MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE GROUND TROOPS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL OF THE TANK TROOPS P. POLUBOYAROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403600001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT MILITARY THGUCxHT: "Some Questions in the
Further Ueve parent and Improvement of the
Ground Trc=opb ', by Coo lone l General of the
Tank Troops P. Pciuboyarov
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SPECIAL COLLECTION OF ARTICLES OF THE JOURNAL
P. Poluboyarov
A. Babadzhanyan
P. Koshevoy
V. Chizh
Yu. Pante leye' r
S. Mironov, M. Mukhin
1961
Some Questions in the Further
Development and Improvement of
the Ground Troops
Some Questions in the Preparation
and Conduct of the Initial
Offensive Operations
Utilization of the Missile Troops
of a Front (Army) in an Offensive
Operation
Planning the Utilization of
Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a
Front Offensive Operation
The Fundamental Scheme of a Front
Offensive Operation
The Submarine Operation of the
Navy - the Naval Operation of the
Future
Urgent Tasks for the Improvement
of Aerial Reconnaissance Under
Modern Conditions
V. Ilinykh, P, Kurochkin-- The Question of Increasing the
Stability of Troop Control
Ya. Shrhepennikov -- Support of the Strategic Concentra-
tion and Deployment of the Armed
Forces in Respect to Transport
Address
os~`cow, V-100 (?), ul. Kropotkina 19;Telephone K 0-13-00,ezt.53-66
Technical Editor R. L. Solomonik Proofreader T.G. Likhacheva
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Some Questions in the Further Development
and
Improvement of the Ground Troops
by
Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov
The rapid development of nuclear/missile weapons and
their broad introduction into the armed forces predetermin-
ed the necessity for a review of previously formed views
on the nature, methods, and forms of conducting modern
operation; an! on the role and significance in them of
vgrious mezr of armed combat and also of views on the
means of further development of types of armec forces and
arms of troops. However, in this natural process, sometimes,
under the guise of being something new, positions are
expressed which are poorly founded, or entirely unfounded
and already repudiated by reality itself.
Recently in our periodical press and in certain speeches,
the opinion has been expressed concerning the advisability
of repudiating tank armies and the necessity for creating,
in place of tank and motorized rifle large units, unified
division capable of performing varied missions under the
complex conditions of a nuclear/missile war.
Taken by itself, this viewpoint is not new. It was
even put into practice in the structure of our ground troops
and the armies of a number of capitalist countries. Thus,
for example, in the French Army which, on the eve of the
invasion of German-Fascist troops into France had a
significant number of tanks, there was not a single tank
division or tank corps. At the beginning of the wr r, there
were only two mechanized divisions in France and a third
was in the state of formation. A large portion of the
tanks of the French Army were dispersed by small subunits
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in infantry units and designated for joint operations with
the infantry. This could not help but have an effect on
the combat effectiveness of the French Army and to a large
degree facilitated its rapid destruction by theiGerman-
Fascist troops.
In the structure of our ground troops prior to the
Second World War there was a similar repudiation of
mLjor large units of armored troops. An attempt was made
to rectify this serious error but not in time, due to the
commencement of war with Fascist Germany. Until the end
of 1942 this error continued to have an effect on the
operations of, our troops, even though we strove to equip
combined arms armies with as many tank regiments and
brigades as possibe. But such an action did not produce
the needed effect, and during the course of the war we
were forced to create tank corps and tank armies which did
play an important role in the successful conduct of all the
successive operations of the Second World War.
After the war mechanized armies were created instead
of tank armies. Subsequently, it was necessary to abandon
these and once more'return to tank armies.
Thus, as was proved by our experience and numrous
examples from the armies of other nations, measures for
the unification of tank and rifle (motorized rifle) large
units have thus far not justified themselves. Are there
sufficient bases to affirm that under the system which
has arisen,of arming ground troops, these measures will be
correct? In our opinion such bases do not yet exist.
It is well known that the decisive role in attaining
the aims of war and of individual operations belongs to
nuclear/miss ile weapons. The efforts of ground troops are
directed toward the matt complete and effective exploitation
of the results of the application of these weapons with the
aim of final defeat of basic enewy groupings and the
seizure of his vitally important centers and areas for
basing weapons of armed combat, primarily nuclear/missile
weapons. Ground troops complete the defeat of armed forces
on ground fronts, seize and hold enemy territory and the
most important installations. 50X1-HUM
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"One of the most basic missions of ground troops, one
of primary concern to the command and staffs" indicated
Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya.
Malin.ovskiy, "must be the skilful exploitation of the
results of strikes by missile troops for the rapid ,advance
of armies and fronts".
On the basis of the nature of modern operations, it is
possible to say that in the composition of ground troops
the most important role will be played by that arm of
troops which by its combat characteristics is able,to the
maximum degree, to exploit the results of the effects of
nuclear weapons on the enemy, which loses its combat
effectivene3s to the least extent from nuclear strikes by
the enemy, which can successfully conduct active, highly
mobile combat operations at high tempos, rapidly overcome
-broad zones of radioEctive contamination, and rout enemy
groupings in meei;ing engagements and battles precipitately.
At the present time such an arm of troops is the tank
troops. This is explained by the specific characteristics
and combat capabilities of tanks. Tanks are more stable
than other weapons under the effects of nuclear weapons
against them, possess powerful arena, high mobility, and
? armor protection, and can operate i .diately after nuclear
strikes; at the same time their crews are quite dependably
protected from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst.
The high combat qualities of tanks allow tank troops to
exploit effectively the results of nuclear strikes and
conduct highly mobile combat operations, to deliver, in
coordination with nuclear weapons and air drops, powerful
and deep strikes on the enemy during an offensive, and to
guarantee the activity and stability of troops in defense.
The high combat qualities of tank troops have pre-
determined the sharp proportional increase of them in the
composition of ground troops and the significant
equipping of combined arms large units and formations with
tanks. The organizational inclusion of tanks in the composition
of combined arms units, large units, and formations, as
well as their full motorization, have significantly raised
the maneuverability, striking force, stability of ground
troops during enemy nuclear strikes, and their ability to
conduct combat operations under conditions of the mass
utilization of nuclear weapons. I
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The equipping of ground troops with nuclear/missile
weapons and the bz'ca:i introduction of tanks and other
armored equipment into their composition have had a
decisive influence on raising the combat capabilities of
combined arms large units and formations. A modern
Combined arms army- is able not only to penetrate success-
fully the tactical defense of the enemy but also to direct
its efforts rapidly to an operational depth and develop
an offensive at high speeds.
Thus, the combat and maneuvering capabilities of
combined arms large units and formations have increased
significantly. However, is it possible, on the basis of
this, to equate motorized rifle to tank divisions or
combined arms armies to tank armies, to assert that the
former can replace the latter, and on the basis of this
to conclude that tank armies are7not needed? In our
opinion, this cannot be done because the large units and
for'a"ticns named differ from one another not only in
quantity of tanks but also in basic combat characteristics
and operational-tactical capabilities.
The modern tank army is an entirely new operational
formation and by its combat qualities and capabilities is
significantly superior not only to the tank army of the
Second World War period but also to the postwar mechanized
army. It also differs in many aspects from ,the modern
combined arms army. Having in its composition four
tank divisions, the tank army is a powerful striking and
highly maneuverable tank formation, capable of exp loft ing
the results of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons in
the best manner. The organizational structure and combat
characteristics of tanks contain great cap iiities for
delivering rapid and powerful tank strikes to a great
depth: for executing a rapid and broad maneuver c Nna the
battlefield, for preserving a significant degree of
stability during enemy nuclear strikes and for surmounting
wide zones of radioactive contamination with high levels
of radiation. By its composition the tank army is homo-
geneous and much more mobile than the combined arms army.
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The combat capabilities of a tank array allow it to
overcome the enemy defense after mass nuclear strikes more
quickly than a combined arms army, to reach ab operational
expanse rapidly, and there to develop bold, decisive, and
highly mobile combat operations, directed in conjunction
with missile units, airbo?ne landing fcrces, and aircraft
toward the destruction of the eneay's deep reserves and
the achievement of operational aims at the highest possible
speeds.
The high maneuverability of large units of a tank army,
their great antiatomic stability, and biz i'3e-penetration
force allow the army to conduct combat operations
successfully at a significant distance from the remaining
forces of the front and to perform in conjunction with
other forces and means the most important missions in the
defeat of enemy troops. The role and significance of tank
armies in moaera operations was defined very exactly by
the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R.
Ya. Malinovskiy, who stated that tank armies were buudles
of arrows released from a tightly bound box string for the
swift achievement of the final goals of an operation.
Certain comrades do n-3t see the fundamental difference
between tank and combined arms armies and propose doing
away with tank armies. In our opinion, this proposal
stems from an incorrect understanding of the significance
of tank troops in general and tank armies specifically in
a nuclear/missile war and from an underestimation of their
combat capabilities.
Recognizing the important role of tank armies, we are
in no measure trying to belittle the significance and combat
capabilities of combined arms armies. Yielding to tank
armies in antiatomic stability, mobility, and ability to
conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, at the same
time combined arms armies possess a numaer of advantages
which allow them to perform many combat missions success-
fully. The same may be said of tank and motorized rifle
divisions. 50X1-HUM
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We consider that under modern conditions the necessity
for tank. armies and tank divisions has in no way diminished
in comparison with the Second World War but, on the contrary,
it has increased. Speaking of the superfluousness of tank
armies, some comrades refer to the complexity of committing
them to battle, and the difficulty of securing their flanks
and supplying them with various materiel. But these
deductions, in our opinion, are not sufficiently confirmed.
With the existence of massive, multi-million man pies,
the huge spatial. scope of a future war and the large variety
of missions which ground troops will perform, tank troops
and motorized infantry will, for the time being, remain
independent arms of troops, and the negation of one or the
other of them is premature. A repetition of mistakes
committed in the past may now lead to even worse results.
We hold the opinion that even with the presence among ground
troops of nu..Lear/missile weapons permitting the destruction
of enemy grot ings of any composition, the necessity
continues to exist for - strike force, for tank troops and
their basic large units aua formations which are tank
divisions and tank armies, and their long-range development
and improvement should be given due attention also in the
future.
It would not be an,exaggeration to say that the
presence of tank troops which are more advanced in technical
equipment, organizational structure, and methods of operations,
also, to a significant degree, in turn stimulates the
development of the infantry which must carry out highly
maneuvers ,ie combat operations in conjunction with tanks.
The attempt of certain comrades to reverse the direction
of this process is in obvious contradiction with the real
course of development of the means and methods of armed
conflict., as well as with the position that preferential
development must be given to the most modern arms of troops.
The currently accepted organizational structure of
large units and formations of ground troops basically
ccrresponds to the modern conditions of conducting combat
operations. However, the constant development of weapons
of armed combat and methods for their use governs the
necessity for its further improvement.
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The improvement of the organizational structure of
tank and motorized rifle large units must proceed, in our
opinion, along the line of an even greater decrease in
personnel, unprotected by armor, increase in antiatowic
stability and viability, strike-penetration force and
maneuverability of large units, and also an increase in
their ease of control and capability for conducting
independent combat operations to a great depth and at high
speeds .
In our opinion it is advisable to have tank divisions
and tank armies of the same composition. A tank army could
consist of 4 to 5 tank divisions, and a tank division of
4 tank regiments of medium tanks. In a tank army as well
as in tank divisions it is necessary to have organic
nuclear/missile weapons. Instead of a motorized rifle
regiment in a tank division it is advisable to have a
motorized rifle battalion in each of its tank regiments.
It is pore advisable to have heavy tank regiments and
divisions under army or front subordination and to turn
them over in case of necessity to large units and form. .tions
during the course of an operation.
Together with improving the organizational forms of
troops, great significance is acquired by the question of
the means of long-range development of tanks and other
armored equipment.
In the armament of our ground troops there are T-55
medium tanks and T-10M heavy tanks which more than other
cosvb :t vehicles guarantee protection of the crew from the
influence of the destructive factors of a nuclear burst
and are best suited for operations under conditions of the
mass utilization of nuclear weapons, and by their basic
combat characteristics are significantly superior to foreign
tanks of corresponding types and years of manufacture. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to suppose that these tanks do
not need improvement. New conditions of conducting combat
operations make radical improvements in the combat qualities
of tanks essential and force the working out of new directions
in their development, because the possibilities of further
improvement of tanks by old methods are, in practice, almost
completely exhausted. In this connection, the question
arises as to along which directions our tank construction
must develop, and which types of tanks is it more advisable
to have in the armament of ground troops?
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In recent years the question of the future of tanks
has been broadly discussed in our auilitary press, on
the pages of which are expressed the most varied proposals
and opinions, some of which even cast doubt generally on
the possibility of successful tank operations on the field
of combat with modern antitank weapons.
It is well known that the appearance of tanks brought
forth the need for weapons to combat them. Such a weapon
was first of all artillery: initially conventional, field;
later antitank, special. All subsequent development of
tanks was carried out in a competition between the
protective characteristics of their armor and the
destructive capabilities of armor-piercing shells. Toward
the end of the last war it bad already become evident
that the superiority in this competition was with smells.
By this time, capabilities for increasing the thickness
of tank armor and its antishell stability had approached
their limits, but the destructive capabilities of shells
radically increased in connection with the use of high-
explosive charges,
The increase in the proportion of tank troops and their
role in performing combat missions under conditions of the
utilization of nuclear weapons has given new impetus to
searches for more effective antitank weapons. In recent
years for arming the armies of NATO countries recoilless
weapons and :.,%titank guided missiles havt been adopted,
the destructive capabilities of which almost doubly
exceed the protective characteristics of tank armor.
Work to -mprove these weapons continues. At the same time
attempts to create a qualitatively new armor have not as
yet reached any appreciable results in practice.
Thus, qt the present time, as in the period of the
Second World War, a significant gap exists between the
protective capabilities of tank armor and the destructive
capabilities of antitank weapons. Easing- their reasoning
on this fact, a number of foreign authors arrive at the
conclusion that tanks are weapons of the past and not of
a modern war, and they propose doing away with the heavy
armor of tanks because the armor is pierced by antitank
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weapons anyway, and changing to lightly armored, but
more mobile and mane:Everable, vehicles. This viewpoint
finds support among a certain segment of our generals and
officers, who propose the creation of a light tank and
having it in the armament of ground troops as the basic
and only combat vehicle. We cannot agree with this for
a number of reasons.
In the first place, a change to tanks with light armor
increases the rossibility of their destruction not only by
antitank but also by other weapons.
Secondly, the chief weapon of destruction under
modern conditions is not antitank, but nuclear weapons,
and for this reason it is fir.,t of all necessary to proceed
from a consideration of the impact of the latter. During
the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations under
conditions of the broad use of nuclear weapons, the most
effective means, capable of protecting a person from the
effects of the destructive factors of a nu tear burst, is
still the armor of tanks. If it is weakened, tanks lose
one of their most important qualities.
Thirdly, with a change to light, thinly armored
vehicles, the qualitative superiority in tanks will
immediately shift to the side of our probable enemies,
in whose armies medium tanks continue to be basic.
Fourthly, data concerning the destructive capabilities
of modern antitank weapons reflect at present only the
results of firing range trials in the absence of the effects
of firing against these weapons, and consequently, without
considering the difference between firing conditions on
the firing range and in combat. Under equal conditions of
the effects of nuclear weapon, and other means of destruction
on tanks and on antitank weapons, tanks will be in a more
favorable situation and will be able to carry out combat
operations successfully, even with the existence of effective
antitank weapons.
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Used on the nature of modern operations and the
conditions of tank construction in our country and in the
major capitalist countries, we consider that.-until new
models are developed for the armament of our army, three
types of tanks must remain: heavy, medium, and special
amphibious. When tanks with higher performance criteria
are created, it is possible that we will do away with
heavy tanks and have in our armament, in addition to light
tanks, one basic type of tank , but with various armament
systems. It seems to us that it does make sense to create
light tanks for airborne troops and reconnaissance units
and subunits.
In our opinion, tanks of the future must, as in the
past, combine in themselves firepower, high mobility,
and armor protection and must guarantee maximum possible
protection to crews from the destructive factors of a
ruc fear burst. The preferential development of one or
another quality at the expense of other characteristics
of tas might lead to the drastic decrease of their
overall conbat effectiveness. In connection with this
the basic guides in the work of building new tanks must be:
-a further significant increase of the firepower of
tanks b improviw the quality of rifled and smoothbore
gun-s, and subsequently by installation in tanks of more
modern guided missile armament, providing the capability
to destroy enemy tanks with certainty at such ranges and
with such accuracy as to exceed the capabilities of enemy
tanks;
-a sharp improvement in the protection of crews from
penetrating radiation as well as improvement in the
protection of tanks from high-explosive charges;
-a further decrease in the weight of tanks by new
arrangements of parts, the use of light alloys, plastics
and other new materials;
-an increase in the maneuverability of tanks and
raising their maximum speeds to 60 to 70 km per hour
and average speeds to 40 to 45 km per hour;
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-a significant increase in the cruising range
of tanks, an increase in the dependability of :their
operation, and a decrease in the amount of servicing
during the course of combat operations;
-a decrease in tank crews to 2 or 3 persons as a
result of complete automation of the combat operations
and servicing of tanks;
-the equipping of tanks with more modern instruments
for firing, sighting and navigational apparatus guarantee-
ing the conduct of combat operations at night as well as
during the day;
-the maximum standardization oI units and assemblies
for tanks;
-the creation of an improved
under water;
tem of driving tanks
-the creation of conditions for transport of tanks
by air.
All these measures must guarantee In the future the
superiority of our tanks over tanks of the armies of
capitalist countries. Tank troops equipped with new tanks
will be able even more successfully to carry out combat
operations under conditions of the mass use of nuclear
weapons.
The interests of increasing the mobility of ground
troops also g:vern the necessity to seek means for increas-
ing the combat and maneuvering capabilities of infantry.
Our infantry in actuality is n 9t. only unprotected
from the dcstructive factors of nuclear bursts but also
from modern small arms. Its mobility and maneuverability
on the field of combat is also very low in comparison with
tanks. Tank units and sut :nits are capable of attacking the
enemy at combat speeds equal to 12 to 15 km per hour, and
of developing an offensive at a speed of 20 to 25 km per
hour and more. On the other hand, the speed of movement
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of dismounted infantry on the field of combat is limited
by the capabilities of the human organism and does not
exceed 3 to 4 km per hour. The armored carriers existing
in the armament of ground troops do not fully guarantee
protection of the infantry and its necessary maneuverability
on the field of combat.
Thus, the infantry at present is the most vulnerable
and least mobile element of the combat structure of the
attacking echelon of ground troops. The great difference
in the combat capabilities of tanks tad infantry hampers
the effective exploitation of the results of using nuclear
weapons and conducting offensives at high speeds.
With the aim of raising the combat and maneuvering
capabilities of the infantry it is advisable, in our
opinion, to create as inexpensively as possible a
special mass combat vehicle for the infantry, which would
pewit it to follow the tanks without lagging and to wage
combat jointly with them from these vehicles, dismounting
only in the most exceptional instances.
We cannot agree with the opinion of certain comrades
who propose, with the aim of raising the combat capabilities
of the motorized rifle division, increasing the numb of
tanks in its composition to 300. It is completely obvious
that in this case the division will not be 3 motorized
rifle but a tank division. In our opinion, there is no
necessity for such an increase in the number of tanks in
a motorized rifle division. A more important problem at
the moment is the matter of raising the combat capabilities
of the infantry. One of the possible ways of solving this
problem is the creation of an infantry combat vehicle.
An infantry combat vehicle must be, in our opin .on,
fully armored, tracked or half-tracked, capable of over-
coming obstructioar on the field of combat and difficult
sectors of terrain on a par with tanks, amphibious,
transportable by air. with high viability and antiatomic
protection for the crew and troops transported (descent).
The maximum speed of the vehicle may be : on wheels - up to
70 to 80 km per hour, on tracks - up to 40 to 50 km per
hour.
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The vehicle must have powerful, but compact and light-
weight missile weapons, permitting the conduct of effective
combat not only against personnel and variousf ire weapons
but also against armored enemy targets.
The crew of the vehicle may consist of two persons.
The passenger complement is a rifle squad. The construction
of the vehicle must permit the transported troops to conduct
combat without dismounting, as well as provide for the
convenient accommodation, boarding, and debarkation of the
transported troops under various conditions of the combat
situation. The weight of the vehicle must be as little
as possible.
With the adoption of such a combat vehicle, the
necessity might arise for certain changes in the organization-
al T'O&E structure of tank and motorized infantry large
units and units. We are not examining this matter in this
article, considering that it can be decided only after the
vehicle is created. At present we should only like to
indicate very briefly what such a combat vehicle might
do for ground troops.
An infantry combat vehicle will provide first of all
S the possibility for significantly increasing the mobility
and maneuverability of motorized rifle units and subunits,
which then will be capable of successfully advancing
behind tanks under the most complex conditions of combat
situations and terrain. Operating from these vehicles,
the infantry will not lag behind tanks and always will
be able to perform various combat missions together with
them.
The high cross-country ability and complete armor
of the combat vehicles will permit the infantry to carry
out broad maneuver on the field of battle and conduct
combat operations under complex and rapidly changing
situational conditions both together with tanks and
independently.
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In equipping the infantry with the new combat vehicle,
the viability and stability of motorized rifle units and
subunits during enemy nuclear attacks and their capability
to exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and cross
zones of radioactive contamination will be raised.
The presence on the combat vehicle of machine guns
and missile mounts capable of engaging in combat with
armored and openly positioned enemy targets will sharply
r .ise the firepower of the infantry. Conducting combat
operations on these vehicles, the infantry will be able
to combat successfully the enemy's fire weapons and
personnel and offer more effective support to tanks on
the field of combat.
All the properties which the infantry will acquire
with the adoption of the combat vehicle will lead not only
to raising the combat capabilities of motorized rifle
unite and subunits but also to increasing the mobility
of tank and motorized rifle large units as a whole. Thanks
to this, the combat qualities of tank and motorized rifle
divisions will correspond more closely to the requirements
of a nuclear/missile war.
The high mobility, great strike force, and armor
protection of all personnel of the contat subunits of t1L,;
and motorized rifle divisions will favor more effective
exploitation of the results of the use of nuclear weapons
and the delivery of even weeper and more rapid strikes
against the enemy. The capabilities of troops for carrying
out broad and rapid maneuver from the zone of interior as
well as directly on the immediate field of combat will
increase significantly.
The presence in the composition of tank and motorized
rifle divisions of easily controlled tank and motorized
rifle units with equal mobility and maneuverability will
1irovide, the capability for rapidly creating such combat
formations for combat as to satisfy the various conditions
and requirements of a sharply changing situation. These
qualities of tank and motorized rifle units will permit,
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in additi.ai the avoidance of a prior tion of considerable forces and weapons ineI limitedearea
on the axis of a major strike and will more fully instill
into the practice of combat o
d~Persal of pest?.ons the principle of
dis:; . This, troops and their operations along separate
operations fprcciple corresponds to the natusE of modern
greatest degree.
The advance of large units and units in dispersed
formations on a broad front and along axes undoubtedly
will decrease troop losses from enemy nuclear strikes,
will make it more difficult for him to utilize weapoac
of mars destruction, and at the same time will troops to cairn=y out a broader and more flexible maneuvers
of forces and weapon, with the air of reaching the
deep rear area and destroying his troops enemy t
Periods of time . by units in short
In conducting combat ope.ratiozs in dispersed formations
along separ t-c ar ,S rations
units long tank and rotcrized rifle large
complsh the destruction of the enem
in mobile forms of combat in conJ'unr y ueual
airborne forces, and aviation. tion with mirsile un
its,
ts,
methodical breakthrough of the The necessity for a
arise ?` . The latter will be overcome after nuclear strikr
along axes,, providing rapid penetration to an o es
peational
depth and development of an offensive at maximum - possible
speed. At the same time, ~
vehicles following nuclear strikes alsofmustabecome a a
ec
occurrence in overcoming the defense. ular
regular
condition can the speed under thirs
and io a 3~ peed of an offens jve be sharply increased the exploited toltheomaxim;r strikes against the enemy be
In overcoming the defense, the motorized rifle sub-
units and units will be-able to attack the enemy from the
tnarea, not dismounting at a line of deployment as has been
now. loving out from the zone of interior after
tank subunits, as they approa^:h the main line of resistance,
they will carry out necessary reiorma,tions while on the
march and in conju etion with tanks will overcome the
enemy's defense on vehicles in combat or approach march
-17--
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formations, ing o combat vehic2~~;,, motorized rifle
units and subunit:, will be able to maneuver more on the
field of combat, more quickly change the structure of
combat formations and change if necessary from combat
formations to approach march formationse or the reverse.
Of course, under varied situational conditions the
possibility of the infaantry operating in dismounted
combat formations is also not excluded when the joint
operations of tanks and infantry on combat vehicles are
for some reason impeded. However, even in thew instances
the infantry will be in more favorable circumstances than-
now. After the infantry has dismounted, the combat
vehicles will not be removed to cover, as is done with
armored carriers, but will support the combat of the infantry
with their fire, advancing after the combat formations of
their subunits. During this, the combat vehicles will be
kept in constant readiness to load the infantry and provide
it with a rapid means if advanc ir.g after the tanks.
The fullest high maneuering capabilities of tanks
and motorized, rifle large units will come about after
overcoming the enemy's defenses. Tangy units and large
units, in reaching an operational expanse, will break
through more boldly and deeply into the depth of the
enemy's defenses, knowing that the infantry on combat
vehicles will not lag behind them and when needed can unite
their efforts wit4 them for delivering coordinated and
sudden strike3 against the enemy. All this will increase
even more the capabilities of tank large units in conducting
independent highly maneuverable cobbat operations at s
of 100 or more kilometers in a 24-hour peels
period.
Equipping the infantry with the combat vehicle creates
new conditions, differing in principle from the past, for
troop forcing of water barriers.
First of all, afte-- the infantry combat vehicle has
become part of our armament, the requirements of troops
for various landing and ferrying means is decreased
considerably and operations of the infantry in the forcing
of water barriers will no longer depend on troops' having
these means.
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Motorized rifle units and subunits, o 50X1-HUM
combat vehicles, will be able to force waterabarriers
while on the march, in the literal sense of the .ord.
Possessing high cross-country and amphibious qualities,
the combat vehicles will ensure that troops reach a
water barrier rapidly on a broad front, and ensure their
rapid deployment and quick forcing of the barrier in
combat or approach march formations. Thus, in the majority
of cases, motorized rifle subunits and units will be able
to surruount water barriers from the march simultaneously
with amphibious tanks along the entire forcing sector with-
out carrying out preparatory engineering work for preparing
crossings (except for mine clearing).
Having infantry combat vehicles will increase the
possibilities for carrying out maneuver with forces and
weapons while forcing water barriers and for transferring
the efforts of advancing troops from one direction to
another. The execution of a subsequent forcing of water
barriers from the march will likewise bt made significantly
easier. Not being tied down by crossing equipment,
motorized rifle units and subunits together with amphibious
tanks as well as tanks equipped for movement under water,
after forcing one water barrier will race toward the next
water barrier and force it from the march.
The equipping of motorized rifle units and subunits
with an infantry combat vehicle will have a
on the nature of troop operations under condigreat tions 2of~uence
strong radioactive contamination of the terrain. Possessing
high mobility, motorized rifle units and subunits on combat
vehicles will be able not only to rapidly bypass zcnes of
contamination, but also to cross them successfully in
directions with the lowest level of radiation. The combat
vehicles will provide in this a higher degree of protection
for personnel from penetrating radiation and radioactive
dust than armored carriers, such less motor vehicles.
Under modern conditions, together with the maneuvering
of troops on the ground, great s ignif Trance is acquired
by troop maneuver in the air. On the basis of this,
troops,together with their weapons and combat a ui
must be capable of being transported by air. Q pment,
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The mass movement of troops by air, as is well known,
is impeded because of tie absence of light transportable
combat equipment and means with a larger load-capacity
for transporting airborne forces. With the creatic-n of a
relatively lightweight infantry combat vehicle, an important
step toward solving this important problem will have been
made. The trans portabi?.ity of the infantry combat vehicle
by air will permit the transfer by air of motorized rifle
units and large units in future operations in mass formation
over considerable distances and in short periods of time.
Naturally, in the future the question will arise of
whether all motorized rifle units of tank and motorized
rifle divisions should be equipped with the infantry combat
vehicle. The solution of this question is directly dependent
on the designated operational missions of the large units
and the economic capabilities of the country. It seems to
us that first of all it would be advisable to equip with
these vehicles those motorized rifle units which make up
the complement of tank armies and tank divisions of 2ombined
arms armies. Subsequently, other large units located in
the most important theaters of military operations could be
so equipped.
? It should be noted that in equipping the infantry
with the combat vehicle, the question of raising the mobility
of tank and motorized rifle divisions is still not completely
solved because there will remain in their composition a
relatively large number of subunits and units of other arms
of troops which are not protected by armor and have less
maneuverability.
Under modern conditions, in the composition of all tank
divisions including those in tank armies, it would be
advisable to have not trailer but self-propelled mounts,
:aainly with atomic armament, which are capable of more
effectively executing various fir# missions during the
conduct by tank troops of highly maneuverable fast moving
combat operations.
Subunits and units of special arms of troops which are
included in the composition of tank and motorized rifle
large units and conduct combat as an attacking echelon must
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also possess increased mobility and greater protection
from the destructive factors of nuclear weapons. This brings
out the necessity of also developing appropriate means of
armament and movement for them.
In the near future, apparently, vehicles can be created
for ground troops utilizing for movement the so-called
principle of the "air cushion". The adoption of such
vehicles will permit a sharper increase in the nobility of
_nfantry and their maneuverability to a level corresponding
to modern requirements. The cross-country abil,ty of such
vehicles will provide troops with the capability to
execute rapid maneuver, to cover large expanses,including
significant zones of rad_oactive contamination and wide
water barriers is short periods of time, and to deliver
sudden strikes against the enemy from the flanks and rear.
Units and subunits equipped with these vebicles will
find the most widespread use as reconnaissance units and
forward detachments of attacking troops. By exploiting
breaks and unoccupied sectors in the enemy's defense,
they will be able to reach the deep rear of the enemy very
quickly and execute not only missions assigned to forward
detachments but also a portion of the missions which are
carried out by,tactical airborne landini forces.
For ground troops it is advisable, in our opinion, to
build vehicles which would have an average speed of 100 to
12C km per hour ands cruising range of 400 to 500 km, with
not less than-30 to 40 per cent of this by air.
The question arises as to whether or not the increase in
the combat capabilities of the infantry will reach the point
where it will be capable of performing all combat missions
With the scare su; ce.ss as tanks. It seems to us that this
will not occur for this reason. No matter how good the
infantry combat vehicles will be, on the basis of its
characteristics it will be far from comparable to our basic
tank. And because this is so, tank large units and units
under other equal conditions will potentially have greater
combat capabilities at their disposal than motorized rifle
large units and units on these vehicles.
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The basic advantages of ta,;.kc ever other comba vehicles
will retain: the best protection of the crew frim nuclear
destruction, more powerful araament, and greater penetrati
strike force. The influence of the first factor indicates
that under conditions' of equal effects by any of the enemy's
weapons- of destruction losses in tanks will be less than
losses in other combat vehicles. Thus, tank troops will
better retain a capability for executing combat missions.
During operations along separate axes or isolated from the
main forces, this will have a decisive significance.
More powerful armament will permit the infliction of great
losses on the enemy and facilitate the possibility for
completing his destruction by a powerful strike by the tanks
themselves. All these advantages taken together will
provide tank troops- with the opportunity to advance at a
higher speed and to a great depth. It s4o uid als- be kept
in rind that the development of tanks, even though it
enccunters certain difficulties, proceeds relatively
rapidly in our country. By the time the infantry receives
the combat vehicle in its arment, tank troops can receive
a new and even more improved and powerful tank.
It should be noted that the development of the infantry
in the postwar period proceeded, along lines of increasing
its strike force and maneuverability, i . e . , properties more
characteristic of tank troops.
Our present motorized rifle divisions: and combined t tms
armies, on the bas is of these characteristics (without
taking nuclear; missile weapons into cori.deration), approach
the level of the large units and formatio of armored and
mechanized troop of the Second world may.. Tank troops
also have advanced a great deal daring this- period in
technical ec~aipent and organizational forts and have become
different- They are constantly reinforced with new models
of combat equipment and armament, have a more i.mpro%ed
organization, and are capable of carrying out highly
maneuverable combat %,perations at a speed of up to 100
and more kilometers per 24-hour period at a significant
distance from the basic forces of a front (army). However,
these high combat qualities of tank troops have not yet been
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fully realized during several training exercises, sometimes
efforts are in evidence to utilize tank divisions' and tank
armies on a par with motorized rifle divisions and combined
armz armies, and of ,,en they are drawn into long and fruit-
less combat instead of being utilized for carrying out
active and rapid offensive operation: to a great depth.
For this reason, together with the further improvement of
combat equipment, armament, and the organizational structure
of troops, it is essential to search for and master in
practice such methods of their use as to fully correspond
to tbL 'hanging conditions of conducting combat operations
and to perwit the maximum exploitation of the results of
nuclear strikes against the enemy.
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