PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON AN ARTICLE FROM THE TOP SECRET VERSION OF THE SOVIET JOURNAL, MILITARY THOUGHT (CSDB-3/651,445)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403270001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

50X1-HUM
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COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT I ? "On the 50X1-HUM
Question of-the Tasks, Organization and
Planning of Military-Scientific Work"
by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov
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On the Question of the Tasks, Organization
and Planning of Military-Scientific Work
by
Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov
The thoughts presented in this article are the
results of some of the author's experience in the work`
of scientific-research groups created during the last
four years under a Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
The great and constantly growing significance of
science in our country is known. The application of
science has become one of the decisive factors in the
mighty growth of the productive forces of society. At
the XXII Congress of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev stated:
-'The constant improvement of the forms and methods of
the management of the national economy, the most
rational use of internal resources and potentialities,
and adherence to scientifically founded proportions l
in the development of the branches of the economy are
taking on special significance now..." (underlined by
me - V.B.)
Life itself demands of the planning and economic
management of new developments a much higher order of
scientific substantiation and economic calculations.
Profound scientific work on the problems of developing
economics and technology must precede the formulation
of plans and the confirmation of economic measures,
Economic and technical research must facilitate the
correct performance of economic tasks.
Obviously, military-scientific work should be
approached with equally high standards, because it
is gradually becoming the cornerstone of Armed Forces
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development. Military-scientific work in the broad
sense of the word encompasses all research activity on
military subjects. However, military-sci_entific work
is normally considered to-be only_ the part of this -11 wort that concerns military theory and that.. does not
touch-upon questions of armament and military equipment,
In this article we shall arbitrarily call this part of
general military-scientific work military-scientific
operational work (including in it not only operational
but also strategic and tactical questions), and we
shall call the second part military-scientific technical
work.
such work has also been performed in the scientific
groups cited in the branches of the Armed Forces.
Military-scientific technical work is also taken up in
part by the majority of the faculties of academies,
according to their curricula, and mainly by the numerous
The organization of both component parts of military-
scientific work is also different. Military-scientific
operational work is conducted by certain faculties and
in scientific groups of military academies, in military-
scientific societies, and also by the scientific aktiv
that is gathered around Military Thought, Naval Collection,
'and other military journals. During the past few years
(branches of the Armed Forces. Experimental-design work
and, to a certain degree, the scientific-research work
1~of industrial institutes serving the Armed Forces, are
combined with their work.
specialized scientific-research institutes of the various
In the second field of military science there is
not only a huge numerical superiority of persons working
directly on questions of military theory, but also sig-
nificantly better organization of scientific work.
Milit
r -scientific technical_} k is conducted. mainly
a2p
in specially organized and equipped scientific estab-
lishments, such as institutes, and is fulfilled, as a
rule, by harmonious scientific collectives. At the
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same time, scientific work in the field of military
theory is scattered among a number of establishments,
i is often fulfilled by persons working alone, not
connected with one another, and, if it is fulfilled
?I by collectives, the latter are often selected not on
grounds of scientific qualifications, but are 'staffed
11 by chance (in particular, many scientific groups in
the branches of the Armed Forces have actually been
selected in this way).
At a.time when military-sc_ientif.ic technical work
has, for a long time. . now;"-been carried out according
to specific plans, often connected with large financial
appropriations, and is usually fulfilled under rigid
supervision, work in the field of military theory began
to be planned only recently. It is poorly supervised
and in a number of cases its quality leaves much to be
desired. As an example, 2 to 4 years ago when one of
the scientific groups was working on the problem of
`combatting ocean-sea communication routes and tried
"to familiarize itself with existing scientific material
on these questions, it was discovered that among the
several hundred pertinent monographs, dissertations,
graduation theses, and articles, half of them were
devoted to one single, important, but isolated topic,
"Combat of Submarine and Air Forces Against Remote
Enemy Communication Routes". In turn, a large part
of the works in this half were compilations that
were of no real value. At the same time, a number
of vital questions of this combat against communication
lines seemed to have dropped out of the field of view
of our naval theoretical literature.
Such a situation is characteristic not only of
work on this problem, but also on other problems.
It can only be explained by deficiencies in planning
and by a certain lack of organization in the selection
of the subjects of scientific work. With all the need
to give scientific personnel freedom in the selection
of subjects, the overall.mapeuvering of scientific
forces and capabilities must, first of all, ensure
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research on . all. the..essent,ial questions with the
necessary time limits.
Finally, while persons working on questions of
armament and military equipment are constantly informed
on the latest scientific-technical achievements in
their field, since without this their work proves to
be fruitless, the majority of the theoretical workers
in the operational field, because of security con-
siderations, are often not given access to documents
that reflect pertinent achievements in the field of
science and technology.
To summarize, with the comparatively large number
of operatives and tacticians working on the theoretical
front, with their quite high training and essential
aptitudes*, the coefficient of the useful operation
of-our military-scientific network isnot great: the
factual results of its work are much lower than its
)iotentialities. Latel in connection with organi-
Itational-staff reductions, the position of operational
scientific work figs become even worse, not only
absolutely but `also relatively. These reductions
ave a ess effecton scientific-technical work.
With any personnel reductions in the composition
of the Armed Forces, military-scientific work cannot
be weakened, but, just the opposite, it is necessary
to broaden and deepen it in every possible way,
* -Here we do not examine the situation of laboratory,
experimental and the experimental-production base of
our academies, and especially, scientific-research
institutes. This question deserves separate dis-
cussion. It should only be said that in this field
much better cooperation is required than exists
now between them, especially with organs of industry.
101010
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because only in this way is it possible to compensate
for the quantitative reduction of forces. This pertains
especally.Ao?scientific work in the field of military
theory.. For, in general, it shnuld_tadt. head
of the military-scientific, including scientific-
technical work. Indeed, this is also demanded by the
development of armament and equipment itself.
Of course, changes in the development of weapons
and equipment determine changes in the development
of military affairs. But, undoubtedly, military theory
also exerts its own reciprocal influence on military
eo Militar'--y technology cannot develop swiftly
without being
M oriented by military theory : ---`-The latter
has-to n~ic nathc'eelt~pm~nt"to military tech-
nology, the most effective ones from the standpoint
of military art. Only on this basis is it possible to
develop practical scientific-technical work in the
most advantageous directions.
Now, when science and technology are developing
so fast, acute scientific thought must be aimed at
not less than ten vears ahe . Only with this con-
dition is it possible to possess modern armament and
equipment of forces at any given moment, because
scientific-technical and design work, the testing of
experimental models, and the creation of large and
smallseries, on the average, take just ten years.
In particular, the matter of research on com-
parative military effectiveness stands very poorly,
including the military-economic profitableness of
various methods of fulfilling particular strategic,
operational, and even tactical, tasks. In conditions
of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and their
delivery to targets by missiles, almost any one of
these tasks can be performed by various methods and
correspondingly with various constituents of forces
and weapons, belonging to various branches of the
Armed Forces.
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These forces, weapons, and methods are by no means
equal in value - both purely military and military-
economic. But, unfortunately,, such, cprr gaga iv e4
investigations m ly__.cond ucted in scientific
organsy .of the ar _.b.anches w fe,th:_,,_grces , and
is does not ens
cessaar~thand
objet i vi not only as a result _q _ga q-favor' ism' and;_TKius, off'' a biassed attitude toward
the capabilities of other brandies of forces;--but even
as a resu t o the aforementioned insufficient know-
ledge of future possibilities of their neighbors, and
likewise as a result of the lack of a common methodology
of comparison-.M.~a.
The tasks of the Armed Forces on ocean-sea axes
that are quite characteristic in this respect are shown
in the table that follows. On the one hand the water
has already lost its former "privileged" position,
when it served as the only means of communication
between bodies of land separated by it. Now the most
universal medium, in this respect, is the air. Even
though air transport is still limited in respect to
weight and dimensions of cargo, and as a result of
its relative high cost, a number of tasks formerly
performed only on the water and from the water, now
can well be carried out outside this medium.
On the other hand the water medium represents
the most diverse field of operations, both for surface,
submarine, and air forces and weapons. Moreover, for
submarine forces it still ensures a fairly high degree
of security.
To summarize the general formulation of the question
of the preferred composition, not of the "navy" or even
of the "ocean-sea forces" but of the forces capable of
operating on ocean-sea axes, now comes to the following. 50X1-HUM
A. To have an effect on any objectives on the
water, partially under the water, and also territorial
objectives located "across the water", i.e., now it is
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also possible to perform the tasks cited in the table
-- la, and all of 2 and 3 from the shore. But
because , in a number of cases, these operations from
the shore (especially against mobile targets) require
too complex and expensive a system of target designation
and guidance, it must be thoroughly examined against
which specific objectives, when and under what conditions,
specifically at what distances from shore, it is more
advantageous to employ weapons, namely missiles, from
the shore and when it is advantageous to employ them
from "intermediate" carriers, i.e., first load them on
special, mobile submarine, air or surface "platforms"
and send them to sea (ocean), in order to move the
weapons closer to the objectives.
Besides, as regards task la, it is necessary to
note the importance of its study in this respect. Now
submarines are recognized as the most promising forces
for antisubmarine defense, including, above all,
operations against Tissile-carrying submarines. Taking
into consideration the very great significance of such
defense for us and the huge forces required far it,
maybe it is more advantageous to direct submarine
construction mainly in this direction? But in some
conditions our missile-carrying submarines (as the
Americans themselves consider) will prove to be more
advantageous than intercontinental missiles? All the
more reason that the entire problem must be thoroughly
analyzed as a whole.
The question of combat against communication
lines, i.e., task 2 * has been studied the most.
However even here there is insufficient clarity in
* See the book "Fundamentals of Employing Submarine
and Air Forces Against Ocean... (several words missing)
1960.
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the point that was just emphasized: with what weapons
is it more advantageous to destroy enemy ports and
bases - missiles from submarines or intercontinental
missiles? And in conditions of nuclear warfare ports
are the main objective in combat against communication
lines
The question of the optimal forces, weapons and
measures for performing task 3 has been developed even
less.
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Standard Ocean-Sea Tasks of the Armed Forces and
Feasible Forces and Weapons for Performing Them.*
a)
Performed
i m a
Coincidentally
.pia
a, at
01 F1 0
i 0
1 QC m
m O
~s ?
P
r'v
U) m
mom.
1. Operations against coasts:
a. With weapons
b. With personnel
2. Operations against Communi-
cation Lines:
a. Against ports and bases
b. At sea
3. Defense coast from the Sea:
a. From aircraft carriers
(AV) and missile car-
riers (RN)
b. From submarines (PLPL)
c. From missiles
d. From landings
4. Communication lines:
a. Coastal
b. Long-range
Special
5. Combat with enemy naval
forces
6. Assistance for army flank
S~e 3a & 3b
1,2,3,4,5 G V G G G
* The numbering and alphabetical designation correspond to the
numbers of the main tasks.
{V -;(G) G IG
(G) ;V G
3, 5 -~-j(G)
G** ?G V**,(G)** - - -
Key: G-capable of playing a major role; V-capable of playing
an auxiliary role; (G)-potential
This task breaks down into a series of previous tasks of various
scales..
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As regards task 3a.,,i.e. combat with aircraft carriers
and missile carriers, both aircraft and submarines can and
must be used for this. However, the employment of ballis'tic~
missiles from the ground against them, as well, seems to
be promising and requires thorough investigation.
Task 3b, i...e. combat with missile-carrying submarines
of the enemy, is especially complex and requires all-around
utilization (and hence, also, all-around investigation) of
the potentialities of a number of branches of the Armed Forces.
Despite the fact that the next task, i.e. 3c, antiair
defense and antimissile defense, must be performed mainly
by the forces and weapons of a special branch of the Armed
Forces, the participation of the Navy is also useful in
its investigation because some of its potentialities in
this respect, namely the potentialities of mobile radar
patrols)that are brought forward deserve attention.
Understandably, in modern conditions, task 3d, i.e.
antilanding combat, requires special cooperation of the
.`various branches of forces and corresponding research work.
B. As regards the more or less similar tasks lb, 4a
and 4b, which relate to sea transport, such short-range trans-
port, within the limits of the possibility of our screening
them with air and sea forces, are completely feasible even
now. But we are now working enough on the question of the
optimum forces, weapons and methods for supporting them,
and the main thing is that we do not keep this question
in the field of continuous attention.
If we refer to long-range transport, namely trans-
oceanic, then, of course, military science must always be
ready to report at the first demand of the leadership,
comprehensive, clear views on the most advantageous var-
iants of forces, weapons and methods for carrying out
such transport, with detailed calculations of the time
periods necessary, and the cost of creating these forces
and weapons. Logically, the following thoughts should be
presented here.
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VV/\ I-1 IIJIVI
Long-range (transsea and transoceanic) transport may
be carried out on the water, in the air and by special
methods.
Large-scale underwater transport has poor future
prospects, as a result of its high cost and vulnerability.
Surface transport is entirely feasible but requires
the support of forces that are superior to those of the
enemy. What kind of forces? At present, with the inade-
quate range of aircraft mw mainly surface means. Calcu-
lations show that if we wanted to we could create such
forces no earlier than 15 to 20 years from now, and this
is clearly useless. In the first place, in ten years
the international situation will have changed sharply.
"When the Soviet Union becomes the first industrial power".
-said N.S. Khrushchev at the XXII Congress - "when the
socialist system is finally transformed into the decisive
factor of world development, when the forces, of peace
multiply even-more throughout the entire world, then the
balance will finally be tilted in favor of the forces of
peace and the barometer of the international weather will;
show: clear. The threat of a world war will have passed
forever."
Secondly, the technical situation also changes: it
will suffice for autonomous aircraft to appear, to have
the significance of aircraft carriers fall off sharply.
Hence the only realistic possibility for our car-
rying out such transport consists: fcreating sufficiently
autonomous, powerful aircraft . not only for the direct
performance of part of the transport by air, but also
for screening the other part of it the transport
carried out by sea. And because we also need these
aircraft for other purposes, all efforts should be ex-
erted toward its creation, the more so, because of
other reasons, we cannot permit the Americans to out-
strip ~]
us in this field.
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In his recent speeches President Kennedy spoke coolly
about atomic aircraft. Of course, for the USA and Britain,
which possess powerful aircraft carrier fleets, atomic air-
craft are really unnecessary. But is not the USA simul-
taneously trying to confuse us with its announcements?
Do not the remarks of the President remind us of the objec-
tions of the USA and Britain at the 1921-1922 Washington
Conference, against submarines, which represented a clear
threat to them? We cannot escape this thought.
C. In actuality the possibilities of performing task 5
have already been examined, and as regards task 6, in addi-
tion to what was said above, an important question is the
creation of an amphibious fleet, which, unfortunately, we
hardly concern ourselves with.
A few years ago the former Minister of Defense, Mar-
shal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, s&jd that since the ground
forces themselves possess powerful strike weapons, they are
not in need of support from the sea. This, of course, is
not so. If.there is no navy a1"sea, then some kind of sea-
going forces will have to be created by the army itself, 50X1-HUM
as this is done to a significant degree by the U.S.Army,
even though they possess a navy. The question is only a
matter of what is more advantageous.
This, in brief, is not a program of the necessary in-
vestigations of the future forces, means and methods for
performing tasks that are before the Armed Forces on the
oceans and seas, but the prerequisites to formulation of
such a program, and then only some prerequisites, because
a number of other important questions have hardly been
touched upon-for example, the cooperation of forces and
their support;--trsuch an important question as the most
feasible standardization of the organization and control
equipment in all branches of the Armed Forces, etc..
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I ~\
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Incidentally, it may be said that, while already
long before the Second World War the constant and "general"
threat of enemy aviation forced the creation of a unified
system of antiair defense, now we are even more in need
of having, if possible, standard organization and equip-
ment of the control of al the Armed Forces inc uding 50X1-HUM
observation, communications, secure communications and
computer equipment).
As was already stated, the above, as well as other
important questions, must be invgate"q,A,1,.X -
rectly__-from the m it ry, but 1,g f, , the military-
economic. seta dpoinnt. This has almost been ignored
until the present time, which explains the eomp eetely
inatl de uate dve]ppmex t of,_the,, metI odo~ogy" of, mil try-
economic calculations. For the calculations must be
c ie out no on y for each separate task but also
for "algebraic sums" of particular variants of these
tasks. Therefore, it is clear that this methodology
must be common for all branches of tfi~e 1 rmec "dr`c s
of course , taking into consideration the specific
characteristics of each of the branches of forces in
their particular sectors.
"Freedom is the basic necessity." Under the exist-
ing situation, complete freedom in selecting the particu-
lar forces and weapons which are really better is lack-
ing in a number of cases. It is lacking not only within
one or another branch of the Armed Forces, but on the
scale of the Armed Forces as a whole. It is already
unnecessary to say that such a situation inevitably
leads to the need for "impulsive" decisions, opens a
broad field for all kinds of irresponsible statements,
unnecessary friction, etc..
Naturally the correct solution to this entire,
particularly important problem consists of the organi-
zation of timely, close, t, creative scientific
work of military theeTj.cians and engineers. The
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question is only how to organize this work correctly,
including the correct control and planning of it.
Also, overall considerations and security require-
ments have forced and are forcing the differentiation of
this entire activity above all by the degrees of its con-
centration and significance. But it is important that
in each of its "stages", the abovementioned creative
operational-tactical collaboration should be retained.
How is it best to organize it?
From the above it is clear that as the paramount
scientific organ, it also works directly, plans the
oT-thlescientific periphery", may only exist at
the level of the Ministry ofpDefense, most likely in
the coi posf i ii 'of 'tIie General Staff or of its Chief
Operations Directorate. Only in this way is it possi-
ble to ensure complex purposefulness (perspective)
and coordination of the development of the individual
branches of the Armed Forces and thus, of the Armed
LForces as a whole, along with the requisite competence
of this organ, and the necessary security of its work.
Occupying itself only with future problems, i.e.,
being completely separated from current operational
planning,-this ocean, incorporating several tens of
the most qualified scientific workers and engineer-
specialists on basic types of weapons and equipment*,
must work on three basic problems:
- on scientific research into the most promising
ways (variants) for performing the main strategic tasks
that stand before the Armed Forces'
Since such a technical organ already exists in the
composition of the General Staff in the form of the
Scientific-Technical Committee (NTK), maybe it would
be best to simply reconstruct this NTK appropriately..
Another variant could be the appropriate organization:.
of military-scientific work of the General Staff
Academy.
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on the promising all-around system of armament
that ensues therefrom, and equally on the optimal se-
quence of its creation;
- on the operational-tactical principles for the
subsequent development of assignments for the main
models of weapons and military equipment that ensue from
this system of armaments.
Of course, the :nall_s-ta.ff of this central scientific
organ will be able to handle the huge volume of tasks listed
only under the following conditions:
- if its foundation is the work of the "scientific
periphery" i.e., other scientific organs such as of the
ministry as a whole, as well as of the branches of the
Armed Forces;
- if at the same time it carefully follows the
C hievements of the general non-military sciences capable
having some military significance, and for this its
representatives will enter into the top scientific organs
of the country that have military interest, in the capacity
of observers of their own arm;
if it does not start to disperse the attention
given to insignificant things, both in its own theoretical-
research work and in its methodological management of the
work of the other scientific organs of the ministry.
In order to observe these conditions it is necessary
to deal only with the scientific organs (institutes) of
the ministry, that work directly with it, and wits the
appropriate scientific management organs of the branches
of forces. In turn, the latter organs must manage all
the scientific establishments of their own branch of forces.
As regards the peripheral network of scientific organs
of the Ministry as a whole, and of the branches of forces,
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i.e., academies and scientific-research institutes, in
each case their scientific work should be directed toward
the accomplishment of an immediate primary task of a par-
ticular faculty or institute - operational-tactical
or technical. The cooperation of military theory with
research in the field of weapons and equipment should fun-
damentally be ensured just as is done now. In the acade-
mies it may be founded on the joint work of related
faculties; in institutes - on the existence in each one
of them of an overall tactical department parallel with
the specialized departments, etc.. The appropriate
staffing of the scientific-technical councils of insti-
tutes and academic councils of academies must play a
definite role.
This reveals the double subordination of scientific
organs, that actually exists even now anyway: in all res-
pects - to its immediate command (institutes - to chiefs
of the appropriate directorates; faculties - to chiefs
f academies, etc.);and in a special respect, more pre-
disely in a scientific-methodological respect - to the
scientific organ of the senior command. In the final
analysis the faculties of academies and institutes in
this special respect must be directed by the scientific
management organs of the main staffs of the branches of
forces, and these organs -- to the management of the
General Staff scientific organ. The central scientific
establishments of the Ministry that do not enter into the
composition of any central directorates must also be
directly subordinate to the latter.
As at present, the actual plans of their work -
long-range and annual - must be made up by each scientific
organ, being guided by the directions of its command and
senior scientific organ. In order to decrease inconven-
iences connected with double subordination, the senior
scientific organs must give basic directions to the junior
ones only through the chain of command, for example; to 50X1-HUM
scientific organs of the main staffs - in the name of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403270001-0 J
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403270001-0
the General Staff. In order to avoid delay in the planning
of these instructions from the General Staff to the main
staffs,they must obviously arrive not later than 1 September,
and from the main staffs to the directorates, not later than
1 October of each year.
In all plans not less than a 20 percent reserve must
remain for performing "specialized" ("fakultativnyy") tasks
that were not envisaged earlier. With the goal of improv-
ing planning, to insure first of all the essential subjects
and to eliminate the search for the most important questions,
when "time limits are already being felt", each planning stage
must have and must constantly maintain at a current level,
thought out, systematic lists of the most important su jects
for research work in the basic sectors under their juris-
diction.
Science constantly enters into our life and into mili-
tary affairs more and more. The purposeful "maneuvering"
of scientific forces and capabilities to point them toward
the performance of the main tasks that facilitate progress
has vast significance that has already been recognized.
In this respect, the newly formed State ittee, of the
Council of Ministers USSR for theme ordination of 9cientifi
Research-Work is the main aid to the leadership ofthe country.
There is no doubt that the management of the entire
system of military scientif ic-research work must be organ-
ized in a centralized. way something like this, with differ-
erices arising from the specific characteristics of the Armed
Forces. But successful overall treatment of the paramount
military-scientific problems can be ensured only by the
presence in the system of this--work of a corresponding com-
petent top military-scientific organ.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403270001-0