MILITARY THOUGHT: THE SUITABILITY OF MODERN MEANS AND METHODS IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, BY MAJOR GENERAL I. ZAVYALOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403240001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Suitability of M dern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations
by
Major-General I. Zavyalov
In all armies, the essence of the development of military art has
consisted, at all stages, of researching into and of developing methods
of conducting combat operations which will ensure the most effective
use of the weapons available.
This task acquires particular urgency during periods when a. weapon
of a completely new principle is appearing which has higher combat
characteristics and which calls for completely new methods in the
comi...izt of combat operations. Such a situation has been created today
by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the armament of armies.
We must recognize that if a great leap was made in a short period
of time in the development of modern means of armed combat arid
especially of nuclear weapons, there are still many very complicated
arid unresolved problems in the research into and the development
of methods for the conduct of combat operations.
It stands to reason that new methods of conducting armed combat
must be built not on the conjectures and fantasies of individuals or on
their good intentions but on a real foundation; on the material resources
for war which the State and its armed forces possess with regard to
the quality and quantity of the new weapons and to the other military
equipment which is already available or which can be produced by the
State for the conduct of a war and, also, with regard to the forces and
potential of the probable entmy. Obliviousness to these requirements
during research on and the development of new methods of conducting
armed combat will lead inevitably to serious mistakes in the theory of
military art and to adventurism in the conduct of war, as was t)"50
for
for example, with Germany in the two World Wars.
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At the same time, the theory of military art must not become sim-
ply a registrar of practical achievements. In studying and summarizing
the experience of troops and the results achieved in the development
of means and methods in the conduct of armed combat, military theory,
like every other advanced scientific theory, must light the way for
practice, must provide decisive influence on the structure of armed
forces / a few words missal:it) means and methods of con-
ducting a war. To perform a task, one must have a clear perspective
before one and one must look far ahead.
Under modern conditions, military art, in theory and practice,
must not go so far as to base its calculations on the idea that the
entire military-political and strateiic aims of a war can be attained
solely with the aid of nuclear/missile weapons. This will lead to
narrow mindedness in military theory, to one-sidedness in the pre-
paration of the armed forces and in the final analysis, to the inability
of the latter to perform combat tasks in the complicated situations
of a future war. It should not be forgotten that nuclear weapons are,
after all, a complex, expensive, and, in the quantitative sense, a
limited means of armed combat. This situation obliges us to seek
and to create such new methods of conducting combat operations as
will ensure the most effective use of the vast combat capabilities of
nuclear weapons in the first place and, with this, of the conventional
means of armed combat.
Large qualitative changes have occurred in the development of
nuclear weapons. They have been widely introduced in all types of
armed forces and have become the basic means of armed combat.
The aircraft, as the basic carrier of nuclear weapons, has yielded
its place to the missile. At present, the nuclear/missile weapon
has attained a level of development which has called into being a
new type of armed forces - missile troops of strategic designation
to whom the main role in a future war has been assigned. Thus,
the nuclear weapon has already ceased to be just a means Psi' th
Independent fulfillment of combat missions on any scale. 50X1 -HUM
It is no longer possible to limit oneself solely to adapting the
old methodz for the conduct of combat operations to the new weapons.
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A bold, radical break is needed in this matter, so that the use of nu-
clear weapons becomes the basis of everything. This break must not
be indiscriminate, needlessly disclaiming all previous experience,
but reasonable.
However, we do not always take into account the changes which
have taken place, and even now the mere renovation of past experi-
ence in tactical and in operational art and the adaptation of antiquated
methods of conducting armed combat to the new weapons continue
to persist. We wiP attempt to show this, using as an example the
solutions of some of the questions of the preparation and conduct of
modern offensive operations.
Conditions of the Preparation of an Offensive Operation
As is generally known, any offensive operation is restricted in
time and space which are, in turn, determined primarily by the sup-
ply of material and technical equipment and by the moral and physi-
cal capabilities of the troops. in the past war, after the conclusion
?la normal offensive operation and the performance of the assigned
tasks, the troops halted, put themselves in order, and consolidated
themselves along the lines which they had reached. This occurred
most frequently while the defending enemy, having brought up fresh
reserves, was strengthening his resistance and when the advancing
troops were exploiting their offensive possibilities completely.
As a result, an operational lull of varying duration occurred,
during which both sides prepared for new operations. Such an
operational lull, during which preparations for a new offensive
were carried out or the troops prepared for defense. was char-
acteristic of past wars. However, even now, one comes across
attempts to transfer this experience mechanically to modern con-
ditions although such opsrations are no longer in keeping with the
new means of armed combat.
in speaking of the first operations of the initial period of a
war, one must assume that these will be primarily nuclear/missile
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pei at ,.- C r! etc. ciezitruction of the ehen.y. It is
...eyond aides, even during peacetime wi atte pt
' ? cli3co:c!r an btudy a' of ea (.n others rrost important targets and
cLicuav t o.,e such a:, rrii e nuc?ear weapons storage site
and rri and political centers. The opponents will
estimate and prepare the cua.ntit-y- of nuclear weapons needed for the
annihilat,on of these targets and wig take every measure required to
accomplish the tasks of the war with the first massive salvoes of
nuclear/missiles, using fixed launch sites (statsionarnaya pozitsiya)
already prepared in peacetime, and missile submarines and aviation.
In the course of such shattering blows or after their delivery, if
the goals of the war have not been attained, the ground troops, who
wig dese`op offen:.ive operations aimed at the consolidation of the
results achieves and at completing Lie detruction of the enemy, will
go into action.
Uncer these conditions, as a rule, the transition from one opera-
tion to anotler will take place without any operational lull since the
preparation for a new operation wi. nave to be accomplished while
the offensive is developing. Even in cases when such a lull does
occur it will be far shorter in duration than those of the last war
and will differ significantly from these in accordance with the char-
acter of the combat operations. It is surely cuite evident that,
wito the powerful long-range means of destruction at their disposal, the
setligerent, will Jcarce ly 'kirrSit themselves to operations which are
purely of a reconnaissance nature or to fignting to irriprove their
positions during the preparatory period of an operation. Therefore.
given that the means of nuclear attack are available, both sides will
conduct aggressive combat operation.., even during an operational
lull. They wil; strive to make use of every favorable moment to '-
deliver nuclearimissile strikes. primari y against the enemy's
means of nuc)ear attack, against his approaching reserves and
against concentrating groupings of his troope, in order to dis-
rupt the preparation of an offensive long before its beginning or
to seriously weaken the enemy and thus to create favorable condi-
tions for the successfu execution of a new operation. The strength
of such strikes will depend upon the availability of nuclear weapc-uA-;,
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and on the ability of tile ground troops to perform the tasks assigned
by exploit rig the results of nuclear strikes.
Modern means of combat not only permit the allocation and per-
formance of such tasks but also require similar activity in the course
of the operation as well as during the operational lull. Furthermore,
given a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons, a transition to the
offensive is possible even though the troops are not completely ready
and although the correlation of the remaining force and weapons is
unfavorable. This lack of readiness can be offset by the delivery
of preemptive (uprezhdayushoh:f7) nuclear strikes against the enemy
which will make it possible to inflict serious losses on him and to
change the correlation of forces to our advantage quickly.
Incidentally, too, we still approach the appraisal of the corre-
lation of forces in the old manner we consider divisions, aircraft,
tanks, and guns first of all and often forget that the principal advan-
tage / di few words missingi in the methods of using
it, in the skilful employment of these means, even though all this
is more difficult to bring out and to evaluate.
Thus, the constitution of the operational lull, if one takes
plsce, will now change completely. /twill be characterized by
aggressive operations by ths. troops with decisive goals, .owing
to the fact that there willapparent' by_22Lo*.s2iltur distinction
between the end of one offensive operation and the beginning of
another. In order to avoid needless losses during the operational
lull, both sides will strive to shorten it as much as possible. As
a result, the preparation of a new offensive operation will now
take place under different and considerably more complex condi-
tions than was the case during previous wars. Past methodology,
in this matter, is dead. However, we must take into account
that such operational methods will require high combat readiness
on the part of the troops both in the exploitation of the results of
their nuclear strikes and in repelling possible enemy strikes.
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The Contents of a Commander'
erational Decision
In the making of decisions on an operation, the tendency which
manifests itself most noticeably is twit of adapting former methods
of operations to new weapons, or alternatively, new weapons to old
methods. If we take the operational decisions of the World War II
period or of the immediate postwar years before the adoption of
nuclear weapons and compare them with modern operational deci-
sions involving the mass employment of nuclear weapons, it is
difficult in a number of cases to discover any kind of difberence.
in principle in their content. In both cases, the activities of the
combined-arms and tank formations or large units form the basis
of the commander's plan for the attainment of the assigned aims
of the operations. Dependent upon this, the method of using (or
the tasks of) aircraft, artillery, and other means of armed com-
bat for the support and protection of infantry and tank combat
operations is determined. Today, such tasks are also given to
the means of nuclear assault.
This was correct at tie time when there were no nuclear
weapons or when their consumption in an operation did not exceed
twenty or thirty units, because the main role in the rout of the
enemy and in the operation as a whole was played by the tanks and the
infantry while nuclear weapons, as well as aircraft, artillery and
other means of combat, played a protective role and supported the
operations of the infantry and tanks. Now, with the mass employ-
:Twit of nuclear weapons, when they have become the basic and
decisive means of destruction, when with nuclear missiles of
varying designation one can perform independently any tasks in
the destruction of enemy groupings, it is wrong to put these
weapons on a par with conventional weapons as used to be done
and to decide on the way in which they should be used in accord-
ance with the methods of infantry and tank operations, i. e., it
would be wrong to assign them to a protective role. as was done
Previously.
The activities of those forces and weanons which play the
main role in the attainment of the goals of an operation must
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form the conceptual basis of any decision. Under modern condi-
tions operations by missile troops and nuclear/missile strikes on
the enemy wil! form the oasis of the troop combat activities
designed to fulfil the tasks of an operation and to attain its goals.
If the missile troops and nuclear weapons are allotted the main
role in an operation, the methods and sequence of use of these
missiles must form the basis of the plan, which aims at iAflict-
ing decisive destruction on the basic groupings of the ,t.rt:...my.
In accordance with and bearing in mind the possible results of
nuclear strikes, it is necessary to determine the sequence and
methods of operations by the infantry, tanks, and other means
of armed cornOat in order to exploit these results to the fullest
for the final destruction of the enemy.
Questions concerning the planning of an operation, which
must be based on the use of nuclear weapons, should be
resolved in the same fashion. This position provokes objec-
tion from no one. However. in practice, during 3ur exercises.
the reverse is often done: operations by the infantry and the
tanks are made the basis of the plans in these cases, while
nuclear weapons are seen as means for their reinforcement arid
support.
Thus.,past experience prevails even in this question.
The selection of the direction of the main strike. As we know,
the principal goal of any operation has been and remains the de-
struction of the enemy. It is for this that operations are organized
and -conducted. In offensive operations by a front, this goal is
attained by the combined efforts of all the forces and weapons called
upon to carry it out by the delivery of a series of simultaneous or
consecutive strikes on the enemy, most frequently in several
directions. One of these strikes is the Midi% one. 50X1 -HUM
In Soviet military art the greatest importance is attached to
the selection of the main strike because it is on this that the
success of the operation largely depends. The determination of
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'tie direction of the main stri. e depends on the goals and tasks of
the operation, on the nature of the defense, on the groupings and
expected methods of enemy operations, the availability and condi-
tion of our troops, the nature of the terrain, and on other conditions.
The basic requirements in directing the main strike are, firstly,
that the most effective use of the combat capabilities of all forces
and weapons called upon for the operation is made in this direction;
secon& y, that the main strike is aimed at the destruction of the
basic enemy grouping and that it is delivered at the most vulriezabla
and weakest point of his defense where maximum results can:be
attained with the least losses in short periods; and thirdly, that
a concentration of the basic forces and means of the advancing
troops is ensured in the direction of the main strike and that
their significant superiority over the enemy is established.
To what extent do these requirements correspond to modern
conditions for the conduct of operations and to the combat capa-
bilities of nuclear weapons? In order to answer this question,
one must take into consideration the fact that the direction of the
main strike is always selected in the interests of the most
effective use of the basic means of armed combat. Previously,
these means, whichdecided the success of an operation, were
infantry, artillery, and tanks. The direction of the main strike
WWII selected in their interests and they formed the basis of the
principle of military art -- deliver the main strike on the
enemy's weakest and most vulnerable spot. This principle
accurately reflected the capabilities of earlier combat weapons.
Why was it necessary to deliver the main strike exactly
at the enemy's weakest spot? First of all, because to deliver
the main strike directly on the basic grouping of the enemy made it
necessary to concentrate a large quantity of forces and weapons
in order to establish superiority,involved the advancing troops
In heavy casualties, did not ensure high rates of advance and.
as a rule, did um lead to the destruction but only to the repulse
of the enemy, i. a. . the goal of the operation was not achieved.
Of no small significance was the fact that the advancing troops
did not have the powerful long range means of destructio50X1-HUM
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would have enabled them to inflict decisive destruction on the enemy
by strikes carried out throughout his entire tactical and operational
defense, to inflict decisive destruction on him, to paralyze the
movement of his reserves, and to prohibit an organized withdrawal
to occupy new defense lines. The absence of these means could
only be compensated for by a rapid breakthrough in the weakest
sector of the enemy's defense and by a swift movement (Sykhod)
to the flanks and rear of his basic forces by powerful strike
gioupings of the advancing troops, particularly tank, with the
simultaneous dropping of airborne troops on the enemy's communi-
cations.
Finally, it is necessary to remember that the enemy, who
was on the defensive, also lacked long range means with sufficient
power to allow him to step up his efforts rapidly in the weakest
sectors of his defense, where the advancing troops were breaking
through and delivering the main striaxe. In the majority of cases,
this could only be done by maneuvering the reserves or by remov-
ing troops from sectors which were not under attack, which took
a long time. Profiting by this and possessing superiority in
forces and weapons, the advancing troops most often succeeding
in breaking through the enemy's defense before he could bring
his reserves up into these directions.
Consequently, the delivery of the main strike against the
weakest spot of the enemy's defense was dictated by the relatively
limited combat capabilities of earlier weapons. It was primarily
by breaking through the weakest link in the enemy's defense that
the rapid movement of the strike groupings of the advancing troops
against the flanks and rear of the basic enemy forces and the task
of destroying them as quickly as possible could be achieved.
At the same time, an analysis of many of the operations of
past wars, and of World War II in particular. also shows that in
a number of cases the main strike was delivered directly against
the basic enemy grouping, i.e. , against the strongest sector of
his defense. This happened particularly in offensive operations
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and also durAlg an advance from ba6es of operations on river lines.
But in the process, a multiple superiority over the enemy was always
established particularly in weapons for neutralization sredstvo
podavieniya).
Under modern c nditions, nuclear weapons alone, without the
A id of other means of combat, are able to inflict zuch losses on the
enemy that they can seriously reduce and even completely deprive
his basic groupings of combat ability and can thus ensure a corre-
lation of forces arlvantageops to us. Therefore, in determining the
direction of the main strike, it is now necessary to begin by consid-
ering the possibilities offered by the most effective use not of the
infantry or of the tansic, but primarily of the nuclear weapons. Where,
against what targets, and for the solution of which tasks would it be
most advantageous to employ these weapons? Obviously, in the
spot where the most appreciable losses can be inflicted on the enemy,
where his system of troop control will be destroyed for a prolonged
period, arid aganst those targets which present the greatest danger
to the advancing troops and which could prevent the attainment of
the goals of the operation. Such targets are the enemy's means
for nuclear assault, the basic strongest groupings of his troops and
his control centers. The destruction of these targets will lead to
a sharp reduction in the enemy's capabilities for the employment
of nuclear weapons and to the disorganization of his defense in
the most important directions and thus creating advantageous
conditions for a swift advance by the infantry and the tanks. The
bulk of the means for nuclear attack arid the basic efforts of the
attacking troops must be directed towards the fulfillment of such
tasks. 50X1 -HUM
The use of nuclear weapons against the most important targets
of the enemy's defense pern.4,:d infl;ction upon him of such
destruction that he will not be in a condition to offer any kind of
serious resistance here. The surviving remnants of the enemy's
forces and weapons will be paralyzed over a vast area and because
of the areas devastated by nuclear strikes, the existing gaps in
his defense will increase even more. This will become the weakest
spot in the enemy's defenseu which the ground troops must boldly
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expiolt in order to destroy the enemy completely and to develop the
offensive in depth rapidly, without the execution of a complicated
maneuver.
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The availability at the front of nuclear missiles with a range of
up to 600 kilometers now permits the simultaneous delivery of
striloes throughout the entire dept:i of the enemy's operational forma-
tion and against his communizations and his troop supply bases, thus
destroying the stability of his defense and prohibiting troop maneuver,
and the provision of supplies. Such strikes will oblige the enemy,
to use his reserves not to deliver counterstrikes against the advanc-
ing troops but to close the breaches formed in his defense and to
make up the losses of the first echelon of the defense troops. As a
result of the operations indicated above, the necessity for the exe-
cution of deep enveloping maneuvers by large groupings of the
advancing troops, aimed at gaining the rear of the basic enemy forces
and at their subsequent encirclement and destructionxha.s largely
passed. Now this task can be more successfully performed by the
rapid advance of strike groupings in the shortest direction after
nuclear strike., with the simultaneous landing of airborne troops
in the enemy's rear.
To use nuclear weapons for the penetration of the enemy's
weakest defense sectors and for the delivery of strikes against
unimportant targets, contradicts the very nature of these weapons
and lead* to their unproductive expenditure. One must take into
account that the defending enemy will also have nuclear weapons
and that, if the advancing troops do not inflict decisive destruction
on him at the proper time, making use of the whole power of their
nuclear weapons, the enemy can forestall them and can wreck the
advance with strikes by his own nuclear weapons.
One must also take into account that the concept of "a weak
spot in the enemy's defense'', in itselt, acquires a completely dif-
ferent weaning under modern conditions. The availability to the
enemy of nuclear/missiles permits him to carry out a maneuver
with nuclear strikes, concentrating them in any sector of the
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Furthermore, the enemy will deliberately leave sectors in his defense
uncovered by troops while keeping them covered by nuclear weapons
in order to lure the advancing troops into this trap, and then to destroy
them with nuclear/missile strikes. Even where the advancing troops
are successful in breaking through the weak defense of the enemy, he
will be in a position to block the progress of the advance in depth by
using the nuclear weapons of his basic grouping. Consequently,
sectors weakly protected by enemy troops are no longer necessarily
his most vulnerable spots. Under modern conditions, the most
vulnerable spots can even be those sectors with the strongest defense.
if the enemy is unable to conceal them and io cover them with a suf-
ficient quantity of nuclear weapons. When superiority of nuclear
means over the enemy is present, his defense in any direction can
be disorganized and weakened / several words missing...I
for the attainment of the aims of an offensive operation. Properly
assigned reconnaissance is necessary in order to prevent nuclear
weapons being used against an empty a- -a.
In selecting the direction for the main strike, the nature of the
terrain plays a role which is iar from unimportant. In the past, ter-
rain was usually selected which best provided for the use and maneuver
of large masses of infantry, tanks, and artillery, and for the main-
tenance of close coordination. It should be said that the suitability
of the terrain from the point of view of using all forces and weapons
and of the advantageous delineation of the front line often determined
the selection of the direction for the main strike, despite the fact
that, as a rule, it was here that the enemy sot up his strongest dalenees.
Under modern conditions, the terrain will also be of great
significance in the selection of the main strike direction. However,
it is not now necessary to establish powerful groupings- of troops in
the most accessible section of the terrain for the penetration of a
strong defense. The performance of this task is facilitated by the
availebility of nuclear weapons. The delivery, hem of the main
strike through the traits use of nuclear weapons makes it possible
to deliver decisive destruction to the defending enemy grouping,
to destroy the stability of his defense, to peralyse his reserves, and
to develop a swift troop advance in great depth. 50X1 -HUM
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In speaking of the main strike, one cannot pass in silence over
the fact that the demand still persists among us, although with vari-
ous reservations, for the concentration of the basic forces and weapons
in the main strike direction. Under modern conditions this demand
is not only unfounded but also conceals within itself the danger of
unnecessary losses caused by the enemy's nuclear weapons. Now, it
is of primary importance to attain superiority over the enemy in
nuclear weapons dispersing them throughout the entire zone of a
front's advance. The great ranges of operational-tactical missiles
permit nuclear weapons to maneuver their strikes freely and, when
necessary, to concentrate these strikes in any direction and in any
area , thus exerting a decisive influence in changing the situation
to our advantage.
There is, therefore, no need to concentrate large forces of
infantry, tanks, and other weapons in the main direction. They,
too, should be dispersed throughout the entire zone of the front.
However, they should be aimed in advance against those directions
where nuclear strikes will be delivered and where they will be
operating. The high mobility of tanks and motorized infantry will
also permit them to carry out a swift maneuver in any direction if
they are supplied with suitable itineraries (marshrut dvisheniya).
Thus, under modern conditions, the concentration of the efforts
of the troops is determined, not fry the creation of powerful group-
ings and great dentities of the forces and weapons of the ground
troops, but, primarily, by the quantity and power of the nuclear
weapons which can be used in one direction or another and for the
performance of the most important tasks.
Finally, in speaking of the selection of the main strike direc-
tion, it should be noted that under modern conditions this term is
beginning to acquire a highly conditional connotation. It must be
realized that in view of the treats of nuclear strikes the defend-
ing enemy will not allow large concentrations of troops:in any ono
definite direction. By maneuvering the strikes of his nuclear
weapons dispersed throughout the entire defense sone. he can
quickly intensify the efforts of troops in any directi(50X1-HUMhe.
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situation dernandE it, For thee reaz,ona, powerful strike groupings
will not be built up in the adva.noing troops as previously and, indeed,
perhaps the necessity for them will disappear since the advance will
probably be conducted by small troop groupings in separate and
most advantageous directions. In addition, it must be considered
that fronts will not now obtain the quantity of troops which they had
in the past war, The tasks of operations and of the war will be
resolved primarily by nuclear weapons, while the infaritry and tanks
will be used for the destruction of the remnants of the enemy and
for the consolidation of occupied territory.
In connection with all that has been said, the conclusion suggests
itself that, under modern conditions, it is more correct to speak
not of the selection of the main strike direeion but of the determi-
nation of the main tasks of an operation toward whose fulfillment
the basic efforts of the means of nuclear assault and of the troops
should be directed.
Thus, the recuirements established by us for the selection of
the main strike direction need serious correction. If there is a
sufficient c;uantity of nuclear weapons, these must be used immedi-
ately for the destruction of the basic enemy grouping and the main
strike by the ground troops must be delivered in this direction; if
these means are not available it will be necessary to resort to
cunning and deception, to seek out the enemy's weak spots, to
maneuver, and to achieve victory by a more difficult and danger-
ous path. It must be borne in mind that the sensitivity of the
troops to strikes along their flanks and rear is not weakened in
the least by the fact that they have been armed with nuclear
weapons. Therefore, the delivery of a strike against the enemy's
wea%est spot retains its full significance in al cases wnen,
foi
some reason, it 14 not possible to employ nuclear weapons, wen
they are insuflicient or wi)en they are completely iacking. This
is especially applicable to the operation-, of the troops in the depth
of the enemy's clefea;:e.
50X1-HUM
r,tiaatity of z.ttri-,e3 in a front As a rule. Coxing operation
';';tr. U. a front, in aciciit,on to the main stri.:e, akso delivered
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one and, less frequently, two auxiliary strikes. An army practically
always delivered one strike. This system for the delivery of
strikes by a front and an army is employed, without any changes,
in the organization of modern operations. Attempts to deliver a
large number of strikes and to disperse the striking groupings
somewhat are often seen by us as a dissipation of the effc50x1um
the troops.
It seems to us that, in this question, too, a mechanical transfer
of past experience to modern conditions is taking place. When there
were no nuclear weapons or missiles, the front was indeed unable
to deliver more than two or three strikes since it did not have either
the forces or the weapons to do this. Much time was required to
maneuver forces and weapons from one direction to another and
fire maneuver was limited.
Modern nuclear/missile weapons permit the exe^.ution of a
maneuver with nuclear strikes along the entire zone of a front and can
ensure the destruction of the enemy by advancing troops at any
point of his defense. It is therefore entirely possible that, during
operations by motorized rifle and tank divisions in separate direc-
tions, a front may deliver three, four, and five sttikes, coordinated
by general concept and directed at the attainment of the goals
assigned to the operation. A sufficient quantity of forces and weapons
must be assigned to each direction to ensure the fulfillment of the
task which has been allotted and to make dense operational and
combat formation unnecessary. / Sentence missing_/--- -
Between adjacent strike groupings and also between separate large
units there can be considerable gaps. 50X1 -HUM
Under moi.ern conditions, it is not important how many
groupings have been established for an offensive in a front,
although this, too, bas considerable significance but, primarily,
bow their advance is organised, where it is d irected to, which
main tasks are carried out with the aid of nuclear weapons, and how
the infautry and tanks are to exploit the results of nuclear strikes
is order to advance at maximum speeds. The dispersion of forces
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and weapons throughout the entire zone of the front does not by any
means indicate that the effort., of the troops are being dissipated.
One must look at the essence of the sitation and not at the out-
ward form. And the essence is that, irrespective of tne disposi-
tion of forces and weapons, the basic efforts of the troops of the
front should be directed towards the solution of the main task--
the destruction of the enemy's basic grouping. Here it is appro-
priate to recall the well-known saying "go separately but fight
together." Nuclear/missile weapons allow this maxim to be5oxi-HUM
fully realized.
The operational formation of the troops of a front in an offen-
sive operation. In the resolution of this question, too, the changes
essential in any comparison with the last period of World War II
have not taken place. Powerful, strike groupings of troops, of
low mobility, continue to be set up for an offensive. In the process,
two echelons are created in a front as a rule and, in addition, a
general reserve of several divisions is set up. If one takes into
account that armies, divisions, and even regiments can also advance
in a two-echelon formation, it turns out that nearly 75 percent of
all the forces and weapons of the front will be located in the second
echelons and the reserves.
Such a situation was normal and even necessary during the
period of World War 11 since, at that time, commanders and com-
manding officers had no means for performing subsequent tasks
or for the development of the offensive in depth, other than the
second echelons and reserves. Furthermore, there were no
effective long-range means of destruction which could have
threatened he second echelons which, until their committment
to combat or engagement, hardly ever suffered any serious
50X1 -HUM
losses.
Things are different in modern operettas'. The availability
of missile weapons makes it possible to provide effective support
to the troops with nuclear strikes throughout the entire depth of an
operation and to support the development of the offensive in any
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d:rection. Th,! commanders of the armies and troops of the front
can now influence the course of the operation not so much through
the second echelons, which will be located at a great distance
from the first echelons, as through strikes by nuclear weapons
and by strong, highly-mobile and maneuvering reserves.
Front and army reserves must be echeloned in depth, must
move in a dispersed fashion and must be used to develop the suc-
cess of the operation, to relieve divisions which have suffered
great losses and have lost their combat efficiency, to repel
enemy countersttike, . and to carry out other unforseen tasks
which may appear in the course of the operation. Here one
should remember that,in connection with possible sharp changes
in the situation, the replacement of some divisions by others dur-
ing the course of an operation will take place repeatedly and
fai:ly frequently
For this reason, and also because of the complexity of control
in modern operations, separate large units and units located in
the reserve can be directed beforehand to fulfil definite tasks as
is now done for second echelons.
Under modern conditions the operational formation of a front
or an army should be no less flexible than the combat formation of
a regiment or a division, in accordance, of course, with their
sizes. This suggests the conclusion that the many-echeloned opera-
tional troop formation which we u in offensive operations does
not correspond to the changed conditions in the conduct of combat
operations and requires serious review. One may agree that,
with modern means of destruction, the two-echeloned formation in
a regiment and in a division can be to some extent justified.. As
regards an army and, even more so. a front, however, the,crea-
tion of second echelons in the old concept is not necessary. Their
tasks can be performed most effectively by the more mobile reserves,
which are maneuverable, and echeloned in depth. 50X1-HUM
Coordination (Vial,lodeystylye). The basic principle of coor-
dination -- the synchronization of the efforts of troops in the
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carrying out of tasks concerned with the aim, place and time of an
operation-- retains all its sig:,ificance under modern conditions,
but one should include in it anot:ier constituent produced by the
new means of armed combat and by the changed nature of combat
operations.
In eac stage of an operation and during the fulfillment of any
tasl:, Soviet military art requires that coordination be organized
in the interests of those large units and formations which play the
main role in the performance of the tasks allotted and in the
attainment of the goals of the operation. Previously, in offensive
operations by ground troops. coordination was organized most
frequently in the interests of the infantry and tanks because they
represented the principal means of performing the allotted tasks.
Today, this question must be resolved in a different manner, since
the principle means of combat are nuclear/missile weapons, and
it seems that it will be necessary to arrange coordination in
si -port of the operations of missile large units and units.
It appears to us that support for the fulfillment of the two
main tasks should form the bass of coordination in modern opera-
tions The first task is the destruction of the enemy's means of
nuclear assault; the troops wilt be faced with this from the begin-
ning to the end of an offensive operation nd also, during the
operational lull (if there is one) while the troops are prtparing
for a new operation. The second task is the timely exploitation
by the advancing troops of the results achieved by nuclear
strikes, with the aim of completels, destroying the enemy. Both
these tasks are of paramount signii:cance. The success of an
operation depends upon their fulfillment. 50X1 -HUM
in considering the first task, it should be noted that the
enemy's means of nuclear assault, located not only in the sone
of (a front's) advance but also in the zones of adjacent fronts
and beyond their limits represent a great danger to the front.
The destruction of these means must therefore be carried out
not only by forces of one front but also by those of adjacent fronts
and armies; those enemy means which are out of range must be
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Qum -HUM
destroyed by the strategic missile troops La few lines missing 7--
With the help o4: nuclear weapons large losses can be inflicted
on opposing enemy groupings and their combat efficiency can be
seriously reduced, but it will not always be possible to destroy
them completely or to force them to capitulate. First among those
who are in a position to perform this task are the ground troops -
the infantry and the tanks. It is they who must exploit the results
of nuclear strikes and complete the final destruction of the enemy.
Therefore, during the arrangement of coordination in the delivery
of nuclear strikes, there must be agreement on the place and time
of the subsequent operations of the infantry and tanks with a view
to the maximum utilization of their combat capabilities. Nuclear
weapons must clear the way for the infantry and tanks, while the
latter, taking advantage of the results of nuclear strikes, must
push forward with determination, break the organized resistance
of the remaining enemy forces, and consolidate the territory which
has been occupied.
The remaining questions of coordination in an offensive opera-
tion must be resolved with regard to and in accordance with the
accomplishment of the two basic tasks mentioned above.
In organizing coordination in modern operations, it is also
very important to ensure the maximum viability of- our own means
of nuclear assault, their timely preparation for an operation and
an agreed place and time for the delivery of nuclear strikes.
Methods of conducting offensive operations The experience
of many exercises shows that even in the first operations of the
Initial period of a war, we often envisage the timely concentration
of troops in the attack positions, their deployment in combat
formation, the carrying out of artillery and air preparation and a
subsequent transition to the offensive. Genert+Ay, such an oppor-
tunity is not to be excluded in a period of threat (igroahayernyy
period), if there is one, but this will not be typical for troop
activities in operations during the initial period of a war, which
are conducted with the mass use of nuclear weapons. 50X1 -HUM
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ouyx-i -HUM
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As we have already said, the first and decisive act of a future
war will be the mutual delivery of mass nuclear strikes by both
sides, with the aim of destroying the means of nuclear assault of the
enemy, the disorganization of his deep rear, the destruction of his
most important military-economic and administrative-political
centers, the creation of complete chaos in the country, the undermin-
ing of popular morale and the destruction of the basic groupings of
armed forces. Therefore, the first offensive operations will most
probably be initiated by thoke troops who have escaped the enemy's
nuclear striii.es, in those directions which have already been deter-
mined for them in peacetime.
The transition to the offensive of these troops will not be pre-
cec:eC" l..)y artillery or air preparation. These methods of using
artillery an. aircraft in combat, which were highly recorrc.-ended
during World War 11, have already lost their former signillcance
and do not correspond to the modern capabilities of the Armed
Forces. It is not these means but nuclear weapons which will
now determine the content of the fire preparation for an offensive.
The first offensive operations in a future war will develop
simultaneously with or after strikes by the missile troops which
will prepare the shortest and most advantageous ways (napravleniye)
for the advancing troops to attain the goals assigned to the opera-
tion. Only during the course of the offensive in the depth of the
enemy's defense can the means of close combat - aircraft1 artil-
lery, and small arms - find combat application. The nuclear
offensive has replaced the former artillery and air offensive and
it will determine the success of the oper,ations.
The main tasks of the advancing troops in the first operations
will be, while exploiting the results of nuclear/missile strikes
to the full, to complete the destruction of the remaining enemy
groupings, to capture the areas where his basic means of armed
combat are based, and to paralyze any effort by the enemy to put
himself in order or to offer organized resistance. Time and,
consequently, the speed of the advance will play a decisive TO-
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in the fulfillment of this task He who first seizes the initiative and
who acts more quickly and more decisively will be in the better
position For this, according to our estimates, troops should move
forward at an. average spee-ii of not lesi than 100 kilometers in
every 24 hours. Such speed i can only be guaranteed by troops who
are highly trained, mobile, and well provided with a variety of
equipment, who are capable of restoring rozids and bridges in a
limited time and of crossing water obstacles quickly, of operating
in zones contaminated by radioactivity, in areas where there are
fires and obstructions, and under other difficult conditions. The
surprise factor and the destructive power of nuclear/missile strikes
make it impossible for the enemy to set up organized defense over
any significant area of the front near the border or in the depth of
his country. Large gaps and unoccupied sectors of terrain are
inevitable in his troop grouping? and in his defense system. Even
if the enemy were successful in creating such a defense in several
directions, it would be completely disrupted by mass nuclear/
missile strikes. Under these conditions there is no need to conduct
a methodical advance in combat order. Most probably the basic
method of troop operations will be an advance by highly maneuver-
able columns of tanks and of infantry on armored carriers. These
columns r--.!st move ahead swiftly,going around or overcoming
obstacles, barriers, contaminated sectors of the terrain and other
obstructions. With tank fire they must quickly destroy the enemy
groupings which iatterript to offer resistance, and, in cases where
this cannot be done, they must sear, out places which are not
occupied by the enemy, break through them and continue to move
fnrwAer4 without pause, allocating part of their strength to deliver
strikes against the flanks and rear of the defending enemy grouping
or leaving large covering detachments (deployed) against it. Some-
times the accomplishment of this task will be left to the echelons
and reserves which are following. In order to avoid the loss of
high speeds of advance, one should not get involved in prolonged
battles, even if the enemy is successful at some point in recap-
turing the basic directions in the zone of a front or of an army and
in organizing their defense. In such a situation, it is better to
go round the enemy and to transfer the efforts of the troops immedi-
ately to other directions or to withdraw one's own troops to a safe
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distance and to deliver repeated nuclear strikes on the consolidated
enemy grouping, explolting their results to continue the advance.
Aggressive and decisive operations by airborne troops, who
are dropped in the enemy's rear arid across the route along which
he is moving and, especially, while troops are negotiating zones
which are contaminated by radioactivity or wide water barriers,
are acquiring Eyes* scope and increasin_g significance in offensive
operations. / Several words missing_/ high speeds
of movement of the advancing troops and their performance of
tasks aimed at the final destruction of the enemy.
In the course of offensive operations, the most varied types
of combat operations are possible: in some directions troops will
move forward swiftly, meeting no serious enemy resistance,or
will perform a turning maneuver; in others large head-on colli-
sions may develop or the troops may be compelled to conduct
defensive operations, to contain an offensive by superior enemy
forces and to repulse strikes by his airborne troops; in still
other directions, the troops may overcome the enemy's defense
or may withdraw in orcier to make possible the delivery of
repeated nuclear/missile strikes on the enemy. Very frequently,
troops will have to negotiate contaminalted sectors of terrain
with high levels of radiation, obstructions, and other obstacles
which are created by nuclear strikes. As a result of such
operations, the front line, as it used to be understood, will
atsappear. front and army engagements will develop across
vast areas along the front and in depth and will become separate
centers, areas and zones of combat operations of the most
varied scope and nature. The driving of deep mutual wedges
(vzaimnoye vklineniye) by the troops will become a general
phenomenon. Our troops may find themselves deep in the
enemy's rear and his troops wiL conduct aggressive combat
operations in the rear of ours.
Although the troops will have to conduct such a variety of
combat operations in the course of an offensive, the basis of all
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these operations must be wide maneuver, founded on the use of a
mobile/combat (pokhodnoboyevoy) order, i e. , coupling a swift
forward movement in small columns with operations in combat
formations when this is demanded by the situation. When nuclear
weapons are being used, such a method of operations can provide
the best assurance of a high rate of advance and of the performance
of tactical and operational tasks in significantly shorter periods
of time than was possible with earlier means of armed combat.
As a result of this, the duration of offensive operations can be
greatly shortened despite their increased depth
This, in general terms, is how we see the methods of con-
ducting an offensive in the operations during the initial period
of a war.
We have very briefly surveyed separate questions of offen-
sive operations in order to show the disparity which exists in a
number of cases between the methods of troop operations in
modern operations and the combat capabilities of the new means
of armed combat. Such disparity can be found in a number of
other questions of military art.
Of course, our reasoning cannot pretend to represent any
degree of exhaustive argument. The questions which we have
touched upon, like many other questions of modern military art,
require profound and complete study and research, and practi-
cal testing on "battle" training grounds. A fraction of this study
is represented by the attempt of this article to provide a critical
analysis of the nature of the operation of one of the most impor-
tant laws of development in military art - the law of the inter-
connection and interdependence of means and weapons of armed
combat - and to show the fulfillment of the requirements of this
law in our resolution of the questions of the preparation and
conduct of modern operations.
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