MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PREPARATION OF THE REAR AREA FOR SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR, BY COLONEL-GENERAL F. MALYKHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
Sate Problem in the Premaration of the P
Area for Suan;rt of
the Armed Forces in the Initial P of a Wer
by Colonel-General F. Nalykhin
Fundamental Changes in the nature of a future war require a basically
nev approach to the resolution of a series of high4 important pr-ems
in the meteriel-technicsl support of armed codbet.
We have in mind, first of all, the prObleme of rear area sIpprirt
of all types of Armed Forces when missile troops have the leading role
in the theaters of military operatioos and simultaneously, .t ,-!. ful-
filment of 'Fissions for the protection of the zone of the interior and
the groupings of the Armed Forces in the depth from enemy strlkee with
weapons of mass destruction. In brief, we are discussing the necessity
of developing special theoretical postulates concerning the utilization
of those tremendous forces and means Which will be made availabl, by
the State for the comprehensive rear area support at the Armed Forc'es
at the beginning of a war.
In none of the previous wars was this problem so keen and urgent.
Dien during the period of the Second World War the attention of
military leaders with respect to the rear area support of the Armed
Forces was directed mainly at the delivery 'of allotted meteriel-technicel
supplies to the fronts and to their prover utilisation in the theater*
of military operations. Moreover, the delivery of a significant port
at the supplies to the consumers, i.e., to the distribution stations
of the frost, was carried out by elements of the nations) economy.
Those supplies which were delivered to the central supply elesemts,
could be delivered to the fronts in a planned manner by using the
regularly operating transportation network of the country. Te
disruption of delivery plans by the enemy took place primaril7 in the
rear areas of the treat and in zones directly adjacent to them.
COepletely different conditions for rear area support at the
Armed Forces will prevail in modern warfare.
In delineating the comditioms of work in the rear area of the
Armed ltreiel it is necessary to bear the following factors it
above all: 50X1-HUM
- the necessity at simultaneous support of operations of fronts
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
OUA I -muivi
?
?
in different theaters of military operatic= and of those groupings
at the Armed Forces which are carrying out combat missions in the
deep rear;
- the provision of reliable transportation networks for the
rear area and for the front, and between theaters of military
operations, for supplying fronts with everything necebsary and for
carrying out strategic and large operational rigroupinas;
- the difficulties of ensuring protection of the rear area of
the Armed Forces from the aeons of mass destruction over the entire
territory of the country.
In modern conditiona the combat readiness of the Armed Farces, as
never before, depends upon the timely preparation and stability of
rear area support. For this reason the theoretical development and
serious scientific investigition of praline of the riser area support
of the Arnett Farces at its present stags must be viewed as the scot
important tasks.
The modern rear services of the Armed forces represent a hag*
organise which at be arranged in such a way as to support continuously,
with minimum losses, the coast activity at fronts, the Antiaircraft
Defense Troops of the Country, and reserves of the Cemeral Meadquarters
Of the Supreme Nigh COsmand in precise conformity with their missions
and the situation.
the rear servicesofth firmed eouron_i_m
should z4erstsnd both the forcesjadment incliAmOimelgjeligmalt
nth2_11e_ntaf the Armed Forces end those attached b the State
to the uriediction of a milita ccmmDt far cell materiel technics
troops at a. lair
,tiPb. DM ?
Depending upon the nature of the alssiome being fulfilled, conditions
CC work LI or 2 words *Way and the organisational ceder, the farces
and means ce the rear area the Armed /trees bie dividee ---
50X1-HUM
follemineelemmats: troop, apserational, and central.
3 3 wordsar misei-uplies and property or
Lew troop elanneesaterieltechnical supplies
is composed at row services units and subunits,p
words sissini7 Of supporting the combat activity at large units ad
units7.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1-HUM
?
Th P fIrlett. ersent of the rear is carposed organizationally
of trke---r---tr6cialorigarl. of rear services large units, =Its, and
insteliations of fronts, armies, fleets (flotillss), and FVO districts.
It is designated for organization and implementation of measures for
eateriel, ter.thnical, and medical support of troops, preparation,
restcration,and utilization of transportation rou.es, and other work
in support of the combat activity of troops.
The central elesert of the rear services includes a large numt4r
of varic.us lar Ee units, units, and installations, bases, depots, arsenals,
repair plants, and other production enterprises of the Ministry of
Defense designated for the rear services support of all the Armed Forces
of the country (their vari(us' types), and at the same time constituting
the reserve of the Supreme High Command and Commanders-in-chief of
the types of Armed Fcrces.
The central organs of the rear services of the Armol Forces utilize
the transportation network of the national economy in accordance with
the full needs ce the Armed Forces, and also the forcen and means of
Mete reserves and the mobilization potentisl of industry prepare
during peacetime and assigned to their jurisdiction by special govern-
ment decrees.
0 or 3 words missinein the preparatico of the rear services of
t,..Armed Forces for warfare is eitremely Urge. In this article we '
shall endeavour to set forth cur point of view only on the most important
prOblema, having,in our opinion, primery significance for fulfillieg
practical missions of preparation of the rear $0711C4* for the support
of the Armed Forces in the initial period of a war.
In these problems we refer first of all to the changing role of
stock* of materiel, determination of their use and principles of their
echelonment? the preperstion of communication routes, and 20*** of
tramsport, and problems of developing new forms of control of the rear
services of the Armed. Farces. 50X1-HUM
* ? ?
With the growth in size of argies, &WU.= of sew, sore sophisti-
cated means of armed combat, increase in offensive tempos, and the
inteusity of defensive eigagsmemta, the materiel requiremects of the
troops increase corrowedingly. During the First World War the Nussian
Arey ankpend?d about C041 Mania* tali of ammunitioa and a toes.' of several
tens-of thousands of toos of fuel. "luring the period at the Second
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
anvl UI IRA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
?
World War the total expenditure of ammunition by the Soviet Armed
Forces cqoprisia-abOut 8 million tonsi8nd7fuel- more than 13 million
tens.
The matertel expenditures of the Armed Forces in a future war
apparently will increase even more. The high level of tee'snical out-
fittins of the Armed Forces has caused a significant increase in the
estimsted units of supply expressed in weight. Thus, the weight of
a unit of fire of a modern front (without aviation) currently amounts
to 18.5 thousand to, and fuel servicing exceeds 22 thousand tons.
Calculations indicate that for 8 to 10 calendsr days of an offensive
operation, developine seed. of 80 to 1CC km in a calendar day, and
for the period of its preparation, the troops of a front may expend
upwards of 240 thousand tons of fuel and about :Lao thousand tons of
various ammunition. To this should be added the probability of
increased combat lsses from weapons of sees destruction. It follows
that the qsantitative growth of materiel expenditures conforms to an
objective law.
Along with the quantitative changes in modern conditions, as a
result of equipping the Armed Forces with Delf types of arms, greet
qualitative changes in esteriel requirammAs have taken place.
A future war will be a nuclear/missile war, in which the decisive
type of Armed Forces will be missile troop* of strategic designation,
and the basis of the firepower of each of the types of Armed YCITOS
will be their missile weapons. In connection with this, the supply
of troops with missilea, missile fuel, and other special materiel for
missile troops acquires primary significance. The need, however, for
cooventiomal types of ammunition, especially for tube artillery and
aircraft bombs, is decreasing 'significantly at the present time.
Speaking of the decrease of the needs of the troops for the.. types
of ammunition, we are basing it an the fact that fire preparation and
the support of operations during broad use of-nuclear/missile weepons
will undergo great changes. An ottessive will be cerried out at
great speeds with brood utilisstiom at nuclear weapons. Secleer/
missile weapcme will also farm the basis of detmesive fire.
So less serious qualitative changes have alsotehem place in
the fuel requirements of the Armed Parcae. The proportion at aviation
fuel in the total expenditure of teal has signiticept4 decreseed,
with a simultaneous colossal growth in the fuel requirement of group&
equipmeet. The supply of troops with sdssile fuel bee acquired the
greatest significance.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDFC1IN:60I1Fli'000403250001-2
?
?
Sericus qualitative changes in the requirements of the Armed
Forces also arise from their increased technical outfitting.
In a future war, much very cceplex equipment will be used. For
this reason one of the nein missions of the rear services is the un-
interrupted supply of the Armed Forces with technical equipment for
the use, repair,snd servicing of nuclear, missile,and radioelectronic
equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, and other materiel.
While, during the Second World War, this equipment cceprised
altoeether only 8 to 10 percent of the weight of expended sniticm,
fuel, and rations, its present proportion has grown to 20 to 25 percent.
The preceding statements permit the conclusion that under modern
conditions the basic types of materiel supplies for support of the
Armed Forces may be considered to be: missiles and assorted nuclear
ammunition, mi .IC fuel, artillery ammunition fuel for ground
equipment and aircraft, technical equipment, a;x1 retinas.
The uninterrupted support of troops with these types of materiel
supplies as the first priority in modern conditions is one of the
chief factors in tueir high ccubet readiness, end depends upon the
status of the supplies and accumuleted stooks in case of a war.
In our time the significance of materiel supplies has grown
immeasurably.
The role and size of stocks depends first of all on the volume
Cf materiel expenditures, the urgency with which needs may arise, and
the capacity of the transportation system to guarantee uninterrupted
delivery of freight from the place of production to the consumers.
tbder modern conditions, with increased requirements for materiel
supplies and the greet vulnerability of the routes of ceamunication
and transportation, guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow at goods
will
be extremely difficult, and in certain instances altogether impossible.
Namely for this reason, stocks a materiel supplies crested In advance
in all elements of the Armed Forces 11111? as never berme, be essential
for guaranteeing the constant combat readiness at troops. This is
especially important for guaranteeing the strategic deployment of the
Armed Forces and conduct ot operatic= &wing the initial period ot
a war, when industry will only be converting to military production,
the transportation network will be occupied mainly with ww"r5606 -HUM
for the eoneentratiN1 of troops, end in e maw of areas soy ww
disrupted by the first massive nuclearimiselle strikes of the enemy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R0-063IA0001-2
?
?
Arguzente are now in procel concerning the size and order of
echelonment of stockl; crebted in pe,..;cetice. Certain comrades advise
maximum reduction of stocks wi7n the ain of supposedly easing the
burden of troops fulther. We are against such an approach to the
resolution of this important prchler.
The correct determination of the essential scale of materiel
stocks accumulated in udvz2nce ru:+s been a subject of special concern
to governments, general staffs, and the rear services elements of
their armed forces throughout the course of the entire history of
warfare.
In our opinion, during the development of plane for the rear
services support of the Arred Forces in the initial period of a
modern wur, careful consideration should be given such factors as:
- the strategic goals facing the armed forces along strategic
axes (theaters of military operations);
- the total volume of materiel requirements tr or 2 words missine
of the Armed Forces;
- the probable period of conversion of current production to
military needs;
- the degree of preparation of the transportation system of the
country for uninterrupted work in carrying out planned movements of
troops and bring12.4 up of materiel supplies under conditions of the
initial nuclear/missile strikes;
- the economic potentialities of the country (i the combined
countries), and the state of combat equipment development (the
possibility of rapid obsolescence of accumulated ammunitioo,
technical, and other supplied).
On the basis of the experience of the last war, and after
ccasideretiom of the postwar changes of the factors Indic:dated above,
we assume that, in preparation for 'lir, it is eseential to create
stocks of material in advance directly within the troops, with the
armies and fronts planned for deployment, and under the jurisdiction
or the central argon of the rear services of the Armed Farces. We
consider the following Ube the optimum stem of the.. stocks spgaicalae
to the western axis:
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
stock.r of deidt.,yd froi,1?1 (robils troop, amy,
front c:doul-ted on the on.ii requireent of the troops;
- supplies of the centr31 orgin of the rear services, calculated
on the three-month requirements of all the Armed Forces of the country,
taking mailization buildup into account.
When determining the size of the stocks, which are eligible for
prior creation and regular maintenance within the troops, in army and
district depots (depots of groups of troops), we,proreed frac the fact
that in the first 20 to 25 calendar days after the initiation of war,
the main types of transport will be converted primarily to operational
movements of troops for supporting strategic concentration and
deployment_of fut'4re_fronts.1 On overland communication routes a
large number of barriers anl centers of persistent contamination will
be formed, A portion of thr piacetimc stocks will be subject to
contamination or will be annihilated by the initial nuclear strikes
of the enemy. For this reason the delivery of materiel supplies
during, the course?dr-the first and even pertly during the second
Offensive operation of the front viii be extremely difficult. In
vdliaivi it apparently will not exceed 25 to 30 percent of the monthly
requirements of the troops, which might cover only the combat loeses
and form some reserve for supporting the combst effectiveness at troops
until the moment of establishment of a system of uninterrupted supply
of the operating army for the delivery of everything necessary from
the depots and bases of the center.
In the determination of the size of stocks, which it is feasible
to accumulate in advance and maintain at central bases, taking into
account all the above-listed factors, we to as a base the time
necessary for the buildup of the mobilization potential and fOr the
conversion of industry to war production.
As is buyinit,te_nont.., were required during the last world
war for the conversion of industry the military needs of our country,
during the course of which bases for production of combat equipment
and various military materiel were crested in interior areas. Already
1. The_poried et the met intensive operational movements on railroads
otjlit WO at the beginning of the asoond World Wer lasted for about
a mouth. Muria; this time the volume of supply aavosiazts vas very low.
arinitte first 10 days of mObillsatiOn it made up altogether only 10
percent of the total volume of military railway sommosta.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
50X1-HUM
In October-November 1?:,41,.our Armed Forces began to receive regularly
everything necessary for combat and life from current production. It
is this very period that we are taking into account, proposing minimum
quantities of supplies at the center for supporting the Armed Forces
at the beginning of a future war.
We may hear objections that the last war was started with extremely
disadvantageous conditions of enemy superiority; the organization of
military production in the surer of 1941 was combined with the evacuation
of a large number of enterprises to the east; in addition to this, our
supply organs did not have sufficient practical experience in the ful-
filment of these complex missions, etc.
All this, undoubtedly, should be considered. However, it is
impossible to overlook the new tl.fficulties connected with the enemy
capability of carrying cut nuclear/missile strikes against important
econcmic centers over the entire territory of the country. For this
reason we take into consideration the potential possibility of annihilation,
or heavy destruction, of a number of enterprises and bases and, consequently,
alsola substantial decrease in mobilization potential and State reserves
in the first days of a war.
Under modern conditions, with the great vulnerability of the lines
of cormaication, the correct determination of the echelonrent of
stocks of msteriel supplies will have exceptionally important significance.
The accepted order of echelonment and location of stocks has direct
influence on the creation of conditions of autonomy and independence
of troop operations and on the viability of the system of rear area
support during widespread utilization of weapons of mass destruction.
We consider that for a deploying front, 05 regards a western axis,
stocks should be echeloned in the following order: (
- with the troops (in regimental end divisional depots) - mails
stocks on motor vehicles in amounts required by the troops for three )
o four calendar days of medium intensity combat;
- in army depots . sladlarly mobile stocks for two calendar days;
- in front depots (of military districts, groups of troops) for
20-25 calendar day requirements of the grouping being supported.
A modern division is a blsbly mail., fully mechanised large unit,
capable of engaiame In combat umder complex comditions, along an
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
fc7.7c, etc. For this reason it is very
import3nt to crezite defir.ite ccrAtticxc of autonomy for the division,
opportunities to conduct combat while cut off from bases of supply,
with broken corennicetion lines, and in other instances of complex
combst situetions. In the interests of easing the burden of the
division, during the last years its rear services have been significantly
decreased and ritocks of meteriel supplies have been substantially
lowered. Further decrease of stocks in the divisioc, in our opinion,
is alreed;,, irspossible. As long as the basic means of transport
ccntitues to Le lzand transportation, based on highly vulnerable routes
of comurtcatior the lowering of the mobile stooks below the level
of three to fo;_:,r calendar day requirements of the division will
inesitehly hsrs, the cm:het effectiveness of the troops. This pertains
esp-scisily to fuel, vitholit ichmosierm,fully mechanized troops may
besoce immobile targets for the enemy.
It is kncur that the expenditure of fuel during a calendar day
when the speed of the offensive is 80 to 10C km may amount to: diesel
fuel for be. tanks, 1.3 fuelinga, and for medium tankn, 0.7 fuelings;
aviation gasoline for armored carriers, 0.7 fuelings, mctor vehicle
gasoline for coubat and transport vehicles, 0.45 fUelinge. If with
such expenditure the divisional supply of diesel fuel drove to two
fuelings, and aviation and Other gpsollne to 1.25 ftelings, then in
case of disruption of transport, the troops will not be able to
continue the fulfilment of their combat missions after one and a
half to two calendar days.
For this reason we categorically object to those who, viewing
the idea of posing the burden of Lsucve es goal in itself,
recommend lowering the fuel stocks in a division to one and. half
to two oalender day requirements.
We consider that the very minimum nails stocks of fuel in a
division must be: motor vehicle gasoline 1.4 fuelinge, diesel fuel -
2.5 fue11ngs.1
The combined-arms and tank armies, under modern conditions, form
the basis of both operational internal and operatiomal interfrontel
maneuver. For this resswn, it is extremely essential to have at the
1. All fuel calculatioes were carried out on the basis that motor
vehicles have a cruising range of 500 he, and far tank*, taking into
consideration the tail in all fuel tanks making up the fuel system of
tanks.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
Ji;o&j Cf thE.: ti.e3t mini 1 reserves of meteriel
oeppliee for coceetioal lolldahce on enorp and unexpected chenges in
the situation. Such a reserve is proposed by us for a combined-arms
army on the scale of troop requirements for two calendar days, and
for a tank army - for one calendar day. 50X1-HUM
In connection with such a lowering of stocks with the troops and
at mobile army beses, as wall as in connection with the significant
decreace of ether forcee and materiel of these elements of the rear
services, there has appeared a necessity to alter the echelonment of
stocks of a front. in the interests of bringing these stocks nearer
to the troops Lopportel, we consider that up to 6o percent, of the=
should be maire.ained in fcrwerd beses of the front, which, with great
strain on the cocrunication lines, cen move their sections. forward.
The remainin 40 percent of the stocks of the front may be kelt in
rer are bezooi of' the front for the regular replenishildg of forward
bases, for deliveries by air transport to armies, and for the direct
support of troops carrying out missions in the depth of the rear
area.
Such a system of stocks echelonment in the zone of operations
of the front, in our opinion, more readily satisfies the requirements
of uninterrupted support of tropys under the complex conditions, of
modern operations.
CertAJI comrades consider that in order to avoid unnecessary
transshipment, bases should not be formed In the deep rear area of
a front. Thus, for examyle, it is orol2oeed to have one front
missile-technical base with tw-_-) sections, which must deploy in an
area alone a 200 to 250 km front and 100 to 150 km in depth. Such
a scheme, seemingly very simple it firet glance, my become, in
actual conditions, very complex, and will not guarantee the ful-
filment of assigned missions. It does net satisfy the requirements
of musimum dispersion, stability of suppiy during the sudden appearance
of barriers on lints of communication, and hinders support of missile
large units deployed in the depth of the rear area.
In vies of the great vulnerability of rear area lines of
communication, remoteness of theaters of military operatives, and
the long-rerge ability of modern Amass of attack, the problem of
correct echelonment of stocks of the central organ of the rear
services o the Armed Forces has arisen sharply at the present time.
The inveetigetion of this problem leads to the conclusion that
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
cur stocks of the center should be maintained in, two.,?helons: in, the border zone and in the zone of interior.i/Bv the
-.--rder one we mean the groups of our troops located on the territory
o countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the territory of Warsaw Pact
_
-oomtries contiguous with our borders, and, for militars, A4,.+-4ots
X1
the border areao of the USSR. 50 -HUM
The moving out of bases of the center on the Western axis beyond
%r borders, with the moving of stocks nearer to troops supported,
will permit Us in initial operations to avoid dependence on.vulnerable
railroad meeting points of Soviet and European gauges.
During the ectelonment of stocks in border areas, their distribution
along the axes of prOtiable troop operations must also be provided for,
taking into consideration requirements of groupings of the Arni2d Forces
for materiel stow along a particular axis.
KI.Iseethor il?the bases of the center in the bOrilitT zone, there
should be 50 .tc;, 6o percent of the total volume of stocks of the center
=_are:.accumtilsteci ahead of ,time. It is advisable to create the
remaining portion (50 to 4o percent) in the zone of interior, located
in fcattered places sheltered from nuclear/missile strikes of the
enemy. These stocks will be utilized to support the full mobilization
at the Armei Forces, troop operations of the antiaircraft defense of
the cuntry, missile troops of strategic designation, and other
groupings fulfilling combat missions in the sone of interior.
During the distribution of stocks created ahead of time, special
etw:entim should be given to their preservation during enemy attack
with weapons of mass destruction. The preservation of troop and army
stocks is assured chiefly by the mobility of bases and depots. Insofar
as the stocks of the front and bases of the center are concerned, in
the interests of great security, they should be located at an appropriate
distunrze from probable tArgets of nuclear strikes, in sheltered places
and ,-...arefully concealed. Unfortunately, at the present tine this vital
in,:ipal is a long way from being Observed everywhere.
/t appears to us, that we should not be carried away with the
creation of large bases, the sheltering and concealment Of which would
require be resources. /t is considerably mere adtventagmcmm to create
smeller bases, to spread them over a larger territory, and place they,
at a distance from possible targets of ems*. nuclear/missile strikes.
The stocks of materiel supplies at the center need not be located
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
only in bases under the jurisdiction of the military comuend. A
portion of these sto-iks may also be located in bases of State materiel
reserves, but which are earmarked even in peacetime for support of
troops in the initial period of a war. The military command must
take part in the determination of the size and points for locating
these stocks. The stocks of the center must be constantly kept
prepared for movement, and ramps and approach routes must be prepared
in advance on the various fronts for all types of transpor50X1-HUM
Under modern conditions large shipments of rateriel supplies,
from the central bases and depots, can be accomplished by air trans-
port, so it is very important to have a prepared network of airfields
In the area of these bases, approaches to them, transportation for
bringing up freight to the airfields, and also a labor force with
loading-unloadin6 equipment.
Such preparation has special significance for missile bases,
dumps of missile fuels, and special articles (izdeliye), belonging to
the armament of missile troops. The most advantageous way to move
materiel supplies of this type will be over great distances from the
deep rear directly to the points of their utilization.
Thus, the most important problem of supporting troops in the
initial period of a war and during the strategic deployment of the
Armed Forces is the accumulation of the required stocks of wateriel
supplies ahead of time, their proper location and echelonment, and
their reliable protection from enemy strikes. The timely and purpose-
ful resolution of this problem will form the most important materiel
basis for armed conflict in the initial period of a future war. This
will also reflect, to e significant degree, upon the successes of our
Armed Forces during the subsequent course of the mar.
* * *
The conditions for conduct of armed combat in s future war bring
Up a series of new, highly important problems in the realm of prepa-
ration of communication lines and means of transport.
In the interests of assuring the required viability of the rail
and motor vehicle roads which form the basis ot the transportation
system in internal areas and in the prefrontal eonss it is eusential,
still in peacetime, to carry out a nuiber of lmportiint measures.
Among these measures are tbst following, above all:
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
anvl UI IRA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
- the development of a network of roads on the required strategic
and operational axes;
- the construction of derp and local bypasses of large junctions,
administrative-political/and industrial-economic centers;
- the preparation of alternate crossings over water obstacles;
- the preparation of modern types of transport.
In the postwar period our country has significantly broadened
the program of construction of lines of communication.
A large measure of capital investment is directed toward the
fulfilment of these missions. Wfth the goal of iodising after the
interests of the Armed Forces, the appropriate elements of the Ministry
of Defense must Very vigorously place before the planning elements of
the national economy the missions for ensuring dependable communication
lines for the vitally important strategic axes which run through
economically less-developed areas of the territory of the country.
These very important measures must be given foremost attention by
State planning organs, as well as by organs of the Ministry of Defense.
We consider one of the most isrertent problens in the preparation
of the rear services of the Armed Forces for war to be the long-range
development of a network of communication lines in precise cCoformity
with strategid plans being developed for the conduct of armed combat.
Under conditions of a modern nuclesrimissile war, when the
stability of the operation of networks of communication lines in
internal areas of the country becomes the most important factor in
the maneuvering of armed forces and in ensuring the fUlfilment at
strategic missions by them, views on the preparation of communication
routes for operation in wartime charge radically. At present the
mission of constructing deep and local (depending upon the importance
of the target) bypasses of centers of communication routes, large
ststions, tranashippinioand other narrow points and aectors, as well
as bypasses of large administrative and industrial centers, should
be pushed to the fore. Only by loving such bypasses prepaimodabsad
Of time is it possible to count on assuring %uninterrupted operation
of transport by rapid transfer of the flow of trains end motor Im6hiola
march calumets to alternate routes or to %%Vacant axes. 50X1 -HUM
It is no less important to carry out preptratogy measures ahead
of time, ensuring uninterrupted military movements across large aster
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
barriers. In our opinion, the resolution of this problem may be
achieved by implementation of a covl.lex of various measures. Of these,
we must first of all mention the construction of main alternate bridges,
the cutting and filling of roadbeds, and also in certain instances, the
laying of load-bearing surfaces on the approaches to points where
temporary alternate crossings are being erected. To shorter the periods
for reestatlishment of traffic in cases of destruction of bridges by
the enemy, it is essential, already at the present time, to develop
broadly the procurement and accumulJtion of stocks of materials for
erecting floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry crossings.
In addition, it is essential to hove such msterials directly under
the control of the Ministry of Defense for concentration along the
most important operational axes, as well as under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Transport Construction for maintenance of rear area
roads where barriers are most likely to occur. In the fulfilment of
this mission, a significant reserve for the decrease of capital
investment may be the adaptation of floating river equipment for the
erection of temporary floating rail and motor vehicle bridgaa and
ferry crossings. In terms of capacity of the river tug fleet and
freight-carrying capacity of the towed fleet in river basins, the
Soviet Union at the present time occupies first place in Europe and
second in the world. This fleet is growing rapidly. During the
period from 1951 to 1958 alone, the freight-carrying capacity of the
self-propelled and towed river fleets increased by more then 3.5
million toms.
In the makeup of the river fleet there is a large rusher of
barge-lighters. with a freight-carrying capacity of 300-2000 tons,
open double-bottomed !petal barges with freight-carrying capacities
of 1800-3000 tons, and other cargo vessels, entirely suitable for
rapid eretion of floating bridges of any length. For the rational
utilizatin of this resesve and appropriate preparation of veltbell,
it appears essential to develop their fixed tonnage for aeries
production and to achieve the introduction of certain design changes,
especially in the superstructure.
Closely related to the resolution of the problems listed is the
need to organise vigorous protection of major transport installations
from the means of enemy attack (allotment of antiaircraft defense means).
It is extremely essential at the initiation of military operations to
screen basic installetions (large centers on main lines of strategic
designation, rail meeting points of Soviet and Vest European (gauges, large
bridges) reliably with antimissile and antisireraft weapcms. It appears
to us that this problem must be worked out beforehand by the joint
efforts of elements of PVC Troops of the Country and the rear services
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
50X1-HUM
of the Arred FolceL.
In the resolution of problen concerning the stability of the
system of the rear services support of the Armed Forces and the
strategic moneuverinE of troops under modern conditions, the continuity
of the transportation process has very important sigilificance. At
the present time -a portion-of our Armed Forces along the western Axis,
are located beyond the territorial lleits of the Ma. For this
reason we must closely tie in the execution of all mieiions connected
with the preparation of networks of communication lines end means of
transport on our territory with analOgOUD measures carried out on the
network:3 of corlrIniLion lins ofAdjacentconntries. This pertains
espectIlly to the re:..dines of rail and motor vehicle roods, as well
as to sei trunort in maritime theaters of military operations.
Modern warfare creates such difficulties in the organization of
troop transport that the fulfilment of these missions can be achieved
only under conditions of combined utilization of all types of transport.
Even in the last war, depending on conditions, various types of
transportation were utilized. Under modern conditions the necessity
of our intensive and cooperative operation of the various typea of
transport has incre3sed even more. For this reason the preparation
of communication routes and means of transport for operation in war-
time should be carried out at once, proceeding precisely from the
problem of their combined utilization.
Let us examine in somewhat more detail the possibilities of
utilizing reasures for the preparation of each of the types of transport.
E5112m4129.11. The utilization of railroads in s future war
will depend on the conditions of the theater of military operations,
the density of networks and other factors mentioned above. If we take
the es tern Theater of Military Operations, then vithill its limits,
on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp, the density of
railroad netvorks is 9.2 km pox 100 square km, and in capitalist
countries It reaches 10.7 km. Sachs density of railroads in this
theater ot military operations, even under conditions of the use at
nuclear missile weapons, permits haps of the possibility of carrying
out a significant volume of military railroad shipments within 18-dm-HUM
confines of the rear areas of fronts deploying there end in the
prefrontal some. Railroad transport in the internal areas of our
country will play. basic role in the total volume of sbippauts Amp
it is prepared beforehand.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105W00040.3260001-2
?
?
An extremelTi calpiicated mission for the rear services of the
Ars'..ed Forces will be ensuring cel_tinuity of the transportation process
from the cent(-r of production t?Jaces) to consumers. In the fal-
filment of 'jbis mission, we must engphasize, above all, such measures
as ensuring dependable opera'6ion at the meeting points of railroads
of r.Ovier, and West European gauges, and the organization of trans-
loadinF operations at points where barriers have resulted from
ene,77 strikes (in the destruction of bridge crossings over large
'eater lines and railroad tunnel sectors).
For ensurinF uninterrupted supply of our Armed Forces operating
in the period of the Second World War on the territory of European
countries, along our Western borders were organized ten trancloading
areas, and a large number of transloading stations were set up.
Such a fundamental system of transloading areas may also be
adopted in a future war, but it must be organized with consideration
of the new conditions of nuclear/missile var. Za4b_Iransloading_area
at the meeting points of railroads of Soviet. and West European gauges
is a huge military installation and a huge installation of the
national economjy. It must include several stations with sectors of
deep extensions of railroad lines of various gauges, a branching net-
work of motor venicle roads and pipelines, a communications system,
a large quantity of loading-unloading equipment, and specially
prepared places for changing the trucks of the rolling stock, as
well as transloading bases with depots and means for transporting
freight. The degree of prior preparation of tranalosding areas
for operations under conditions of a nuclear/missile war viii render
a decisive influene on the feasibility of maintaining uninterrupted
deli7ery of materiel supplies from the zone of interior to the
distrituting stations of the fronts.
.-')ometimes proposals are introduced to reject tranaloading areas
and to resort, at the initiation of a war, to the altering of gauges
of West European lines to Soviet gauges. In the period of the Second
World War it was not uncommon to resort to such a measure. Thus,
in the zones of operation of the Belorussian and the First Ukrainian
fronts, to the line of the Vistula River, most of the railroad lines
were altered; later the following main lines were fully altered:
Kaunas-Insterburgehoenigsberg-Marienburg; Btalystok-Tlusscs-Ostrolenka-
Deutach-Eylau; Bres-lWaraav-Poanan-Berltn.Lvorr-Frxemysl-Krakow-Katowice-
Breslau. Experience showed that to rely upon the alt50x1 -HUM h.sle
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
50X1-HUM
main lines is not advisable. This must be resorted to only in exceptional
case, in individual secondary sectors. The alteration of bosic main
linas may lead to broed gauge lines' cutting the entire network of
railrceds of European countries into isolated areas, and this will
drastically limit the utilization of local transport in rear areas of
the fronts and in the prefrontal zone. Along with this there will be
insufficient native rolling stock and locomotives in the event of
a sharp increasc, in the length of the network, And it will be
impossile to utilize West European gauge rolling stock. Besides,
the smaller dimensions of the auxiliary structures on West European
gauge railroad lines would make it more difficult to utilise our
rolling stock, especially in the organization of tvo-way traffic on
two-way bridges and tunnels. In connection with this we consider it
mire advantageous to concentrate on ensuring the stable operation of
a diversified network of transloading areas at meeting points of
railroads of different gauges.
A new and extremely complex problem in ensuring the continuity
of transport networks between the front and the rear viii be the
organization of the surmounting of obstructed places along railroad
lines, especially in the internal areas of the country. The mcet
rational form for organizing this operation appears to be the creation
/of temporary trensloading areas (vremeonyy per:gruzochnyy rayon VPR).
In the composition of the VPR it is essential to have various special
railroad formetions, as well as motor vehicle, veld, pipeline, leading-
unloading, God other equipment. The basic mission at the temporary
trensloading areas must be the emsuring of continuity in the flow of
freight without a substantial decree ee in the tome of shipments
during the surnounting of obstructed places until through railroad
traffic is restored.
We consider that such orgenisetions should be provided for in the
robilisatioo plane of railroads for operations om railroeds Of interval
areas of the country. To support tremolo/adios at meter barriers, as
well as at tunnel sectors of railroads on the territory at Western
countries (outside the borders of epereting fronts), it Is eseestial
to have rather strong reserves of this equipoise* ahich coat be moved
up to an area where needed in a abort period Of time.
It is expedient to have 'While formatimeOf teiporery tresained-
ing areas in the reserve of the rear services of the Allot neves for
aiding fronts to surmount obstructed:pieces. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
?
The volupe of reconstruction work on railroads in a future war
will significantly exceed the work carried out during the period of
thf. Se::ond World War.
Rtking this into account, it is essential to begin serious work
on preparatior for the restoration of internal railroads and those
Ir the prefrontal zone. In the compIex of preparatory work, primary
significance is attached to the creation and training of special
forrations, the prior creation of stocks of '11:pair-reconstruction
meteriale, and others. All these problems in internal areas of the
country will be resolved by elements of the transport ministries.
11wever, it is essential for us to submit our requirements now and
participate in the measures which are being carried aut.
More intensive conversion to diesel-electric traction takes on
special significance for railroad rolling stock, will increase
significantly the transport capacity of railroads, and will facilitate
:econstruction operations. A significant increase must be obtained in
the proportion in the car park of large-capacity flatcars and tank cars
for the transport of petroleum products. It is extremely essential
to create, in the neer future, a sufficient perk of special cars and
flatcars for the transport of missiles and missile equipment, and also
tank oars for the transport of the components of liquid missile fuel.
The problem of creating a sufficient park of trucks and steam locomotive
of West European geuge which any be utilised for movement from trans-
loading areas along railroads of West Suropean gauge in the first days
of a war, acquires great significance.
4at,,27. transport in maritime theaters of military ?Operations and
when there are internal water routes along the axes of combat operations,
and in the zone of interior, will carry out a significant vcaume of
troop transport, especially the transport of supplies.
For the preparation of water transport, the problems of organisa-
tion of transloading areas and outfitting them with equipmemst capable
of carrying out rapid transloading of armament* and all type of
supplies from an unequilTed shore to vessels anchored in the road-
stead and vice versa, should be decided beforehand. it is necessary
to carry out scientific-research and experimental design work for the
creation of special equipment of sea-going river vessels for the
transport of modern types of weapons and anivaltion and the development
of transloading equipment on ooard the vessels.
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
-H U M
?
?
For the maintenance of water communication routes in a state of
conatant usability, it viii be necessary to craate special formations.
In our opinion, it is expedient to have a part of the vessels
In the composition of the naval fleets and flotillas adapted so that
they are capable of operating at see and on large river waterways.
This will make it possible, in many instances, to avoid the rather
difficult operations of carrying out transloaditig work in roadsteads.
Motor vehicle roads and motor vehicle tranetcrt dljverjeg
played a large roLe in carrying out tranaport of troops and supplies
within a front already during the past war. There were also frequent
instances when motor vehicle transport was utilized for delivery of
materiel supplies to the fronts in accordance with the plans of the
Centraelements of the rear area, and for urgent transport of
personnel replacements. Thus, in 1942tilevehicle park of the Reserve
CC the Supreme High Command (RVOK) transported up to 1.3 million
tons of various freight to the fronts, and altogether for 10 months
of 1943 - about 1.4 million toms of freight and 130 thousand personnel
replacements.
In connection with the large volume of motor vehicle shipments
of the center in the 1941 to 1943 period, the following special
military motor vehicle roads of the center were prepared and serviced:
Oorkly-to-Mbecow, Moscow-to-Leningrad, Mr,mcow-to-Volokolamek,
Moscow-to-Moshaysk, MOscow-to?Yukhnov, and others. Daring the final
stage of the war the MOscov-to-Warmaw-to-Barlin highway was in operation.
In modern conditions it is most probable that there will be,
not periodic, but constant use of motor vehicle transport along the
entire extent of the bisic axis from the sone of interior to the
operating fronts. Motor vehicle transport will ft/Atoll have to
supplement or duplicate railroad transport, but duriag a certain period
will fully replace it along individual axes.
In modern conditions large tcr vehiole highways will be utilised
not only for delivery of materiel .'plies, but chiefly tar the more-
sant ce troops in motor vehicles and by mechanised tract Ion, reserves,
and :al types of replacements. Yoe this reason the role at motor
vehicle roads is now growing and qualitatively changing.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
cnyi Inn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
In connection with this the problem of development of a network
of hard-surfaced motor vehicle roads arises shortly. In addition,
it is necessary to strive to improve corresp gly the transportability
and passability of motor vehicle roads on our t itory and on the
territory of countries of the Socialist Camp a ed with us. In an
adverse situation the holding up of motor vehicle transport in Darrow
places and delay in the flow of freight will be unavoidable.
The intensive transport traffic, and enemy actions against
important installations of basic motor vehicle communication routes
desends the carrying out of serious measures far their maintenance in
usable condition and their reconstruction. We suppose, that during
the first days of the war the basic motor vehicle highways of the
center must be serviced by special road-reconstruction and maintenance
formations, which must be capable of carrying out work of technical
concealment, reconstruction, and maintenance of the rear area motor
vehicle roads.
In the interests of ensuring a ugh degree of readiness of the
, road service for operations in the initial period of a mar, it appears
expedient to carry out large-scale preparatory work in peacetime, taking
into consideration the utilization of all forces andsmens of the
military establishment as well as civilian argenizations.
A special role in the preparation of military motor vehicle
roads will be played by such measure, as prior bul34np of stocks
of construction-repair materials, the procurement and concentration,
in necessary: locations, of spare structural components for reconstruction
at auxiliary structures, the preparation and proper setting-up in
peacetime of civilian road organizations equipped with machinery, the
development of bypasses of the most vulnerable place., etc.
The motor vehicle park of our country has grown significantly
during the postwar period, and is more Ulan 80 percent modernized
by the receipt at more highly perfected motor vehicles. litr
sqpipping the Soviet Army, especially the motor vehicle transport
laze, units and it. at central subordination, there viii appear,
Leaver increasing quantities, larger freight-capeeity motor vehl.cles
eith large trailers, semitrailers with inispendemt transmissiat4?
and motor vehicle trains. The introduction at this equipment will
pa:1dt a sharp increase in the trvieht capacity of traespart
and large units and viii signiticantly decrease lastistAmlaceding
aterations. From this it follows that it is essential for us to
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
submit, in a timely manner, the military requirements for newly
designed models of motor vehicle equipment, in ovder that during
motili=tion the motor vehicle park of the national economy might,
with great effectiveness, be utilized in all elements of the rear
services of the Armed Forces in wartime.
50X1-HUM
A task which cannot be postponed is the development within
the system of the Ministry of Defense of essential types of motor
vehicles, semitrailers, and motor vehicle trains for transport of ell
types of missiles, missile fuels, and other special freight for
supporting missile troops. Here we are epeeking of special motor
vehicle transport suitable for operations in the central element of
transport.
Pipeljne transport is an economical, high-capacity method of
fuel transport that has low vulnerability. The positive valities
of pipeline transport are extremely important for the creation of a
stable system of supporting modern mechanized Armed Forces in war-
time. In the Soviet Ubior and the countries of the Socialist Camp
friendly to us, the network of pipelines is increasing from year to
year. At the present time a large program far the development of
permanent pipelines is being planned. The Seven-Year Plan for
developing the national econoLly of the USSR provides for the
construction of new petroleum and petroleum prodact pipelines, which
will ensure an almost three-fold increase in the length of the mmin
pipelines. Together with this, the construction of the petroleum
pipeline from the Trans -Vole" region throw.' Eryanek, with breaches
to the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which has been started,
Vii]. have special significance not 0147 for the mations' economy but
oleo for supplying the Armed Forces in the &mean theaters at5oxi -HUM
military operations with fuel.
In modern conditions it appears extremely essemtial to force
the construction of pipelines within the framework at the-Ocuncil
for A4tual Economic Aid ((SMA), to achieve the uniting at the basic
main lines and local petroleum pipelines into e single network at the countries
of the PeoplesiDesmocracies. The stability at the rapport of the Arwood
Farces in theaters of military operations mr17 substantially facilitate
the creation of a system at field main pipelines es en extension ot
permaneot lines. For this reason me consider that the development
in every possible way ar the production at Mb4 pipalthe equipment
with a pipe diamaterct 150 mm has good prospects. dystems at such
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1-HUM
?
pipelines with a 24-hour delivery capacity of each line of 2,000-
2,40C tons, must guhrantee the delivery of basic types of fuel, with-
out overloading, to a depth of 600 kr. and more from the terminals
of permanent piclines or from onerting sectors of railroads.
Air , even in the last war, in various instances,
played an importalt role in the transport of troops and their
meteriel support. It is sufficient to indicate that the forces of
the Civil Air Fleet and Long Range Aviation, based upon incomplete
data for the period of the war, transported over 30C thousand tons
of freight and more than 1.5 million personnel.
Air transport during the period of the Second World War was
utilized primarily centrally in the capacity of a reso..xr7.e of the
Supreue High Command. However, even during that period there were
instances of temporary assigneent of certain units of transport
aviatior to the fronts. Thus, gut of the 228 transport aircraft
in the Far Ihstern Theater of Military Operatioms during the summer
of 1945, 189 were detached for the servicing of the Tmnstaykal
Front. During the time of preperation and conduct of the operation
by this front, about 16.5 thousand soldiers and officers, up to
2.8 thousand tons of fuel, and 2 thousand tons of miscellaneous
freight were moved by air transport.
In view of the exceptional prospects for the use of sir
transport under future war conditions, at intortant modern prdblen
is the long-range increase in freight capaclty of the transport
aviation pool and ensuring the capability of aircraft to operate
from small dirt airfields. It is expedient, even nov, to determine
the basic axes for utilization of military transport aviation
according to the plans of the central elements of the rear services.
In order to ensure these shipments it is essential to have powerful
central military transport aviation for transfer of troops and to
determine beforehand the quantity of this aviation needed by the
rear services at the beginning of a war. This will permit timely
planning of the utilisation of transport aviation of the center, the
preparation at the necessary points of materiel stocks, materiel
support, airfields, and other omens ensuring the uninterrupte-a
50X1
operation of transport aviation. -HUM
In line with this it is essential for elements of the rear
services of the Armed Forces to unfold more broadly the work of
resolving problem of airfield-engineering? seterial-technicel,
and special support of miittary transport evistion itself.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1-HUM
?
?
The mimeration of prcblews in he preparation of the lines of
communication and transport is not by any meats limited to those
indicated above. 115W-ArVer, even those listedisho-w with sufficient
corviction,the nece:ssity of adoptini decisi'es measures for further
development of transport.
* * *
The investigation of the problems of the argantzaticm of rear
services support of the Armed Forces in a future war acquires entirely
WV significance at the present time.
First of all these questions arise.
Who in the Armed Forces it exercise control of all the means
allotted by the State for the rear services support of missile troops,
the ground troops, the air forces., and the navyl
What orgens are needed in the system of the Armed For Ce* for
the correct distribution and organization of rational utilization
of the means of zeteriel support in the interests of the overall
.rd conflict!
Mn our (pinion, the only correct resolution of these questicele
lies in the centralization of the entire matter of the rear area
support of the Armed FOreee. There are sufficient grounds for such a
conclusion both from the scientific-theoretical viewpoint and from
the experience gained from pest wars.
In Nay 1519, at the height of the Civil Mir, V.I. Lenin wrcte
in The Draft Dirs_ctivetotteCentrel Cousitt Un :
" the DerCeSeartiOnr"orli success this mar is unity
of command of ell detachments of the Bed ArmY IPIALIDEAtElEln5..
centre title ? the direction of all forces Waresectu-es oz the
us of
materialethever -- Under
1701;TVamiel/-2941A4 373).
The fulfilment of this demand of the leader of the revolution
and founder of the Soviet Army permitted the utilisation of the available
extremely limited materiel resources of the country in the interests of
protection of the young socialist republic during the period of the
Civil War with maximum expediency and effectiveness.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1-HUM
During the period of the Second World War, the General Head-
quarters of the Supreme High Connend was in charge of all resources
which the State Comittee for Defense allotted for the conduct of
almed conflict, carrying out its functions for the rear area support
of the Armed Forces through a single central element of the rear
services of the Ministry of Defense.
It follows that there is every basis to consider the strict
centralization of the entire matter of rear area support of the
Arred Forces as an objective necessity. Being guided by such a
conclusion, it is approcriste to object to the authols who fight
for the creation of a territorial system of materiel (2 or 3 words
missiniil support in place of the existing elements of the rear
services, organized along the principle of channels of military
command.
The completer*** and efficacy of satisfying the materiel
requirements at the Armed /cress in a future war will depend to a
significant degree, as indicated, above, on the prior accumaLlatioa
of mebilization stocks, Waite materiel reserves, and the creation
of mObilisation capacities of industry corresponding with the
proposed groupings of troops sod the directions of the armed conflict
which ViroaTt. The correct fulfilanut of these most important missions,
connected with the plans for the development of the national economy
of the country, is only in the p0M07 of central elements. It will be
a drastic mistake if we permit decentralisation in this matter among
various aliments haying* limited sphere of activity), according to
somes. /be division of those missione according to types of Armed
Farces is likewise intolerable.
Ensuring the stability of the network of ccannnicetion lines,
for use in wartime by various types of transport, in our country
as well as in the countries of the Socielist Camp allied with us,
maybe achieved only under conditions of unified centralised planning
and:management. The talfillasat of this mission is tied in with
large capital evenditures carried out in accordance with the
general plea for the davelopment at the rational econcmy of our
country end the *mew Pact. For this realm the impossibility of
handing over these functions to any elemants responsible only for
one axis or oat area of possible local cg,retices at an operational
or eves of a Strategic greening cit the Armedlteces, is ca--6x-,11:16m
apparent.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
?
We recommend, for the fulfilment of all tasks of organization
and control of the rear, the materiel and medical support of fronts
and other groupings of the Armed Forces, and the management of all
types of transport, that there be a special element in the form of
an or of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in
the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, The Chief
of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces will be able to direct
purposefully all the forces and means of rear services support in
accordance with future strategic plans only under the condition
that he be included in the Gener4I Headquarters complement.
The Staff of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, the central
supply, the supporting ani transport elements, being under unified
management of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces,
must, in their work, closely cooperate with the General Staff and be
guided by its directives. The central elements of the rear services
of the Armed Forces must be assigned the missions of organizing rear
area support of operating fro:Its, the troops of MO of the Country,
missile large units of strategic designation and the utilisation of
production capabilities in the territory occupied by the troops,
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme High Commend. These elements
will likewise carry out the functions of direct management of large
units, units, and installations of the central element of the rear
services of the Armed ?trees deployed in the interior areas of the
country, as well as in the prefrontal sone.
In the course of war there maybe crested high commands in
various theaters or axes at military operations in the interests of
achieving better coordination of operational efforts of operating
front formation*.
We consider that in the high command of a group of fronts, in
this instance it vi be expedient to bay* anegeratiomal group of
the Chief of ihviii Rear Services of the Aruilaroee? lownww, such
grow canna be looted wanes an intermediate supply echelon.The
creation at additional supply levels always involves the eulargmeent
at the rear services operations; the latroductica at istersediete tress-
loading points, in the ead result, adversely affects tnAITVailty
of the system at rear area support,
In our opinion, it is expedient to Charge the operatiomal group
at the Chief at the MeaT esrvices cd' the Armed Yams attached to
the ugh commands of grave at frosts with reederiag assistance to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2
?
the fronts in the rear area support of troops, when the timely
information of the Headquarters of the Rear Services of the Armed
Forces, euenoting frcm a coccretely established situation, indicates
a suddenly arising necessity to change the supply plans and carry
out an interfrontal neneuver. Herein we allow for temporary
subordination to the operational groups of the appropriate central
bases erected beforehand in the prefrontal sone. The operational
groups of the Chief of the Beer Services of the Armed Forces in
specific theetere of military operations may be formed also for the
fulfilment of certain narrower missicce (organization of use of
production . capacities, putting right the operation of the
transportation network or occupied territory, etc.).
The activity of central organs of the reer services of the
Armed Forces in a future war hes not as yet been sufficiently
explored, and it Is essential to carry cut appropriate work in
this sphere. However, we are absolutely convinced that it ien
expedient during the organinetion of rear arse support to take as
a basis a systes which hes proven itself: General Biadquartere -
front - army - troop.. This sresensets the requireennts at
centralizatico to the greatest degree, corresponds to the
structural orgenisatice of the Armed Forces, and is relatively
economical and efficient.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403250001-2