MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 214 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUILDING ON WEDNESDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 1946, AT 11:15 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060018-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/13: CIA-RDP10-01569R000100060018-6
T.A. 7th Meeting
COPY NO.. 21
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
NATIONAL'. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minute $ Hof ~Meotiag held in Room 214
De tm? t'~of State Builc'in
on' tirec'nes September 1946, . t 'll r15 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Acting Secretary of State William L. Clayton, in the
Che it
Secretary of War Robert P. ratterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of.the Fresic'ent
Lieut. Geioral,Hoyt S. VanCemborg.
Director of`.Central Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
Unc'er Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. EC.Cy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research ane Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War Howarr'. C. Peterson
Mr. John D. Hiekerson, Department of State
Co_.tain Robert L. Dennison, USN
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
td
S_E,CRET
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NIA 7th Meeting
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SE - CRE
1. REPORT BY T DIRECTOR.:O CENThA INTELLIGENCE
GETTERI.L VANDENBERG, using c. series cf clbrts;,,presented
a report' on the cctivities of the Central Intelli once Groups
GENERAL VANDENBERG first noteC. the objectives of the
0.1.0. as e..yressed in the Prosi,..ent's letter of 22 January
191k an:'. N.I.A, Directives Nos. 1 and. ? 5 . He then present e'
a of "intelligence relctec'. to the national secur-
it;r ,7.s interpreted. by' the C.I.G. He enumerates' the following
ste.s '.s essential to the production of such intelligence:
. Anticipating needs.
b. Determining most effective means.
c. Ensuring collection.
4. Receiving all available intelligence information.
c. Checking each item against all others.
f. Correlating political, military, economic and other
implications.
g. Reporting in useful, form to appropriate officials.
GENERAL VANDENBERG showoc' the initial organization of the
C.I.G. which was c'.esignod. primarily for planning, except for a
smell staff preparing the daily factual summary of incoming'.
cables and. e.ispatches. - He note('. that the question of central
intelligence services was left for subsequent decision.
GENERAL VANDENBERG submitted. a list of 31 projects which
ha,' 1:)cen rbferrec to C,I.G. for study by one or more intolli-
gencc agencies. In the. light of the study of these projects
an'. the e:cperience gained up. to that time, C.I.G. was roorgan-
izc` on 22 July along lines explained by General Vandenberg. He
note'. that the need for such a reorganization was note('. in
A,`nri_ral Souers' final report to the National Intelligence
Authority. General Vandenberg analyzed the personnel alloca-
tions for this organization at the present time ens". as estimate::
for 'l December 1945. ?
GENERAL VANDENBERG then lister'. over 20 accomplishments
of the C.I.G. to ('.ate, stressing the fact that while many of
those w,~rc incomplete anc' continuing projects, an agreement as
to the proper line of action in each case had already been
reached'..
(SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated. that he was dubious about the
destruction of the F.B.I. operation in Lotion America. He con-
si~".ercd'. those peripheral areas, such as Mexico, Cuba, etc., to
be c;.%treruely important to our national security, and' thought
that the F.B.I. W. eonC.uetec'_ a very efJ eetive intelligence
act .vity there, He r ske( General Vandenberg whether he was
satisfied with the present arrangement.
GENERAL VANDENBERG agree:'. that the F.B.I. had conducted
a very effective intelligence operation. He explained, however,
that the F.B.I. had agrees'. to turn over to C.I.G. the contacts
it had cvelopeO. in Latin America.. This turnover, of course,
wou_s tale time to accomplish, but if it is carries' out as agree'.
at uresent, there should not be aryserious interruption in the
operaation.
In answer to a question by Mr. Hickerson, ADMIRAL LEAHY
states'. that, at the' insistence of Mr. Hoover, the C.Z.G. was
prvclu,'ec,. from hiring,Jormcr F.B.I. men in Latin America.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was r e crust ing personnel
for this activity by personal contact. He also stated'. that
C.I.G. 'was now prepared to utilize, to the extent security..per-
mits, all American business concerns with connections abroad'.,
as valuable sources of foreign intelligence.I
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j
S E C R E T
GENERAL VANDENBERG then listed: 19 problems in the coord'.-
ination of intelligence activities that are in process in
C.I.G. for which solutions have not yet been devise"".
ADMIRAL LEAHY con ntpd'`that the problems enumerated were
very far-reaching,; end-. it was not hard. to unc'erstanc: why
solutions had not yet been fount' .
GENERAL VANDENBERG explained. certain general plans for
C.I.G. intelligence operations overseas and. for the F.B.I.S.
activity.
GENERAL VANDENBERG then presented some of the c'.ifficul-
ties faced: by C.I. G.. of :which he felt the N.I.A. should. be ap-
prise:'. First of all, he stressed the 'fact that C.I.G.. could:
not ??rol-'ueo national intelligence without all the intelligence
inf--rma.tion available-0 the Government. In this regard he
felt strongly-that only' trained'. O.I.G. personnel coulr' c:etermixp
whether r 'given piece of information contained important inter-
ligence implications. He noted that to the best of his knowl
ec'go the State and Navy Departments were furnishing complete,.
coverage of their information. Some of the main sources of
information to which C.I.G. C10 not have access were the
President's messages, General Marshall's messages, an:'. War De-
p'rt;nont OPD "eyes only" messages. He felt that the best solu-
tion was to have a trained'. C.I. G, officer who was acceptable to
each ( .c:_xirtment stationed'. in the message center of each depart-.
wont whero :he could. review,the messages and transmit to 0.1.0.,
.
su'~jcct to any necessary restrictions, those messages having
intelligence value.
SECRETARY PATTERSON expressed. the belief that such an
anc-ngement could be made.
GENERAL VANDENBERG then note(: the difficult problem of
the relationship between C, I. G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
He pointed out that the Joint~Intelligence Committee dupli
cates the work of C.I.G. Also, J.I.C. Intelligence coprdine-
tion activities may conflict with similar C.I.G. activities.
He said that J.I.C. stuc;ies generally receive priority in the
'.,Ter on,-. Navy intelligence agencies since the J.C.S. wore the
immediate superiors of the heads of those agencies. The possi-
bility :f combining C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff
(JIS) h^'. been considered'., but raised: difficulties since C.I.G.
might than be serving two masters. He said that the solution
was a. difficult one, but tht!t it was being carefully studied.
SECRETARY PATTERSON said that he did not see why the J.I.8;
should. not be disbanded,
ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed. that this apt- eared'. to be the proper
solut:'t.:'n, an said that he had so stated: to the Joint Chiefs of
Sta.f, Ho observed. that this was not an easy problem to solve.,
but h:3 thought that a workable solution would' be foun(ft.
GENERAL VANDENBERG note:' that a third-. difficulty which was
un:er active consideration was the relationship of C.I.G. to the
Stag-':TC.r-N:.(vy Coordinating Committee.
k f-*)urth and most serious- difficulty enumerates: by General
Vtvn:'on org was the relationship of N.T.A. to the Atomic Energy
Cow:iissicn. He pointed. out that the Atomic Energy Act create:. an
in-'c--jcn:'.ont agency which had. the authority to engage in extreme-
ly i.m_>ortant intelligence activities without coort.inction by
the N.I.A. Furthermore, it was rumored. that the Commission
wou7.t' c nr'.uct a foreign intelligence o .ere tion which would. in-
volvo ,. ,?rrVo danger o:P conflict with similar C.I.G. oper-
nti-ins.
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NIA 7th Meeting
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ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he thought the President would
e,.o the best he con to turn atomic energy intelligence activi-
ties over to the N.I.A. The President, however, does not want
to pot until the Atomic?:Energy,Commission is appointed.
Admirc.l Leahy thinl.s that, this matter will be arranged, but can
not say definitely at this time.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that a fifth c?.ifficulty was the
procvY meant of key Army ens' Naval personnel for C.I.G. He Said
the t the present C.I.G. ceiling for Naval officers was 13, an.'.
that a. request for n h increase to 65 was under consideration
in the Navy Department but had not been confirmed. He stater.
that any assistance in this matter which Secretary Forrestal
might render would be extremely helpful.
SECRETARY FORRESTAL,cgreed to look into the present
GENERAL VANDENBER G then, explained that Army and Naval
officers assigned to C.I.G. were fearful that they might lose
their normal opportunities for promotion. He felt that a few
key promotions in C.I.G, at this time would be of the greatest
value in improving morale. He therefore requested that the
Secretaries of W .-.r and the Navy press for the promotion of
certain 0.1.0. personnel.
GENERAL VANDENBERG then presented a chart showing the time
rec.ui.rec'. for processing a typical C.I.G. field officer to be
from four to six months. 'Ho explainer'. that this was intended
t.aa in'iccte one of the reasons for what might seem to be delay
in establishing field operations such as in Latin America. He
assurer'. the N.I.A. that every attempt was being made to reduce
the length of time involved in this processing
SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that he would prefer to see
this work done carefully rather than too hurriedly.
THE NATIONAL INTELI-ITENCE. AUTRORITY :
Noted the report of C.I.G. activities by General
Vandenberg.
status this request,
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