MILITARY THOUGHT: THE THEORY OF MILITARY ART NEEDS REVIEW, BY COLONEL GENERAL A. GASTILOVICH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402920001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- WASHINDTON 25. D.C.
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' DEC 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense .Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT : 'MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Theory of Military
Art Needs Review", by Colonel-General
A.GastiloviC1
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TGP SECRET SEecial Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" (.1.7oyennaya Miors1") published by the
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed dpwn to the level of
Army Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this ?:port or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
OR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
Enclosure
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RICFIARD P2LMS
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Original: The DirectDr, Defense Intelligence Agency
cc: Military Assistant to the President
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director-of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
intelligence Committee
Deputy Directoz for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligcnce
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
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15 December 1961
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COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Theory of Military Art
Needs Review; by Colonel-General A. Gaatilovich
DATE OF INFO: Early 1960
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled
"The ,:neory of Military Art Needs Reviews, writ-ten by Colonel-
General A. Gastilovich.
This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special
version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya )sl (Military
Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified
TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The First Issue of 1960 was the initial
issue of this special collection, and this article by Colonel-
General Gastilovich has been a subject of controversy in numerous
subseguent articles.
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The Theory of Military Art Needs Review
Colonel-General A. Gastilovich
We all admit that nuclear weapons and missiles chahge the conditions
of war, but having said "a", we are afraid to say "b". Dropping
curtsies in the direction of missiles end introducing some minor
corrections in the theory of military *rt, we still hold in practice
to the old positions existing at the end of World War II. Past
experience, traditions, and habits taught to us for decades,
tenaciously hold us back and preys:ft the same kind of revolution
in military art which nuclear weapons and missiles created in the
sphere of armament.
We strive unsuccessfully to squeeze miesileinuclear weapons into
the framework of the old habitual postulates of pur military doctrines
only slightly "nodernielcg" the latter, and we forget that this doctrine
was founded on the basis of using weapons of military combat
fundamentally different from contemporary once and not comparable
with thca.
Speaking of past world. were Imre report to the Session of the
80prene Soviet in January 1960, LS. thrushebev noted that they
fornerly began on the borders of the warring countries where the
troope were concentrated. Concerning comtemporary conditioos he said:
"Nowadays, if war starts military actions will develop
differently, since countries will have at their disposal the means
of delivering weapons over thausandk of kilometers. Vsr will start
first of all in the depths of the warring countries and every single
capital, every single large industrial or adidxistrlitive center, every
single strategic area, viii be subject to attack not just during the
first days, but during the first minutes of the var. In thismannerP
warwill both begin differently, if it is begynoand develop differently."
In another part of his report V.S. Ihrushchev said: "I once
more emphasise, that we already have so many nuclear venom --atonic
and tberaccucleay, and appropriate missiles for delivery of these
weapons to the territory of a possible aggressor, that if some madman
should order an attack &pelmet our country, 5 or 4 words missind
then we would be able to wipe such a country, or coumtries, completaky
from the face of the earth."
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Defining this thought concrete3/, Marshal of the Soviet Union
R. Yu Iblinovskly, in his speech at the same Session, said: ilbont
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100 such nuclear charges detonated vithin a short period of time on
an industrially developed country whose territory is approximately
300-500 thousand square kilcmeters, will be sufficient to convert
all of its industrial arms and admirdstrative-political centers
into a heap of nibble and the territory -- into a lifeless desert
contaminated with deadly radioactive snbstances."
. It must be clear to everyone that such statements are not smde
for the sake of rhetoric, but are fully substantiated from the stand-
point of the achiervemett of unitary technology and of the econcmic
capability of our country.
Under contemporary conditions, the formations of missile troops
of the VZ (Supreme Eigh Command), with their unlimited range of
action and colossal force of fire strike, have become the primawy
and decisive fans of armed forces. They, rather than any other
means of armed conflict "pave the may," if cm may use tile expression,
for all other forma of armed forces radically changing the
strategic situation as a whole and the operational situation in the
theaters of military operations.
Tho efforts of all other forum at the armed forces, which are
equipped with nuclear/missile venoms, must be directed toward
maximum rapid and effective exploitation of the strikes of missile
formations of the YOE. In this connection, the basis for planning
operations of each of the types of forces again becomes a question
of the use of their own nuclear/missile weapons, and not of the
number of divisions, vessels, aircraft, etc.
From these considerations it is already completely apparent
that a whole series of established, Views of our militcry doctrine
must be seriously reexamined, beginning with questions of strategy
and operational art and ending with tactics and troop organisation.
Some Questions of Strategy
Let us examine some questions concerning the initial period
of war. Let us imagine MATO without two-three countries which
have been taken out of the mar hymens of a powerful nuclear/
missile strike of formations or the VOL or which have even ceased
to exist in the first days of the war. 2his-is, after all, a
c spletely reclistic perspective; let us remember incidentally,
that the area of each such country is significantly less than 300
thousand square kilometers and several tens of large nuclear missiles
are sufficient for its destruction turally, such operations by
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VA nissile troops completely change the nature of operatics of
ground troops, the navy, and aviation.
It would. be naive to think that the enemy will be incapable of
delivering stellar powerful nuclear strikes against the territory of
countries of the Socialist Camp and first and foremost against the
territory of the Soviet Union. But such strikes will not be able to
knock these countries out of the
The superiority of the socialist structure with its economic
potentialities and political unity of peoples-eill enable countries
of the Socialist Camp to withstand the first nuclear strikes of the
enemy. This is further favored by the enormous territory, the
inexhaustible human resources, and a relatirely great dispersion of
industrial and administrative centers. The imperialist bloc does
not have such possibilities. Tor this reason, in preparing the
country for the possible launching of war by aggressors, me mast first
of all utilise the advantages of our socialist wean so as not to
give the enemy the possibility of recovering after our retaliatory
nuclear strike.
Of course we mut take into account the consequences of the
first powerful enemy nuclear strikes. As it appears to us, they
will make themselves felt,fi.st of all, by the fact that in the
first operation of the initial period of the mr, a substantial rein-
forcement of troops in theaters of military operatioos cannot be
expected by bringing up forces and equipment from the depth of the
country.
Under these cooditions, it appears absolutely necessary to us
to review seriously certain tenets of our military etrategy con-
cerning the length of a contemporary war and the Ember of armed
forces participating in it.
The example of the capitalist countries anolhilated in the
first days of the ear will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the ressiLing
countries for its proloogstion. We must take into account the
enormous moral shock to peoples, not to spark of the huge material
losses and the human victims. It is sufficiemt to compare figures
Of human losses in previous wars with expected losses during the
course of the first days or even the first hours of a caatemporerY
war for the picture tobaccos clear.
The losses of 33 earring countries during the four years of
World War I totaled lOndllice persoos kitilad and 3itRlliOQ persons
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maimed, i.e., an average of 11 million persons per year. The losses
of 72 warring countries during the six years of World War II totaled
about 34 million persons killed and 28 million persons maimed, or
an average also of about 11 million persons per year. According to
the data of a special study by the Office of Civil DefOUSe of the
USA conducted in 1955, the losses in the course of several hours
from the first aerial attack carried out chiefly by atomic and thermo-
nuclear weapons totaled 15 million persons dead and about 24 million
persons sick and wounded, altogether up to ko million in the USA
alone. In addition, about 50 to 60 percent of the country's industry
was destroyed. It is well to note that in the above-mentioned study
only 53 cities were subjected to the pre-arranged attack and that
thermonuclear barbs were dropped on only 11 of these cities. The
moral fatigue of peoples, which became evident toward the end of
World War I as well of World War II, is yell known. It is easy
to imagine how great this fatigue and depression will be after the
first nuclear etrikes in a future var.
It appears to us that after the first nuclear/missile strikes,
the basis for all operetta?, an a strategic scale mnet be a decisive
attentive against the as yet unrecovered enemy; the more quickly
and energetically that this is accomplished, the more probable that
the enemy will be unable to cope with the disruption brought about
by the first attack, and to argenise stubborn resistance.
Whoever withstands the first enemy attack must conclude the war
rapidly.
At present we already consider it possible for the tempo of
operations to be 100 Its in a 24-br. period and the duration of a
frontal operation to be 10 to 12 24-hr. periods. If this is so,
for how navy days are we prepar'ng to wage ear to achieve decisive
strategic results?
At present there is already a deep-seated cattail:lactic:a ..t:"'Iraeli
demands to conduct operations on a large scale, at high tempos,
vithout louses, and the still extant and accepted poeitioc regarding
the duration of initial period of the mob war, which ant continue
to the end of full ilisation of forces sodas beginang of the
receipt of material resources and arms from mobilised industry.
This is hardly realistic and apparently me must calculate on a
short initial period of the war, vhich wilt be the decisive period
of the eutire var.
There is no need to fear the teas *blitzkrieg" just because
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this concept was compromised by the experience of past world vars.
Under the conditioms of nuclear war only "blitz" operations can
promise victory. If victory is not achieved in a short time, than
peoples vill hardly be able to continue it in a slow, dravn-out
fashion, especially the peoples of capitalist countries, Vho have a
lower moral - political potential than countries of the Socialist
camp. He who has withstood the first strikes must and can codclude
the war rapidly if he prepares his armed forces properly in peace-
time.
Strategic art cannot be replaced by urgent demands on the moral
fiber of peoples, end netraer can one plan strategy on the basis of
fear of calculated. risk and the sacrifices connected 'with it.
The enemies of blitzkrieg habitually argue that our World liar II
losses of 1/3 of all military industry, half of the steel and coal
production, ho percent of petroleum production and output of electric
power, more than half of all the rail limes and several tams of
millions of the population in territory occupied by the enemy, not
counting cat lasses not only lid not bring about cessation of
prolonged resistance ILt even permitted the crushing of the Geraell
. fascist blitzkrieg plea and sidesequently the achievement of a
brilliant victory.
They forget the fact that the above-Doted losses were spread out
over a period of almost two years. They were inflicted only along
the line of the treat and within its limits; in the zome of interior
they vere almost non-existent. "Wan losses at the framt and in the
rear were not afforded the necessary medical and other aid available
tenancies of the voanded and. sick of the local populace. The
inhabitants situated behind the line of the !root were palyeiCelly
almoat uniVare of these losses since life in the rear continued to
flow acre or less normally. The picture will be entirely different
LOW.
War present conditions, the possibility of victory must be
assured by readiness, the capacity and captbility of concluding the
war in the shortest possible time. The theory of a prolonged war
is more acceptable at present to the monopolistic circles of the
Met, since the preparation for such a bser costs more and consepatalY
promises the menufacturers at are greater profits. And in the name
of profits they may not even consider the expediency of the theory.
The postulatts of our military strategy concerning the size of
the armed farces are also stLL1 based on the experience of past
world wars and arise from the necessity of conducting war with mass,
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multi-milliom-men armies.
Advocates of muiti-million-man armies allude to the experience
of all twentieth-century wars, which showed that the grcmth of the
destructive force of weapons in armed ccabst with an enemy of equal
strength never brought about a decrease in the armed forces during
war, but rather caused their increase. They forget that this
ezperience is based on entirely different means of armed cozbat and
methods of its conduct. Por this reason, analogies caneot be made
in this matter.
Under current conditions can operations unfold in the old manner?
Can they, having begun vith a relatively small number of regular
combat-ready troops then continually broaden by dint of the arrival
of fully mobilised large units, and finally change into engagements
of numerous fronts and of saati-million-son armies? Under current
conditions this is firstly impossible, and secondly, =necessary.
It is impossible because nothing will arrive from the depth of the
country in time, and possibly will never arrive. It is unnecessary
because sr.:ex the first nuclear strikes the Ices:zing forces of the
enemy in the border zones also cannot be evaeroue it is necessary
to crush quickly the remains of these forces and to occupy the enemy
country and., for this, operations of a completely different nature
will be required from those which we are now studying.
At the present time, of the 61 divisions within the composition
of the Allied ground troops of the BUrcTsan military bloc, there
are 5 American ilvisions, 4 British divisions, anci 8 West German
divieions; the remaining divisions: 1k Trench, 10 Turkish divisions,
and other countries - 20 divisions.
She first obliterating strike by missile formations of the VOK
can be directed against the enemy in such a manner that only a
border strip with a depth of several tens of kilometers (in the
interest of the safety of our troops) will remein =destroyed. The
taking of this strip will then become the primary mission of the
advancing divisions of the fIrst echelon; it must be accomplished
also by their wide use of unclear missiles of tactical and operational '
designation.
After taking the border zone, the mission confronting the troops
viii be chiefly the speedy taking over of zones of s treater or
lesser degree of destruction and radiation resulting from the massive
strike of strategic missiles. Under these conditions, the main-
zational build-up of the enemy or the approach of his large
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operational, ar even strategic, reserves can hardly be expected. It
is more likely that it will be necessary to overcome the resistance
of enemy troops retreating from the border zone.
To exploit the first powerful missile strike it will be
completely unnecessary to deploy a large number of divisions, as
was done in past wars.
Taking over the border zone and the zones of total destruction
and radiation will necessitate special organization and preparation
of troops, but will not, at all, necessitate multi-million-nen armies.
The execution of this; type of mission in the ZUropeen theater of
military operations on a front of 600-700 ka, for example, is
possible with 20-25 divisions, primarily tank, rushing ahead along
separate axes and in separate bested bottles, pounding the large
units and units of the enemy which offer resistance in the abore-
mentioned zones. Of course a significant portion of these troops
will suffer from enemy nuclear strikes; relatively frequent re-
placement of entire large units which brve sustained beery losses
will be necessary. For this reason there should. be 10-15 more
reserve di-visit:ma behind thew in all 30-40 divisions, well equipped
with tactical nuclear venoms, and which will make up the first
operational echelon, will be required.
Organizationally, the strike of the first operatioosl echelon
in a zone of 600-700 km may be represented by two fronts at 15-20
divisions each, plus a certain number of divisions of airborne
!trees, (2 or 3 for a front). a front may consist of 2 Cr 3 armies
CC k or 5 divisions, each acting in a sone of 100 to 200 km, plus a
certain number of divisions of the front reserve.
Forces, mobilized in the interior of the country, can arrive
gradually in the theater of military operations probably after the
completion of the first cpmeretioms at the fromI:and their principal
role will consist of occupation of captured territory.
If, after taking over the territory of a country subjected, to
the first massive nuclear attack, the enemy does not capitulate.
similar sl]-shattering strike noble repeated an the next country.
Froa the aforementioned, it does not follow of come* that
those divisions which will befin action in the first operetiocal
echelon of ground troops Will besufficient for the war ass vhcae.
It is apparent that in accordance with the forward novement a signifi-
cant number of troops which here been designated for carrAii out
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occupational functions in tke occupied territory will be required.
A significant number of forces viii also be needed in the zone of
interior chiefly fcr various forsetions such as local antiaircraft
defense (MFV0). Therefore, for the conduct of the war a sufficiently
large number of ground troops is needed, :rut their over-all size,
designation end natureof use will of course be different than in
past vars.
The number of ground troops engeged directly in combat operaticos
my be, es it appears to us, many tines smaller than it was in
previous vars.
We have outlined a concept for initial operations under
European Theater conditions which is convenient for the activities
of all are of troops. To the same degree, with certain corrections
for geographical conditions, it_cen also be applied in other theaters.
In this concept, the principal leading role below to the operations
of the TM missile formatiOns but not with the aims which we nO4
have under general review. ILA is not combat against enemy nuclear
venoms, not the weakening of his economic potential, not caibat
against his reserves, etc., but the full annihilation of the enemy
with nuclear warheads of mageton yield over a vast-territory with
the aim of knocking entire countries out of the war.
Briefly, if there is a possibility for holding out, then there
is also a possibility of victory in a short period of time. Moreover,
for direct combat operations at the front such numerous ground armed
forces as in previous wars will be needed neither in the beginning
of the war nor during its course.
Certain Questions of Operatics:al Art
It is necessary to examine the current operatic= of ground
troops in close connection with the operations of =missile formations.
It appears to to that among the ranks of the latter, in addition to
formations carrying out the missions of knocking entire countries
out of the war, there must be formations designated for activities -
in the interest of several frosts coodueting operations ou co* stra-
tegic axis. Sudh formations, remaining under the juriedictico and
comma of General Seadeparters (newts), could establish favorable
conditions for the development of groumd troop operations by means
of annihilation of enemy nuclear weapons, his reserves, airfields,
transportation (raters, depots, and other installations located
beyond. the range of action of frost missile weapons; by their strikes
they could also reinforce the fire capability of the frosts in those
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instances when the Utter, for one reason or another, found them-
selves without sufficient nuclear /missile weapons. Strikes in the
interests of separate fronts could be carried out either on command
of the Stavka (or the comend of theater forces) or upon requests
of the fronts within the range of prescribed limitations.
At the sale time, this VOX missile formation can carry out
separate tasks assigned by the Stacks which are not directly' connected
with the activities of the fronts.
In all instances the V= opmetiorel missile forint:ion must have
at its disposal its own long-range means of reconnaissance (aviation,
radiatechnical, and others), in order to be able to respond rapidly
to a change in the situation and to avoid multi-channel coordinations
CC re-33snaissanee tasks. -
It appears expeditum. to us to plan the WIC missile operations
as special operations for the destruction of enemy nuclear weapons,
for undermining his econoadc potential, for casket agaimrt supply,
etc. An this must be a constituent part of two types of missile
operations: those operations carried out by the VS missile troop
fOreatiOaS with the aim of emplete annihilation of an enemy countzy
and knocking it out of the var, or operations in support of ground
troops. Missile operaticos or the first type usually most precede
operations of the second type end, subillequently, are also carried
out simultaneously. It is obvious that the ncture at the targets
under attack will be different in each type of operation.
It is absolutely unnecessary to deploy MK midget's formations,
in coordinated action with grotmd troops, directly in the theater of
military activities or close to it. On the contrary, their placement
in the zone of interior is even preferable, since this sakes the
vork.ce mew intelligence laare difficult and negates the need to
form a separate antiaircraft defense or these formations; their WO
can be combined with the antiaircreft defense of certain areas of
the country.
Ihe sescution of VOL sIssile operations, the possibility of
similar strikes by the enemy, the repletion of ground troops with
their own orgenic nuclear/missile mans, and the possibility of using
high-yield mclear warheads, not only in the sone of interior, but
in engagements and even on the field of battle, demands thorough
review of certain postulates of our military doctrine in commotion
with the operations of ground troops.
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Above all, it is tine to repudiate the very concept and. expression
"strike group" (udarnar gruppirovka) as aotiquated and harmful. Any
grouping formed with the personnel and. materiel or ground troops
threatens to became a good target for an enmity nuclear strike and to
bear extra, =warranted losses.
In place of the creation of "strike groups" in all types Of
operations, it is necessary to instill the concept of "concentration
of the efforts of nuclear/missile weapons". The activities, after
all, Of ground troops both in the offensive and in defense suet take
place over broad zones, approximately the erase for Urge units in
offense as in defense. This, incidentally, vas recently taken into
account by our probable enemies.
The bases of conteeporary operations are rapid 'renewer and
swift attacks by mall groupings (a divisicw size), from different
directions, not shoulder to shoulder, and Inking use of their caw
nuclear strikes. Sven these lttle groupings are dispersed after a
successful attack. A strike group in contemporary neaning spells
death, since it for a comsat and good target for a high-,yield
nuclear weapon.
Contempozez7 offensive and defensive operatic= must differ
from one another by the quantity c: nuclear warheads *noted to their
implementation and not by the limber Of divisions. loth in Offensive
and defensive ground troop operations the primary activities are
nuclear strikes, swift maneuver, and short assaults with tanks and
personnel. lb* difference rests in the fact that in Off=e1.`":
operations there seat be a strong first echelon which permits swift
destruction a the opposing an; in a defensive operation it is
expedient to have a weaker first echelon and to designate it for
holding certain transportation centers, important areas or position
sectors behind large natural barriers, with the aim of slowing the
to at the anew offensive; defense as a whole should be based on
newer and strikes with forces located in the zone of interior,
even with the loss of territory, in order to win tine and concen-
trate essential nuclear/missile weapons. 50X1-HUM
It appears to us tint under current conditions, it is un-
neelessary to have second echelons, in the previous meaning of this
tern, either in defense or in offense. They ince always thought
Cf as a potential strike group vbich could be brought into battle
in a new direction. At present it is mach *ore expedient to
consider everything Located behind the first echelan,which is en-
gaged in battle, as reserve, dispersed over the ant ? eld of
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hostilities and designated as reinforcement for the first echelon
during an eiensive, but on the defensive - for counterattacks and
counterstrikee. To overcome enemy opposition during an offensive,
there should not be concentration of troops by bringing in the
second echelon, but concentration of nuclear witapone and. their means
of delivery (nositel). Only when there is an insufficient quantity
of these NOS= can a strike be undertaken by several divisions, and
then not with a compact striking group, but rather from several
directions.
The possibility of enemy use of high-yield nuclear warheads in
the field of hostilities obliges even those small groupings, of
division size as we mentioned, to overate at a distance of 20 to ko
or more kilometers frost each other or, as ve frequently point out,
to operate in separate directions.
Moreover, the inclination of each advancing large unit to lend
assistance to its neighbor, to wheel rapidly if necessary in a new
direction for a strike against the enemy rear is a binding prinoip1e
of coordinated action.
4111 Therefore the conduct of offensive operations now requires a
Therefore,
lesser operational density but a larger number of tank
divisions in the first echelon. Divisions located in the stem of
interior and moving up -- are not the second echelon but ratherr
reserves designated as replacements for decimated. divisions of the
first echelon and for the circumvention of all types of obstacles.
It is necessary to reject decisively the inclination developed
in previoss were toward encirclement of separate groupings and the
formation of rings around than. This tendency is very viable and
has remained with us as an inheritance from the period. when there
were no other methods for annihilation of the enemy left in the rear
of advancing troops. lowadeys, the enemy left in the rear must be
destroyed either in meeting esgagemente by reserve large units and
units or if stationary, they .at be v,4 h4 with nuclear strikes.
The latter, of course, is preferable.
In the training of troops, it is necessary also to reject decisive-
ly 'th* cultivation of the principle of break through the enemy's
prepared defenses. It it possible, or course, in isitridnal
$ instances vhen the enemy defense cannot be bypassed or annihilated
by nuclear strike. In the in, however, under conditions not in-
volving solid frosts or heated battles, the breakthrough of an enemy
') prepared. defense has ceased-to be the primary fczn of offensive
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actions, but is yieiing to meeting engagements and envelopment.
The taking of radioactively contaminated zones created by the
enemy acquires great importance. It must be carried out by large
units, depending upon t'ae tasks t.:ley are fulfilling, the meteorological
situation, and the degree of permissible dosage of radiation received
during the period of action. DependIng upon these conditions, the
contaminated zones are taken either by a rapid forward push or by
bypassing, or in the final. analysis, tl-e troops continue to carry
out their mission in the contaminated zone without regard to possible
losses. All discussions regarding the creation of passages into
contaminated zones, the surmounting of them in helicopters and others
are utopian at the present time.
In planning contemporary offensive operations on the scale of
a front and armies, it is impossible to proceed from an single "D"
(day). In terms of time, operations will flow in different directions,
at different tempos and it is more advisable to plan them by calendar
days (except, of course, the initia retaliatory nissile strike).
Moreover, concrete army and large unit tasks can be established for
only 1-2 days and for a longer period it is sufficient to indicate
the general direction, tne nature of the activities and final goal
of the operation. More detailed planning is highly problematical,
since sharp changes in the situation are unav-idable as a result of
enemy nuclear strikes.
The tempos of contemporary operations may be planned, as already
mentioned, up to 850 to 100 and more kilometers during a 24-hr. period
but it dust be kept in mind that, as a result of enemy nuclear
strikes an our deep rear, the front will not be able to rely on
systematic delivery from the rear of the country. Everything which
is essential must already le stored in the theaters in peacetime and
such supplies as POL must, tc a significant degree, be sought out
from war trophies in the course of th. advance.
It is also essential to take into account the cumulative physical
tension on tank and track drivers (it will be necessary to have two
reliefs for interchange of crew members) and the large number of
vehicles which will go out of commission.
Vigorous maneuver and nuclear strikes mast become the basis of
contemporary defense. Re who sits in place, even in prepared positions,
will be knocke- out by nuclear weapons or bypassed. Only a relatively
small part of the forces can hold separate areas or positions with
the aim of slowing the tempo of the enemy advance along axes 'which
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are ccovenient for him and, consequently, cluster his battle array
and operational formation. In this connection an important role in
defense is played by broad utilization of obstacles and terrains
presenting natural obstructions for slowing the tempo of the enemy
advance. Eovever4 the fate of modern defense is decided in the final
analysis by the maneuver of missiles, chiefly the shifting of their
trajectories, and the availability of nuclear warhemds, in conjunction
with counterattacks and counterblows of the reserves.
It appears to us that under contemporary conditions defense, in
the pest meaning of this termlcan take place only on a tactical scale.
Army and front operational defense, deliberately subordinated to the
interests of offensive operations in other directions or dictated by
a sharp change in the situation in the enemy's favor, viii, of course,
also have its place. But it must be based on the same methods of
operation as in offensive operations. i.e., on heated meting battles
and engagements. For this, the army and !root may have a umber of
large unite and a scale of zones of action equal to those of an almy
and front carrying out offensive operations. The difference will be
in the presence of a smaller quantity of nuclear warheads, which viii
necessitate loss of a part of the forces and territory in order to
win time.
Defensive operations of the front and army, differing free
offensive operations in aims of action and quantity of nuclear
Weapons, will resemble the latter in methods of large unit tactical
Operations.
In defensive operations, certain armies of the front and certain
large units of armies, taking advantage of a convenient local situation
which has arisen as a result of swift actions or nuclear strikes, will
frequently carry out an agfensive with limited goals.
In a contemporary operational defense, the formation of defensive
lanes is not advisable because they do not justify their designation.
Any large unit defending itself in place win be annihilated by
nuclear strikes of the enemy or simply bypassed. On the operational
s0a1e4 the two "stable defense" sbculd be relegated to the archives
because under modern conditiens it can be neither solid nor stable.
Slowing the tempo of the advancing mew by amens of defense is based
on counterattacks and counterstrikes carried out from different
directions, on skilful and swift disengagements Ina the anew, and
on broad use of barricides and utilisation of natural terrain obstacles,
until the time a possibility presents itself to destroy the enemy
with a nuclear strike.
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In connection with this it is necessary, evidently, to re-
examine our views on the nature of so-called counterpreperation
(kontrpodgotovka) in defense and on organization of counterstrikes.
In these questions we: continue to proceed from the concept of the
solid and relatively stable front.
It appears to us that a limited quantity of nuclear weapons in
the defense will not permit a breakup of the enemy offensive with
one or two missive nuclear strikes, especially since he will not
form compact groupings for his offensive. Apparently, instead of
counterpreparation, it will be necessary to restrict oneself to
daily and rapid annihilation of disclosed enemy means of nuclear
attack and. to individual (to the extent possible) nuclear strikes
at various times on the most dangerous of his tank divisions vhich
have broken through. If, however, the availability of nuclear
weapons permits the delivery of a massive strike capable of breaking
up the enemy offensive completely, then this is already not counter-
preparation but going over to the offensive.
I% is more expedient to carry out counterstrikes in operational
defense, by means of meeting eNwpmeerta,not with a compact grouping
especially created for this purpose and deployed on a definite line,
but with several divisions operating ainataneously, though from
different directions.
Anti-debarkation defense along the coast by ground troops can
also have no defensive zones either on the coast or in the zone of
interior. In poets and in vulnerable landing sectors along the coast
there can be separate tank subunits and units designated basically
for combat against airoonne landings and for initial repulsion of
debarkations of the enemy in landing-debarkation craft.
The basis of anti-debarkation defense must be the maneuvering
activities of large units which move up from the interior of coastal
zones and, in meeting engagements, pound the enemy utilizing nuclear
WeepOra
Of the now generally accepted means of anti-debarkation defense,
cm.1,7 the ccnstruction of obstacles, both in the water as well as on
the land, can achieve such sigrificance. 50X1-HUM
Enemy amphibious lending operations, while =route at sea, do
not merit expensi.e and cumbersome operations against them by the
navy and lOugeange dviation. The basis of their anmallation can
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be missile strikes in esbarkation and debarkation areas: while enroute
at sea, it is again more expedient to anrillilate landing forces by
strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several megatons.
After the discovery of the landing forces at sea, these attacks can
be calculated on the basis of their passage of a definite point (area).
Certain Questions at the Develoyment and Orgenization of the
Types of Armed Forces
The changing of certain strategic and operational points of TiOW
is unavoidably bound up in the review of the programs for development
end organization of the different types of armed forces. This
development must, first of all, evolve only frog the needs of the
initial period of the war, since a lone; drawn-nut nuclear/missile
struggle is impossible; s:ccedly, it must develop under the banner
of the indubitable priority of nuclear/missile troops. In this
respect it is expedient to develop primarily missile troops of the
MK, capable of using MISODAS of megaton yields.
Missile troops of all types -- TM, operational, and tactical --
must develop in the directions of:
- increasing their firing rate (skorostrelnost); in this respect
the introduction of solid iehseile fuels has decisive significance;
missiles must be per as ready projectiles, fully assembled and
requiring only the establishment of the flight progrta;
- perfection and automation of the process of tying in the la-nching
mounts (carriers) to the terrain;
- perfection of missile guidance systems, not subject to jamming;
- perfection of missile isrriers capable of changing the launch
area quickly; in this respect an important role must be played
principally by "air-surface" type missiles cc seaplanes (gidrosamolet),
missile-carrying submarines, and missile trains (poyesd) (for
strategic missiles);
- perfection of the vet= of ceutralised command of launching
missiles from widely separated commumilocdmts.
It must be acknowledged directly that in their present state,
missiles of tactical and operational designation are still not suf-
ficiently suitable for the missions assigned to them because of their
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low firing rate conditioned by complex preparations for launching,
for retargeting and for changing of firing positions.
The Found troops as a whole must develop in a form transportable
by air. Perfection and introduction of lighter type tanks (since any
armor is penetrable) suitable for transport by air is essential. The
great ipportance which is attached to the ability of ground troops
to take ruined and contaminated zones and water barriers requires
significant development of engineering troops; however the most
important mission of the engineering troops must not be fortificatinr
in the existing meaninc of this term, i.e., not the construction of
positions and of anti-etc shelters but the rapid preparation of
missile launch sites, establishment of Obstacles, road construction,
and provisions for the surmounting of large water obstacles.
The air forces, it appears to usil have not yet lost their
significance to the degree that they should be ignored. Discussion
should concern only the change in their role in warfare and, subse-
quently, a change in their composition and organization.
long-range aviation, armed with missiles of the "air-ship" class,
is (in conjunction with submarines) a good means of comtlat with
motile carriers of nuclear weapons at see and one that is difficult
to replace. In view of this, it is apparently advisable to include
it in the composition of the navy.
7
Front air forces (VVS) are also needed, though of a type other
than those now available. Certainly, front bcmber aviation is
derrerting the scene, since its missions can, to a significant degree,
be carried out by missiles. Nevertheless, on the field of modern
battle and engagements there will be many important small and mobile
targets whose annihilation by missiles is still improketae. An air-
craft of the fighter-bomber type is needed which, on its own, could
find the target and. annibilAte it; such an aircraft mat be capable
of great acceleration, permitting it to appear and depart rapidly
(this may be achieved with the aid of rocket boosters): at the
same time it must be capable of carrying out combet missions at
relatively low speeds as well. An aircraft flying at a speed equal
to inch 1-2 (X-211). is poorly suited to seek out small and mobile
targets; even with the use of radar equipment.
Fighter aviation within the =position of the YVES of a front
is essential, as a more maneuverable component of the PV01 as long
as aviation remains one of the principal carriers of nuclear weapons
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for the enemy and as long as ground antiaircraft missile systems do
not possess a sufficient range of destruction.
In addition, the front needs a manifold troop (army) aviation
for observation and reconnaissance, including radiation, for liaison,
camand., and transport. Such aviation must undoubtedly develop as
not airfield-based. It may consist of helicopters and other flying
machines, for example the type well known in foreign literature under
the term "flying saucers" (ground effect machine-turbolet).
The VV8 of the front must have a much greater number of
reconnaissance aircraft than they have at present.
Finally, greater-capacity transport aviation is meantime
resource of the Supreme Nigh Commumi.
The VV8 of the front (air army) is not designated wader modern
conditions for the execution of any independent air operations, and
is the means for directly coordinated action with canbined-arns
armies. For tbis reason, their composition must include several
aircraft divisions of fighter-bombers because only the latter are
eavorable for combat against mobile carriers of nuclear weapons and
he advancing reserves of the enemy. In this connection, however,
it is inadvisable to distribute the VT8 forces of the front for
support of definite armies or divisions; it is better to utilise
them centrally, under the jurisdiction of the VV8 commander.
The la . The future at sea belongs to submarines and to
miss -carrying seaplanes which are not bound to airfields and which
are capable of long-range operations. These, it would appear, should
now be developed.
The basic mission of the fleet -- to annildlate carriers of
uuclearimissile weapons at sea which as a consequence of their-
nobility have greater survival chances. Such carriers will be
mdesile-carrying aircraft and sissile-carrying atomic submarines.
As a result of their high radar-Image contrast and, consequently,
their vulnerability aircraft carriers and other surfede vessels
apparently will soon depart from the scene. -
Under contemporary conditions it is hardly possible to imagine
large amphibious landing operatic= of an operetta:1.4am' even less,
of strategic significance. A landing force is always, at some stage
of its activity, a compact group or it does not make sense; but this
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condition spells destruction for the landing force. The possibilities
are all in favor of its annihilation by nuclear/missile weapons while
it is still at its bases or while it is at sea.
Surface vessels of the fleet will not be able to play a signifi-
cant role in armed conflict. Their utility will probably be limited
to coastal areas under heavy PVC cover for execution of support
missions. As far as protection of ocean supply transport is concerned,
even now they are of little use for carrying out this mission.
Antiaircraft defense of troops and the country, as it appears
to us, is on the correct course of development, chiefly of anti-
missile resources in the form of the creation of fully automatic
systems of antiaircraft missiles.
The age of tube antiaircraft artillery is irrevocably receding
into the past and it is only in the antiaircraft defense of troops
that small-caliber tube antiaircraft artillery mey still have some
significance for the protection of small snits fraa lam-flying
aircraft.
The principal antiaircraft defense of troops and the country
must be an automatic system of antiaircraft missil- installations of
various ranges which could cover, not installations, but separate
large areas and could resolve the task of protecting both the
troops and the territorial installations of the country (in these
areas). Separate antiaircraft defense of troops, except for the
self-defense of diSll subunits mentioned above, appears to us to
be an antiquated tradition. Fighter aircraft aviation within the
system of antiaircraft defense will also became archaic in the near
future. It is needed only until antiaircraft mdasiles have achieved
the necessary technical perfection.
A new type of forces. In addition to existing types of armed
forces he necessity has sprung up, in our opinion, for the creation
of a now type of force which is not designeted for direct conduct
of combat operation.,but which is extremely Important, nonetheless,
under conditions of wawa/missile W.T. VS have in 'did troops,
possibly called rescue-rehabilition. (spaestelno-vosstanovitelnyy),
which are designated for operations in the country's interior, in
areas subjected to enemy nuclear attack. Their basis should comae
of medical service and rehibilatian units and large units.
In contrast to other types of forces, these must be
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especially massive, organized according to territorial character-
istics and trained without being pulled out of production. We
have something similar now in the form of civilian formations of the
antiaircraft defenE (MVO). But these formations mixt mostly
on paper, are not supported from a material -technical standpoint,
are semi-voluntary organization, and are not properly directed by
anyone. In addition, organs of the ENO are concerned with a very
large number of problems which, in essence, are the prerogatives of
governmental authority, such as communications, supplying the popu-
lation with food, evacuation, etc.
It appears to us that such very important undertakings as medical
assistance to the suffering populace and rehabilitative work) i.e.,
measures permitting the people to withstand enemy nuclear attack,
must be implemented by special troops. Their cadres and necessary
equipment mast be maintained in peacetime and they must be assured
mabilisational buildup under the leaderstir of organs of military
control with the initiation of military &ctivities.
stions Cont Prom rol. Fr the standpoint of the nature of
control of of operations the new forms of armed conflict do not
introduce any basic changes. As in the past there will be wed for
Intelligence and collation of its information, an appraisal of the
situation, a decision, and its transmittal to executors, supervision
CC execution,
: influence on the course of events by changing the
tasks of 6W:4ordinate troops, or through the influence of the senior
commander's means exerted on the enemy, the infontng of the commander
and of adjacent units. &waver, the methods of control and the means
by which they are implemented experience significant changes.
The method of direct personal contact in operations is of little
value today. It can lead only to a waste of the senior commander's
time and promote incorrect decisions based upon impressions of one
center of conhat operations. This method is admissible DOW only in
combat on a subunit level, but not in operatic.
The need to see the field of canbat along the decisive direction
also has little admissibility now. This need arose from crushing
the enemy with messes of troops which were in direct contact with him.
This vill not usually happen, now.
The most important thing in control is quick reaction to a change
in the situation, a rapid tempo of control, and, consequently, the
well-kmown need for its mechanization, automation, and reduction of
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the nuther of its documents.
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Even now wire telegraphy and telephone communications should be
added to obsolescent means of control as they will not be able to
keep pace with the operating tempo of troops.
Apparently even such an attribute of control as the preparation
of large unit and army command posts with all types of shelters
(dugouts), by the forces and equipment of engineer troops, is
becoming obsolete. The rapid tempos of battles and operations require
highly mobile command points using available places of cover (cellars,
buildings, tunnels, quarries, etc.).
The recording of meteorological conditions and their prediction
become a very important factor in operational planning and in daily
control. In this connection, the creation of special meteorological
units in all staffs from division to front is absolutely essential.
Uhtil automatic systems permitting rapid and accurate determi-
nation of coordinates for missile launchers are worked out, it is
essential to have in the staffs of armies and fronts a separate
topogeodetic service with subordinate special units to support missile
units and large units.
* * *
In this article we have only touched upon some of the most ,
topical questions of 'military art. In connection with the development
of nuclear/Missile weapons, the total number of postulates in nee4
of review is undoubtedlymnch greater. Many of the questions touched
upon by us are set forth only by way of posing them and bringing them
to the attention of military-theoretical thought. Therefore, the
Judgements of the author cannot lay claim to exhaustive completeness
or infallibility.
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MI TIMM OF minium Arr NUM (2 I fftga
(Col. Gen. A. Oftstilovich)
11, oannot squeeze missile/nuclear weapons into the framework
of tbr old habitual poctulate of military doctrine.
If var starts, It will begin differently, develop differently
and end differently.
The formations of missile troops of the VOX (Supreme Kish Command)
,
(
have become the primary and decisive form of used forces. In this
capacity it mmy be said that they "pave the vibe for all other forme
of armed foress. Other for of the armed forces must be directed
)
tovards maximum rapid and effective erploitation of the strikes of
missile formatieme of the VOL
nes it is appeeemt that the whole series of established vises
on military doctrine must be re-examined.
The actions of the VOK in the initial phases of the mar (kooehles
out 2-3 counteles), changes the nature of the operations by pomp*
*ogee navy amd aviation.
2he ememy will deliver powerfel strikes against the socialist
Ole*
Mese strikes will not bloc* the camp out of the mar because of
the shperiority of the socialist structure, its economic potentialities
amd political unity of its peoples.
must take into account the enormous moral Mock to people,
material losses and hymen victims.
It is sufficient to compare names of human lasses in preview
ears with expected looses during the course of the first dere or
boors of a contemporary war.
It is easy to imagine how great soralpfhtigue sad depressiam mill
be after the first nuclear itrikes.
Mower withstands the first attack mist conclude the war mipplay.
The initial period will be the decisive period.
Be who has withstood the first strikes mnst and can =poled* tbo
war rapidly if he preAres his armed forces properly in peacetime.
Under the conditio-J; -" -101*-"
promise victory.
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?
Oua- military stater wm.loarnimg tn, slew of '.no anted tore is
410 based on past wart oceductwi wit.lti.ailior man &rale*. It is
impossible and unmecesaary for the war to hroaden out on the fronts
atter the laitial devastating blow. There will be no requirement for
I other armies to move up to battle. The remains of the eneey forces
.at be crushed quickly and the enemy country occupied. For this,
operations of a different nature will be required.
The first strike by the YGIC against the enemy will lea7C:only a
border .tri p (servers] 10s of kilometers) undestroyed. The first edhelam
will have 44 its mission the taking of this strip, also vith nualetridasUAMP.,
To coganit the first powerful missile strike it will be omkpleteli
unnetessa7y to deploy a large mr. of divisions. The first echelon seed
oily be 20 - 25 divisions with 10 - 15 more reserve divisioms behimd
them; in all, 30 - 40 ditisions. Forces from the interior of the wintry
Will irTiVO later to ocourpy the territory.
/be ar. of ground troops engaged directly in combat operations mey
Di mamy times smaller than it was Is previous ware.
The V0K massils formations will act to:
lai Knock entire countries out of themr.
b Sepport fromtal operations by annihilating emery mualear
weapons, his reserves, airfields, transportation center*, depots, 44e.
legated seyomd the range at frost missile weapons.
In all instanoee the ME operational missile formatiAm met have et
4111 its disposal its owe leeg-rasgemweas of reconnaissaaos (*victim, rag*
technical e others) is order to be able to respond rapidly.
It is ummecessary to deploy VOA tbrmationa in coordineted astima
groumd troops. It is preferable to place them in the SI to Woe oeler
imtall tones more difficult, amd precludimg the mead tori oppariMBIWV
,StrilatChmesmla by ground troops are out -.too good as tazge444
someentratiome. Aativities by ground troops meat take Plume ammo %me
amass by small grogpimge (of ay. sise).
The primary activities are nuclear strike, swift ARROUVOr age sheet
assaalts.
&mood eshelem stmike groupie on a front are out. liverythileg
the rivet softies shoal 10 eassidered as reserve with comemmtie$ieeo.
mmolear mamas replasim, 11,14s)entratiom of troops. There shifted bele
larger mr. of tank dive. is tee first sehelea. The taking of
somtemimated some acqpires greet importing*.
%cause of the high to (e0-100 kms.) dialog a 24 hr. porimillii
Also enemy nuelear strikes as the rear, the frnat will net be able to
OR delivery from tbe row. Thus most supplies will be stored is the
derieg pease time. Other supplies sulk as KL vill be sought out tem.
trophies.
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?f?
#7.r,T17, 211
Defense must profit Prom obstacle terrein 'Lowing the enemy
advance. Defense in the final analysis is decided ty the naueuver of
missiles and the shifting of trajectories.
Slaving the tempo of the advancing enemy by mewls of defense is
based on counterattacks and couterstrikes carried out fro liferent
directions, on damn amd swift disensagmeants from the enemy, and
on broad use of barricades and utilization of natural terrain obstacles
until the opportunity presents itself to destroy the enemy with a
nuclear strike.
Counterstrike should be carried rut by several divisions operating
simultaneously but in different directions.
Amphibiems landing forces eau best be annihilated by missile strike
at embarkation or debarkation areas or while enroute at sea.
lineations on the Development ef Wes of Armed Forces VOIC
Imdebiteble priority of missile troops which vast CL) increase
their firing rate (ready missiles, solid fuel), (2) perfection of
missile gnidanct systems ,(3) perfection of missile carriers capable
C)henging lanzsdh area quickly (seaplanes, subs and missile trains),
4perfection of system of centralised oommand of launching missiles
widely separated ,:ammand points. Preempt missiles complicated by
low firing rate, retargeting, complexlmaching preparations, etc.
amend TroM.sholild develop in a fors tamnsportable by air;
introduce lighter teak types; develop engineering troops towards the
Waft of ruined and contemiested sones and water barriers.
Air Porno' not yet Lost their significance. LEA armed with air-
ship missiles is a good seams of coast with mobile carriers at sea.
Advisable to include it in conposition of the Navy.
hoot bomber aviation is departing the scene. In its stead there
is t need for fighter-bomber types to seek out and destroy small and
mobile targets not annihilated by missiles.
Fighter aviation of a front ic essential as a component of the
MO, as long as aviation remains one of the principal carriers.
!root also needs nom-eislUldlesed (holicopter) aviation for
observation, reconsmimance, radiation, liaison ommmuldand transport.
Greater cepacity transport aviation needed as a resource of the
Ss ?Ours at sea belonse to subs and missile ownVilliplamea
Irt to airfields.
Missies - to amaibilate emigre of nuelserhd.ssLle resemss
TET
at ass.
7-- 'v"7174w-willi-1,4?
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41 Val' 0-4?*", L
Landinz fcrees ari2 4.zitivnted by virtue of their compactamew
and hence vulnerability to nuclue.... attack.
eurface vessels lack significant role - limited to support
missions along coast protected b
Antiaircraft Defense_t: Develop properly towards fully automatic
antio&-----Earfes:--frghter aircraft for AA defense becoming archaic.
?Rescue Sehabilitation Troop*: Nem type of force for operations
ia interior in aroma 'Objected to essay nuclear attack to provide
medical service. They should be especially massive organized according
to territorial characteristics. NUst be maintained in peacetime and
assured of snotilisational bull under ailltary control -with the
initiation of mdlitary activities.
decision and execution. Requires quick reaction to change, muchaai
Contal: Moo new chins* - need intelligence, collation of info=
automation and reduction of documents.
Wire telegrOphr and telephone communicatione are antigumted and win
not hasp pact lath operating tempo.
hequirot recording of metejetions and creation of special =Its
in all staffs from division to front is essential.
A separate topogoodetic service to support missile units and
Lars units required - to provide accurate detentination of coordinates
for missile launches.
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