MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE CAPABILITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE FORCES AND MEANS OF A FRONT AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302770001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Capabilities of the Reconnaissance
Forces and Means of a Front and Their Employment
by
General -Leytenant M. Ivanov
Integrated tactical-special exercises were conducted for
reconnaissance, missile, missile technical and communications units in the
Baltic Military District in 1965-1966, in order to study the capabilities
of the reconnaissance forces and means of a front. The participants in
these exercises were the intelligence directorate of the military district
staff, the intelligence departments of the staffs of the combined-arms army
and the air army, SPETSNAZ and OSNAZ large units and units, the control
post of the military district chief of intelligence, operational and
tactical air reconnaissance squadrons, separate reconnaissance battalions
of divisions, and other reconnaissance subunits. Appropriate forces and
means were used to represent the enemy.
We will examine the progress and results of researching the
capabilities of the different types of reconnaissance in the exercises.
Aerial reconnaissance plays a major role. As a result of joint
planning by tTe inte' ligence directorate of the front staff, the
intelligence department of the air army staff anTby the staff of the front
rocket troops and artillery, a special plan-schedule of massed sorties-o7-
reconnaissance aviation to reconnoiter targets during the initial nuclear
strike, was worked out in detail. This plan indicated the subunits and
units allocated for reconnaissance; the targets, methods and time periods
for conducting reconnaissance; the call signs of the crews, the time and
addressees for transmission of reconnaissance data from on board the
aircraft and from wet negatives; and also measures for combat support of a
sortie of reconnaissance aviation. The plan-schedule was approved. by the
front commander. We think that only such joint planning can ensure the
most effective employment of the means of aerial reconnaissance.
In the exercises, a massed sortie of operational and tactical
reconnaissance aircraft was carried out at the beginning of combat actions.
The reconnaissance aircraft flew at altitudes of 300 to 800 meters; search
and detection of "enemy" missile/nuclear means, troops and equipment were
carried out visually, followed by photography. 50X1-HUM
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Based on the experience of the exercises, the range at which enemy
missile/nuclear weapons can be detected when a reconnaissance aircraft
flies at low altitudes, varies from one-two kilometers to three-four
kilometers, depending on the terrain, meteorological conditions and the
nature of the target. The limited range for detecting targets and the need
to determine their coordinates accurately force the crews to make two to
four passes over a 10 to 20 square kilometer reconnaissance area, and even
more over wooded terrain. When the enemy has a strong air defense, it is
not very likely that such a number of passes can be completed, and this may
result in unwarranted high losses of reconnaissance aircraft.
In the exercises the crews prepared themselves thoroughly for the
flight, used a map and other materials to study the reconnaissance area and
the disposition of air defense means in the flight path and in the
reconnaissance area, determined the area in which the missile/nuclear means
probably were located and, in accordance with these data, worked out the
most desirable pattern of passes. Frrors averaged no more than 200 to 300
meters when the coordinates were determined visually.
In the intelligence directorate, in the staff of the rocket troops and
artillery of the front, and in the formations and large units, receivers
with monitor recording of the radio messages on magnetic tape were set up
to receive aerial reconnaissance data directly from on board the aircraft.
A radio-relay aircraft was used to ensure reconnaissance data were received
from the reconnaissance aircraft in the ultra-shortwave band. The
experience of the exercises showed that the organization of communications
between the combined-arms command posts and the reconnaissance aircraft,
and also the technical means by which they are carried out, do not fully
meet present-day requirements. In the period of the massed sortie of
reconnaissance aviation these communications hardly will he able to fulfil
their tasks. Practice shows that reliable communications may be achieved
with the condition that one radio channel is used by no more than 10 to 12
subscribers.
An attempt was made in the exercises to overcome these difficulties
within the framework of existing capabilities. For this purpose a special
schedule for the transmission of reconnaissance data by the crews was
worked out, in which each crew was assigned a primary and alternate time
for transmitting radio messages, based on the periods for conducting
reconnaissance. However, such communications by time periods delay the
transmission of data already obtained, which is absolutely intolerable. 50X1 HUM
The submission td the front command post of reconnaissance reports
based on the results of interpreting the wet negatives from two or three
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targets took an average of one to three hours. In this, the photographic
laboratories required 12 to 15 minutes to interpret, determine coordinates
and draft a coded message. The passage of the report via technical
communications means through the air army command post was extremely slow
due to the heavy load on the communications centers and frequently took
several hours. As a result, the aerial reconnaissance data lost their
value and could not be utilized.
The organization of reliable information reporting requires
establishing direct communications lines, primarily cable lines, between
the command posts of the reconnaissance aviation units and the front
intelligence directorate, using high-speed equipment, and having an aerial
reconnaissance data collection point attached to the front intelligence
directorate.
Radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. One of the main tasks of the
exercises was to research the capabilities of radio direction finding, to
test several theoretical propositions and calculations, and to study the
capabilities and effectiveness of the direction-finding service while
conducting radio reconnaissance of actual targets in the front zone. Since
more improved technical means of secure troop control are constantly being
introduced, and plain text radio traffic is being reduced to the minimum,
radio direction finding is the only method in the radio reconnaissance
system for establishing the areas in which radio sets -- and, consequently,
the enemy staffs, command posts and other troop control organs -- are
situated.
In the exercises the OSNAZ units deployed their radio
direction-finding subunits in a line, with a distance of 45 to 60
kilometers between them. The targets of reconnaissance were field radio
sets of no more than 200 watts power, operating in the two to three
megahertz band and located throughout the direction-finding zone.
Analysis of the results of the direction finding of the radio sets
shows that the accuracy of direction finding is affected by the distance to
the sets and the frequencies on which they are operating. Direction
finding of field radio sets with operating frequencies of two to three
megahertz, located 70 to 80 kilometers away, can be carried out by surface
radiowave with errors not exceeding plus or minus two to five degrees, but
direction finding of those located in the zone 90 to 260 kilometers away
hardly is feasible, especially at night, when errors increase to plus or
minus 15 to 20 degrees. 50X1-HUM
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In the zone 270 to 340 kilometers away the quality of radio direction
finding by reflected beam improves mainly in the daytime (0500 to 1800
hours). If multiple bearings are recorded and they are averaged, direction
finding with errors not exceeding plus or minus five degrees (at night up
to plus or minus 20 degrees) is possible. Direction finding may be
performed accurately against radio sets located at distances greater than
360 kilometers. Errors in the daytime amount to plus or minus two to three
degrees, and at night approach plus or minus 10 to 15 degrees; however,
when multiple bearings are taken, these errors are reduced considerably.
The reduction in direction-finding quality was greatly influenced by
lack of data on the systemic errors associated with the relief of the
terrain when the direction-finding means were relocated and set up in new
areas. It is a difficult problem to determine such errors in the
direction-finding sector in a short time, when positions are changed
frequently due to the high rate of advance of the troops.
In addition, direction finding of radio sets when active jamming is
being produced by SPETSNAZ means, poses considerable difficulties. It is
obvious that when planning and conducting radio reconnaissance in a front
operation, the most careful organization of cooperation in terms of time
and tasks between the OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ units is required, and the mutual
detailing of liaison officers is compulsory.
In the exercises, recommendations as to the desirable disposition of
the battle formation of a radio reconnaissance regiment were researched.
Since the most certain direction finding is carried out in the zones up to
80 kilometers and more than 360 kilometers away, the regiment's radio
direction-finding means should be positioned in two lines. However, such a
disposition severely hinders direction finding of radio sets by surface
beam, since the required 400 to 500 kilometer base cannot actually be
established under the current practice of placing three radio
direction-finding companies in the first line. When placed a distance of
150 to 200 kilometers from each other, the flank direction-finding
companies will be in different direction-finding zones, and simultaneous
direction finding of the radio set will not occur.
Direction finding is feasible from the first line if the radio
direction-finding companies are deployed a distance of 30 to 40 kilometers
from each other. In this case it will be necessary to have no less thasOX1-HUM
ten such companies on a 400 to 500 kilometer front, which is virtually
unattainable. In the exercises the direction-finding base amounted to 90
kilometers. Even so, the regiment, which had three companies in the first
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line, experienced difficulties in fixing the location of the radio sets.
In addition, considering the frequent changing of positions by the radio
direction-finding companies during the operation (once or twice per day)
and the time normally required to close down and set up the radio direction
finders, it may be assumed that one or two companies will always be in
motion and, in fact, the first line of the regiment's battle formation will
be absent. When direction finding is performed from the second line of the
regiment's battle formation, linear errors increase, although they are
smaller than in the zone 90 to 260 kilometers away.
Having considered the positive and negative aspects of the disposition
of the battle formation of a radio direction-finding regiment, we believe
that a two-echelon disposition of radio direction-finding companies is
permissible only prior to the beginning of a front offensive operation.
During the operation, however, it is most desirable to employ the
single-echelon disposition of the regiment's battle formation and deploy
the radio direction-finding companies in one line located more than 260
kilometers from the forward edge, which according to calculations ensures
continuity of reconnaissance. Direction finding of radio sets via surface
beam should be the responsibility of army OSNAZ radio battalions. This
requires establishing a unified front radio direction-finding net. The
regiment's battle formation may be relocated by echelons, e. g., three
radio direction-finding companies and a radio intercept battalion conduct
reconnaissance while two radio direction-finding companies and a second
radio intercept battalion are relocated to new positions. The conclusions
and calculations presented require further study and practical verification
in exercises.
In the exercises, the capabilities of a separate OSNAZ radiotechnical
regiment to conduct reconnaissance of ground-based radar sets from the
ground and air, were researched. Artillery radars and the radars of air
defense units were used as the targets of reconnaissance. The experience
showed that it is desirable for reconnaissance of enemy ground-based
radiotechnical means to be conducted on the most important axes by platoons
of light radiotechnical sets, which in our opinion should be deployed a
distance of five to 15 kilometers from the forward edge of one's own troops
and no farther than 40 kilometers from each other. Long-range detection
radars are monitored at a distance of 60 to 70 kilometers and in a large
scanning sector, which makes it difficult to take bearings and results in
errors on the order of six to 15 degrees. 50X1-HUM
The exercises confirmed that aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance is
an effective means of obtaining reconnaissance information on grog-md-based
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radar sets located 40 to 150 kilometers from the line of troop contact. In
this way, up to 50 percent of the operating "enemy" radar sets were
detected, as a rule.
One of the difficult problems is to maintain the continuity of the _
conduct of radiotechnical reconnaissance and control of the subunits while
they are being relocated during an offensive operation. In order for the
radiotechnical subunits not to lose touch with the reconnaissance targets,
they must be relocated right behind the attacking troops. While heavy
radiotechnical sets are being relocated, their tasks should be assigned to
aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance.
To ensure continuous control of the OSNAZ units and rapid transmission
of reconnaissance information, radio communications in the exercises were
organized through the control post of the chief of intelligence of the
front via radio printer links utilizing coding machines. The coded punched
tapes were taken directly from the cipher organ to the transmitter of the
regiment's communications center, which reduced radio message delivery time
by five to ten minutes. Aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance data were
transmitted directly from the aircraft, using a coded map and a signal
table, which considerably reduced their passage time.
The passage of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance data is
characterized by the following time periods: transmission of the
direction-finding command (from the moment the operation of the enemy radio
set is detected) through the communications centers of the regiment and the
radio direction-finding company -- one to two minutes; measuring the
bearing, evaluating it, and transmitting the magnitude of the bearing to
the regiment command post through the communications centers of the radio
direction-finding company and the regiment (taking the parameters of the
detected radar and transmitting them to the regiment command post) -- two
to three minutes; collection, processing and analysis of the reconnaissance
data at the regiment command post -- five to ten minutes; drafting reports
and giving them to the cipher organ -- three to seven minutes; coding --
five to ten minutes; transmission of the punched tapes through the
regiment's transmitter to the control post of the front chief of
intelligence -- three to eight minutes. The total time spent on passage of
the information is 19 to 40 minutes. 50X1-HUM
As we have seen, a great deal of time is expended at the regiment
command post, in the cipher organs, and in transmitting the reports to the
front intelligence directorate. Experience shows, however, that when the
personnel are well trained and the work is better organized, the total time
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may be reduced to 15 to 25 minutes. Organizing communications using the
communications means already in service with the OSNAZ radio regiments,
makes certain demands on the placement of elements of the battle formations
of these regiments. Thus, it is desirable to place the radio intercept
battalions no more than 70 kilometers from the front staff (and the
regiment command post should be colocated with one of the battalions). A
radio printer link must be set up between the regiment command post and the
control post of the front chief of intelligence, using the appropriate
radio sets and coding machines.
In a radio reconnaissance regiment it is desirable to set up two
parallel radio nets (one for each radio intercept battalion), which will
ensure that fixes are received from four to five direction finders.
Assuming the coding and transmission of each command takes 20 to 25 seconds
and the pause between them five seconds, then 1,200 to 1,400 commands may
be transmitted on each radio net in one day. The proposed procedure for
organizing radio communications ensures that direction finding is performed
continuously, even while the regiment is being relocated by echelons. To
control the radio direction-finding-companies, it is necessary that the
regiment commander have a separate radio net. Communications with the
regiment's subunits operating on isolated axes are organized via
independent radio links.
Special reconnaissance in the enemy rear is a basic and effective type
of reconnaissance. In--t-Fe-exercises a limited range of the most important
problems associated with the use of special-purpose reconnaissance groups
was researched. The experience of the exercises showed that such a group
composed of seven men is capable of conducting reconnaissance of targets in
an area of up to 300 square kilometers in one day. In the exercises ten
groups detected 11 actual targets, including six missile launching sites,
in the course of 12 hours after landing.
The average error in determining the coordinates was 100 to 200
meters, which is sufficiently reliable to permit planning the
neutralization of a target. However, due to the lack of special portable
geodetic devices, the assessment of the target and determination of its
coordinates took a great deal of time -- eight to 1S minutes. Coding the
radio message required three to six minutes, transmitting it three to four
minutes, and decoding at the control post and plotting the data on a map --
three to six minutes. As a result, the information was reported to the 50X1-HUM
command 17 to 31 minutes from the moment the target was detected.
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Obviously, it is a major task to reduce the time spent on determining
coordinates and to increase their accuracy. This may be accomplished by
the simultaneous fixing of the target from two or three points, and through
improving the quality of the technical equipping of the reconnaissance
groups. Reconnaissance personnel must have more improved means for
surveillance and for automatic determination of target coordinates.
Further improvement of secure troop control documents and improvement of
radio set tactical-technical specifications are needed, so that the radio
sets can be made smaller and communications carried on while on the move or
from short halts.
In our opinion, the reconnaissance groups must be provided with
transistorized receivers with a 2,000 to 6,000 kilohertz shortwave
sub-band, which will give them a capability for continuous reception of
instructions from the center, without taking the time to set up the
cumbersome radio set antennas the groups have in their table of equipment.
In turn the front chief of intelligence and the commander of the
special-purpose unit will be able to issue priority instructions to the
groups at any time.
We also need to positively resolve the problem of rapid transmission
of commands to withdraw the reconnaissance groups and extricate them from
the areas in which there are situated targets we plan to deliver nuclear
strikes against.
The front chief of intelligence communicated with the special-purpose
units and the radio center via radio links. Up to 10,000 groups of
information were passed on each of them daily. However, the information
flow was irregular, and in the maximum load period information was
unavoidably delayed. For more reliable and efficient communications,
radio-relay communications -- being more stable -- are required.
In the exercises, to ensure that communications with the
special-purpose reconnaissance groups and individual sources were highly
reliable, round-the-clock parallel monitoring of above-precedence calls was
organized, and the data were received by the separate radio center and by
the control post of the front chief of intelligence. This organization of
simultaneous monitoring -o=t e correspondents entirely proved its worth.5OX1-HUM
To maintain reliable communications with especially important
correspondents, and to increase the efficiency of control of special
reconnaissance, the control post, like the radio center, needs a specially
assigned receiver vehicle with the appropriate receivers and radio sets.
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The conduct of integrated tactical-special exercises for
reconnaissance units of division, army and military district subordination
helps improve teamwork in all the reconnaissance organs and units, makes it
possible to more fully work out the problems of cooperation among them, and
also improves their level of field training under conditions which
approximate actual combat.
The data of the exercises indicate that further improvement of the
organization of reconnaissance and its technical equipping is needed. To
increase efficiency in the control of reconnaissance and reduce the passage
time for reconnaissance data, it is necessary for the chiefs of
intelligence of the divisions, armies and front to have mobile control
posts equipped with modern communications means, including radio-relay
means, and also equipment for automating the collection and processing of
reconnaissance information.
The state of the aerial photographic service of the reconnaissance
aviation units and its technical equipping do not ensure that the results
of aerial photography are processed quickly. Photographic materials have
to be developed on board the reconnaissance aircraft in order to take the
coordinates of targets from the wet negatives and transmit them to the
interested staffs right in flight.
The technical reconnaissance means which are in service with the OSNAZ
and SPETSNAZ units do not provide the required accuracy for determining the
coordinates of targets, and require improvement.
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