MILITARY THOUGHT: NUCLEAR/MISSILE ARMAMENT AND SOME PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE, BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF THE ENGINEERING-TECHNICAL SERVICE M. GORYAINOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402960001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armament
ii Some Principles of Military Doctrine",
by Major-General of the Engineering-Technical
Service M. Goryainov
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NucIear/Yissiie Armament and Some Principles
of
Military Doctrine
by
ftjcr-Genera; of the Ingineeriag-Technical Service
?
M. Goryainov
universal recognition of the enormous and even
decisive significance of nuclear/missile armament,
as experience shows, does not exclude various opinions
nor even radical divergencies in the evaluation of
its influence on armed combat. Divergence of views
on the principles of preparing for and conducting
modern war, as well as on the structure of the armed
forces naturally follows from this.
In the history o; the development of armed forces
there are many known instances when new equipment
(tekhnika), despite its universal recognition, continued
to be underestimated for a long time, and did not find
its true place in the army. In addition, obsolescent
equipment was over-evaluated for a prolonged period of
time, thus holding back understanding of the new
equipment.
Something of the sort is taking place right now in
the introduction of the newest types of armament and
in the c larif ication of their role In warfare are. A
great number of works and official and non-official
studies have been published in many countries, in
which the new weapons are evaluated and conjectures
are made on their use and on the necessary reorganiza-
tion of armies.
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In this literature it is quite clearly shown
that the agonizing process of reorganization is still
far from being completed even in rough form, and that
there is still insufficient clarity regarding the
dec is ive problems .
Judging by the special literature, everything
which is being accomplished in the area of restructur-
ing and reorganization of forces, particularly of
ground troops, thus far conforms well with existing,
old military doctrines, principles and views on
the conduct of battles, of operations and of the war
as a whole. Questions regarding the duration of war,
its sweep, the enlistment of human masses into the
armed forces and the role of the economic potential
are all examined in the light of old military theories.
In specific terms, this is expressed in the fact
that the new weaponry is for the most part considered
as a means of considerably increasing the firepower
of the army; therefore, there is basically nothing
new from the organizational point of view. A new
technical means of combat has appeared - a new arm of
troops is created, as was the case with aircraft,
tanks, and still earlier, with artillery. The old
arms of troops are modernized as much as possible and
"assimilate" nuclear charges and missiles. Armies
continue to consist of the usual arms of troops
(modernized, of course) - plus missile troops.
In other words, the process of assimilating the
new means of armament which is now taking place can
be characterized as follows: proceeding from the
experijnce of the past and taking into consideration
the achievements of the present, armies are adapting
nuclear,' missile armament to the established views
on the preparation and conduct of war.
This is a natural process - blessed by the ages -
of an empirical approach to the solution of little-
explored problems. Such an approach, which is the
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only possible and norr i occ for the military science
of capitalist countries, is completely unacceptable
to the armier, of the socialist countries, the
military science of which is built on Marxist-Leninist
teachings on war. Obviously, we must go faster and
further both in the theory of using nuclear/missile
weapons and in their production.
However, as is known, there are substantial gape
in our military-theoretical thought - "...in a number
of problems we have not shown the necessary creativity,
..scientific boldness and daring, and we have long
marked time".1
What, in our view, are the reasons why our military-
theoretical thought lags behind the practical problem
or organizing the army?
The first reason, an organizational-methodological
one, lies in the fact that the indispensable minimum
of tactical-technical information about the new means -
not only ours but also the Americans' - reaches the
organizations which carry on military-technical work
in extremely scanty amounts. This leads to insufficient
understanding of and under-evaluation of nuclear/missile
weapons. Together with this, certain technical perfections
and modernizations of old types of weapons are more
widely known and lead to their over-evaluation under
contemporary conditions.
The next reason is more complex. We received our
initial information on nuclear means of warfare from
American sources. These broadly showed the properties
of low-yield nuclear weapons. As far as their
potentialities in a full-scale war are concerned, low-
yield nuclear weapons (and medium-yield bombs as well)
1. From the speech by R. Ya. Walinovskiy at the All-
Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party
Organizations.
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It is clear to all that even 20 kt nuclear charges
with missiles call for tremendous changes in the
conduct of war and for fundamental changes in the
conduct of battles and operations. But the question of
what changes follow from the use of inters ontinental
missiles with charges of 2-5 ngt and
remains little-explored to the present time. The
first widely published positions on these questions
were expressed by M.S. Khrushchev and R. Ta. Mal.inovskiy
in speeches at the January session of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR and later in an address by R. Ta. ltalinovskiy
to the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Local Party
Organizations. In the light of these widely known
statements, we consider it necessary on some
of the characteristics of highly po bombs
with TIFF equivalents in millions of tons (mgt).
To know from publications of the existence of
bombs with a force in TNT equivalents of 1,2,3,5,10
and 20 million tons.
Calculations can be found in American reference
books of the combat effects of bombs of 40, 50, and
100 million t. In order to be able to imagine
military significance of such means of destruction,
we will touch in passing on the potentialities of
destruction nmaand terialahhsveibeenf published~~, about
which
bombs.
e
are primarily operational and operational-tactical
weapons. In our view, they are legitimately
considered as a means of increasing troop firepower,
and the use of then conforms well with previous
principles of conducting war. Our own military thought
has also lingered more than was necessary on the
analysis of the potentialities of low-yield nuclear
bombs and, in fact, has not approached the study of
the potentialities of powerful, multi-megaton nuclear
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Note: 1. The table was compiled on the basis of foreign
materials.
2. Exposure to a dose of 50Cr causes death in more
th.,n ? percent of cases; radiation of up to
300r - death of up to 15 percent; the rest lose
combat effectiveness for a number of months;
doses of 100r cause nausea and vomiting in up
tc 10 percent of the cases and partial loss of,
combat effectiveness in the rest.
-6-
rharacteriStic4Z
Strict e3
People
Size of
radio-
active
Yield in TNI
Shcck wave
Radioactive cor.tamin.ation
cloud
(thousand
iv
part"aLlY
of terrain
(sq.
.
equ
tors'
dentr.
t Sr _ a tc
'u app.i00r
1,000
3~'~
OG~ c.2,0C0
10,000
c.4,030
2000
,
-
c.2,000 c.4,000
20,000
c.12,000
5,000
9,OOO/ic7
c.5,000 c.10,000
30,000
c.22,000
10,000
1,300
c.10,000 c.20,000
100,000
c.45,000
20,000
3,200
c.20,000 c.40,000
200,000
c.80,000
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It can be seen from the Table that megaton bombs
raise thousands and tens of thousands of cubic
kilometers of radioactive dust into the atmosphere.
This duet settles back to earth quite quickly,
contaminating thousands and tens of thousands of
square kilometers with a lethal concentration and
hundreds of thousands of square kilometers with a
combat concentration (boyevaya kontsentratsiya).
The flash (svetovoye izlucheniye) and the shock
wave are devastating only at the moment of action,
but the radiological factor of megaton bombs is
hundreds of times more important.
As is well known, various shelters protect well
against the shock wave and the flash. No shelters
can - in practical terms - protect troops from the
radioactive substances of megaton bombs, the action
of which lasts for many days and weeks, and extends
over tremendous areas.
Table 1 shows convincingly that rpdioactive
contamination of terrain by megaton bombs can --Become
Let us examine more fully the radiological
action of a 20 mgt bomb on the basis of testing
carried out by the Americans.
In March 1954, on the atoll of Bikini, in the
Pacific Ocean, a bomb was exploded with % TNT
equivalent of about 15-20 million t. During the
explosion, from 30 million t. to 100 million t. of
various radioactive particles of earth were thrown
into the atmosphere (for 1 t of conventionally
exploded TNT, 1.5 - 5 t of earth is not so very such).
As was reported in publications, as a result of
radioactive fallout as early as 36 hours after the
blast, the cumulative dosage of radioactive contamina-
tion in an area of 15 thousand sq. km. reached 900 r,
and in an area of approximately 26 thousand sq. la.
it reached 670 r.
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km.
In an operational situation, 26 thousand sq.
can be considered as the territory occupied by a
front (an area 250-300 .
with
We imagine that
meteorological conditions, the covering of the
territory of a front with the radioactive products
of the explosion of one 20 mgt bomb would not only
lower the combat effectiveness of the troops of
the front, but would also necessitate their
abandoning a significant portion of, if not the whole
of that territory.
It, as a result of meteorological conditions, the
radioactive products of the explosion have thepossibbility
turns out
of spreading to an even greater area, then it
that in an area of 120-130 thousand sq. km. the level
of radiation will be about 200 r, and in an area of
200 thousand sq. km. about 100 r.l
Perhaps the figures cited here are only the
product of theoretical calculations not based on
actual testing. Unfortunately not. Preparing for
the testing of thermonuclear bombs, the Americans
declared a danger zone in the Pacific Ocean of
130 thousand sq. km. before 1 March 1954. But as is
known, Japanese fishermen of the vessel "Fukuryuti ru",
which was 145 km. from the point of detonation,
inhabitants of the Marshall Islands and American military
personnel on the atoll of Rungelap, at a distance of
250 miles (about 400 km.) from the epicenter, all
suffered as a result of the explosion of 1 March 1954.
These facts forced the Americans during the repeat
teats on 19 March and 22 May to extend the d ge,Jzonn
Japan-
to 780 thousand sq. kv., that is, by six
ese expeditionary vessels which were at sea from May
Julyahcontamination
18? North water
Latitude
place in an area bounded by 100
1. These figures were taken from the book, "Nuclear
Weapons, and Foreign Policy".
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As was already stated, however, a bomb of 20 ~t
advisable,
is not maximal. If it is fou d toemployed.
50 and 100 egt bombs may b
Before proceeding to further discussion it should
be pointed out that usuaiiy the characteristics of
shock wave and flash are given for optimum conditions. ion Of This cannot be said for rtdsurfacEaburstsaincrease the
radiological tItp is kno o
tentialities of bombs, while air bursts decrease them. Nevertheless, test
tbtudieh-indicaindicate
that usually 25 to 50 percent burst
, and particles fall out in orsfofthethe a.tnosphere~e
rest, penetrating the high and cannot
fall out during the course of many years
have any significance for military purposes.
This means that from the military point-of view
megaton bombs can be even sore effective (by 2-3 times)
if optimum conditions foint theofbuist .arln sorde ta lisoedo
from the radiological po
this, it is necessary first of all to know
o cth
bursts the most
advisable heights for with a certain digging-in to
bursts of megaton
van Fa-nw:Vth ? a e res
the above that nuclear bombs oca con am na on of
above all a means o ra ? gng coosaquences.
and 1500 to 1750 Last Longitude, that t is, anthrea
of 1,560 thousand sq. . o month after
r of the water at
last explosion, the radioactivity
a distance of 1,920 km. from the island of Bikini ikinie
still exceeded by 20 times the maximum permi
dose for drinking water.
If one takes into consideration the fact that
such countries as West Germany and Englandarehabout
250 thousand sq . km. in area, the meaning Of
residual radiation of one 20w mgt bomb blast becomes
clear from all points it should be absolutely clear from
In our view, f -Pat yield are
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the earth will permit the raising into the air of
more radioactive particles, and in such a case
more of these will fall out in the area of the burst
and fewer will escape into the stratosphere. Besides
this, the chemical composition of the ground and
soils of the blast areas can also exert a great
influence on increasing the effectiveness of the blast
products. Such elements as sodium, iron, silicon,
and others can substantially increase the radioactive
mass of particles which are raised into the air.
A firm knowledge of local meteorological conditions in
possible strike areas becomes of enormous significance
to -the proper use of powerful bombs. These conditions
should be studied well in advance, and materials should
be systematically amassed in such amounts that they
would permit a good prediction of the meteorological
conditions at any given time.
Let us examine the problem of employing powerful
nuclear weapons in operational-tactical situations.
What does radioactive contamination of areas mean
to combat formations of troops? As an example, let
us examine the effect of bomb strikes in areas which
are occupied by combat formations of trc ps on the
defense (Table 2).
Table 2 shows that nuclear bursts will cause
death by radioactive contamination for large masses of
people dispersed over tremendous areas in the course of
a few hours after the bursts. A division which occupies
200 sq. ka. is liquidated with one 1-mgt bomb; 4-5
divisions, occupying an area of up to 2,400 sq. km., will
lose their combat significance with the strike of two
or three 1-mgt bombs or of one or two 2-mgt bombs, during
which a large percentage of the personnel may die and
the rest will have to be immediately evacuated; a field
army (in the USA - up to 350 thousand men) can be
liquidated ,as a military organism with two 10-mgt bombs.
At the same time, in addition to contamination, from
4 to 10 percent of the territory (hundreds and thousands
of square kilometers) would be devastated by the shock
waves and by tires from the flash.
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Approximately the same results would be obtained
if the combat formations of troops on the offense
were examined.
Analysis of the data in the Table from the point
of view of effective use of nuclear bombs shows that
bombs of large yield are more advantageous than
low-yield bombs, both from a combat and from an
e`comooffi c po nk o view.
Let us examine an example. In order to force
the enemy troops to abandon an area of 2,400 sq. km.,
it is necessary to carry out 240 strikes with bombs
of 20 kt yield in the course of a few hours. To
launch such a number of missies in a few hours,
it would be necessary to use up to ten troop missile
organizations each with 1,500-2,000 son and with
300-400 vehicles of all types. Working under combat
conditions, every"ling else being equal, such a
troop organization will suffer losses proportional
to the amount of its personnel and equipment.
The same area can be destroyed with only 2 or
3 bombs of 1 mgt or with 1 bomb of 2 act. This will
be carried out one or two words missi~ss j7 times faster
and, under equivalent conditions, with oases smaller
to the degree that the number of people involved are
fewer and to the degree that they were in firing
positions for less time.
It mu1-t also be noted that the production of 240
bombs o_ 20 kt is apparently considerably more
expensive than 2 or 3 bombs of 1 mgt.
Does this mean that small-yield bombs are completely
unnecessary? No. If bombs of megaton yield, correctly
used, are capable of t ciding the fates of nations
and the over-all outcome of the war, then kiloton
bombs will be completely effective for the destruction
and eli,ainationof individual targets, for the most part
the delivery vehicles (nositel) of nuclear/missile
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weapons, individual bases, and launching pads.
Kiloton bombs will also be needed in operations with
strategic goals, particularly when it is necessary
to avoid unnecessary victims.
The existing concept that the primary form of
using nuclear/missile weapons is the operational-
tactical form arose in the army from earlier
doctrine on warfare. This form narrows the technical
possibilities of nuclear weapons, leads to an in-
efficient decrease in the yield of nuclear weapons
and ultimately makes it necessary to have mass
quantities of small-yield nuclear weapons, and hence
a large number of ground troop missile units, the
effective use of which becomes in itself problematical.
Even today there is a widespread opinion that a
nuclear/missile weapon is fabulously expensive, that
the basic raw materials used in its construction are
obtained with great difficulty and in small quantities.
This leads to the conclusion that the economic factor
does not permit giving this weapon a sufficiently mass
character. In this connection we will briefly examine
the following two questions: the understanding of mass
4xantity (massovost) as applied to nuclear/missile
armaments and the cost of nuclear bombs.
What do we mean by mass quantity as concerns
missiles and nuclear equipment? This question has
fundamental significance in the evaluation of the role
of new means of warfare and in the understanding of
the nature and peculiarities of nuclear/missile war-
fare. Nuclear means of warfare are so immensely power-
ful that a comparatively small number of them can
already be considered mass.
If 100-200 atomic bombs can create a turning point
in a battle and assure victory, then this number can
be considered as mass for a specific goal. If, in
order to win a world war, 300-400 thermonuclear bombe
are sufficient, then this quantity will also be
considered sufficiently mass.
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a def ini%e degree. From this point of view as
regards nuclear/missile armaments the concepF
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Therefore, "mass quart ity" should be understood
not as just any large quantity, but as that quantity
which satisfies the requirement or need for it to
tlie-qua r y of n v dual means o
manifested in a decisive manner.
armament to
In light of this, the numbers of bombs mentioned
above may be considered as "mass" for all practical
purposes.
From the speech of Marshal of the Soviet Union
Comrade B. Ya. Malinovskiy it follows that 100
2-mgt bombs will turn a territory of up to 500,000
sq. km. into a desert. To inflict utter defeat on
a state or states, it is, of course, unnecessary to
completely destroy everything. It is important to
destroy the important residential centers whose areas
comprise not even ten but only a few percentage points
of the over-all territory. It follows that the
aforementioned 100 bombs are capable of demoralizing
the resistance of a state which occupies not 500,000
sq. km. but a great 6,.:l more, for example, all the
West European NATO allies. In this sense, 100 2-agt
bombs is a sufficiently mass quantity, since the
problem of defeating the enemy in western Europe is
solved with this number.
As a result of exercises in the USA during which
strikes were delivered ap;.i:.;t 50 out of 170 typical
city areas, it was calculated that theso strikes by
powerful bombs threatened to liquidate 25 percent
of the entire population, up to 50 percent of the
means of transpor tat ion and up to 60 _ percent ' of
American industrial enterprises. By analogy with
these figures, it follows that 100-120 20-mgt bombs
can incapacitate no less than three-fourths of the
industry ~.ad more than 50 percent of the population
of the USA.
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ThercicFr i.! _ _, ?' 4V?r or 104s-150 2-mgt are the quantity, ahict, if used correctly, will
decide the outcome of the With this figure we
eahust the unders'and.ng of mass quantity for bombs
of given Yields. To a;se this quantity of powerful
bombs we evidently need a sinall ni ber of strategic
missile troop units.
The situation is different as concerns low-yield
bombs. In radiological effect, the above-mentioned
number of powerful barbs is equivalent to 100-135 thousand
20-kt boin . It follows that in the case of such
bombs, is tali; pr inc ip . j aims of the war are to be
gained pr im.:~_ i iy by the use of low-yield bombs, the concept
of mass quantity will be defined in many tens of
thousands.
Now, regarding the cost of nuclear bombs. In
1954-1955 the production of cne kilogram of basic
nuclear material (uranium 235) cost about 20 thousand
dollars. The total cost of a kilogram of natural
uranium was about 100 dcllars and a kilogram of heavy
water, 65 dollars. Based on these prices of raw
materials and on the special features of the production
of the first nuclear bombs, it was established that one
20-mgt bomb cost about 100 million dollars. In recent
years, important research was conducted on the use of
natural uranium together with its isotopes and other
fissionable materials in nuclear bombs, which would
permit lowering the cost of the bomb to 2-10 million
do l lars .
In technical literature for the years 1958-1959
there is information to the effect that the cost of
nuclear materials, and along with them, the cost of
the weapons themselves had significantly decreased.
1. It appears that the liquidation of nuclear/missile
bases requires a certai., numbccr of kiloton bombs of
comparative1 weak yield I o or three words missinj7...
atmosphere..~7
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Lae fu-6 a~C cofalt10ns-~'w
a a O a~ ., _
Pau ar is estrus ve
s ra c na. .. an
become 11
a mass wen eaPon has become (or can
Pon as
so come to the conclusion
? that the nuclear/missile
This gives a basis for supposing that by 1960 the
cost of nuclear bombs is within the limits of
from several hundred thousand dollars for
bombs to several million low-yield in dollars for megaton bombs.
1959 it was reported that a nuclear charge of
3-mgt yield for thE' Atlas missile is Valued at
2-3 million dollars.
This cost is large, in itself,
with tanks which come to hundre but in andpandscfn
airplanes which cost millions of thousand end
tans of millions of dollar some of them even
Comparatively nuclear weapons are
effectiveness of CL-6&p, twotisu compared, the military
From the above it follows that the budgetar
capabilities of the largest countries e
accumulation of nuclear ?ea pons Permit the
As concerns missiles there in mass quantities,
at the present time obviously no doubt that
at thebires ime the status of industry, the
y of Processed special materials, the
construction-technical level of missiles and guidance
instruments permit the organization of
of all types of missiles, including inteerms Production
continental.
Judging by the foreign press, the cost in series production is placed at 2.5-5 million dolmissiles
for intercontinental, 1,2-1.5
million strategic, and several hundred thousandodolla s for
operational-tactical missiles.
for
All that has been said above about the effects
of megaton bombs, about
a
Power u in ustr a coun r aaer as n8 a economy o
accoapli$ a ec n
ca Y n a s on o
Per
o o e an w ou o
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is
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We believe that a view of contemporary warfare,
of prevailing military doctrine and of the principles
of organization of the armed forces must differ
radically from views of war, not only of the pre-
atomic period, but also of a war in which the operational-
tactical use of low-yield nuclear/missile weapons plays
the leading role. Proceeding from this, we will
examine the following questions:
- the time limits (limit of duration) of a nuclear/
missile war;
- the nature of the course of the initial period of
war and the tasks of the armed forces in a nuclear/
missile war;
the principles of the organization of the armed
forces.
The time limits of a nuclear/missile war. The
history o mankind recalls-ware o various durations,
up to hundred-year wars. Th9 duration of wars
depends principally on the sharpness of the contradictions
and the economic and technical capabilities of the
wari,ing sides. The question of the permissible time
limits of a war had no decisive significance in the
past. The means of warfare, the means of destruction
were essentially so small in comparison with the
creative capabilities of mankind and of nature that
the thought of the possibility of monstrous destruction
and mass annihilation of people never arose.
The question is posed differently today. It is
clear from the above-mentioned considerations that if
the number of nuclear weapons sufficient to liquidate
human life on earth has not yet been created, it can
be created in the immediate future. In this connection,
the most destructive factor is radioactive contamination.
However, the process of radioactive poisoning of
the atmosphere and the earth's surface cannot be
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on oradio radioactive su arzce ngerous to human e
instantaneous. This process can take place in a
certain span of time. Consequently, the time-span
from the moment of the beginning of a nuclear world
war to the momen f e po son ug of tbhe atmosp ere
o the globe or a given zone oof i witb a concen ra-
on ear can
e time s o a war.
The ultimate limit of a aar depends on a series
of factors, namely:
- the scientifically determined limit of concentration
or radioactive substances in the at~.~o;.4c=
- the quantity and quality of the nuclear devices
detonated;
- the intensity of the nuclear bursts;
- the height of the bursts and their distribution over
the surface of the globe, and on certain other factors.
We will not examine the a',:ove-mentioned factors in
detail. For the goals of this work it is important to
show that the scientific solution of the question of
the time limits of-war is-&-n--alm-olute necess y.
Obviously, the basic solution of this question
depends on the definition of the maximum permissible
dose of atmospheric contamination. Kissinger's book,
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", states that a
doubling of the natural dose is required to eliminate
all life, which can be achieved in the northern
hemisphere by 300-800 50-mgt bombs or 750-2,000
20-mgt bombs. This number of bombs can evidently be
built by even one state.
What conclusion should be drawn from the arguments
cn the time limits of a nuclear/missile war, if such a
war is thrust on us? There can be only one. The main
decisive phase of the war, defined as the complete
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paralyzation of the enemy's nuclear strength, must
be achieved in the shortest possible time; this must
be much shorier than the time necessary to create a
dangerous radioactive concentration. The technical
possibilities for such a solution are evidently
available.
A protracted nuclear/missile war with a decision
in favor of one side is excluded because such a war
on the str -th of military logic, as past experience
------~--c----- --.--.-~.--_
..vow severli.y anal
_
w
iae uce o ever mare ;per u an over more
numerous destructive nuc ear weapons. a resu t of
such a course o war would equally disastrous for
all warring sides.
A decision in favor of one side depends on
read ness an a y to-fln-Ish a war n
- - o---v wwa aria YOOY said
in our press recently concorning the fact that even
the bourgeois military ideologists reject the theory
of a short-term nuclear-missile war. Such statements have,
in fact, been made in the West. But this cannot
servo as a serious argument in favor of a prolonged
nuclear/.missile war.
Prior to the appearance of nuclear armaments,
representatives of llestern military thought created
a large number of theories about short-term war,
about blitzkrieg. It is well known that Hitler's
military doctrine was based on this. Such blitzkriegs
were particularly alluring against countries with
inadequately developed industry or with comparatively
small territory. Capitalism was deeply interested in
such an approach to war because an extended war
accompanied by arming of the masses in our time would
very probably lead to revolutions. The experience
of two world wars has already shown that both ware
were prolonged and protracted. The principal reason
for thin phenomenon could be formulated thus: comparative
equality of forces, means and potential capabilities of
the warring sides in the course of a certain segment of
time under conditions of comparatively weak means of
warfare (destruction).
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-A , vACeeu zne means of
crew n.
Is there anything new in this question of nuclear/
missile weapons? Evidently, yes. The material base
for a war lasting for years may not even eX st,
cons derma cow emi ors,
rv rune ne ,. ___
Bow are these new conditions reflected in the
interests and the ideology of the warring classes?
First of all, 'one must keep in mind that no
norrz1 man can be interested in the destruction of
neanki. d. The matter is different, however, from
the point of view of the ruling classes who are
disappearing from the scene of history.
History has shown more than once that a dying
class, a dying social order, gives birth to theories
%nd dogmas of human destruction characterized by
the phrases "apres moi le deluge" and "better be
atomized than communized". For reactionary forces,
doomed to parish by dint of historical hopelessness,
a long war (like any other war) is not contraindicated,
the more so since preparation for such a war is
ecc,nomically advantageous for certain monopolistic
circles.
Preparation for an extended war is many times
more costly than for a short war and the profits of
capitalists many times higher in this case. Preparation
for an extended war is conducted on the basis of the
theory of maximum application of the country's economy
to the needs of war and requires expenditures on all
other forms of armament and other requisitdt, ~f .- long
war as well as on nuclear/ miss i le weapons. This
facilitates an increase in the concentration of capital
and in the monopolistic power of certain groups. But
from the point of view of the cost of the military
mac.'Une and its combat effectiveness, the nuclear/missile
weapon is the cheapest and a short nuclear/missile war
is relatively the most economical in expenditures on
the forces of destruction. And if the nuclear/missal,,
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weapon, in reducin., the duration of war, reduces the
incomes of the monopolies, then the pertinent groups
of monopolists w-i ll, of course, be for a long war.
Therefore, as a result of economic reasons and
partly because of the aspirations of groups connected
with military production to preserve the commanding
position which they hold in the economy of a country
like the USA, the theory of an extended war receives
wide circulation. This theory ties in well with the
necessity of keeping colonial and economically weakly
developed countries under the threat of war and even
to thrust wars upon them.
The interests of the progressive forces of the.
world dictate a different approach. The material
prerequisties for the victory of the socialist world
over the capitalist world by peaceful means have
already been created. Consequently the progressive
forces are keenly interested in avoiding war. But
if war becomes inevitable, the new world, naturally,
must strive to keep war losses to a minimum and
ccn equently should do all possible to keep the
war short and, in any case, to finish the decisive
phase of the war prior to substantial atmospheric
contamination over large areas.
The nature of the course of the initial period
of a war and the tasks f ` the armed rces In a
nuc ear7m ss a war. In examining these ques ons
we s ai? from the -proposition that the leading
capitalist states are preparing for a nuclear world
war, in which they will strive for a decisive result
at all costs. In technical times, such a decision
means the inevitable use of the host powerful nuclear
and other weapons against which the other side must
use no less powerful destructive weapons within
certain time limits to gain the victory.
Before the age of nuclear/missile armaments it
was considered that the direct manifestation of war
was armed conflict between two opposing armies of
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pecpleF, of statues 50X1-HUM
technical means of
' or of warfare oasaN.cl. Kh Coctencparary
pointed
out, dictate a different concept of the physical
process of war itself. For a number of economically
Powerful and heavily populated states which are,
however, small in territorial size, the wa:- can end
in their complete defeat and even destruction before
the main part of the armed forces of these countries
can enter into action. For the r
somewhat different. The disrupton,of the
theiruPote
nn is
for resistance will require more time and weapons andlies
obviously, it will be difficult to avoid some strikes
from their side. In these circumstances, strikes
in the enemy's industrial rear, and on his
and administrative centers acquire heliiigal
significance, an overwhelming
Powerful strikes, capable of disrupting
(or liquidating) the economy and the organfzed control
of the country and the army, will naturally undermine
the base of military activity and the existence of the
armed forces.
Concurrently, strikes must be made on the necessary
number of strategically active
targets (bases, launching pads,navaltvessels) fromve)
(
which the enemy can launch nuclear weapons at our
economic and political centers.
strikes could be made with bombs oIn these cases,
f lower yields.the
Given the selection of the appropriate their technically correct use, itis p pb yib les oss to indicate tentatively the quantity of nuclearl
weapons required. We realize that defini
?n just this point in concrete terms can be mmostviews
vulnerable for a number of reasons. But the importance
of the problem demands this concrete definition, it
requires a point of departure. In our opinion, even
a mistake of 2-3 times in this case should not be
embarrassing; it is important to show the
nature of the process based on actual material.
Analysis of data published in foreign literature
indicates that for a world war about 200 bombs from
1-2 mgt to 15-20 mgt and about 600-900 bombs from
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10 to 30 kt (for strikes on nuclear weapons targets,
if therI are 300 as is reported in the press) are
needed,
It would seem that a total of 1,000-1,100 nuclear
strikes are not many for a world war and all these
deliberations may appear to be unfounded. However,
it should by remembered that a similar number of
strikes (chiefly by hydrogen bombs of the type
detonated at Bikini) is capable of creating radio-
active contamination (higher than 600 r) of an area
of about 2 million sq, km. and contamination of over
50 r of sn area of about 20 million sq. km. (This
does not allow for the enemy's detonations of
'ic lear weapons.) Moreover, hundreds of thousands
of kilometers will be devastated by shock waves and
flash radiation. This fact necessitates a very.
careful approach to the use of megaton bombs in
general, and particularly in Europe, where population
density is extraordinarily high.
Apparently, however, the use of nuclear/missile
weapons under technically optimum conditions may not.
require such a quantity of megaton bombs for
destruction of the NATO bloc.
50X1-HUM
Therefore, it appears that just a few hundred
powerful nuclear bursts will be the primary and
decisive factors affecting the outcome of the war
and that they will be made in the first hours and
days of the war. It follows that the initial period
of a war becomes its decisive period, the period in
which the armed forces solve the primary technical
problem of the war - to liquidate the enemy's
capability to use nun ear/mss a weapons, to undermine
fiis V 11 'to light and to weaken decisively his forces
and means.
1. If enemy atomic targets are greater in number, or
if there targets are specially concealed, then the,
number of small-yield bombs can be increased somewhat.
Such an increase on the radiational situation in the
world .../two or three words missinCl.
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:wn I -Flu IVI
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The second period of w.r, undoubtedly protracted
in time, will evidently consist of liquidating the
resistance of military organisms still extant, of
rendering immediate all-round aid to victims and of
reconstructing the economies and state systems of
the appropriate countries.
In this period, considering the scale of destruction,
reconstruction work will require extended and enormous
efforts by the socialist countries and the enlistment
of large masses of peoples, possibly numbering in the
millions.
It appears that during this period, the principal
role will be played by the ground troops, aviation,
and navy.
One can proceed from a different concept, according
to which the primary tasks of a future world war will
be resolved by ground armies on fronts in coordination
with strategic missile troops, aviation, and the navy;
to achieve victory it is necessary to destroy the
enemy's armies and to occupy his territory; strikes
by the strategic missile troops deep in the enemy rear
will play an important but subsidiary role. This would
memo that we underestimate the potential of powerful
multi-megaton nuclear bombs and of long-range missiles,
that we will have to create tens of thousands of low-
yield nuclear bombs, form a large number of operational-
tactical missile units, maintain various mass types cf
troops and a multi-million man army, and base all plans
on an extended war with the inherent consequences of
economic overstress and of losses many times greater
than the losses of World War II.
A third concept is also possible. Keeping aside,
in a technical and practical sense, the principal
and decisive role of strategic missile troops, to
aaiitain powerful ground and interacting and inter-
dependent air and naval forces, which, like the ground
troops would be saturated with operational-tactical
missile units and constantly perfecting (by type of
troops) their combat and auxiliary equipment.
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This is a cautious concept calculated to finish
the war in the shortest possible time, but if
unsuccessful in this, to be prepared to wage an
extended war with the maximum efforts of all the
forces and means of the country and of coalitions
of countries.
Past experience teaches us that at the beginning
of all great wars, the opponents seriously over-
estimated their own strength and underestimated the
enemy's strength, Moreover, not a single war ever
went the way it was planned.
It is possible that in the course of a war a
situation can arise in which the strategic missile
troops of both sides will turn out, for various
technical reasons, to be not entirely reliable,
that they will only partially fulfill their tasks,
and that the decisive effect will not be achieved.
In this instance, during the time period necessary for
the restoration of the combat capability of the strategic
missile troops for the Eurasian war sector, the role of
the ground troops and of aviation will become decisive.
The role of the navy will also increase, particularly
that of submarines. Fran this point of view, the
third concept appears to be the most acceptable,
despite the fact that it leads to a substantial
increase in the burden of expenditures prior to the
beginning of war and presupposes an even sharper
increase with the initiation of war.
At the same time, if war is thrust upon us, we
must be so prepared that the strategic missile troops
can send sufficiently powerful strikes in the first
minutes to paralyze the enemy countries and armies
and to denrive him of his nuclear/missile weapons.
The operations of the other types of troops during
the initial period of war must be coordinated with the
operations of the strategic missile troops and be
subordinate to them.
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From all that has been said it is obvious that
the nuclear/missile weapon is primary and decisive
in the present period to time; for this reason the
strategic missile troops have become the primary
Rnd decisive type of troops, with all the consequences
ensuing from this fact. The situation is somewhat
different as concerns the quantitative side of the
question. The primary and decisive type of troops
need not be and indeed will not be the most numerous.
The ground troops and the PVO troops will be more
numerous.
The new means of warfare, as was said earlier,
bring upon the scene other types of troop formations -
medical-sanitation and reconstruction formations -
which have every reason to be mass formations, and
to be formed and undergo training on territorial
principles. In our opinion this question requires
very profound investigation.
Until the recent past, ground troops were
legitimately considered as the primary type of armed
forces, since they carried out the principal tasks
=f war, which amounted to the total defeat of the
enemy's armed forces and the taking Of his territory.
Nov, when the forms of war are changing and its
principal tasks will evidently not be decided on
fronts in direct engagements of opposing armies, but
rather in the interiors of countries, the ground troops
cannot carry out the principal. task of war independently.
In addition to the u.ual resources of combat materiel,
the ground troops have missile equipment with a limited
radius of operation. With these means of armament, the
ground troops can neither withstand the strikes of
strategic missile troops nor protect the country from
these strikes. At the same time, the ground troops
must be regarded as forces which, together with the
air forces are capable of assuring victory in all
circumstances.
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Taking into account the possibility that megaton
borbs may be used on the battlefield, it is necessary
to make an all-round evaluation of the existing
organization and the current combat formations of
ground troops and of tho it suitability for nuclear/
missile war.
As history teaches, the combat formations of
troops and the corresponding organization of troops
change form depending on the means of combat, and
primarily on the decisive means, firepower. The
more effective the fire means of war, the more profound
the changes. Right up to the appearance of nuclear/
missile weapons, to the degree of the strength of
fire, combat formations have grown more and more
deeply.../io or three words missiQ7.
The tendency to thin out military formations
has increased in the past five years under the
influence of nuclear/missile operational-tactical
weapons, but contemporary organization of troops
(preserved from the pre-atomic period) and under-
evaluation of the new conditions of conducting war
fetter and retard this tendency.
It appears that combat formations of ground troops
can become sufficiently vital and combat ready through
fulfillment of the following conditions:
- increasing the combat independence (autonomy) of
all organizational levels (zveno) of troops, and
parti,ularly of the lower - the tactical ones;
- increasing the firepower of tactical elements of
units and large units;
substantial increase in the speed of moving of
troops;
a sharp thinning out of personnel and equipment
in combat formations.
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Increasing the combat independence of all levels
(zveno) of the troop organism is possible by
weakening or eliminating the mutual dependence (but not cooperation) elements between organizational
(yedinitsa) of troops. The principles of
standardization of the means of combat and auxiliary
equipment, of organizational autonomy and of a
broad independence in carrying out combat missions,
must underlie army structure from the primary cells
(yacheyka) through all succeeding levels.
Organizationally, it appears advisable to create
units (chant) composed of interchangeable, uniform,
primary tactical elements (yedinitsa). The creation
of regiments of ground troops composed of eleaentc which
have high firepower, are completely mobile, tactically
independent, and low in personnel composition, and
which in case of loss can be easily replaced by similar
ones, must have a positive effect on the viability of
combat formations.
An increase in speed of movement can be achieved
by full mechanization of troops, which would increase
this speed by several times in cross-country, as well
as in road, movements. Movements of large combat
groups of ground troops by aircraft must become common
and be applied in the very broadest dimensions.
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Existing military doctrines are built on the follow-
ing basic principles:
a country's entire economy and the country as a
whole prepare for war beforehand;
- calculations are based on a protracted war and
on mass armies which will enlist the greatest possible
numb,r of the healthy male and female population;
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- victory or defeat in war is decided on fronts of
opposing armies; the strength of armies is determined
in the final analysis by the viability and power of
the rear;
- the theaters of military operations are studied from
the standpoint of the decisive significance of frontal
combat of armies, and in this connection, plans for
achieving war aims are worked out which take into
account the factors of time, space, forces and means;
the capabilities of enemies and allies are studied
in this same manner;
- military operations are based on principles of
seizure of the initiative, concentration of maximum
forces and weapons on the main axis, on the selection
of the most advantageous time for initiation of
operations and for delivery of the main strike;
- the achievement of the basic goals of war absolutely
presupposes the total defeat or destruction of armies
and the seizure of the most important parts or all of
the enemy's territory.
In light of the new quality of nuclear/-missile
armament it can be said that the above-listed principles
of contemporary military doctrine are subject to
radical review. Some of the principles will lose their
significance entirely, others will take on a different
content.
New doctrines must be built on the basis of the
potentialities of mass nuclear/missile and radio-
electronic means of warfare. Their principles must
reflect a new approach, a new understanding of the
dimensions of time, space, destructive forces, and
forces of resistance.
The new military doctrines must proceed primarily
from the principal and decisive role of nuclear/
missile strategic weapons in war, and, consequently,
from the principal and decisi^e role of the type of
troops armed with these means of combat.
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Basic principles of the new doctrine could .nclude
the fcllowiLg propositfoas.
- the contemporary power of the forces of d' atruction
is immeasurably greater than that of the for ;es of
creation;
- the nuclear/missile weapon is a mass type of
weapon, is relatively economical, and, from the
combat point of view, It is the'moat effective:
- the range of nuclear/missile weapons ensures
their reaching any point on the globe; in this
connection, their accuracy satisfies practical
requirements;
- the theater of military operations is the entire
globe;
- the primary task of the armed forces in war (from
our point of view) should not be the seizure of
territories, but of depriving the enemy of the
Possibility of using nuclear/missile weapons;
in
case of necessity, temporary occupation is permissible;
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a nuclear/missile war must be short-lived; its
active phase can be measured in days or weeks;
the time limits of a war must be determined by
the power of the nuclear weapons, and the intensity
and number of bursts which will not cause a dangerous
saturation of the atmosphere and of the surface of
the globe or the expanse of our country, or allied
and non-combatant countries, with radioactive substances.
In our opinion, investigation of the questions
connected with the elaboration of military doctrines
and a discussion of then within definite limits must
be considered the most vital necessity for contemporary
military thought. It is in this light that the
present article offerb; itself as a means of posing the
question. Moreover, it geems to us that the time has
come not only to ezcha,,.ge views on these questions
through articles in jc srnals, but also to cooperate in
every way in the creation of fuller works. -
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