees fit. The Committee's investigation revealed that. on the. whole,
the Agency has been responsive to internal and external review and
authorization requirements. Most of the significant covert operations
have been approved by the appropriate. NSC committee. At. the same
time, the Committee notes that, approval outside the Agency does not,
solve all problems since the NSC committees have. approved (and in
some cases initiated) projects that, involved highly improper practices
or were inconsistent with declared foreign policies.
Approximately three-fourths of all covert action projects are never
reviewed or approved by a high level body outside the CIA.28 These
projects which are not brought before the NSC for review are so-
called "non-sensitive" projects, or part of what the CIA calls its
"operational infi