MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS IN THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF INITIAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL A. BABADZHANYAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403610001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJEa IM:. '_" T OU : " Some Questions in the Preparation
and Curt of Initial C feaive Operations", bJ
Colonel-General A. Babadzha n 50X1-HUM
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Some Queatioes in the Pr retior: and Conduct of Initial
Offers Iva t rations
by
Colonel-General A. Babadzhazi an
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The constant quantitative and qualitative growth of missile
weapons and the increase in the gntity of nuclear warheads allotted
for tae execution of an operation are causing continuos:s changes in
the method of conbet operations of ground troops. These changes are
now occurring so rapidly that, at times, that which only several
months ago was new and progressive becomes obsolescent and ceases
to correspond to the requirements of the day. Specifically, the methods
of execution of the offensive operations of the initial period of a
nuclear/missile war have undergone such a rapid development. The
purpose of this a.t.icle, which is on the order of a response to a
number of articles published in previous issues of the Special.
Collection, is to examine some of the questions in the preparation
and conduct of initial offensive operations.
As is well known, a nuclear/missile war will be of an
exce,,ilv.;c,'?/ aerisive nature. The availability of modern, powerful
cimbcit weapons pcrmits even an enemy sthh Is being defeated and is close
to destruction to deliver telling thermonuciear strikes against, the
deep r-ar area end groupings of the armed forces holding the upper
hand. In order to fully deprive tie enemy of any opportunity to use
nuclear weapons, it is not enough to deliver strategic massed nuclear
strike, :Against his territory. No nuclear strikes can guarantee the
complete destruction of all the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack or
eliminate his capability to deliver strikes.
The fulfilment of this mission can be guaranteed only by the
swiftest capture and ocetatiom of enemy territory. By this very
mans can our country be made completely secure from strikes by the
enemq?'s ground nuclear weapons and the enemy deprived of bases for his
submarine and surface missile-carrying fleet which can still operate
on the ocean for a certain period of time after the land forces are
destroTed.
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For the quickest capture of enemy tecrit
territory the seizure of which will not r MT (of covrae,;that
Win: OPe'ationa across the ccear, l e4 'e the o??gi i2a ?ion Of
decisive strategic offensive txsro5 , it is necessary to carry out a
thestexe. In thi th-is regard, -&htut the entire depth of the
o be under no conditions of a situstion can
le shifting to the offensive, or alternate the front alm In tter with defense in all or the greater
W
We ~hasiae that., imsaediate pert of its zone of operations.
all fro, -vt e pha a what, ly at the beginning of combat operations,
exception, Axazt shift to the offensive on the
&Z?;s w re the seizure of enemy territory is possible and ne
A shift to the defensive an such. axes is not Permissible
ad' the front mist shirt to the offensive to . Tb~tz'o~ops
even after under _ regardless of their coeaditiaaa
ao enemy nuc..ear strikes. ,
In connection with this, in our opinion there must be a change
in the point of view regarding the nature of
the of ground troops in the case when the enmW ecombat anrop rat
Previosaly., we considered that lpts na iu oge-iaras.
shift us the that,, trader these ccaditiona, a front must
defensive in order to repulse an en attack. low, it is
ne essary to coalsideo that, eron in this situation, a front with all
available forces will imayediately shift to the offensive, vhich, mmoet
probably, will assume the nature of a meeting emp8ameat.
The
dote and question is of great practical interert. What will be
the n depth of the first strategic offensive operation
directed at attaining the imoediate strategic goat of a na+rt
By looking at a map, it can be seen that the a
Offensive on the ropean content can be
the of de a strategic
defined as goals
of the treed forces of the aggressor l 'essor countries located there and
reaching the seacoasts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.
In terms of depth, this consists on various stra
600 to 80o km (Southwestern Theater of Ililita tegi? axes from
from 1200 to 2000 ]on (western TYD). rY 0perationa--~YD) and
According to modern views, the average speed of an offensive
can reach 100 km per day. It is also cccsidered that, in a system
Of strategic offensive, the offensive operations of farastic" met follow one after the other wilt o tioaal parses Cons
equent t be k of strategic offensive in the theaters being examined ~, fulfilled within 10 to 20 2k-haze periods. if adjustments
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are mde in their time periods to accost for mountainou,a conditio s,
fon? delays in forcing wide water barriers (for exuaple!, straits), and
f tYb t cie, z s of radioactive contamination., then it will take more
than 20 24-hour perio de . It is possible that these time periods will
even comprise the duration of the initial period of war.
How many subsequent front offensive operations will it be necessary
to tarry out on the two a"-indicated basic theaters in the initial
period of a war?
Acctcxrding to existing amnions, the depth of an offensive operation
of a front can be from 500 to 60C up to 800 to 1000 lust. We consider
that the second opinion corresponds to a greater degree to the
conditions of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war.
Tbo, deph of a front offensive operation is deterr;'.ned by the
range of opzreti of the weapons of destruction, by the maneuver
capfsbi.' vies of the troops, by the 'capability for uninterrupted supply
of terisl, and by the depth of the ev's operational formation.
In the post war, as a practical matter, the range of the front
bcmicx aircreft was about 300 km; the rear services could.
uninter -upted , support the arl ncir:,g troops to a distance of not
acre than 250 to 300 kc from the area where they were initially based;
the depth of the operational formation of the enemy's group of armies
was 200 to 250 lug. All this determined the depth of a front offensive
operation as 250 to 300 km.
The offensive operations of the concluding stage of World War II
occupied a special place in the...:r scope, when a significant quantity
of tan, and mac nized large site and formt?o% which sharply
increassd the nobility of troops, appeased in the c
Poe
ition of our
ground trocn. Par a lm, the depth of the Vistula-Oder otfeueive
open t{ on wes axz-e than 500 km, and the depth of the ) nchurian
Offensive op tion was 600 to 800 km. The scope of these operations,
achieved in 1945 when the troops did not have those weapons of
cis? ctioa of Articles of he JoUraal "Il.U
2. '"12?66'-p4 tdsrn War, published by the ltil.itary Acadmgr at the General
Staff194.
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destruction or those maneuvering capabilities which modern ground
troops have, shoe that the props e4 depth of a modern from offensive
operation of 1000 km is not fantastic.
E-no now the weapons of a tror-t and the means of reiutorcing a
t r o t can e n a the destruction, o f the czemy to a depth of up to
500 ka. The cuesti n of s wppi :.rag the front with missiles possessing
a great range of fire ie in the sr.;age of practical resolution. In
addition, missile troops of strategic deaig tion will undoubtedly
be used in the fr t rove door to the in' tial period of a wr.
In cot .ris n with the past war, the depth of the ena~
oper+atit l fort ion bas) at present, also increased. Oertein
e s of the enery's operctivwl misaile rear services are
located it a distance of up to 1000 ka from the frost line.
that stall causes one to doubt the reality of
assigniW a mission of such depth to a front is the limited
capabilities of the operational rear services. The fact is that the
capabilities of the rear services have not urx rgr a any substantial
eha d a i. t! past se'i er l years and, to samc degree, have even
decreased, if one ciders the probable destruction of railroads and
the sass destrulo of for vehicle roads. Decisive insures are
necessary to inc: rase the capabilities of the rear se ices for
delivering mEtterial, in the first place, providing the rear services
wit units and Urge units of aircraft, helicopters, and motor
vehicles with large load capacities, and the extensive introduction
of pipe-line t a port. Omly in t case can the rear spices ensure
the execution of deep and swift offensive operations.
emu, it will be neceta ry to carry out 1 or 2 successive front
offensive operatio in order to attain than inv*diate strategic goals
in lord: operation on the Southwestern TVD and two on the
Western T'VD.
At the present time, veriout opinions exist as to how the
strategic offensive will be executed orrganiratiomlly.
The authors of the book Modern War, believe that in the slates
of operations in ground theater th irat position will be given to
front operations, not to the operations of groups of fronts as it was
in the past war.
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In the article "The question of the Theory of the Operatics
of a troop of !roans",l Colonel S. Kozlov coss,eiders it necessary to
create high commands in all TSDas and to r4ordi to to than mot daily
front fatic but also the other ty:ps of armed forces operating
in a given `i'ii (xissila troops, the Navy, long-range aviation, and
troops of the F VU of the Country).
A co sraiise is expressed In the point of view presented by
Cclonal l I. Petvla+rskiy2 that offensive operations in the
initial period at a war can be executed by fronts and grocers of fronts.
Let us examIne this question. Airing the years of World Wr II,
be 4 with the Soviet Army cot nterc tf cans 1ve near !kisscar
1941 to April 19), all the min offensive operations
were carried out, as a rule, asst by seperate fronts 'but by the
united efforts of several fronts. Usually, the goals of an offensive
operst-LoL on a etra c axis were achieved by the efforts of 2 or 3
fronts. The conditions at the past war required this, when an
moos density of weapon and a superiority of no less than 2 or 3
times aver the enexy were needed for a breakthrough of defenes.
Uke efforts of several fronts ;,P--e use lly concentrated an smeh a
strategic or operational axis, the gee ephic conditions at which
provided, the capability for close operetio l coordination asmS
the i'rcanta.
In the conduct of a nuclear/missile war, a concentration or
masses of personnel and equipment is not required to carry
out an offensive. Ivvs no the lenity of troops has sbsrply decreased,
while the zoom of offensive at formations have i sed 1.5 to 2 tines
All of this indicate, that under z coat itioas the efforts of
one front ere sufficient for them' axes where in the past war it was
necessary to c trata the efforts of several frets.
C uomo, the troops of one trout will no6r operate, as a
rule, on each of the strategic or important t ?ational axes. It is
our 'view that under these conditions the ecubining of several fronts
into a gi o% is not advisable, if only because operationl coacrdination
1 action of Articles at the journal "I!'ULtary ,mo Mum4htn No. 2/52/, "
1964.
2. Apecial Colleatias of Articles of the Jourml "1[i2itary zt"
First Issue, y i
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between frosts operating on independent strategic or important
parationa7 axes is not always possible, or is almost impossible.
Zae General Headquarters (Stavka) will organize strategic
coordinat"zin between the fronts, or tether, implement strategic
coordination of the efforts of strategic nuclear/scissile weapons
with the operations of the fronts.
On the basis of the above, we conclude that in a nuclear/missile
war the in role in attaining the goals of arced combat in theaters
will belong not to the operations of a group of fronts, but to the
system of sizuItanaos and successive front operations. This does
not preclude, of course, the conduct of operations by a group of
fronts at individual stages of a strategic offensive operation on
axes where operational coordination of several fronts .s feasible.
In our view, the limited number of fronts in a nuclear/missile
war also wakes the *. ormatinn of TVD casmmnda inadvisable. It is
known that, at the beginning of World War II, the number of fronts
was limited (five fronts) and corresponded exactly to the number of
strategic axes which existed at the time (Northern, Northwestern,
Western, Southwestern, and Southern). Under these conditions the
fronts fulfilled not only operational, but also strategic missions.
The commands of three axes were created in July 19L1, the
Northwestern, the Western, and the Southwestern; they were called
upon to carry out the operational-strategic direction of the fronts
(which generally numbered from 5 to 11 at various periods). The
complexity and the intensity of the situation at the fronts of war
Srequently for: ced the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command to directly control the fronts, bypassing the commands of
the axes, thereby making them useless. As is known, after existing
for about one year altogether, these commands were abolished.
Ia conducting a nuclear/missile war the number of fronts on the
indicated axes will be less than in the past war. The conditions for
military operations will become still more complex. The maneuverability
of troops and the maubility of the front line will increase by several
times. All this provides a basis for considering the creation of
coomands of axes or of TYD's in a future war inadvisable.
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In our opinion , the formation of TO coaaands is possible only
in remote theaters where the control of the armed forces will be
difficult for the General Headquarters,, for eriample, in the Par Bast
(as it was in the post war) or on other continents when our troops
arrive there.
KoVerer, granting the passibility of creating strategic coeimaads
in remote TyD, it is not possible to agree with the proposal that
th:t val force," op tic ; In the waters adjoining the theater should
be subordinated to these c nd . The mission of supporting ground
forces is secondary for the naval forces, in comparison with the
missions of Vloctadix~g eneeW countries and of disrupting enema ocean
and sea interconti tal transport, Vach missions are frequently
carried out in remote ocean areas or even on other oceans. For the
fulfil nt of these nissico-s, a broad otrategic maneuver by submarine
forces is req'aired. The subordination of all naval forces to the
TVD command cou:4 thug fetter and licit the Navy's capability of
fulfils ;.ng its in missions. Of course, the part of the naval
forces which vi,, l be operating in support of the troops of a TVD
(thy: destruction of ene strike mi3sile-carrying and aircraft-
carrier naval forces, the disruption of enea * amphibious landing
operations, the participation in amphibious landing operations of TO
troops, etc.) must be subordinated to the TPD ccaaiand.
The thought expressed by some authors of articles concerning
the creation of operational-stratesgfc-ccand.s in our theaters of
?te.x r operati. was undtxbte
dly influenced to some degree by the
presence of such control el.e ants on the territories of the countries
of the iaperialist coslltion.. Baweveea?, such an analogy is not
justified here. The fact of the natter is that the American Joint
Staff in essence contro3A the armies of the countries which comprise
the i3 r'i ,st eonl.ition. But the Americans are not in a position
to effect centralized- cone of of all the armed forces that as" up
the coalition and which are dispersed on almost all the continents of
the world. Therefoare, they formed intermediate control elements,
coaads of the TVD.
Under our conc3itioara, when theaters of military operations are
located on two continents (Burope and Asia) and are cooed by land
borders With Well-established assns of communications and supply, it
vILU hardly be necessary to form such an intermediate co^mand as a TPD
A mad.
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Several words on the initial offensive operations of fronts.
These operati.o can begin under various conditions at i situation.
Th t shitting of fronts to an of'fenaive can be preceded by a threatening
Period. It will 'take place if a war starts after a significant
inteta7ification of tension in the relations between the principal
ccr. ntries of the imperialist coalition and those of the Socialist Camp,
and uter it becomes clear that the political relations of the two
camps will inevitably bring on a military confl .ct . The threatening
period can also take place when a world war starts through involvement
of the principal countries in the course of a local war in one of the
areas of the world.
Tar can also be started by a surprise enemy strike, when there
will b; no threatening period. The most characteristic version of
a surprise attack can be the delivery by the probable aggressor of a
ms :s the i:onucleer strike against the socialist countrieb under the
guise of carrying out large training exercises.,
A Sur=prise attack is the moat advantageous method of starting a
war. It my be assumed that war will be unleashed by a surprise
attack, if the imperialists decide on this. Therefore, in the
practical activity of our armed forces and in their operational and
cot training, it is necessary to embark decisively on a course for
the preparation of troops for the entry into a war which is not
preceded by a threatening period. If the armed forces are ready
to begin military operations when there is no threatening period,
then they will al yc be able to do so when there is a threatening
Period.
An irtportant, situational condition, under -.hich fronts can begin
thei initial oLtfensv o a tic a, is the location of the troops of
a front in relation to the enemy before the start of military
operations. A front (group of farces) which, prior to the start of
military operations, is located directly on the border beyond which
the countries of the imperialist coalition are located, will comma
into contact with the ground enemy immediately. However, a front
located at a distance from this border at the start of military
operations can shift to the offensive only after reaching the line
of contact between the aggressor troops and the armies of countries
friendly to us.
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in all cases, the tr. oopa Of a front will shift to a decisive
offensive i stely after a eoen terstrlke or after a strike to
frustrate a srrprise end attack. A counterstrike, or a strike to
frustx?ete an eta attack, will be osrried cct on the basis of the
d c i v l on of the high, party and goverxa nt leaders of the country;
the nai~4 role in carrying it out will be played by the missile
troops of strategic desigratiov. It is Mood that government
leaders will also make the decision for the front troops to shift
to a decisive offensive.
There is a vide-spread point of view that front nuclear/gtissile
weapons asst also participate in a coxnterstrike to frustrate a
surprise enemy attack, which are mxasures of the Supreme High
Cowmnd- In our opinion, the front weapons will not be in a
position to participate in a counterstr: or in the first nuclear
strike for the fol? owing reasons :
--the nuclear/missile weapons of a considerable nuzLer of toe
fronts, which are located at a distance from the borders adjacent to
the enter prior to the start of military operations, cannot be used
because of the comparatively short range of the operations;
--the nuclear/missile weapt of these fronts, even those directly
in the border zozae, will not be able to participate in immediate
operations, because considerable time (up to several hours, and, under
certain conditions., up to several days) will be reaquirect to bring than
up to combat condition (basically, for the assembly and checking of
missiles and warheads),
In addition to the above, it is necessary to take into account
the following consideration. In an offensive operation, the planned
tramp a ?t of missiles, special chargt-s, and missile fuel will be
greatly h pered because of the mars destruction of coanm icatioc
lines and the destruction of certain depots which bad becoare sown to
the enemy. Thtxrefore, it is not advisable to expend a significant
amount of the nuclear/missile weapons of a front at the very beginning
of an operation. They should be saved for subsequent use in the course
of an operation and in completing it.
The +txttensive use of nuclear/mit eile weapons c oaaappels a nw
approach to solving the problem of the cc ubat camposition of a front.
In the past war, the combat composition of a front was determined by
the necessity of creating a twofold or threefold (and soaeti 41V
) superiority of forces and weapon over the enema an the assn
of strikes.
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Under tern coeditLouisa the criterion for deters ining the
composition of a front is its capability to inflict destruction on an
opposing enemy grouping with nuclear wetpona and to complete its rant
with. t crrized rifle, tank, and airbcc a barge units. Figuratively
speekiw , one can say thet comZitsed-arms and tank large units will
now play the role of a "brooa" by means of which the front's offensive
zone will be cleared of the remaining ener troops after thzty are
routed by nuclear weapons. Under cc itioas when, as the result of
nuclear strikes, the correlation of forces can rapidly and shadily
change in favor of the side tbnt has executed thy, an offensive
operation of a front can be carried out successfully even when the
initial correlation of forces and weapons was equal.
74.,* carat cc `action of a front in ,,3 initial operation will
depend on the method of unleashing the war.
If a war starts by a surprise eq attack, the trout Will then
be forced to start combat operations with a limited mudxar of large
units in constant readiness. During the course of an operation, the
front will be reinforced by fully mobilized large units and by large
units in constant readiness arriving from the zone of interior (in
accordance with the plan for the strategic deployment of the grou-A
troops).
If, however, military operations develop after a threatening period,
then the first front operation can start with a larger t Cr of troops:
large units in constant readiness and those fully mobilized. In all
cases, it is necessary to consider the t the approach of troops from
the zone of interior can be frustrated or delayed by the enema- by means
of direct strikes against these large units and alacc by the destruction
of conication routes.
)fissile large units and units are the skeleton of the operational
forxssticn of a front, without which the duct of cuabat operations
under modern conditions is impossible. Therefore, in a border district
(group of forces), the ccaposi ticm of the missile troops a:zast be such
as is necessary for achievement of the objectives of the first
operation. In addition, the coerpoeiticn of the missile troops and
their supply of aaaanition at caPensate for the shortage of
Combined-arms and tank large units when these are put out of action
on this field of battle or when their arrival fr-em the zone of interior
is disrupted or delayed.
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Let us dwell briefly on the methods of operatisa of the troops
of a front in initial offensive operations.
The folio -in, factors will exert an influence on the mehods of
conducting initial offensive operations: the limited number of front
troops; disorganization of the enemy's gent.al control and the
control of his armed forces, and, consequently, the isolation of the
enemy ' a troops and the putting cut of action of entire elements of his
opera t ic-m l formation; the ener!r' a lack of prepared and occupied
lines of defense; and the existence of large areas of radioactive
contamination.
The &ove-listed factors date favorable conditions for an
offensive by sxveral strike grorpings on axes. An offensive on
separate axes ensurers the splintering of the enesy front and a
dispersal of his attention and efforts. At the same time, an
offensive on axes is muc;Y more cesapliceted than an offensive which is
carried out with close lateral contact between units, large units.
and n arxiec. wring an offensive on axtc, each grouping will a+e in
a difficult altuat.ion and will have to operate independently with its
flanks, and even its rear area,, exposed. In view of this, the
significance of preparing our command cater for such operations
becoas clear .
In the, years of World W r II, an offensive vas conducted on a
solid front in close combat far tions, with a methodical breakthrough
of enemy positions and defense zones. Actually, combat operations
were conducted in the zone of effective fire of the infantry and
artillery weapons, i.e., in a zone 10 to 15 ka on both sides from the
line of contact, if one does not consider epcradic aerial strikes
against the deptb. Under these conditions, the effect of fire
against the enemy was exploited immediately. Close coordination in
tiring and location was executed between the fire weapons, the
infantry, and tanks.
Under modern conditions, the sharply increased capabilities of
fire weapons have led than to a contradiction with the capabilities
of the infantry and tanks. The infantry and tanks have become
incapable of Immediately exploiting the effect of clear/missile
strikes against the entire depth of a defending enemy. To ensure
rapid seinne of the entire depth of the eneiW defeams by active
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combat operations and to achieve the objectives of the operation in
the shortest period of time, it is necessary to increase sharply the
rate of the offensive which, by the Directive of the Minister of Defense
for Operstiorsl Tta1ni fo 1961, was ordered to be increased to
100 km per 24-hour period. This is a very high rate. It is sufficient
to state that the distance covered in a 24-hour period in the execution
of a march con fists of 180 to 250 km, i.e., only two times greater
than the distance which must be covered by attacking troops in a
24-hour period.
In planning an operation, is it posnible to guarantee that a rate
of, say 100 km per dAy, will be sustained every day? Certainly not.
There will be days in an operation when troops will be able to advance
only negligibly, days when they vi.-.l not move at all, and, possibly,
days when they will ever fall back. We are speaking of those days
when fret troops will be repi wing enen counteretrikes, conducting
meeting er ge e s with the eneny, forcing water barriers, and
overcoming substantial zones of radioactive contamination and mountain
posses. Consequently, on the other days of the operation, the rate
01 advance must be such so as to c nsate for the days of slow or
of no rate of ad-rance:, i.e., it t approach the speed of executing a
march.
In the offensive operations of the' past war, the most decisive
results were achieved by encircling the enemy operational groupings
and subsequently annihilating and capturing them. Hover, at the
end of the war,, especially in the Vistula-Oder operation, the
ineffectiveness of encirclement as a form of conducting an operation"
had already become obvious. Those enemy groupings around which a
solid ring of encircle n`. was not closed turned into so-called
"roaming pockets" and quickly ceased to exist. But those enemy
graupin that were encircled by our troops (for eale, the Poznan
and the Schneidennxt-l groupings) continued to fight Wile surrounded
until the end of the war, diverting a substantial number of our troops
to them.
We cannot agree with the statement) that in a modern war
encirclement and deetrrction of large enemy grcmpiiygs can be eMloyed
aloes with the delivery of swift, deep strikes on separate axes.
Spec ion of Azrticies of the Journal "lfilttary Thought",
Pins
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Under the conditions of highly maneuvering coobat operations, it
will be inadvisable to encircle a large enemy grouping which is
dispersed over a large area. The lint--d number of troops in a
fret vile. not peradt the ore t3 ors of irmer and outer fronts of
encircltmnt -and the conduct of methodical combat for the purpose, of
contracting a ring of encircle t, breaking up the encircled
and destroying it piec:ema 1. Such c9eretions threaten loss
grour
of the rate of the offensive and, possibly, ever, its frustration.
It is much more advisable to use smell forces to intercept the main
routes of retreat of an enveloped enemy and subsequently dastroy
him with nualaear/missile weapons . In this, the mein body of the
front troops must move forward without delay and without glancing
back at the encircled enemy grouping.
Ia the most, terms, this is how we visualize the initial
offensive operations of the initial period of a var. toubtediy,
scum of the problem we have e d require further consideration
and critical analysis.
50X1-HUM
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