CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M02313R000100710002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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'. CUTIVE SECRE.TAIUTAT
Routing Shp
L.1 DCI
2 DM
5 1 DO/A
Chm/NIC
GC
Compt
17 AO/DCI
181 C/ACrS/D
19 EXDIR
20
22
Remarks:
SUSPENSE
STAT
xecu ive bocretary
,6- Jan 82
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FM OFFICE OF THE utt'uI T u1R"~,-
EMOR.NDUM FOR: SN/DDCI
DDCI, please. Thanks.
CA '
The DDI would like you to mention this to the
STAT
DDI Action Officer
Date January 25, 1982
.er eervinuS GPO : 1981 0 - 345-783
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1 11 :U1J/- U7w-I ~fI
MEMORANDUM FOR: 'DDI
tells me that the DCI queried the DDCI STAT
on the status o the CW verification paper directed on
page 3 of NSDD 18 (attached).
- That paper is being prepared by ACDA --
with substantial input from CIA and
coordination with the IC.
- Work has been under way for several weeks;
a first draft exists; and the Working Group
expects to meet the 30 January deadline.
- CIA's participation is being spearheaded
by of our staff. She has, STAT
of course, coordinated the draft with
OSWR and SOVA. A CW treaty monitoring
paper prepared earlier by the IC for the
IG has been an important input.
I STAT
We will keep you informed.
ACIS
Date 20 January 1982
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January 4, 1982
SECRET
NL>JMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control
The President has formally approved the implementation of
the attached National Security Decision Directive -)n
the United States' chemical and biological weapons arms
control policy.
James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SECRET
Review December 10, 1987
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L J/7 _ ,Js~a j
1
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SECRET January 4, 1982
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 18
UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
ARMS CONTROL POLICY
The President has reviewed the interagency recommendations
on United States chemical and biological weapons arms con-
trol policy and approves the policies set forth below.
To encourage compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons
Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United
States will:
(1) Intensify its public information campaign and use
the 36th United Nations General Assembly debate, particu-
larly the UN Group of Experts investigating CW use, and
debate in the First (Political) Committee on the issue of
reports of chemical and toxin weapons use in Afghanistan,
Laos, and Kampuchea, as well as discussions in the Committee
on Disarmament and other international fora, to continue to
expose the chemical and biological warfare activities of the
Soviet Union and its associated states to international
scrutiny and pressure;
(2) Seek to convene* a meeting of States Parties to
the Biological Weapons Convention with the aim of strength-
ening its verification and compliance mechanisms in light
of probable Soviet non-compliance, and to provide an addi-
tional forum for maintaining international pressure on the
Soviet Union concerning its chemical and biological warfare
activities; and
*The phrase "Seek to convene" represents the policy deci-
sion which is required, and is used without prejudice to
tactical judgments (i.e., whether the US would propose the
meeting or support the Swedish proposal for a meeting of
States Parties) to be made once policy approval is obtained.
SECRET
Review on December 10, 2001
Extended by J.W. Nance
Reason: NSC 1.13 (d) (e)
SECRET
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SECRET
(3) After assessing the results of the steps above,
and after evaluating interagency analyses, consider invoking
the other two remedies provided by the Biological Weapons
Convention:
(a) Taking the issue to the United Nations
Security Council, and
(h) As an ultimate step, withdrawing from the
Biological Weapons Convention.
To provide the basis for proceeding with the above, the
Government is directed to study and submit recommendations
o Il :
Specific measures to strengthen the verification
and compliance provisions of the Biological
Weapons Convention;
The relationship of the United States' position
on biological warfare to other arms control,
East-West and United Nations strategies;
Consultations with United States Allies on a
strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere;
and
The legal issues associated with formally charging
the Soviet Union with violation of the Biological
Weapons Convention.
With respect to chemical weapons arms control, the United
States will: -
(1) Support the eventual objective of concluding a
complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons pro-
duction, development, and stockpiling, recognizing that for
the foreseeable future such a prohibition would be unverifi-
able by national technical means alone;
(2) Ensure that modernization of short- and long-range
chemical weapons systems proceeds so that the United States
iias a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability,
and so that the United States can gain negotiating leverage
in the area of chemical weapons arms control;
SECRET
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SECRET
SECRET
(3) Allow the United States-Soviet negotiations to
lapse informally; and
(4) Support chemical weapons arms control discussions
in the Committee on Disarmament leading to multilateral
negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical
weapons prohibition, if further interagency study should
support such a step.
an support of United States chemical weapons arms control
objectives, the Government is directed to study and, by
January 3C, 1982, submit recommendations on United States
Government positions with respect to:
declarations of chemical warfare agent and munitions
stocks and production facilities;
entry into force;
an appropriate public posture with respect to CW
arms control.;
relationship of the United States' position on
chemical weapons to other arms control, East-West
and United Nations strategies; and
consultations with the United States Allies on a
strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere.
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