MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 5132 NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING ON MONDAY, 10 JUNE 1946, AT 2:30 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
Oi FIDENTIAL COPY NO,- 1 _29
I .A. B. 5th Meeting
t;ENTRAL INTELLIGEN(;E GROUP
INTLLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeti held in Room 5132
New War Department Buildin
on Mond?, In June 94+ , at 2:30 P.M.
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
eventral Intelligence
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
M. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear
Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence)
Br-i. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
i;hiu~;f of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
ALSO PRESENT
Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Group
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O. N. I .
Captain J.J. Rochofort, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. (;olonel n mer, G-2
Central Intelligence Group
Capt Lin W.E. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. L L Monta uo Central Intelligence Group
Central Intelligence Group
Central Intelligence Group
Central Intelligence group
Central Intelligence Group
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr . , Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority
Mr. J.K. Tibhy, Assistant Secretary
-OTID ;NTIAL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
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,;ONFIDEI'TTIAL
1. PROVISION OF MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADi;ASTS
OF FOR-EIGPOWERS
u.I.G. 1/2, and (;.I.G. 1/3)
ADMIRAL SO'JERS recalled that the proposals raised in
,I.G. 1/1 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the
cvi.oustinr;. In view of General V,and:enberg-'s suggestion
_aat the operation of FBIS be assum. d by State, that department
had been ,.31,.ed to make a study of its capabilities. The Stat
)e partmoont r: olie:ed (in (;. I . G. 1/3) that while they wire keenly
intcerested in having the monitoring service continue it would
impossi.'.l for the Department to assume administrative respon-
sibility or FBIS during the next fiscal year. ADMIRAL SOUERS
felt that these developments justified the Members in aphrovi.n
.;.I.G. I./l. ,;h.ch in substance called for War Department o a-
t:_on of FP?IS under directives from the Director of Central
I_itelligo c: as to collecting and distributing missions.
DR. LAIJGE'R underscored the reasons leading to Stag's
conclusions. Those were chiefly technical and budgetary. PP'cr
example, State estimated that the ad%iinistrative costs of ~?._ IS
could mean JO per cent increase in th,; entire amount bu,i=;E t. c?
a for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the
Jresontly buddetod amounts had not boon finally approved b
e;ongress. There were also questions of the establishment of
z to stations i.n military zones, thy: transfer of some ]cil_ ifee
now under f3ritish auspices, the procurement of new
end the 11 . --all of which he felt could be more effectf -,,_!_y
handled ' the W .r Department at present.
GENERAL VANDENBER r observed that an ev:.;ntual altcrn:'.t _v.
to State or War Department administration would be direct con-
trol by iztral Intelligence, if t;. I. G. ,,ore to obtain an
operating;appropriation of its own. But such considerations
could not apply in the volution of the immediate problem.
In th.: course of the general discussion which followed
.t was brour;ht out by .A +iIRAL SOUERS that the Central Intell:_-
fe;nce Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds
from War for direct adi nistration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was
not arl authorized disbuSrsing agency. It was therefore the
consen~us of the MombexRb that the best immediate solution '.m
oeorat;on by the Direc r of Central Intelligence with the
e iministrativc assistance of the War Department.
After concludin- discussion,
TE, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD : -
Approv_;d e.;.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification
to insure that the' recommendation to the National
Inte111gonc_ Authority provided for operation of `G):-
--Monitoring function by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence with the administrative assistance of the
War D_partment. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulat_:e_ a s
2.
N.I.A. 5).
i . I . G. WEEIiI,Y SUI,:MARY
ADMIRAL SOUERS invited discussion and criticism 0,-
1.,-:
trial
.ssuo of the u. I. G." Weekly Summery circulated on 7
Ju_i.;.
Thu- discussion which followed centered on two issues devcloY: _.u
by DR. 'LANCER : first, whether intcrerotivo articles such,
t_ e Wo kly contained could be prepared more effective !y I.G.
0IN'F IDEINNTIAL
.P 5th i, j t. L_ t lt?,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
ON ,IDENT!A L
as in the trial issue, or by specialists in the contributin
nart^,cr:ts; Ted s::cond, the suggestion that the Weekly con-
c_ _aitraton whore the C.I.G. has something new or novel
add to tb normal intelligence produced by the departtments.
As to the first point, DR. LANGER emphasized that ho was
dolly in favor of the undertaking represented by the ?1e e?cl;~T
5u-many. However, it was essential to make the Weekly the
pest pu lication of which "this city" is capable . The job of
entorprctation n eded to be done by people who have "responsi-
) lity and w_ight". For instance, h, thought it inevitabl..
filet the host political comment woulcl bo obtained from the
uolitical sections of the State Departnv,,,nt, whore there was
',sponsibility for policy as well as analysis, and that e.I.G.
could hardly build upp comparably well-in:?ornmed groups of
cial _sts its own staff. On this assiunption, ho
Included t 1^.t e ::cps the preparation of article for the
lcly should b transferred to the departmental ports . Iii
this case, DID. LANGER thought, the C .I.G. editors would
left with ti-i. true; function of correlatinr,~ political int.;ll _-
;ence jud n;nts from State with related military judgments
from the arm i services. On his second point, he believed It
1~:_ ;ht b_; a mistake for the Weekly to offer intorprctations of
tters 11 id, ll covered in other ?sub-ications, or whom:.
Weekly; did not have '!something to add".
In ^.c?_no~, led . ng these issues, MR. MONTAGUE observed
that the Wt1,c_'ki was not, of course, to be a summary of all the
.ncidents o_." a wool: but an attempt to lout into pc rspectiv__ some
of the most _-i--port-ant incidents and trends. Most of the events
with which the Wee -1y dealt; had alr,-ad,,, boon renort:ed br.',- --
:a.ind without opportunity or elucidation--in the C;. I . G. dail.-
stunmarios The Weekly was to provide background
and. "depth". Th,: fact t' at the trial issue was heavily
" political" in substance reflected the undermanned state of
the reports. staff, lie was awaiting the arrival of several
specialists from the contributing departments.
As to sources of material for the eekly, IvM. MONTAGUE
thought it was clear that these would always be primarily the
departmental cables and iteIegrams, plus departmental summaries
such as the G-2 ;- ooklyo S ary and the State Department s -tuation
r? _;uorts . The reports st ff did not recoivo "raw" or unevaluated
data. A much greater degree of contact with the departmental
so cialists was imporatiio,` he agreed, and when the full staff
h.d been assembled such Contact should and would be continuous.
ADMIRAL SOUERS commented that c;. I . G, had been ful_1_-r
of departmental responsibilities for the analysis of
_ntelligence--the Stag; Department's responsibility for 'or?ei_ i1
iL.colitical intolligcencee, and so on. There was no attempt to
co.spetc with s;pecia.lizedsummaries produced in State, War, and
i;c, vy. On t he^ other hand, as he saw it, the problem was to
-produce _ c .d l s digest" which would collect and condense
the most s igni fi.cant jud ents from all these sources. Ho had
on rc luctent to begin h. Weekly without an adequatelyT
s Gaff and had E iven some: ithought to asking Members of !,A.'). to
designat::: de_, artmental: experts who could meet with the reports
staff on a re ular basis; to insure policy screening at le -_St--
th_ough not n,_ ceessarily tc write the articles themselves.
Gi r EIlAL `TAiIDE:NB ;G proposed that the Weekly continu
p :blicaat i_on under the common observation o the Members o.1'. A. B. ,
that be be advisod. w1 enever it was found that departmental
v--_..ws had bc.L n distorted 4or otherwise improperly represont.. ,'_.
;CPFIDE ` If- I L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060026-7
.t IDEs7 IAL
S; _ ci fie^.__~ h_ asked Dr. Langer to n.rran_,e a means wbo
tic~intelli--ice texts could be promptly checked when
n cessar r with a State Department specialist. He transni Ltt~:c?
specific comments and suggestions from G-2 reg .rd in
t}trial issu.: to Mr. Montague.
The Members of I.A.B. were. in a.gree~.ment with General
Vandenberg's proposal.
COMMODORE REND commented that it was essential to co.nrm:nee
r aular publ=ication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that
r._:_ ;ht be_ inev itable in early issues; and GENERAL McDONALD and
1, . LARD t.hour,ht that, in view of all the circumstances, the
a -arts staff should be congratulated on good beginning.
PROVISIONS i'OR COORDINATING TBE AGc;UISITION OF FOREIGii
TI-01.1 - ID
(G.I.G. 9)
ADMIRAL SOUfES noted that replies had not v_;t bean re-
-_v--d from. all A, _ar.'~ars regarding e; . I . G. 9, which had been
__r?culated for informal consideration. A_: tar brief discuss._)I',
ring which it .s igrood to reduce the classification of -h.
to "Restricted",
THE, INTELLI GENuuE ADVISORY BOARD : -
Approv:.:d e. I . G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to
N.I.A. a.s ii.I.A. 4.)
1 REMARKS BY '1D:1,I1RAL SOUERS
ADMIRAL SOUERRS said he wanted to t,-.ice occasion, on `),.:_n_ -1
r::l :,ved as Director of c=entral Int:lligence, to expresss to all
i~ rs of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation o~-
unstinted coou:;ration he had r ceiveed from each one . It
tnoic great satisfaction in turning over his duties to G r~cr .l
V,-1a(-1 nberg.
GENERAL VANDENBERG, in an acknowled Bent in behalf of
l those pr: sent, expressed the hope that the work of ,;,:astral
lligonce should be maintained at the standard set by
1 ::.sal Souors.
I FIDENTIAL
nth iiaotin
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