IG MEETING ON APRIL 22

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M02313R000100750012-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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sCUTWE SECRETARIAT
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ACTION I INFO
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Execut've S cretary
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April 20, 1982
eomrfDENTi
TO: Members of the Interagency Group on Coordination
of Substantive Preparations for the United Nations
Special Session on Disarmament
SUBJECT: IG Meeting on April 22
The first meeting of the SSOD Interagency Group will
take place on Thursday, April 22, at 10:15, in the PM Confer-
ence Room (7422). The purpose of this meeting is to consider
basic U.S. objectives for SSOD II and to begin consideration of
possible initiatives which the U.S. might put forward at the SSOD.
To guide our discussion is a scope paper drafted by
ACDA. It..is a revision of a paper circulated earlier and takes
into account comments made since then. We are also circulating
a memo from Ambassador Kirkpatrick, which discusses possible U.S.
initiatives for the SSOD.
Please inform Alexander Liebowitz (632-4761) of the name
of the representative from your agency.
a V. is uC4." t U
Robert D. Blackwill 'ames George
Principal Deputy Director Assistant Director
PM ACDA/MA
C01,47 T =NT ~Eft
4/20/88 GDS
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DISTRIBUTION:
OVP -
Ms.
Nancy Bearg-Dyke
NSC -
Mr.
Michael O. Wheeler
ODS -
Col.
John Stanford
CIA -
Mr.
Thomas B.Cormack
JCS -
Maj.
Dennis J. Stanley
OMB -
Mr.
William Schneider
USUN
- Amb. Kenneth Adelman
State
10 -
Mr.
Platt, Acting
EUR -
Mr.
Holmes, Acting
S/P -
Mr.
Wolfowitz
INR -
Mr.
Montgomery
S/S-S: Mr. Tompkins
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CONFIDENTIAL April 19, 1982
UNGA SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT
Draft Scope Paper
I. Setting
The non-aligned conceived the idea of the First SSOD and
continue to regard it as-their "child". In one sense the concept
of the Special Session is an element of the North-South dialogue
in which the neutral and non-aligned nations (NNA) press the
developed countries to make concessions to their point of view.
In this case they are interested not only in reducing the
perceived threat of nuclear weapons but also in achieving their
objectives in other areas that they relate to the general complex
of arms control issues such as assistance in nuclear technology.
If the NNA perspective makes up the warp of the fabric of
the Special Session, the East-West issues comprise its woof.
In fact the majority of substantive issues with which the session
will be seized are US-Soviet issues. The strains in East-West
relations, which are unlikely to have abated by June, will have
a profound effect on the course of the Special Session.
These strains will also affect public attitudes toward the
session. "Peace" groups, both domestic and foreign, will want to
seize it as an occasion for applying heat to both sides, although
in the nature of things that heat will be directed more to the US
and its friends than to the Soviets and their minions. For those
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public groups that. are skeptical about the value of UN debates,
the SSOD will be regarded as just another opportunity for
adversaries to weaken the US defense modernization effort. Thus,
to the extent that it attracts public attention, the session will
be conducted in an-atmosphere which is a mixture of impatience
and cynicism.
The General Assembly forum of the SSOD has obvious draw-
backs: the general debate of the initial two weeks will be
repetitive at best as each nation strives to insure that its
favored ideas receive recognition. But the SSOD also gives us
an opportunity to gain better understanding and acceptance here
and abroad for our policies and for more realistic ways of dealing with
the problems of arms limitation in both the nuclear and con-
ventional fields. While the documents produced by the session
will be mainly horatory, they will be with us for some time and
will serve as the basis for the international community's future
approach to arms control issues.
Regardless of the internal workings of the session itself,
SSOD II should take on particular significance for the US and
its Allies because of the decision by President Reagan and other
major Western leaders such as Chancellor Schmidt and Prime
Minister Trudeau to address it. The conjunction of SSOD II
with the freeze and anti-nuclear movements makes it essential
that the US approach to SSOD II be coherent, positive, and co-
ordinated with the arms control components of other activities
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in the same time frame -- the President's first visit to Europe
and the NATO Summit; his speeches on national security isses in
connection with that trip; possible arms control initiatives
undertaken in that period; and the resumption of the INF talks.
II. 'US Objectives
The US approach to SSOD II will have two basic themes:
We will seek to promote understanding and support for
arms control of the sort described in the President's speech of
November 18, 1981: "substantial militarily significant reductions
in forces; equal ceilings for similar types of forces; and
adequate provisions for verification."
-- We will press for wider recognition of the need for
improvements in the verification and compliance mechanisms for
current arms control agreements and inclusion of adequate
- mechanisms in future agreements.
In line with the first theme, we will work for the following
objectives:
-- endorsement in any concluding document of basic arms
control objectives compatible with our own;
-- exposing the hollow, propagandistic nature of Soviet
arms control proposals;
-- establishing in any Comprehensive Program for Disarma-
ment to be adopted by SSOD II, a realistic set of guidelines for
future international arms control activities that will neither
create artificial deadlines nor be juridically binding;
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-- preserving the integrity of the CD as the single multi-
lateral negotiating forum, while resisting proposals for its
enlargement or procedural changes that may command wide support
but might threaten the consensus principle or pave the way for
-unbridled expansion. of the Committee.
In support of the second theme, we could engage in various
-- Support initiatives such as the Swedish proposal to
convene the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention
to improve its verification and compliance provisions and the
Belgian proposal for a compliance mechanism to improve the 1925
Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons;
- Make positive proposals of our own on verification and
compliance, to possibly include;
a. SSOD endorsement of the Principle of adequate
mechanisms in arms control agreements for
verification and compliance;
b. SSOD support for the reexamination of existing
multilateral agreements towards improvements of
their verification and compliance mechanisms;
c. SSOD establishment of new bodies or procedures
to deal with verification and compliance questions.
(A permanent"UN body on verification and compliance;
an Ad Hoc working group within the Committee on
Disarmament for the negotiation of verification
and compliance mechanisms; an independent inter-
national institute for the study and development
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of verification and compliance mechanisms; a
matidate to the World Health Organization to create
the capability for investigation in the CW and BW
areas?)
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III. Objectives of Others
A. Non-=aligned
to publicize the lack of movement since SSOD I and
to pressure the US and USSR as well as other nuclear powers to
make more and faster progress on nuclear disarmament negotiations;
--- to press for a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament;
to get maximum exposure for their views on arms
control and get the leadership of both the Western and Communist
camps to listen to them.
-- to gain a greater say in disarmament negotiations
by strengthening the role of the UN in multilateral disarmament
machinery and persuading the major powers to do more of their
negotiating in bodies such as the CD;
-?- to obtain an explicit recognition of a linkage
between disarmament and development, if possible including
commitment to make resources freed by disarmament available for
development assistance;
--'to win increased recognition of their right to
share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and combat
"discrimination" against them by nuclear suppliers in the name
of non-proliferation.
B. Soviet and East European
--- to use this major political event to try to seize
some of the high ground on disarmament issues, by pumping up old
Soviet initiatives on subjects such as a non-use-of'-force treaty,
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and non-stationing of nuclear weapons? as well as to launch-new
cynical initiatives.
--- to possibly promote a Balkan nuclear weapons-free
zone, with implications for a possible Nordic NWFC.
-- to castigate the-West and the US in particular for
propagandistic purposes on the "neutron" bomb and binary chemical
weapons, among other issues.
-- to urge a superfluous World Disarmament Conference
as the follow-on to the SSOD.
C. Allies
The Allies will in general work closely with the US to
maintain a united front; they share many of the objectives listed
in Section II. Some Allies, however, have special concerns which
lead them to take positions that may vary somewhat from the US
approach, or, on occasion, to break completely with the rest of
the West.
-- the EC-l0 has become institutionalized as a group
working within the arms control community and its tendency to seek
the lowest common denominator within the group dilutes the support
we might otherwise receive from some of its members. For a long
time Ireland has tended to lean heavily toward NNA positions and
now Greece is taking a-similar tack;
On the test ban issue many allies are at odds with us.
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark
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in particular are under great public pressure and may openly oppose'
us. The French and British have views similar to ours about the
substantive aspects of a CTB, but may be flexible on language
giving CTB a high priority among nuclear arms control measures.
Other differences between US and Allied positions have shown up
in the past, e.g., nuclear supplies to South Africa and a South
Asian nuclear weapons free zone, but these have not been serious
enough to break general allied unit;
-- the European Allies will be keeping one eye on their
dissenters at home and will probably wish to make a splash with
initiatives that are "headline-grabbing" even if their chances for
success are small, such as the French call (originally made at
SSOD I) for the creation of an international satellite verification
agency, or the FRG's global approach to CBM's;
-- some Allies, particularly the French and Germans,
attach importance to a comprehensive program for disarmament (CPD)
believing fundamental Western interests can be protected while
incorporating enough of the NNA desiderata to give it political
appeal. It is too early to judge whether this will produce serious
divergences between the Allies.
IV. US strategy
-- We should make use of the Barton Group in New York
to coordinate strategy with our friends to the maximum extent
possible and arrange bilateral meetings with others for the
same purpose;
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We will prepare a wide-ranging public information
plan, utilizing resources in State, ACDA, and USICA to insure
that US positions are adequately communicated to foreign
governments and both US and foreign public interest groups,
both before and during the Special Session.
-- On compliance issues such as CW/BW use we should
be building a record on which we can draw at SSOD II, including
the sharing of the maximum possible amount of information with
interested parties;
-- After two weeks of general debate, the President's
address will conclude statements by world leaders. He should
build on and follow up his November 18, 1981 speech on arms
control, exploiting the fact that negotiations on INF are underway
and that START negotiations are imminent.
V. Discussions with the Soviet Union
Unlike the situation at the time of SSOD I we do not have a
large number of ongoing negotiations with the Soviets, nor do we
share many common objectives. Nevertheless to the extent possible
we will want to keep track of what the Soviets are thinking and
planning aobut the session. We can accomplish this in part through
third parties, including certain of our allies and leading non-
aligned who may be willing to share with us the results of their
consultations with the Soviets.
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THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
April 19, 1982
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Mr. William C. Clark
National Security Adviser
Mr. Eugene Rostow
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. Charles Wick
Director, International Communication Agency
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION.ON
DISARMAMENT (SSOD II), NEW YORK, JUNE 7-JULY 9, 1982
President Reagan's intention to address the SSOD II came as
welcome news. It reinforces the importance of our efforts
underway for some time at USUN to use the SSOD II as an occasion
for effective public diplomacy.
We know our record and intentions are better than the Soviets.
The problem is that too many others do not know it. Such a
good opportunity to tell them will not soon come again. This
opportunity is unique because the SSOD II, at which many world
leaders will appear, is sure to attract world attention, and
the presence at the United Nations of an elite international
press corps assures world-wide coverage.
USUN personnel have been actively involved in conversations
with State, ACDA, NSC, ICA and Defense to. explore how we should
take advantage of this opportunity. An overview of our plan:
followsa
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GDS 04/19/88 (KIRKPATRICK, JEANE J.) OR-M
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I. US Goal
The US should use the SSOD II to wage its assault in the battle
of ideas on defense, nuclear policy and arms control. The
expected attendance of nearly all major world leaders makes
this a prime opportunity. Each nation will send a high-level
delegation accompanied by press and non-governmental organizations.
The Japanese, for example, expect thirty to forty Diet members
and at least 1,500 private citizens here for the events.
With our goal one of public diplomacy, our targets are (in
rough order of priority):
A.
Foreign
press
B.
Foreign
delegations (Ambassadors and appointees)
C.
Foreign
parliamentarians
and opinion-leaders
D.
E.
American
Foreign
press
non-governmental
organizations, and lastly
F.
American
non-governmental
organizations.
To help balance the American NGO participation (surely the
largest group), I have written more conservative (national
seL.urity) organizations on how they might receive credentials
for the SSOD II. We must, however, still expect most NGO's to
be in ferocious opposition to Administration plans and programs.
II. US Themes
The target groups should receive themes that are both simple
and consistent (themes most effective in public diplomacy).
These themes should be reflected and reinforced in President
Reagan's speech, the main display (now being designed by ICA
pamphlets and briefing teams.
A. The history of US initiatives-on'arms control is a
proud one, from the time of the Baruch Plan to the Zero Option
and plans for real reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We
should discuss US proposals to place nuclear weapons under
international control in the 1940's; such ideas as the "open
skies" proposal of the 1950's; the test ban and non-proliferation
treaties of the 1960's; the b i o l 'Dig i c a 1 a n d chemical treaties,
SALT I, ABM accord and real reductions sought in the March 1977
SALT II proposals of the 1970's; and the Zero Option and START
ideas of the 1980's. The US has been and is today the main
force for realistic, verifiable arms control and peace initiatives
in the world.
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In a similar vein, the US has been the main financial contribu-
tor to United Nations disarmament efforts: to the United
Nations Disarmament Committee, the US Disarmament Scholarships
and the United Nations Disarmament Studies.
B. The history of USSR actions in arms procurement
across the board (particularly in strategic nuclear arms) has
been relentless and destabilizing. In essence, there has been
no "arms race" over the past fifteen years; one side (the USSR)
has been building steadily while the other (the US) has been
holding steady, even declining.
The military trends have been adverse over the past fifteen
years to the point where-the Soviet Union now allocates
150 percent of our defense budget, now spends two and a half
times the US level on strategic nuclear forces, and now has
deployed 300 SS-20's aimed at Europe, etc. The Reagan
Administration came to office with the USSR having an open
production line in all three legs of the strategic triad --
land, air and sea-based strategic nuclear forces -- while the
US had an open production line in only one (sea-based).
C. In terms of use of arms (as well as possession of
arms), the USSR has been the main destabilizing force. The
situations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea speak for themselves.
The Soviets' involvement with yellow rain casts new fears of
inhumane and outrageous behavior reinforcing the need for
verifiable arms control agreements. The massive Soviet arms
shipments to Ethiopia -- twice as much in an eighteen month
period as the US delivered there over a quarter of a century -
and use of Cuban troops in Africa shows their readiness to use,
as well as to stockpile, weaponry.
D. The values of the United Nations Charter and of the
US are higher than military might. We, like people across
the world, long for freedom and prosperity. However, neither
for the First World nor the Third World can there be either
economic development nor political development (toward stability
and freedom) without security. Security can come in terms of
arms stabilization, arms control, or a buildup to maintain.
deterrence. T h e t asks of building security are not
pleasant; they are, nonetheless, necessary given the Soviets'
clear record on both amassing and deploying military might.
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III. US Techniques of Presentation
A. The main presentation of our themes will, of course,
be the President's address.
B. We plan an impressive display with charts, graphs,
simple language, film, video and guides in the lobby of the
US Mission. All the sundry groups briefed by US personnel
will first be shown the display to set terms of reference for
the ensuing discussion.
C. We will distribute brochures and pamphlets (currently
in preparation) on:
1. US Peace Initiatives from the Truman to the
Reagan Administrations
2. US/Soviet Trends over the past fifteen years;
current US/Soviet expenditures and arsenals
in such categories as strategic nuclear, theater
nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons; in
research and development; and investment
3. Nuclear Freeze proposals
4. The uses of weapons, as well as possession
thereof (i.e., Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Africa,
Central America), and
5. The relation of security to economic development
and liberty.
D. We will have a full-blown "speakers bureau" headquartered
at USUN for foreign delegations and foreign and American press.
The primary briefers will be:
1. Members of the US Delegation (Presidential
appointees)
2. US Ambassadors at the State Department awaiting
on-going assignment (we have begun to set this
in motion), and
3. Staff members of USUN, PM, 10, ACDA and the Pentagon.
E. Daily press briefings on different arms control and
disarmament topics, with material and experts on hand.
We also plan to establish a small (two to three people) think-
tank at USUN as a resource base during the SSOD II, to handle
technical questions that arise. Finally, we will explore the
possibility of a Hughes-type briefing of declassified, aerial
photography for a very select group of high-level foreign
delegates (Heads of Delegation and their immediate staff).
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F. To back up our speakers, we will have material on hand
on such topics as:
1. Nuclear freeze plans
2. INF negotiations in Europe
3. CW use (yellow rain)
4. US chemical weapons plans
5. CTB (comprehensive test ban proposals)
6. SALT/START
7. US/Soviet conventional arms transfers
IV. Possible US Initiatives
Presumably, the final determination of initiatives will emerge
from the NSC process, after planning is done in State, Defense,
ACDA and the NSC. Whether an initiative ready by June should
be unveiled at SSOD II or in Europe during the President's
trip (or on its own) is again a decision for NSC principals.
Nonetheless, we submit the following ideas as first-cuts -- to
be explored and considered by experts and then (if merited) by
the NSC.
A. Calling a multilateral conference on major military
expenditures at present and over the past two decades. LOGIC:
To move toward real disarmament, we must be more precise and
knowledgeable about armaments, particularly each major country's
level of effort on defense. ADVANTAGE: This emphasizes the
Soviets' two main "public diplomacy" vulnerabilities: (1) secrecy
and (2) relentless military buildup; and obversely our two
main "public diplomacy" advantages: (1) openness and (2) steady
or even declining military expenditures over twenty years.
B. Calling the Security Council to meet on the Soviet/
Vietnamese use of chemical weapons, pursuant to the terms of the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention. LOGIC: The evidence has
become overwhelming. The US cannot indefinitely assert that
there have been and are now gross-violations of solemn inter-
national obligations without our invoking the agreed-upon mechanism
in case of violations. ADVANTAGE: Obviously, to take our case
one step byond its present level. Also, such action points up
that the Administration takes arms control agreements very
seriously, demands adherence to those already in force while
seeking to=proceed on to other accords, and places verification
at the forefront of our concerns.
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C. Calling for a consideration of a pledge of no first-use
of nuclear weapons in Europe after the establishment (through
MBFR, Warsaw Pact reductions or substantial NATO augmentations)
of a conventional force balance in Europe. LOGIC: Arguments on
"no first-use" have begun and are sure to spread by June. The
Administration should meet the challenge head on, in a positive
manner. ADVANTAGE: Such an initiative would point up Warsaw
Pact conventional superiority on the Central Front (as well as
INF advantages). It would also reinforce the Administration's
message that the Europeans must do more in defense to lower the
nuclear threshold. There cannot be a budding nuclear allergy
and conventional acquiescence.
D. Calling for a multinational conference on conventional
arms in the non-aligned wor and on arms transfers to such
countries. LOGIC: Arms control and disarmament cannot a con-
in~ ed to nuclear weapons (as the Third World desires) but must
be comprehensive. ADVANTAGE: This initiative would emphasize
how (1) the rate of growth of military expenditures has been
higher in the Third World than the First or even Second Worlds
and (2) the Soviet Union has become the world's foremost arras
supplier-around the globe.
CnNrTflPNTTAT.
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