MILITARY THOUGHT: URGENT TASKS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL OF AVIATION S. MIRONOV AND MAJOR-GENERAL OF AVIATION M. MUKHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403760001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ut nt 'leeks fcr the ?rovene t of Aeril Recchnais rice
Under Modern Conditio-c,
by
Colonel-General of Aviation S. W..ronov
JJ or-General of Aviation M. Mukhim
It is generally known that the degree of troop control is directly
dependent on the timeliness with which the various command echelces
of the armed forces receive necessary intelligence infwmation.
The demands of military art for all types of intelligence are
coeseently increasing in proportiot to changes in the nature of armed
combat, and the equipping of troops with the newest types of weapons
and combat equipment. This emphasizes the problem of further technicel
improvenent of the present means of reconnaissance and the creation
of new =dela or recomnsitsance equipment.
On the basis of a study of experience froe the cat traininG
of troops and the state of the means of leconnaiasence, it can be
said that the troop demands levied on the orgens and Weans of
reconnaissanc significantly exceed the capabilities of the latter.
This pertains mainly to aerial reconnaissance, the status of which
causes us perticular alarm.
Aerial reconnaissance pert oris its tasks with the aid of a whole
complex of various technical means which are organically inter-connected
and which together constitute a single intelligemee system.
It is necessary to comasider the vehicles of reconnaissance
equip aent as the first element of this system.
Aerial reconnaissance must have at its disposal a great number
of sophisticated flying equipment: manned and pil.dtless, fast Lnd
slow, high and low flying and having vatious ranges of operation.
It to the present, however, we have had only manned aircraft, mainly
of obsolete construction (TU-16B, IL-2814, )1G-15R bis), with low
performance characteristics and extremely limited capabilities for
overcoming an enemy PV O system.
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The reconnaissance aircraft which are available can only partially
perforr their tests. Moreover, their reconneissance equipment does
not provide for detectior Cf srell aai mobile tar6ets, for determination
of their geogrEpticL1 coordinates, or for transmission of infwmetion
from the aircraft.
The YAK-27R, utichizin series production, has limited performance
characteristics and the evipment installed on these aircraft permits
only visual observation and sex Lal photography reconnaissance during
daylight hours under favorable weather calditions.
The second most important element of the system of aerial
reconnaissance meens is the complex of technical equipment of
reconnaissance aircraft, inclwiing reconnaissance, navigational and
communications devices designated for detection and identification
of targets, determination of their geographic coordinates, and
transmission of the intelligence information from the reconnaissance
aircraft to the appropriate command posts. It should be noted that
the problees of receipt, processing and tranamission of intelligence
data in short periods of time,and in the neoassary vallnae,arc the most
complex of all the problems facing aerial reconnaissance.
This is explained by the extraordinary and varied nature of the
targets which may be point-like (tochechmyy), of smell dimensions,
area (ploahchadmyy), aerial, on land (cc water), underground (under water),
concealed or camcuflaged. The characteristics of each type of target
exert a great influence on determining the requirements that are levied
on the reconnaissance devices: in relation to the capability for
long-range detection of targets, the resolving power of the devices,
the time for conduct of reconnaissance of a given target, etc.
Aerial reconnaissance can exploit such important characteristics
of targets as, for example, the reflection and radiation of
electromagnetic waves of various frequency ranges and also the magnetic,
ionization and radiation characteristics. Thus, taking into account
that the targets of reconnaissance naturally emit electromagnetic
waves, radio and radio-technical reconnaissance devices are constructed,
and on the basis of exploiGing the principle of reflection?aerial
photography, television, infrared, radar and other devices are
constructed.
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At the present tine, aerial photoEsaphy end radio-technical
recorneissarce devices have becoae the basic recocInaissance equipment
of our armei forcee. Unfortunote, other types of these devices
(television, infrared, radLr, magtometric, radionietric, radiational
and mete:clogial) are not sfficiently Indiv1duF1 mode1z
of such devices have not yet beer perfected and are of little use in
Obtaining irtelligehee data.
The inadequate development of the above-listed typet, of
reconnaissance device F seriously limits the capabilities of aerial
reconnaissance. The devices of reconnaissance aircraft do not satisfy
the requirements of the armed forces as to voime, quality or timeliness
of receipt of intelligence informatio7 The degre: of .iut-lation of
airborne reconneissance devices is extremely low atid special operators
are needed to operate them in flight: Night photography is limited ?
because airborne lighting means have not been perfected. It is possible
only after lighting the terrain with photObombs, as a result of Which
the number of aerial photographs is limited by the supply of photObothe
on board. There are no electrical lighting devices in the equipment
of our units for taking night photographs of targets from various
altitudes.
The radio-technical reconnaissance quipment does not ensure
complete detection of the enemy's radar networks, particularly of the
stations for controlling missile weapons. The handding capacity of
the equipment is low. As a result, an experienced operator, in one
flight in a TU-16R with en SRS-1 station, is capable of reconnoitering
only 8 to 10 ground radar stations. The accuracy of determining the
locations of individual radar stations is extremely low: 10 to 20 km.
The processing and interp7etation of the results of radio-technical
reconmiissance require a rather lengthy period of time.
Intelligence on the enemy' ri modern radio-technical equipment
which operates by rapid bursts or by switch-over of frequencies
is practically nonexistent.
The existing means of air navigation do not in fact provide for
the necessary accuracy in determining the geographical coordinates of
targets, especially under difficult weather conditions and at night,
and the navigational prObleme in long-distance flights over areas
without reference points and in northern latitudes are also unresolved.
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The creitl.sn and perfection of navigational means which perzdt
accurate gent7a9hical pirpointingof targets and ths determination
of a current pssition of the reconnaissanoz aircraft is an independent
prole= in itself, s is also mastery of the whole com.;lex of
re2nnal53an-e
Modern 'warfare emphasizes the need to shorten, to the maximum
extent possible, the intelligence cycle, i.e., from the time of
receipt of the initial reconnaissance information to the time of
receipt of exhaustive inteiligence`idata by the appropriate staffs.
A whole cot4,1ex of airborne and ground devices is necessary for this.
This problem can be resolved in various ways, for example, by
tranardtting the initial information directly- frcea the reconnaissance
aircraft. Another method is the imocessing of the initial informaticm
aboard the reconnaissance aircraft. A third method envisages having
all the recontmissance information accumulated abcerd the aircraft
but processing it on the ground after completion of the reconnaissance
flight. This method is basically embodied in the existing reconnaisrance
apparatus since the problems- of processing reconnaissance infccrmaticm
in flight and its automatic transmission from the reconnaissance
aircraft are sti.11. unresolved.
The existing ground equipment is not capable of processing and
transmittiug reconnaissance informetion in the required volume. For
essample, the production capacity of the photo-laboratories of
reconnaissance units provides far the process:113g of only 40 to ,50 percent
of the photographic materials produced by reconnaissance crevs during
the course of a day. Unfortunately, as yet the has been inadequate
development of such highly advanced an of reconnaissanee infcramtion
processihig as television, photo-television, aerial photography with
processing of photo-documents on board during flight, and also
apperatus for the systematic processing of infortation aboard the
reconnaissance airplane with subsequent transmission to the ground.
For a cculete resolution of this problem, it is necessary to
create ground points for collection and automatic processing of
information which is received from strategic, operational and tactical
aerial reconnaissance. For transmission of the reconnaissance
information to the interested headquarters, It is necessary to
introduce television, facsimile and other high-speed means-
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An examination of the basic elements that enter into the complex
of aerial reconnaissance Indicates that each of them presents a
complicated scientifiC-technicel problem.
In order to ensure the necessary coordination in the development
of aerial reconnaissance means and in the activities of the various
organizations conducting work in this direction, it is advisable to
concentrate in a single center the processing development and requests
pertaining to all means of aerial as well as satellite reconnaissance.
In our opinion, the air forces will most successfully cope with this
problem with appropriate guidance from the General Staff. Together
with this measure, in order to eliminate more rapidly the existing
discrepancy between the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance means
and the revirements of modern weapons of destruction, it is advisable
to broaden greatly the scope of scientific-research, experimental and
experimental-design work in the field of the creation of the latest
technical means of aerial reconnaissance. In particular, it is
necessary to designate the leading institutes (especially for the
development of reconnaissance devices) and U., broaden the production
base of the industry engaged in the creation of series models of
aerial reconnaissance means by widely initiating the production of
devices in smell series. In this connection, the development and
creation of new aerial reconnaissance means should, in our opinion,
be considered one of the primary tasks in the field of increasing
the combat readiness of all of armed forces.
In order to ensure timely intelligence data for all types of
armed forces, we must solve a number of problems that are connected
with determining the numerical composition of aerial reconnaissance
forces for peacetime and wartime conditions, the organizational
structure of these forces and control over them, and also Cie
development of the most favorable system for the flow or intelligence
information from the lowest level to all interested echelons.
In considering the necessity for maintaining a'high degree of
combat readiness of aerial reconnaissance, we believe that in peacetime
it is very importamt to have strategic, operatiomaloand tactical
means in quantities which will permit the timely detection of the
preparations of an aggressor for nuclear/missile attack and will
provide all types of armed forces with intelligence data in the
initial period of a war. The readiness of the aerial reconnaissance
forces mast correspond to the combat readiness of our strike force&
and above all of our missile troops.
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In view of the fact that in the majority of cases aerial
recon.n.Assance will be carried or. under conditions of strong opposition
from enemy PV3 weapon& and will be accoepanied by significant losses,
it is necessary to envisage the creation of special reserves for the
period of the war., including those of the Supreme High Command, Which
are capable of ensuring reinforcement of reconnaissance forces on the
meet important axet of operations of our troops. During the course
of operations, because of the sharply increased troop maneuverability,
aerial reconnaissance must be marked by very frequent Observation of.
(targets), Which means conducting a large number of flights by manned
and pilotless Means.
Research, based on materials from training exercises and maneuvers
of our troops, indicates that in the most typical front offensive
operation in a developed theater of combat operations against a group
of enemy armies consisting of 25 to 30 divisions, it will be necessary
to conduct 650 to 70C reconnaissance flights per calendar day? In
determining the overall number of aerial reconnaissance forces and
means required by a front, it 17 net_osary to keep in mind the fact
that the average potential of manned reconnaissance aircraft consists
of: 3 flights per calendar day for tactical reconnaissance, 2 flights
for operational reconnaissance, and 0.5 flights for strategic reconnaissance.
The new tasks facing aerial reconnaissance also necessitate a change
in the form of the structure of the entire intelligence system. In our
opinion, the basis of the organizational structure of the intelligence
system must be the idea of ensuring centralized direction and use of
all forces and means. To accomplish this, it is necessary, along with
the CU, which does not embrace all types of intelligence, to have
within the Ministry of Defeuse a single directing intelligence organ
upon vhich should be levied:
--the working out and improvement of the system of equipping
intelligence elements;
--the working out of a single organizational-organic structure
of intelligence AnIts and organs;
--coordination of the activities of the intelligence organs
of the various type& of armed forces and the organization of
coordinated operations among ther;
--centralized direction of all types of intelligence.
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The absence at the present tink of such sr intelligence organ does
not plovIde at opportunity for the nos7c effective use of our available
forces and nears of intelligence and is a serious Obstacle to the
creation of E single intelligence syster within our armed forces.
The direction of strategic, operational and tactical aerial
reconnaissance with the al.= of receiving reconnaissance data for all
of the interested echelons should, in our opinion, also be concentrated
in appropriate intelligence centers. For this, the forces and means
of atrategic aerial reconnaissance of the armed forces, inc2,;4ine
satellite reconnaissance, should be concentrated in a special center
of the air force, VhiCh would be responsible for providing intelligence
data both to the Supreee High Commend and. to all types of armed forces.
The forces and means of operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance
should be concentrated in the intelligence centers of air armies
(air fortes (voyenno vozdusbnyyt sily--VVS) of fleets or groups of
troops) which would be responsible for furnishing intelligence data
to the troops of the district (front or fleet).
We consider the introduction of aerial reconnaissance units and
subunits into the (TOLE) of corbined-arms and tank armies prerature
for the tine being, since a large number of oervice units and subunits
would be required for airfield support. As a result, this would
decrease the maneuverability of the canbined.arms formations, would
result in a dispersal of the a)ready Iiirited forces of aerie
reconnaissance, 'would hinder combat support of the operations of aerial
reconnaissance forces, and in peacetime would also significantly weaken
the organization of combat training and the direction of reconnaissance
units and subunits. As pilotless means for reconnaissance or a field
of combat are introduced, nears which do not require complicated
maintenance, it will be possible to introduce them into the TOLE of
combined-erns formations. At the present time, however, combined.arme
and tank armies must receive reconnaissance data from the headquarters
of the trout, liehich, depepAirg on the mcmlet situetiom which is taking
shape, will carry out operations by the forces and means of aerial
reconnaissance on behalf of all trowe and in accordance with the goals
of the front operation being conducted.
It should be noted that the intelligence crap= which exist in
the main headquarters of the VVS, the headquarters of naval
(voyenno-morskoy flot--vmr) aviation, and in air armies (VVS of districts
and frocte) by virtue of their small numbers and organisational
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imperfection, will not be able to perform. the tasks which we propose
to lorri OL. the intelligence centers of strategic and operational-
tactical reconnaissance. Also, the separate reconnaissance squadrons
created in the military- districts (groups of troops) instead of aviation
regircnts, are not capable of fulfilling r.ombet tasks to the required
exter.-.L, and the extremely limited forceE and means of aerial.
radio-technical reconnaissance are widely dispersed: 2 or 3 aircraft
available in the special purpose (osoboye naznacheniye?osnaz) units
of districts (groups of troops) and in the reconna,issance units of
air armies.
It is perfectly clear that the existing dual subordination of units
and subunits of tactical aerial reconnaissance (to the district and
to the air army) and the dispersal of reconnaissance means: weakens
direction of them and does not permit sufficiently efficient and
purposeful organization of cooperation between operational and tactical
aerial reconnaissance.
Therefore,it seems to us advisable to create aviation reconnaissance
regiments in some military districts (groups of troops) primarily on
the main axes: instead of having separate all intelligence subunits
in eacn military district.
The question of having cadres of reconnaissance specialists for
intelligence organs and units and subunits of aerial reconnaissance
is also very important at the present time.
In connection with the increaced demands of modern conditions,
specialists of the intelligence organs of all echelons must have
broad general and special traininc. However, this category of officer
personnel has not been trained in military educational institutions
in the courae of recent years. As e result, a significant part of the
Intelligence orgens and staffs of air regiments are still manniki with
officers who do not have the necessary theoretical knovledge,and work
experience.
The acute shortage of reconnaissance specialists can be
eliminated only by establishing special training au a sufficient
scale in the military educational institutions of the country. In
addition, in the interests of maintaining permanent cadres of
intelligence personnel, it would also be advisable to resolve the
question of the material-legal incenttrep of the personnel of
intelligence organs and units.
.1?11s.
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Alsccfnomllimportince is the pralen of improving the TO&E of
reconnaissance units. In aviation reconnaissance regiments, for eke1e,
the position of photogramnetric interpreter is usually filled by
privates and privates first class who are serving their normal period
of comnulsory military service. Taking into account that under modern
conditions decisions for the use cf weapons of mass destruction will
be made on the basis of the interpreted materials of aerial photo-
reconnaissance, we consider that it is advisable to assign to these
positions officer-specialists and soldiers who are serving voluntarily
beyond the required period and who possess high qualifications.
In conclusion, a few words about the preparation of intelligence
organs and the training of intelligence personnel.
At the present time, the performance of reconnaissance tasks
is not being achieved to the required extent because of the extremely
limited training facilltiWs, the lack of trained command poets for
controlling reconnaissance aviation, the lack of proper opposition
by PVC forces and weapons during training exercises, and also because
significant limitations in the mode of operation of reconnaissance
aircraft in flight cause serious defects in the training of units and
intelligence organs.
In order to inprove the combat training of intelligence organs
and units, it is necessary above all to create an appropriate
training facility which will permit the training of unite and
intelligence organs in the conduct of reconnaissance of weapons of mass
destruction and determination of the coordinates of targets with the
maximum possible accuracy. In cuu. view, it is advisable to create
within the armed forces specialized inter-district firing ranges with
control and support means which provide targets which are mdbile
at firing positions both on the firing ranges and in areas outside
the ranges.
In order that reconnaissance units perform their tasks during
training exercises under conditions of strong enemy PV0, we feel
that it is necessary during the trainiuz to create realistic
courftermeesures by fighter aircraft, by units of antiaircraft missile
troops (zenitmcy7e raketnyye voyaks--7V), aud by radio jamming.
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And fiiy, in order to work out, durilw the course of the
traimim: of units, the whole copTlex of tasht in the collection,
processinE and analysis of reconnaissance data, and also for the
transmission of in the shortest period of tine to the interested
headquarters) it is adyisable to employ the mexim possible number
of reconnaissance units and subunits and the intelligence organs of
all echelons in the troop training exercise. and maneuvers.
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Speedy resolution of the entire complex of problems facing aerial
reconnaissance will ensure the calcination of the gap which has formed
between its capabilities and the requirements of the troops. This will
increase the effectiveness of the use of the new weapons of destruction
and also the combat readiness and combat efficiency of all types of
armed forces to a significant degree.
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