MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME CONCLUSIONS ON THE NATO ARMED FORCES EXERCISE SIDE STEP, BY COLONEL-GENERAL S. IVANOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WA.SP4t4GION 25. C.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central
MILITAR1 THOUGHT:
NATO Armed Forces'
ColDnel-General S.
50X1 -HUM
22 JAN 1962
Intelligence
Some Conclusions on the
Exercise SIDE STEP; by
Ivanov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought' 1"VoTennsya Myer) published by the
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Bequests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
FOR TM DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FLANS:
Enclosure
AAA
RICHARD HEL124S
50X1 -HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?, 50X1-HUM
: D1 cfC,entra: Intelligenze
^7:
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Military Representative cf the President
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Director for. Intelligence
The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army'
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
'Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
IIII vers.!'
50X1 -HUM
.1?1.
50X1 -HUM
4110
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000462-970001-4
MI O\f) CT
DCI
DIA
RIO/
EEO/
JCS
Air
Army
/levy
RSA
State
ARC
RIC
GMAIC
DDI
AD/RE
AD/CI
AD/RE
AD/SI
CdP-DD/P
C7I
CSR
SR/Rp
January 1962
- Copy #1.
Copies #2 ard 3
- Copy #4
Copy #5
Copies #6 and 7
- Copies #8, 9, 10, 11, and 12
- Copies #13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18
- Copy #19
- Copy #20
- Copies 021 and 22
- Copy #23
? Copy #24
- Copy #25
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
50X1 -HUM
COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Sone Conclusions on the NATO
Armed Forces Exercise SIDE STET", by Colonel-
General S. Ivanov
DATE or num: 1960
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled
"Some Conclusions on the MATO Armed Forces' ftercise SIDS STD?,
by Colonel-General S. Ivanov.
This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special
version of the Soviet military journal Vo MAl (Military
T41,). This journal is publtsbed,irregulsz].y az is
classified TOP =BST by the Soviets. It is distributed only
within the Ministry of Defense dawn to the level of Army
Commander.
50X1 -HUM
omment: Some of the detail on the attached map
Is unclear; ilthough the majority of the designations can be
accepted with confidence, there is some room for error in the
breakdown of the various army corps and similar small print.
It is also difficult to distinguish between the lines of the
successive positions. The transliterated letters 11/11?
indicate military units without designations. 50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
V
Some Conclusions on the NATO
Armed Forces' Exercise
?SIDS STEr
by
Colonel-General S. Ivanov
The leaders of the aggressive NATO Bloc plan to Launch a future
gorld war primarily by means of a surprise attaCk against the countries
of the Socialist Camp. One cannot rule out their launching a world
war after a period of sharp political tension or local wars. They
envisage carrying out preparations for an aggress I've war in such a
way that they will be interpreted as purely "defensive" preparations,
not only by the enemy but also by the personnel of the armed forces
and by the populations of the mether-countries of the bloc.
Decisive significance is attached to the initial period of the
war, in the course of which it is intended to destroy the atomic
potential of the enemy, to disorganize the national administration
and economy, to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of the armed
forces, to undermine the morale of the people, and in this way to
achieve the tmmediate strategic goals of the VAX and to predetermine
Its outcome to their benefit. For the fulfillment of these tasks it
is planned to bring to bear the greatest possible number of forces
and means capoble of using nuclear weapons.
The operational plans for the initial period of the war are
periodically tested in operational-strategic exercises, during which
different variations for launching and waging war given various
degrees of preparedness of the armed forces are studied and tested.
Fr.Am this point of view, the command-staff exercise, SIDE sam,
conducted in September 1959 with the participation of troops of the
Allied Armed Forces of NATO merits special attention. In the
importance of the prOblemm which were being worked out, in its sweep
and in the composition of the participants it was one of the largest
exercises of recent years. It covered almost the entire area of
Europe, of the Atlantic, and of the Mediterranean.
-1-
50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
r-
\)
?
CI:
MIME
The commanders-in-chief and staffs of the armed forces of the
North European, Central European, South Nuropean,.Atlantte and
Mediterranean theaters of military operations, the comnanders and
staffs of the branches (vid) of the armed forces and of the regions
(rayon) in the theaters of military operaticns, the commanders and
staffs of army groups, the tactical aviation commands of field and
air armies, the commanding officers and staffs of army corps
(altogether 19) and divisions (51), and also the commanding officers
and staffs of atomic artillery, guided missile and free rocket
units participated in the training exercise.
In addition, the central directorates of defense ministries,
commands and staffs of military-territorial organs, rear elements
(organ tyla), the central directorates of Ministries of Internal
Affairs, of Transport, of the Merchant Fleet, of Itonomjcs, of
Health, of Communications and a nulber of other agencies from all
European mamber-countries of MATO participated in this exercise.
ftercise UDE STEP consisted of four 'exercises uhich were
conducted according to a common plan and against the background
of a single strategic s!-.uation.
The most important were the exercises of the Allied Armed
Forces of NATO of the Central European and of the' cutheastern
East of the South European Theaters of Military Operations in
which prohlens of preparation and conduct of the first operations
in the initial period of the liar were worked on. The basic goals
set were: perfection of the system for bringing the allied and
national armed fortes to combat readiness; testing the methods of
using nuclear arms in the course of the initial operations; the
orgeaination of command; the coordination of forces and means
and of the comprehensive support of military operations.
At the mime time, a rear area exercise was conducted in all
European theaters of military operations with the aim of testing
the existing system of supply, as well as of studying the ability
of melher-countries of the bloc to support their armed forces with
supplies independently. American troops stationed in Europe
conducted a special rear area exercise, "RAPID SERVICE" ("Bystralya
podacha"), in which questions of material-technical support of
nuclear ground troops units were studied.
-2-
50X1-HUM
ckiz
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
V i
50X1-HUM
IMO SE(ET
On the basis of a -_onc-..dn cperaticnal-strategic sit,Attion, a
naval exercise waz als (.7ond...;ced on defense cf cflmmunications and
on control cf merchant snipping, in which the coordination between
the Allied NATO staffs and the national staffs and establishments
on questions of defense of naval domm;inications and cf Insuring
uninterrupted merchant navigation in the bteanning of the war was
worked on.
Exercise SIDE STEP was under the command of the Supreme
Commanders-In-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO in Europe
and on the Atlantic. FCT direct command of the exercise, directing
staffs were created at all staffs of formations and large units of
the. armed forces, as well as at the commands of military-territorial
organs of various establishments participating in the exercise.
This exercise was conducted against a background of "military
operations" in BUrope and in the Atlantic area between the armed
forces o NATO ( BLUE ) and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact
CRAIG!) ?
According to the given situation, the war between BLUE and
ORANGE began as a result of gradual sharpening of international
tension lasting for more than five months. The situation and the
actions of the two sides were worked out so as to plate all the
blame for unleashing the war on the ORANGE , that is, on the
Socialist countries, while the imperialist states, the MATO members,
would be represented as victims of aggression, supposedly forced
to carry out counter measures to the "aggressive" actions of mums.
If this rather artless camouflage is discarded, the predatory plans
and actions of the bloc headed by the USA can be seen distinctly
through the entire idea and course of the exercise.
flow then was the development of events up to the outbreak of
var envisaged?
The first period (January-March 1959) VBS characterized by
"international equilfbrium". This was followed by a period of
"international distrust" (April-June), during the course of which
relations between the leading countries of the political groupings
deteriorated. The reason for this was supposedly a mutually
prejudiced appraisal of the actions of the two sides, doubt of
the sincerity of each other's policies and also the deadlock
-3-
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
50X1 -HUM
which had been readhed in ti e negoaticns pf the leading powers
on control of the prothIction cf n1;cLear arms (.!nIst exactly on
control, rather than on_protitition of nuclear arms).
The period of distrust was followed by increased international
tension (July-k.wast).
Since the international situation "continued to intensify",
the NATO command announced a threatening situation on 1 September
which continued for two weeks (until 14 September). During this
period all bloc participants mapped car_ measures for partial
mobilization, for bringing the armed forces to combat readiness,
and for establishing the necessary order in the rear. After this,
the system of alerts adopted by NATO was put into effect (14-19
September), and during this time the armed forces were brought to
full combat readiness and were deployed in operational formations.
In this manner, events graduAlly developed up to the beginning
of armed conflict. Evidently the NATO command reckons that under
these conditions the aggressive bloc will succeed in completely
preparing tor war agelnst the countries of the Socialist Camp, and
at the same time in disorienting vorld opinion, with which, it is
true, the imperialists do not now especially concern themselves.
However, this by no means signifies that they plan only this
method of preparation for unleashing war. If we analyse other
exercises, especially the practical measures of NATO in prepa-
ration for future war, then it is not difficult to be convinced
of the fact that they place first priority on a s rtirie attack
against the countries of the Soaialist Camp, 'Hecretly prepared
in a very short time.
Further events developed in the following manner: ORANGE,
having concentrated three fronts (75 divisions) in the Central
European Theater of Military Operatims, and also considerable
forces (24 divisions) on the Balkan Peninsula and in the Caucasus,
launched massed air and missile nuclear strikes at 0530 hours on
19 September against airfields, the means ofiL nuclear attack
(sredstvo yadernogy napadeniya), ports, large communication nets,
and against BLUE troops; simultaneously, they took the offensive
with groupings of ground troops. In the Central European theater,
ORANGE directed the main attacks in the directions of: Magdeburg;
Hanover; MOenster; Eisenach; Frankfurt um Main; Kaiserslautern.
Auxiliary attacks were launched in a series of directions (disama J.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
a =Er L e
?
On the Balkan Peninsula, the main attack was directed against
Istanbul and two attacks against Salonika from the territory of
Bulgaria and Albania. From the Caucasus, the offensive vas carried
out in a series of directions deep into Turkish territory.
BLUE carries out a nuclear offensive gits47,using strategic,
tactical, and carrier aviation, aissiles and other ground troop
esegcca. The groupings of ground troops on ..11 frontsconduct
defensive actions and by 24 September fall back to a depth of from
50 to 150 he, where they stop the offensive of ORANGE. At the
NM time BIM concentrate their reserves and prepare to wow
to the counter attack. At 1500 hours on 25 Septetber the exerepos
vas concluded.
Let us briefly examine the grouping of ground troops set up
at exercise SIDE SP at the beginning of military operations.
In the Central European Theater were deployed the tvo army
grumps - the Northern and the Central - vhiCh existed there in
peacetime. The Northern Army Group consisting of 10 divisions,
eme brismae group, and two regiments, strengthened by four atomic
support battalions (division atomnoy poddershki)t and a "Corporals
aissile regimert was deployed in a 280 km strip (polosa) along the
Vetoer and Fulda Rivers, 100-120 he to the vest of the border between
the ImpG and the German Democratic Republic.
The Central Army Group consisting of the 7th American and the
let French Armies (14 divisions, one tank group, four separate
regiment, (otdelnyy polk) and 24 atoeac support battalions) deployed
in a h75 he strip along a line located 30-50 he from the GDR border
and in places up to 120 he.
The desire of the MATO command to cover the entire strategic
front with divisions to an average operational density of 30 km
per division attracts attention. In front of the defense line ?
cover some (zone prikrytiya) is organized, where reconnaissance
units operate and possibly, individual units from the first eohelon
divisions. Cover units are distributed along a considerable front.
Their mission is to carry out holding actions in front of the basic
defines line. They are incapable of offering serious resistance
to the advance of our troops.
- 5-
111111SRET
50X1 ?HUM
50X1 ?HUM
50X1 ?HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
In the strategic reserve of the NATO command there were about
10-12 divisions from thc com;lemeht of tne flrs. ecnelon of NATO
(Trench and Belgian arty corps, a D-...tcn divis:on, West German units
formed by mobilization, as veil as larg ,..nits transferred from
North Africa, North America and EngIand).
Approxinate31 the sane concept VS3 appliel to the operational
formation of NATO .forces on the Balkan Penitsuia and In eastern
Turkey.
Thus, in exercise SIDE STEP the NATO command organizes a
typical linear defense along the entire strategic front, deploying
the basic mass of its divisions in & single line. Such a defense
condemned the ground troops to passivity, and consequently led to
the instability of the entire defense, which was faced with strong
offensive groupings of ORANGE ground troops superior to a significant
degree to the NATO forces.
At first glance it may appear incomprehensibile that the NATO
command for a defense in the theaters of ailitary operations,
which can not withstand an offensive when nuclear arms are used.
If one analyses the entire course of the exercise, however, then
It is not difficult to be convinced of the fact that the NATO
command in the exercise relied basically not on the action of
ground forces, but on the use of a large quantity of tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons, on the conduct of a nuclear offensive.
Wider these conditions, the ground troop* which had been brought
to readiness by the beginning of military operations were
entrusted with the task of covering the base locations of nuclear
means (prikryt bazirovaniye yadernyye sredstva) andinsurifitthe
carrying out of a nuclear offensive and the deployment of the
strategic reserves. By means of nuclear attacks, the NATO command
evidently counted on inflicting sucn destruction on the enemy as
to insure that its ground forces could go over to the offensive
without engaging in----(4 or 5 words missing)----battles.
It is yell known that ground troops are assigned an active role
in the NATO plans of preparation for future war, especially in the
Central European Theater. According to these plans, atter a
successful nuclear offensive, groupings of NATO ground troops must
go over to a decisive offensive with the mission of destroying the
troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, of occupying the territories
of the GDE, Boland, Hungary, Czedhoslovakia, and of carrying
-6-
MOP SECRET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402976001-4
1 1110 SE( ET
military operations or.' th terrItcry nf the USSR. The most
responsible roe in thc.,offensi is e.ntr.asted tc the armored and
airborne troops, whc must ci?,.ick,.y ant effectively exploit the
results of the nuclear strikes by decisive actions.
If for any reasons the surprise nuclear attack of the Western
Bloc does not achieve the expected results, defensive operations
by the ground troops are envisaged. in order to win time for the
concentration of reserves and the creation of conditions for going
over to the counter-offensive. It is calculated that this goal
may be achieved in a short period. Defensive operations are also
based on the massed use of nuclear weapons, on troad maneuvering
of forces and means, on the carrying out of counter-attacks and
counter-blows by highly mobile units and large units, and on the
wide use of all possible obstacles. Facts at our disposal indicate
that the defensive grouping of ground troops set up in the exercise
did not fully ensure the conduct of such a defensive operation.
Let us examine the course of coMbat operations in exercise
SIM OM.
According to the plan, ORANGE started military operations by
striking massed nuclear blows by mIssile troops and aviation with
the simultaneous taking of the offensive by the ground troops.
Actuall4 the one was conducted differently. ORANGE launched the
first massed nuclear strike at 0530 hours on 19 September (on the.
Balkan Peninsula at 0500 hours), but the commanders of ,the exercise
game the signal for the use of nuclear weapons by BLUES at 0340
hours on 19 Septedher, that is, almost two hours before the name
attack. It follows that the first nuclear blow at the exercise
was struck by the NATO troops, which is what they are indeed
preparing for. This was a pre-emptive (uprethdayushchiy) and not
a "counter" otvet nuclear attack, as the NATO command was
trying to show.
From the first minutes of the war the NATO troops conduct a
nuclear offensive on a broad scale. The nuclear offensive planned
by our probable enemies in the initial period of the war can be
arbitrarily divided into two parts. The first and main part is
the destruction of objectives in the Soviet Union throughout the
entire depth of its territory by strategic nuclear means of attack.
This part of the nuclear offensive was not played out in the
exercise, but it was taken .into account. The second part of the
-7-
- SECRET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
IrMiyK1J
?
nuc_ear cffeh2,1ve
herders cf thea-tr:
terrtr'sf toe USSR ? -p to
a depth of 1,30C kn frsr fr_r? f.rcet7 -na means unier
50X1-HUM
the jurisdiction of theater :'7;=&/.1.7..
The principal mean c1e-r ttEc i. t -nea--:rs of
military operations are ta--,ioau avlaticr ani sr?se mistiles
samclety-snaryady) of .1ht type , whicr are et .lisposai
of the co no toe thea*er. Te IlEffle wesi-cr.; an-J atomic
artillery of the ground vh1:,-, art ,nier tht iirestion of
the commands of arm-, groipo, lied are, ani arr.1- corps, and in
the US Army - of divis:-,n, a_ vt_l, art e_ss used.
The following m3851.0(15 were entrusted to tactical aviation ir
the course of the nuclear offensive; the destruction of the mew.
of nuclear attack (sredstvc yadernogc napadeniya); the neutralizat In
of radiotechnical equipment; the disruption of communications; the
destruction of reserves and of other enemy otjectives; the support
of their own troop operations.
The battle against the means cf nuclear attack was considered
by the NATO command as one of the nost important tasks of the nuclear
offensive. This vas conductei by the destruction cf airfields and
missile launch sites, nuclear weapons, aviation and missiles, and
of command centers. The final goal of this battle was set as the
achievement of nuclear superiority over the enemy.
To disrupt communications, bridges and road junctions were
destroyed, and barriers were created by atomic means. This was
also intended to disrupt and interdict the transport of troops and
supplies, to make difficult the maneuvering of troops, and to
prevent the bringing up of strategic reserves.
Tactical aviation was- used for the direct support of ground
troops by striking blows against the combat formations of enemy
troops, enemy reserves, co-and posts, depots, and also by
conducting aerial reconnaissance. However, only a limited number of
aircraft umsnade available for the direct support of ground troops.
The organization of the centralized control (wravleniye) of
nuclear strikes in the Sc-th European Theater of Military Operations
attracts attention. The resources of the 6th Fleet and the air
the
yar*.y Cr. toe
-5-
NIP SECIET
50X
1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25CIA-RDP10-00105R00O4629Hth01-4
Ci->f4L
?
?
cannary4 were z=tinet. For s, an operational center for joint
operatic:ns vas firmed at the 6tn Allied Tactical Air Command; in
this center tnere were representatives of the Supreme Commander-
in-Cralef of MATO Armed Forces In Europe, of the connander-in-chiefof the
armed forces cf tie theater and of the commanders of the ground
forces, the air force, and the navy. This center received reciuests
from field and air armies for nuclear strikes, took decisions and
issued the neoessary instructions. Under this system, more than
two hours elapsed from tne moment intelligence information was
received concerning Identified targets for nuclear strikes to the
time an order was issued fcr their destruction.
Operational-tactical missile3 and atomic artillery were used
to strike nuclear blows against objectives in operational-tactical
depth and to support the coast operations of the ground troops.
The majority .of the missile and atomic artillery units was alloted
to the army corps. A "Corporal" missile regiment was left under
the command of the Commander of the Northern Army Group, while
two 'Redstone" missile groups (krupa) were under the command of the
Commander of the 7th American Army.
Available information, though incomplete, concerning the use
of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP attests to the significant
increase in the number of nuclear strikes during the first days of
the operation in comparison with previous exercises. Thus, the 4th
Allied Tac-.Lcal Air Command used 180 nuclear units (yedinits) during
the first 38 hours of the Max, the 7th American Army used about 205
nuclear rounds (boyevyye pripasy) in six days. In the South
European Theater of Military Operations 313 nuclear rounds were
used in the six days of war, 255 of which were used during the
course of the first three days.
The experience gained in working on the problems of the use
of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP confirms the existence of
plans by the MATO command for the use of sudden massed (several -
words missing) - with the aim of winning nuclear superiority,
inflicting defeat on enemy troops, changing the strategic situation
to their advantage, and insuring that their ground troops can go
over to the offensive. The implementation of these plans in a
future war can cause great damage to our armed forces in the
theaters of military operations, unless timely effective methods
to disrupt the nuclear offensive of the enemy are undertaken by
our side at the very beginning of the var. In this connection,
-9-
SEC ET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
i "ifi)
j.
it is wortl noting se\era_ weak points in the so-called nuclear
might cf NATO. The f)r (.sing nuclear weapons in the
theaters of military opera'iorc by the probable enemy remains
tactical aviation, agains* wictcothat is not a complex problem
at the present time. A ...arg?- pzoportion of the nuclear weapons
of the NATO ground tro=i,p: con,ists of the cumbersome 280 mm cannons
and 203.2 mm howitzers. 'ne arnihilation of which Ices not present
any special diffic,It?,:. either.
In the exercise, a great deal of attention was given to the
defeat in combat operation, of tie ground troops (proigrysh boyevykh
deystviy sukhopltnykh voysx). Although these questions have not
been sufficiently clarified, the followipe conclusions bay still-be
made on the basis cf available information.
Holding actions in the cover zone went on for one day. By thi
end of the day on 19 September, ORANGE approached the basic line
of defense having negotiated a distance of from 30 to 120 km. From
20 to 24 September NATO troops carried out defensive operations and
were forced to retreat with continuing resistance in all direction'.
The general depth of the withdrawal was on the average 100-150 km,
the average tempo of the withdrawal was 10-15 km a day in major
directions (na glavnykh napravleniyakh), and 20-30 km a day in
secondary dire _ons. The withdrawal was accomplished evenly, almost
along the enti.e front, under cover of massed nuclear strikes. In
the course of the defensive engagement, no active operations of any
kind were apparent on the part of the groupings of ground troops.
By the end of 24 September the front had stabilized. It can be
supposed that from this line (rubezh) it was planned to go over
to the counter-offensive with the concentrated strategic reserves,
who had not participated in the defensive engagements.
The indicated method of conducting the defensive operations
of NATO troops in exercise SIDE STEP has its strong and its weak
sides. The strong side of the defense is the massed use of nuclear
weapons, while its weak side may be considered to be the shallow
linear formation of the ground troops and their insuffitient
aggressiveness during the course of the engagement. In order to
shatter such a defense, it is necessary to destroy the means of
nuclear attack and to organize skillfully the operations of mobile
groupings of troops in the most important directions with the aim
of quick penetration to a great depth and the conduct of maneuvering
operations. As far as the reserves who have concentrated in the
-10-
eV SE ET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
SECIET
?
?
.??????
rear are concernei, they can also be uncovered and crushed by
nucicar strikes. Houever, in the preparation of our armed forces
it is necessary to assume that they will have to conduct offensive
operations in the beginning of a future war under more complex
conditions and against a more aggressive enemy.
Let us examine in more detail the more important questions which
were worked out in exercise SIDE STEP.
First of all let us consider the measures taken by the member-
countries of the aggressive NATO Bloc 1,1 preparing for and launching
the war. The study of these measures was one of the important goals
of the exercise. Incidentally, ty these measures one may judge to
a certain degree the actual plans of the probable enemy in regard
to the unleashing of war against the countries of the Socialist
Camp.
In the period of mounting international tension, that is
approxtmately two and a half months prior to the beginning of the
warts. aeries of concealed measures are taken in the NATO countries
in pleparation for var. With the introduction of a threatening
situation preparation is intensified. The NATO Command looks upon
the threatening period as a period of direct preparation for war.
Under various pretexts (conduct of exercises, various call-ups
and other "usual" measures), a concealed and comprehensive build-
up of the Bloc's preparedness for unleashing an armed conflict
takes place during this period. First of all, it was planned to
intensify construction and repair work at all installations
(oyekt) of major military significance, mith a simultaneous
discontinuation of work at secondary and non-military installations.
Government control was establiLhed for the distribution and ,
consumption of fuel and critical raw materials; the security of air-
fields, storage depots, pipe lines, staffs, communications centers,
and other importan- installations was strengthened; measures were
carried out on a broad scale for antiaircraft defense and anti-
atomic protection; the evacuation of the most important enterprises
from border areas was planned.
Ten days prior to the beginning of military operations the
transfer of French first-line large units and units from North
Africa to France and onto the territory of the FRG begins. At the
same time secret partial mobilization is carried out in a number
of NATO member-countries and the building up to prescribed strength
-11-
50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
*IN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
4IMP .s AV
?
?
of large unite of the first eotelon and the reserves; intelligence
is activated E.-E well.
In exercise SIDE STEP the introduction of a threatening
situation did not signify change over to martial law. Martial lay
was introduced on 14 September, that is, five days before the war,
when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of
NAM received authority from the Permanent MATO Council (its
highest political body) to put the alert systems into operation.
Two alert systems have been worked out in NATO: the military
alert system, and the so-called official alert system. The first
is brought into operation by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armed Forces of the Bloc even without the sanction of the
NATO Council in that instance vhen armed conflict may be suddenly
unleAwLed within a one to 36-hour period. ;fa this system measures
of a purely military nature are carried out -- bringing to combat
readiness foi 'Jmly the Allied Armed. Forces.
The second, alert system is brought into operation by a
resolution of the NATO Council in that instance when the military-
political situation is aggravated relatively gradually. This
system includes a simple, reinforced and a general alert, and
signifies general political, military, and economic preparation by
the Bloc for entry into war. It is important to note that the
Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO is
granted the right to independently declare a simple and neinforced
alert in case of extraordinary circumstances.
In this manner, the military command of NATO, which is in the
hands of the USA, has in essence unlimited authority to the extent
of unleashing war, without considering the opinions of the other
Bloc members. The alert declared by the Secretary of Defense of
the USA, Gates, on the eve of the meetings of Chiefs of State in
Paris, does not enter into the NATO alert system. This alert is
considered to be an internal affair of the USA.
Exercise SIDE STEP was played out (3 or 4 words missing)
alerts.
A Simple Alert was declared at. 1700 hours on 14 September.
On the basis of it the law on the state of emergency goes into
effect in the member-countries of NATO. Secret mobilization
-12-
11111111 SECiET
50x1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
50x1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
DUAI-nUM
?
measures are carried out on a broad scale, military reserves are
callei up, the units ani large units assigned. to the disposal of
the NATO Command are brought up to wartime strength, as are the
cadre units of national subordination. Armed forces in areas of
permanent disposition are brought to combat readiness, as are the
troops of territorial and local antiaircraft defensepthe system of
shore defense, etc. Reserve units of various branches of the
service are formed, and new units of national defense forces
(vautrenmaya oborona) and various units of special designation are
created. The border defense, and the antiaircraft, anti-atomic,
anti-chemical, and anti-bacteriological defense of troops, of the
population, and of military and non-military ine-allations are
strengthened. The wartime communications system is brought into
operation, and preparations are made for anti-communications
obstructions (zagrathdeniye) and destruction. The movement of
material, technical and medical supplies into the zone of c'-at
operations is begun. At the same time many other measures are also
carried out (the limiting of non-military deliveries, partial
evacuation of the means of transport from border areas, preparation
for the evacuation of the population from combat zones, establishment
of control over refugees, intensification of counter-intelligence,
etc.).
Two days before the beginning of military operations a Reinforced
Alert is declared. In these two days formations and large units
are deployed along lines and in positions in accordance with the
operational plan, and aerial reconnaissance is significantly increased.
The Border Guard is replaced by ground troops. At this same time,
the delivery of nuclear weapons to airfields and to firing positions
is organized, and all Lhe reserves of matkerial supplies of the
troops are brought up to the established norms. Evacuation of
supply depots, enterprises, raw material reserves, and the means
of transport from border areas to the rear is organized on a broad
scale, censorship is introduced, and the means of electronic war-
fare (sredstvo radio-voyny) are readied for activation.
The carrying out of the above-mentioned measures upon the
declaration of a Reinforced Alert two days before the beginning
of military operations has been noted in anymber of training
exercises. This indicates that the NATO Command Is striving to
limit to the utmost the time needed for deployment of armed
forces and operational formations and their arrival in attack
positions prior to the beginning of military operations.
-13-
SdRET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
411111111Pir
The order of the Suprer%e 7:zr.77.ander-in-Chief tc, lse nuclear arms
vas given 2f minutes la-_er, i.e., at 034-7, hcurs.
We have examined in detail the measures carried cut by the
IATO CoMmand in exercise SIDE STEP in the way of preparations for
unleashing war. Of course, these are far from all of the measures
which will be carried out in an actual situation. For this reason,
our intelligence organs are faced with a complex and responsible
aission -- to keep. all the preparations of the probable enemy for
unleashing a new var under constant observation in order to give
timely warning to our armed forces.
Of all the measures carried out by the NATO Command in the
way of preparations for unleashing war, mobilization of the armed
force* of member-countries of the aggressive bloc merits special
attention. In exercise SIDE STEP, secret partial measures for
building up the armed forces througn mobilization started 20 days
before the beginning of military operations.
7ive days prior to the beginning of war the scale of secret
mobilization in all the member countries of the aggressive NATO
Bloc broadened significantly. We do not have full information
concerning the specific form taken by the development of
mobilization in this exercise. However, if a number of training
exercises and certain other measures of the NATO Command are
analyzed, one may come to the following conclusions.
In accordance with existing agreements, 86 divisions and a
nuMber of separate brigade groups, units, and subunits were
assigned to the Allied Armed Forces from the 109 divisions available
in the NATO countries at the beginning of 1960. However, of these,
only 50 divisions, and 23 brigade groups and separate units were
subordinated to the Allied Command. The remaining large units and
units remain under the subordination of national .zommands as part
of the troops of the-first and second echelons.
The large units subordinated to the Allied Command are main-
tained in peacetime at full TO & N strength and do not require
additional build-up through mobilization. Almost all of them
participated in the exercise and were deployed in operational
formations two days prior to the beginning of war. The members
of NATO provided the following number of divisions: nu-5, FRG-8,
England-3, France-4, Turkey-15, Greece-8 divisions. A small
--14-
-
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release1/42,012/0?/215 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
r.
Follah:
iDn.f.: were eiaium
-
divisions),
50X1-HUM
7ne firc't ecaeion of NC scomirisel f 6 divisions and
fr brigades. In peacetime, they are maintained at 60 percent
personnel strength an. IX) percen el.ipment strength. Five lays
are ailoted for tneir noiLization ht;,11d-up. It must he assmed
tnat these divisions coid oe notiiize!d and f-dly ready ty the
beginning 1r war, aLthcn information is lac:king about their use
in the exercise.
The remaining 20 dons whicn comprise the second echelon
of NATO, are kept at only 25-5: percent strength during 'peacetime.
It.would require 10-20 days to bring the' to combat readiness.
What base do the NATO countries have for the build-up of
ground troops through mobilization?
In th USA, in addition to the existing 15 regular divisions
(of which 5 divisions are in Europe) there are 52 National Guard
and Army Reserve divisions (about 1.5 aillion.nen), a significant
part of which systematically undergoes combat training. The Inactive
Reserve consists of about 500 thousand men. In this manner, the
USA has at its disposal a trained reserve of up to 2 million men.
In the USA much attention is being given to the problem of insuring
rapid mobilization and the reinforcement of troops deployed in over-
seas theaters of military operations.
The FRG had 11 divisions at the beginning of 1960. When the
Simple Alert was declared (14 September), assembly points for
mobilization were set up in Western Germany and the call-up of
reserves was started under the guise of refresher training. By
17 September it was planned to bring all large units and units
of the Bundeswehr to a ful: wartime complement, to form a
considerable number of new units, and to form personnel reserves.
Specifically, reserve battalions were rormed in each of the
eight divisions under the subordination of the NATO Command. In
military districts 57 reserve training battalions were formed, which
were deployed in areas adjoWng the western border of the FRG.
The total number of enlisted and non-commissioned officer personnel
in the organized reserve by 17 September was 78 thousand nen, and
about 500 reserve officers. In addition - (several words 'missing) -
men who had passed the examination but who had not served in the
Bundeswehr.
-15-
4 I I I I P sEr FT
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
SI:( F7- w
In Great Britain at the beginning of 1960 there were six
divisions and 13 brigades and brigade groups. The base for the
build-up of ground troops in wartime is the territorial army,
consisting of 10 divisions vhich in peacetime are kept at 70-60
percent strength.
In other EATO member-countries contingents of military trained
reserves are fermed. Large units and units of reserves similar to
the American and English ones dc not exist in the majority of these
countries at the present time.
It would not be correct to evaluate the potential build-up of
NATO armed forces through mobilization in terms of divisions of
glound troops. Under contemporary conditions the evaluation of
the probable enemy's potential for the means of nuclear attack adnnires
decisive significance. Warm of this type which are available to
the NATO Command are: tactical aviation, cruise missiles "Matador"
and ce", tactical missiles ("Redstone", !Corporal", "BOpest John",
"Lacrosse", "Little John"), and atomic artillery (260 mm cannon and
203.2 mm howitzers). As is known, the strategic means of nuclear
attack have not been put at the disposal of the NATO Command, they
are in the hands of the Anglo-American command and may be used in
addition to the existing forces of MATO.
At the present time, plans are maturing for the creation of
allied strategic nuclear forces vithis. the Western European Alliance
which includes Great Britain, Prance, FRG, Italy, Belgium, The
Netherlands, and Luxemburg, that is, not all the members of NATO.
Evidently, what is intended is to create air force and IBM units
capable of using nuclear weapons. These units are considered to
be the basic means of war in Europe. For the present, no such
allied strategic nuclear forces as yet exist in Europe. In
exercise SIDE STEP, operational-tactical nuclear forces wez-.! used.
By 17 SepteMber all th.. 4.?:tical aviation forces available
to the Allied NATO Command were brought to full combat readiness.
In the Central European Theater of Military Operations the 2nd
and 4th Allied Tactical Air Commands, composed of 115 squadrons
(about 2500 aircraft, including about 1,500 fighters-bombers and
more than 500 fighters of the Air Defense)swere readied. In addition,
the USA and. England allocated about 1,000 fighter-bombers and
fighters of the Air Defense. This nuMber of aircraft basically
conforms to the coMbat strength of NATO aviation in peacetime.
??????
-16-
SNIFF
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
r Tii
munr- 11:71
In the South European Theater of Military Operations tr.! 6th
Allied Tactical Air Commend was brought to readiness. In addition,
two tactical air squadrons were transferred tc this theater from
the USA and the carrier aviatioa of the 6th Fleet was used.
Significant forces of tactical aviation remain under the
subordination of the national commands of the USA, England, and
France. It was also planned to bring this aviation to coat
readiness. In lime with this the principal meabers of MATO are
creating aviation reserves for replacing losses. The best are
the Air Force reserves of the USA (the National Guard and the
Air Force Reserve), which can also be brought to combA readiness.
Tactical missiles and atomic artillery are for the present
underlhe command of the USA and, in part, England. At the present
time, there are 48 battalions of guided missiles and free rockets
of an operational-tactical designation and atomic artillery con-
centrated in the European theaters, of which 36 battalions are
located in the Central ftropean Theater of Military Operations.
Elvidemtly all of them took part in the exercise. In the last two
days Were the beginning of the war it was planned to deploy all
these units in the appropriate areas and to equip them with nuclear
veapons. The MATO Command considers that there is an insufficient
quantity of these means of nuclear attack to support the combat
operations of the allied ground troops. For this reason it is
planned by 1963 to bring the number of battalions, together with
the former ones, to 130 missile battalions of operational-tactical
designation.
In this mower, exercise 81E1 SW and a nuMber of other
training exercises indicate that the MATO Commend evidently plans
to carry out in advance secret, comprehensive measures for the
build-up of the armed forces through mobilization under conditions
when war is preceded by a period of Sharp political tension. At
the same time it is known. that in recent years in the West many
of the military ideologists of imperialism are coming out against
the build-up of the armed forces through mobilization before the
beginning of war in view of the difficulty of hiding this under-
taking, sad consequently, the impossibility of achieving a surprise
attack. Por this reason it is proposed to have auch'ard *tombs%
inratandiag combat readiness in peacetime, as they would be Ole
to start military operations without undertaking the slightest
noticeable mobilization measures prior to the beginning of armed
-17 -
11111110 SEpidT
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1-HUM
J
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
11111110 kii}z(rT
?
conflict. It is fully possible that these views are reflected
in the aggressive planz; of the Command of the Anglo-American Bloc.
We have many facts which indicate that this Command, utilizing
numerous bases and the territories of the countries dependent on
the USA and England, is striving to deploy in advance the necessary
groupings of forces and means in'the appropriate areas and in the
theaters of military operations, from where they plan to start a
war against the countries of the Socialist Capp.
Let us pause briefly on the problems which were worked on in
the rear area exercises. These exercises took,in all the European
theaters of military operations. As already noted, in these exercises
the existing system for supplying the armed forces of NATO with
materiel was checked and the abilities of Bloc member-countries to
independently support their troops assigned to NATO were studied.
The following principles were applied as the basis for
orgmnizing,material-technical support in the exercise. Each
meiber-country of NATO was responsiblelbr"the materiel, technical,
and medical support of its troops and determined independently
the types and quantities of the materiel necessary for 'the support
of combat operations. The commanders of the Allied troops were
charged with the responsibility for distribution and .use of the
material-technical supplies allocated to their jurisdiction, for
making up requisitions ( together with the corresponding national
authorities) for material-technical supplies and for the fulfillment
of these requisitions by the national authorities and by the NATO
high command. The commanders of the national formations were
responsibile for the materiel, technical and medical support of the
troops :under their subordination.
Rear support of American and English ground troops was
accomplished through zones of communication, which passed through
the territories of FraY FRG, Belgium, and Holland and were the
connecting link between the USA, Great Britain and the zones of
combat operations in the Central European Theater of Military
Operations. In the aims of -- (part of one sentence missing) --
by rear units -- sectors, the base area (basovyy uchastok) and
the forward area (peredovoy uchasta) within the confines of
which were located depots of various designations, rear units and
establishments. The command for supplying atomic and missile
weapons to the A4erican ground troops was situated in the for-
ward zone; it supplied these types of weapons to sal atomic support
units, including units assigned underlthe commands of other MATO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
?
?
members countries.
Nbtor transport was chiefly used for delivery of supplies; fuel
and lubricants were delivered by pipe lines and brought up in tank
trucks and RR tankcars. Special attention in the exercise was
devoted to questions of rapid delivery of supplies from ports located
011 the French coast to depots in the zone cf combat operations.
As a whole, the system of organization of material-technical
support of ground troops in the cxercise was characterized by
extreme complexity; this was caused by the fact that the governments and
*commends of eadh NATO member-country were responsible for supporting their
troops with essential supplies, as well as by the differences in
the organization of supply of the national formations and troops
assigned to the jurisdiction of,. -the NATO Command. One of the
vulnerable points in this system is the great extension of the
lines of communication. It is sufficient to point out that the
depth of the zones of communicetione of the American and Inglieh
troops, without counting the depth of the at operation zones,
was more than 700-750 km. Thig 'forces the command to ,divide "
into sectors, which in turn complicates the organization of
delivery and supply.
There were certain unudual features in the operational calculattans
of the norms used in the exercise for material-technical supply cJi
the Vest German ground troops, which consisted of the fact that to
facilitate the farimalatica of estimates, all types of reserves of
materiel-technical supplies were calculete on the basis of unit
average norms of supply for one man, expressed in kilograms. Ina,
clothing, engineer equipment, construction mmterials,
communicetions equipment and other items were planned in weight
units per man.
The method of calculating losses deserves attention. Losses of
personnel and coebst materiel were determined by taking into account
the place of the large unit in the operational formation (mesta
soyedineniys v operativnaa postroyenii) and the degree of tatensitY
of combat oparatices. For the first *even days of war thee* losses
sore estimated approximately as follows: personnel -1441 percent;
atomic artillery, guided Ideal*a and free rots, eat colhat
vehicles -30-40 percent; tactical aviation combat aircraft - 71 per-
cent; and air defense aircraft - 53 percent (taking into account
repairs of damaged aircraft); atomic weapon,. - 30-35 'aroma;
conventional ammunition -20-30 percent; pm - 20-35 percent.
-19-
INN SEC
50X1 -HUM
50X1-HUM
"!..50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
11111110 ?.7` 7-
Characteristically, losses of personnel, armament, and combat
materiel during the first day of war were 34 times higher than
the average daily losses for the seven days of the war.
The questions worked on in the naval exercise were basically
those of defense of communications and control of merchant shipping
during this first days of the war. The staffs of the allied naval
and air forces on the Atlantic and in the zone of the English
Channel, the staffs of the naval forces in the European theaters
of military operations, and also merchant marine enterprises of
the MATO member-countries took part in this training exercise.
In the design of the exercise it vas planned that the main
efforts of the NATO naval forces during the first days of the war
be concentrated on the annihilation of nuclear missile weapons,
airfields and sUblerine bases in the northwestern and southern
*ream of ORAN= territory, and on the defensekof communications
lines in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Prior to the
beginning of combat operations mobilization measures were
carried out in the naval forces and in the merchant fleet,
specific tasks of the allied naval forces in different areas were
defined, the dispersion of the forces and weapons of the fleet vas
provided for, material-technical support and the evacuation of
bases and p-ts afore organized, a centralized directorate of
shipping was created, convoy_ !ere formed and other measures
were carried out.
It was considered that with the beginning of military
operations ? significant pert of the INTO naval bases, ports and
airfields in Western Europe and in Mdrth America was destroyed
or was put out of commission for a prolonged period as a result of
MAGA nuclear strikes, and that a part of the reserves of different
types of supplies qn hard at the beginning of the war in depots
of the European member-countries of Judo van wiped out. .In this
connection, the MATO Command planned to organize loadingOpunloading
work in small harbors, in roadsteads and in unequipped sectors of
:he coast, although this brought Shout adWmovese in shipping
turnover (smdoOborot) and a shortage of mestift IreelmilLsoxi-Hum
According to the plan of the exercise eamead, the principal
threat to the shipping of NATO ammber-countries was ereeted by
CNA= sUbearines, deployed along conmunicntions lines le the
Atlantic end in the Mediterranean Ana, as yell as by their
-20-
S EC E T
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
50X1-HUM
?
?
IIIIP.ST/s)FT
'
aviation, which along with carrying out attacks against ports and
ships at sea, layed mines in coastal communications lines and in
the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean Sea.
In these circ4.7Qtances, the defense of naval communications was
organized on a zo,. ' Aciple, in accordance with which responsi-
bility for the security of merchant navigation within the boundaries
of a theater or region rested on the corresponding KATO naval
commander. The guarding and defense of individual vessels which
had not yet been brought into a convoy were organizI,d only in
areas of most intensive navigation with the use of antisubmarine
vessels and aircraft for this purpose, as well as of aircraft
carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups. With defense of
naval communications lines organized In this manner, the NATO
Command calculates that the communications lines will not be
seriously disrupted at the beginning of the war.
The exercise thous that the JAW Commusd is devoting great
attention to insuring uninterrupted merchant navigation in
fUture war.
We have examined the most *portant features of the exercise
uf the allied armed forces of the aggressive MATO Bloc, SIDE STEP,
and the basic problems which were worked on in this exercise. As
can be seen, the exercise VAS a many-sided one, in which many
practical problems of preparation and conduct of war in Europe
were tested. To a certain degree, the exercise reflects the
official vieWs of the command of the Anglo-American Bloc on the
nature and methods of waging a future aegressive war against the
countries of the Socialist Cupp. .
Special significance is attacped to the advance implementation of
mobilization measures to bringing the armed forces to combat rea&jn?,
to their deployment in operational formations, and to supplying them
with all the essential means: of support. The leaders of the Anglo-
American Bloc are evidently not certain of the fact that the war
unleashed by them will end as quickly as they wish. Pbr this
reason they are looking for methods of immuring the readiness of
their armed forces even for a war which ang be of long duration
(last two words uncertain).
In the plans :or waging the war the main reliance is placed
on the use of nuclear weapons and on the carrying out of a nuclear
offensive, with the aid of which it is cslculated to drastically
-21-
111101. Crib r-r.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
change the correlation of forces in their favor and, it is hoped,
to give the ground troops the possibility of conducting offensive
operations. Among the means of using nuclear veapons. side by
side vith aviation great importance is attadhed to missiles of
fa
o ratiooal-tactical designation. At the same time, atomic
rreg artillery is videly used as in the past. A Large role
s also assigned to the ground troops, vho are given the mission
of exploitingAbe results of a nuclear offensive for carrying
military operations, as may be 3udged from certain available
information, onto the territory of the Soviet Union.
On the whole, exercise SUB STEP testifies to the aggressive
nature of the NATO nilitary preparations, vhidh are openly directed
against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist
Cask! It is well to bear in mind, however, that the military
preparations of NATO reflected in exercise SIDE STEP do not exhaust
all the aggressive plans of the Apg1004111011CSU Bloc. As is known,
in the future war WhiCh they are 'feverishly preparing against the
USSR, the militaristic circles of this bloc *see principal reliance
on the strategic neans of nuclear attack - strategic aviation
intercontinental missiles, missiles of intermediate range, and
the aircraft carrier and missile carrier assault fleet. With the
aid of these means of armed conflict they aim to solve the main
problems of a future nuO_ear war.
10411 this obligates our command personnel: to study thoroughly
the experience of the training exercises of the probable enemy,
to analyse more deeply all the measures carried out by them on the
preparation and unleaihing of a new war against the Soviet Union
and the other countries of the Socialist Camp, and to take this
into account in the preparation of our armed forces and in the
working out of methods of thvarting the aggressive adventures of
the NATO leaders. ;
............
-22-
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
SE
50X1-HUM
tut
IPIPIEZIPPiPt
Norttioro Army Group
Army Corps (Dusch)
1st Corps (W. Gorman)
llst Army C.orps (lfatilsk)
10 Army Corps (lleigium)
No. op. g1Df aIc sup.
4S .p. M R.g?COurpL
at lii. to PA Clikt.
TC4491 CLOPIPIMPUNG
log Amy Onms P.V. Gemmed
scull to kir. DS,3.4 Thi Tk. Ow.
Iritittleltatte
WWISTOMP
1st Amos ComMillidag
#1111t.
IPAR4S
lbist 4045 w.
Fria ream rage.
4114 Op. Me. tOmostas1 i M. ION
()HAMM
2nci Ailed Tac. Air Com.
Smomiroiss-53
Airooft-1 03
$T
11. MEW
10 Pt.
160, Masi D.
1
81+X FORCES
SM A
Aldt km& Or_
Um, 72n4, 212olterGf
ard tr,f
3ad ^Pad. 011s.
1411 Sop. Mead.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
k
ckkt
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
mot realm
CLOPIPOSOURO
I at Amy CaiMe len. Gonne*
ifit *IL 01w. 3rd. TA Th. C.
1)
reeteninsiD
ACIRY
sad. ME.
n. in..
False
314 Alt
lind Tic
ILINIP11113
?
Mods
le* Mode. Arss
21.s NW& Osw. 2nd
1011s
2md. , 20*
itri7.6 limn Tic Oes.
66 wad. ea oa. a 2nd Ilt Army
2sad Angry (GDR
1W, 2nd Rif.
3rd
2sed Mzd RW
32nd Airben. 01w.
R.
4-0-o
KM, 5111401 40 Mail or.. 3nd CM.
? eat) ?146 Sep. Awed.
I, 2r4.04 rS 36,11. nond, 212#,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
qf.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
46'01;
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
wiessiroar
rt"
Yfe!I ehi/
Nfr,
KASSEL
410
ORANGE FORCES ,
It
kt_caloosTR.AL FRONT
i Mod% Amiss k
Shod 7k
2ard y
AntlAn7.0, k
tta 2ird iiparkird%)
3214 Abbrs. Mt
MIME&
21st Mad 61.-
Irr 170. la& Th. oft.
Ado Maw& 1111. OW. &
3.d 11c OW.
3n1 inf. Mtn.
(fornnp.nosa)
o 01.44le ro. or.
rs
_,?, riArtilorrrrilrmr-vommtorriemirprtram,, grrmr.., .-stsr.r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
Ccpi-
Ar.-y
No cp.ikrof onic sup.
4thSep. M Reg .---Corp.
MUNST
1. 2nd, nth, 5.-h Di,
T d Army Corps (sr t*)
To ream. e.g?-
4th CV- brig- (Canadian)
3,Zer% al HAMM
??-?.. 2nd Allied Tac. Air Coin.
Squadrons-53
for
Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
?
,221-1L
oir.47cAiVA.
Al:croft-1032
y
1-4-Atir
BE FORCES
50:1:472511
irc
tatreligiP;
esset
area
Skoadifl
let Ti. Army
Seb, 6,11. 70, 11
10. Army Corps Weiseemel
10 int .
160, Sanwa M..
18th Med
21 se ewe*.
1704, 16Sh
6111 Wog.
3rd ilc- Dh
:Antral
AISERSLAUTE
VkAvtasio. 7* Army (American)
364 7* Amy Conlin I.haddilMOM)
:Sptid.ard Amoy Carps (W.pen**1
We lot. os,
"Jimikur Gr.
AY?
Anuy (American)
1st Army (Frossch) kikR
MA Allied Ter- Air
Scprodrens-62
Aircraft--1455,
7*
OhIly.olliz. Amid. Oew.
2?*, 11* $ep. Amid. Gav.
3501i. 2106 Flid-
egiEas sm.ss:s
LEGEND
STUTTGAR
2--tcvisugaimi
10 Nloututeht Id. Mg.
1st Alrhon.
2rid ItAttsd kti- Pr.
a
a
ULM
Situation as of 19/9
Situation at departure
time 19/9
Situation at departure
time 24/9
zpra
let Army IFrats44
list Army Corps (Franck)
3?11. 15* id- OW'. ?Paw ("4 0 MUNICH
Sle *wad 131w.
5 0 X 1 - HUM--
PLAN and COURSE of COMBAT OPERATIONS Le the CENTRAL EUROPEAN T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
3ra
1sT
OGARDELEGESI MUNST fa/a
" Ar" ,/ 4&,i*Igh?
2nd. 4*%. 51*,
Two rem". ...lit
4* OP lkig (Canadian) DIN,. KAN
?HAMM
SOf4:11.15.
WUP $10 Ilf
_
WA
1st Ti
511.,
Atm'T CorP*4544clus/
Tti bet 011,...
I. Amid- 01v.
I 8*
17*
3rd
NM HUM
0I
HEATER
50X1-HUM
lit Army Corps (Frencia.".- p
ard, 151h Ia. DM. =Os el 0 WHICH
alb Atm& Pc
50X1-HUM
PLAN and COURSE of COMBAT OPERATIONS In the CENTRAL EUROPEAN 1
2,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4
Wt.1NSTORF
At) T
1/N
-
Li ??
Mtrzd. ir,4.
eNL \
3,11k..
Til_.:LENTRAL FRONT k
3rad4401%,Mech Arm)/
BERLIN A.\.4.
f
11i, 71a. Army
Aryi. IN
11 Arm,' (GOR)
Ic
Arm, N/N
01-IleKeityrAuse
of. Co,
1140E
I ath Medh_ Ann;4,)
210 tasas.1Dtr.
At.
17ilk 1Ip IL M.
6sh /Aft& RC Dlw. &
3?41 h. Mo.
ard,moss. le
21of
LEIPZIG -a
-
ORANGE FORCES 1
2nd CENTRAL FRONT
2rad, 1 ath, 20th Medi Armies
2tbd Tic
Army
2rad AnetMDR
2eld Atazd. RN. Dlr.
1st, 2ed Corps
32ed Airtarvi_ Div.
7,(0-tAry
?Nk.,
L.SSAD
edit)
OPILSE.N
3rd CENTRAL FRONT
2616 Army
Two Antilles Nft4
?2:3M
fit sksyny Como (Fr)
O3a3.d, 1511 k. Dlo, olio of Cio MUNCICH
Amid OIL
lATIONS in the CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER
-23
?-flkiss
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402970001-4