ELIMINATION OF THE LAG IN OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, BY LT. GEN. M. KOCHETKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402860001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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Eimination of the Lag
in
Operational and Tactical Intelligence-
by
Lieutenant General M. Kochetkov
Vast changes in the nature of armed combat, caused by the
appearance of weapons of mass destruction and, especially, of
missiles of varying designation, necessitate the development of
new intelligence (razvedy-vatelnaya) techniques and their
introduction into large units (soyedineniye) and groupings
(obedineniye) of the branches of the armed f)rces and arms of
troops, a re-examination of the organizational structure of
operational and tactical intelligence from top to bottom, and the
development of new forms ahd methods of combat activity of
/operational and tactical intelligence in peacetime and wartime.
Naturally, the solving of all these questions must take into
account the nature of a future war.
There is no need to prove the importance of operational
and tactical intelligence. Its importance is adequately stated
in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov
in the first issue of the gpecial Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" (Voyennaya Mysl) for 1960. It would
be useful to refer to the statement of the Minister of Defense,
Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, made by him at
the 6 July 1956 critique. He pointed out: "Under modern
conditions intelligence takes on extraordinary significance; it
has never been as important as it is now and will be in the near
future. It is impossible to count on victory if one does not have
reliable information about the enemy. If we t..1k about operational
Intelligence - its importance is simply enormous. To know the
plans of the enemy, the concentration of his forces, means, and
formations (gruppirovka) and react to them accordingly - this is
half the victory over the enemy."
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It 1.t known "hat t!-- rr,151ie *,roops have move-: up to assume
first place dmonw, ntner branches of the arini:d forces. There
are missile tro,Jp:. of Ytragic Of=signation which are the means
of the Supreme Pii:h C(trmand (VGK). (In the Fuccessful operations
of the latter dep,:nd the oeizdre of the strategic initiative in
the initial perioi of a war and it retention during the war until
the enemy is completely destroyed.
The missile troops of the VGK are capable of solving tasks
at great strategic depth for eliminating from a war entire
countries and other great strategic objectives, as well as
destroying, in coordination with the ground forces, enemy targets
in the theater of military operations (TVD) in the operational
depth, beyond the range limits of the micsile means of a front.
The operations of other branches of the armed forces -
antiaircraft SPV0) troops of the country, the ground forces,
the air .orcet (VVS) and the naval forces, are dependent on
Successful operations of the missile troops, which create
conditions favorable for the operations of the others in the
theater of military operations.
In examining the role and place of the branches of the
armed forces in a future war, with the purpose of establishing
their interrelationship and degree of independence, we come to
the conclusion that even in peacetime the missile troops have
to be provided with exhaustive, precise date on all objectives
subject to destruction in the first counterblow of the missile
troops against the aggressor. Naturally the missile troops
must be targeted against these objectives in advance and be
in a state of maximum readiness for an instantaneous counter-
blow.
In connection with this, we feel that, on behalf of the
missile troops of the VGK and fronts, an appropriate body
composed of operatives (operator) and intelligence officers
(razvedchik) shoLld be created in the General Staff. Its task
must include the collation of intelligence data on'strategic
and operational objectives of the countries of the imperialist
camp, and the determination, depending on the importance of
these objectives and their influence on the course of a %Far 50X1 -HUM,
of the order in which they will be subjected to nuclear strikes.
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This body should have an accurately worked out card index
enftmpassing all strategic and operational objectives in both the
strategic and the operational depth. The cards for each objective
should specify: its characteristics, precise geodetic ard topo-
graphic location (privyazka), the size of the nuclear charge,
the type of burst (ground, air), the method of delivering the
nuclear charge to the target, the amount of time needed to deliver
the strike after the command) Is given, and ?tiler new data on the
listed objectives, and reports on newly appeared objectives.
The first priority targets will be the irdivilual, most
aggressive, and dangerous countries, large political, economic,
and administrative centers, military-industrial objectives,
and mainly the depots with etockpiles of nuclear weapons,
industry for the production of nuclear weapons delivery, air and
naval bases, and che means of control and command of the missile
troops and armed forces in the theaters of military operations.
Thus, it seems to us that only as a result of a successful,
welltimed strike by the missile troops of the WIC can one count
an an entree to the large-scale operational employment of all the
other branches of the armed forces.
In peacetime conditions, strategic intelligence provides the
VGK with the necessary intelligence data on the above-mentioned
objectives. It should be pointed out, however, that these
objectives are on the whole stationary, non-mobile, and, in place
for a long time, which affords the opportunity for their
exhaustive reconnaissance and study. Operational intelligence
participates in these efforts to a limited extent.
As soon as the first atomic strike is inflicted and a war is
unleashed, the situation, above all for intelligence, vill undergo
a tremendous change. The armed forces of the enemy will start
moving, their large-scale movements will unfold, as well as
dispersal to the theaters of military operations, and the nuclear-
missile troops of the enemy, and other delivery vehicles of nuclear
weapons, including aviation, aircraft carriers, and the missile-
carrying fleet, will start maneuvering in the theaters of combat
operations.
Under these circumstances new tasks will arise for intelligence,
the significance of which is hard to overestimate. 50X1-HUM
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First of all, It will be ri,_:ceary to clarify the results
of our nuclear eowIterblow delivered by the missile troops, to
continue intelligence operations agairct the nuclear weapons
preserved by the enemy, the means of control and command, nuclear
industry, the nature of the formations of the armed forces in the
theaters of military operations and their plans and intentions.
All new, mobile objectives must be discovered quickly by
intelligence operations, so that a blow can be inflicted at once,
and thus,keep the strategic initiative in oar hands.
In such a situation it is unlikely that we can count on the
volume and timeliness of receipt of intelligence data as in the
peacetime network, and it is all the more unlikely that it will
be possible to avoid multistages in the levying of these tasks on
the appropriate organs of intelligence. The time element will
acquire extraordinary significance.
It appears to us that the missile troops of the VOK must now
have their own means of long-range intelligence (manned and
unmanned reconnaissance planes, radiotechnical reconnaissance,
and other means) in order to carry out independent reconnaissance
and re-reconnaissance of objectives, and react to any charges in
the situation immediately.
Our armed forces, and mainly our missile troops, have first-
class equipment, while operational and tactical intelligence and
their technical equipment lag seriously. A certain gap between
the means of destruction and the means of intelligence has
developed.
Our intelligence does not have dependable technical means
of detection of weans of mass destruction. Reconnaissance
planes are not yet able to find the Launching pads of nuclear
weapons and transmit the information acquired from aboard the
aircraft directly to a control point. Aerial photography and
the processing of photographs are done extremely slowly and
are late in providing their results.
The technical means of rediotechnical reconnaissance also
Lag in their development.\ We still do not have dependable ultra-
shortwave (UKV) band direction finders, comLunications intercept
equipment ispoorly developed, troop reconnaissance still does
not have television equipment, there are a few infrared
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reconnaissance ire7trueerts, and photographic reconnaissance has
not been perfected. The technical means of artillery and enginrer
reconnaissance have limited depth of operation, in that they can
be used only in the tertical zone, which excludes the possibility
of reconnaissance of the atomic means of divisions and corps of the
potential enemies.
The time has come for a thorough investigation of the
technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence
and to bring about the order needed. We consider that the
serious fault which led to the lag in the technical equirment
of operational and tactical intelligence is the absence of one
central organ for operational and tactical intelligence an the
General Staff which would occupy itself with questions of
developing and providing technical equipment to intelligence units
(chast) and subunits (podrazdeleniye) of all branches of the armed
forces, just as it did at the end of the last war and during the
period of existence of the reconnaissance corps (korpus razvedki).
The Chief Intelligence Directorate does not deal with these
matters at the present time, because it has been relieved of
such work.
To the extent that their powers and capabilities permit, the
staffs of the branches of the armed forces and their intelligence
departments (otdel) are dealing with these matters. Therefore,
it is not surprising that there is a Lack of unity of views con-
cerning the development and supply of intelligence equipment
that in many cases there is parallelism and duplication, and
that requirements of the General Staff and the Armed Forces as a
whole for technical means of intelligence are not taken into
account for appropriate orders to industry and planners. Every
branch of the armed forces looks out for itself in the field of
technical equipping of intelligence.
In order to close the gap between the means of destruction
and the technical means of operational ad tanttical intelligence,
it would be advisable to czeate an appropriate body in the
structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate capable of
Coordinating and planning the development of technical intelligence
means on behalf of all the armed forces, working in close cooperation
with the Scientific-Technical Committee of the General Staff and the
O:rational Directorate.2
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The organiza',1071 :trure rf military intlligence from
regiment thrrAlp7 fro:A -eris serir)u7
The quefAion or brin6ng rr1r t,) I ne organizationalst,ructure
and technical of milit:iry ant increasing itz:
penetrating capaUlity, ties :n directly wfth the thision of our
government to reuce the Armed Forces without jeopardizing the
overall security of the country. Obviously, the smaller the Armed
Forces, the stronger and better organized must be tne organs ani
means of intelligence, which is called upon to provide essential
Information to the 70K and to the comman-_'. of all levels, both in
peacetime and wartime.
It seems to us that the fundamental principle which should be
used as the basis for the organizational structure of operational and
tactical intelligence must be the creation of greater intelligence
independence of divisions and armies from the higher staffs. The
divisions and armies must provide themselves independently with-rthe
required intelligence information in the entire depth of an operation
(battle), using their own means.
To be sure, In modern operations the army and division will be
operating in much wider zones and at greater depth. Under the
conditions of enemy employment of powerful nuclear and termo-
nuclear (vodorcdnyy) ehapges, divisions, with gaps of 20-40 km or
more between themovhereupon large units that are moving ahead
successfully are always obligated to be ready to assist a neigtt?cr!
who has encountered a stronger enemy, which can cause a change in
the direction of an offensive.
Besides, it is scarcely likely that, in the next war, one can
expect to carry out classical offensive operations with break-
throughs of a previously prepared defense or the conduct of
defensive engagements under conditions similar to the previous
ones. The meeting battle (engagement) will probably become the
basic form of combat operation, and it will begin with the appromch,
and not upon direct contact with the enemy. Consequently, the
intelligence operations of large units, using their own means, must
ensure ;he collection, analysis, and collation of the intelligence
data required by the commanders (komandir) of large units and the
commanders (komanduyuchchiy) of groupings in order for them to,
make decisions, with these units leaning primarily upon their pin
forces and means.
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Thur, the intonience 'f(rces anl means of large units must
, I provide intelligence to a 'lepth on the orier of 50-u0 km, ard
groupings up to 3,2) km. In rega:H to a fro'?, intelligence must
embrace a depth of at lea:A two frort ovrations, so that at the
end of the current operation, excluiirg any operational pauses, it
would be ready to report full Information about the enemy, his
plans and intentions, for making a decision on the follow-up
operation.
Along with the conduct of intelligence operations for them-
selves, the large units and operational groupings must perform a
series of very important intelligence tasks On behalf of the higher
, staff, operational groupings, and the General Staff; in return, the
, General Staff and the staffs of the higher groupings, using their
1 intelligence means, are obligated to service t,he lower intelligence
organs and staffs.
Therefore, the next principle of organizational structure
of operational and tactical intelligence must be the centralization
of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches and arms
of the armed forces', an the subordination of intelligence organs
1111 of lower combined-arms staffs to the higher ones, from the
intelligence standpoint, withthe General Staff playing the dominant
role. In turn the intelligence organs of combined-arms staffs
consolidate in themselves the intelligence operations of the arms
of the armed forces. r
The higher intelligence organs must direct, supervise, and
assist their subordinates with the organization and conduct of
intelligence operations, with the provision of intelligence
equipment, with selection of personnel, and with the combat training
of intelligence units and subunits, always maintaining the combat
preparedness of the latter.
It is necessary to examine the questions of organizational
structure along two lines: the structure of the intelligence
organs proper, from the Center down to the regiment, and the
structure of intelligence units, subunits, large units, and groupings
subordinate to these organs.
The following structure of operational and tactical
intelligence seems most expedient to us.
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Iv4r Tr!;11-,--0,(. :02 lAJ, (;pn.,rtil
therr! snout.] t.e rt tnnI.riltetilv-nce. This
directcrate Li trc.;31,1 4.1:e f,,110,../171g
--Unifying the coordinating t'..e operati(lis of
all branches and grm2 of troops;
--Planning and conducting Lntelligence activities of the
intelligence departments of the branches and arms of troops on
behalf of the large units and grcupinFs of the bralle'rieS and arms
of troops and the General Staff (concentrating the intelligence
efforts of the armed forces in a theater of militar; operations
in the in directions);
--Working out the orders and directives of the Minister of
Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concerning the status
of operational and tactical intelligence, and the fireetion of its
development;
--Guiding the intelligence work of the Intelligence directorates
of the staffs of military districts, especially the border districts,
and the fleets, by all types and means of intelligence as a whole,
not separating the latter for subordination according to the Yarious
echelons of command (air, agent, naval, radiotechnica1);3
--Working out, for design bureaus and scientific-research
institutes, the tactical-technical data of the technical means of
intelligence for all branches of the armed forces in order to
eliminate duplication and parallelism in the work, coordinating
this work with the intelligence departments of the branches of
the armed forces;
-,Publisting bulletins about current questions of operational
and tactical intelligence of the branches of the armed forces, and
also manuals and instructions on oporational and tactical intelligence;
--Direct participation of the Directorate in working out large
exercises and maneuvers carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the
General Staff, and the staffs of the branches of the armed forces, in
order to accumqlate experience in intelligence, and to study and work out
questions in its planning and conduct, collect intelligence data for use
by the trGops, and also to develop informational work in all elements of
the intelligence organs;
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--PartlipatIng
special equipmnt;
t.
approi,rfat,- anl
--Carrying out experlmental and u,:mo:-:stration exercises in
intelligence;
--Participating in the instruction, posting, and training of
intelligence personnel from division of all branches of the armed
forces up to chfs nf intelligence iirectorate 3 of military districts
(fronts); and otter questions.
It is known that qperational intelliFence was not prepared at
the beginning of the last war. Therefore, while the war was in
progress, a search was made for organizational forms and working
. methods, and not until 1943, 23 months after the start of the war, did
operational intelligence acquire an acceptable organizational structure
in troop units and in the Gvneral Staff, in which was created the
Reconnaissance Directorate .4.
Under modern conditions we consider it impracical to create
such an independent directorate, but it is quite necessary in the
structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GPU) of the General
Staff. It is unlikely that, in the next war, we shall have as long
(23 months) for working out the structure of operational intelligence
as e whole, and in the General Staff in particular, and for the
accumulation of experience in the combat activity of operational
intelligence. All this work should be carried out long before the
war. The lessons of history must be taken into consideration. In
the postwar period, when the reconnaisance corps was in existence',
there was such a directorate in the GRTJ of the General Staff and it
did a lot of work, but thnm, instead of developing it and improving
operational intelligence, it began to 1,1se its importance and then
cee'sed to exist. This ,iefieieney hou11 be eliminated quickly. This
will not require a large number of personnel.
It is advisable to enlarge somewhat the intelligence depart-
ments of the brinches of the armed forces. These departments
must fully guide the operational and tactical intelligence of their
branch of the armed forces and organize and carry out combat
training of intelligence subunits and units, in accordance with the
orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of.
the General Staff, with the coordination and guiding role in this
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work performed by the OP7 the General Staff.
It 17 necessary to r-store to duty the chiefs of intelligence
of the arms of troops, providing them with asmall organization,
2 or 3 persons, anl giving them the responsibility for carrying out
the guidance of inteLLigence in their arm of troops.
It is necessary to examine the intelligence directorates of
military districts and: fleets, an,i bring them into line with modern
requirements, taking into account the fact that in the first
operations of the initial period of a war, the border military
districts will haYe to oprate with the forces and means on hand.
Therefore, it is alvisable for the intelligence organs, units, and
sub-units of these military districts to be close to the wartime
table of. organization and equipment even in peacetime. -
It is advisable to strengthen the intelligence departments of
'armies so that they can fulfill the tasks facing -them. It is
necessary-to do the same regarding the intelligence sections
(otdeleniye) of divisions (large units).
It is absolutely necessary to raise the authority of intelligence
and the chiefs of intelligence at all levels, in fact, not just naying
the latter lip service as deputies to the chiefs of staff, and to
relate they more closely to the chiefs of the operational sections,
departments, and directorates, and demand that they perform creative
and active work. In regard to the structure of units and subunits
of intelligence, supplying them with intelligence equipment, as veil
as the question of what means, units, and subunits the large units
and groupings of the ground forces should have at their disposal, we
have at this time nothing to add to that which is stated in the
article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov. The
Implementation of his proporels will permit a sharp improvement of
operational and tactical intelligence.
We have touched upon only a few of the important questions.
Obviously, in the future it will be necessary to discuss these
problems of operational and tactical intelligence more fully in the
pages of this Collection.
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Headp:,-
Accriing to tyr reliable sJqrces,re GRU carg,-?1 with
the collectir, stratric intelnce rtrategichckava
razvedka), so-called operational intiLi-rr. (operat:Ynaya
razvedka, earing opposing 2rmed forces in one
theater of perations), and so-called miiitary intelligence
(voyskovaya razvedka, information supporting unit commanders
in the r.rtherance of tmmediate, localized combat missions).
Apparently tr:e term tactical inteligece (takticheskaya
razvedka) has supplant,:d the term military in'_elligec.
2. This is the OT)erational Directorte 7,f the General Staff,
concerned with military operations, and b!-ould not be
confused with the now-defunct Operations Directorate of the
GRU. Many of the functions proposed by Kochetkov for the
"Operational Intelligence Directorate" (see page 9, first
paragraph) were formerly performed by the GRU Operations
Directorate.
3. The responsibilities for both agent operations and radio-
technical (communications and electronics intelligence)
activities are le.nowri to have been held by the Intelligence
Direct,.-a,-,e of the Gr-)up of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)
as of 195.
L. This term (Razvedyvalteinoye upravleniye) can also be
translated as Intelligence Directorate, but from the
context Reconnaissance Directorate appears more accurate.
It is not clear how the GRU is able to distinguish between
the two designative concepts, intelligence and reconnaissance.
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