MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COUNTERPREPARATION IN AN ARMY DEFENSIVE OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302750001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Counterpreparation in an Army Defensive Operation
by
General-Mayor of Artillery N. Korf
Colonel A. Razuvayev
As is known, the primary task of defending forces is to disrupt an
enemy offensive and destroy the enemy attack groupings. This task is
accomplished with the combined efforts of all the branch arms. To disrupt
an offensive being prepared by the enemy means to take measures which
result in forcing him to temporarily or permanently abandon offensive
actions. An enemy offensive can be disrupted by the massed employment of
nuclear weapons or by conducting counterpreparation against the enemy troop
groupings poised for the offensive.
Calculations show that to disrupt an enemy offensive it is necessary
to destroy his nuclear attack means, his artillery, and at least 30 to 40
percent of his tank and motorized infantry battalions.
During a nuclear war, the delivery of a simultaneous massed nuclear
strike or of several concentrated nuclear strikes upon the enemy means of
nuclear attack or on his main grouping can sharply alter the balance of
forces in favor of the defending forces and create the preconditions for
their transition to an all-out offensive. Under these conditions there is
no need to engage in a counterpreparation.
During a defense without the employment of nuclear weapons, the most
important measure taken to disrupt or weaken the enemy offensive is
counterpreparation, which is a powerful preemptive strike carried out by
aviation, artillery, tanks and rocket troops, employing conventional
ammunition.
Thus, during the last war, when a counterpreparation was carried out
skilfully and in a timely manner, it helped increase the aggressiveness and
stability of the defense, and not only weakened the enemy strike but also
frequently disrupted the enemy offensive.
The most effective artillery counterpreparation during the Great
Patriotic War was conducted in defensive operations in the vicinity of
Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk and on the Dnepr River (in July 1944).
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Army and Area
of Conduct of
Counter-
preparation
Date
of
Conduct
Front of
Counter-
preparation
Sector (in
kilometers)
Average
Density of
Artillery
(per km of
front)
Duration
(in
minutes)
Number
of
Fire
Strikes
Expenditure
of ammunitil
(in units
of fire)
16th and 20th
Armies of the
Western Front
20
October
1941
10
20.1
16
1
0.3
42nd Army in
cooperation with
the ships of the3eptember
Red Banner Bal-
tic Fleet in the
vicinity of Lenilgrad
21
1941
__
20
15
1
--
62nd Army in
the vicinity of
Stalingrad
26
Zeptember
1942
2
100
60
3
0.25
13th Army in
the vicinity
of Kursk
5
July
1943
32
30
(without
rocket
artillgayr)
30
2
0.25
7th Guards
Army in the
vicinity of
Kursk
5
July
1943
46
45-68
30
2
0.5
0,
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When organizing and planning a counterpreparation under modern
conditions, it is essential to take into consideration a number of special
features that stem from the nature of the enemy offensive operations. As
is known, the basic method used at the present time is the offensive from
the march, where the enemy does not form clearly defined, compact offensive
groupings on selected axes, but disperses his forces along the front and in
the depth, carefully camouflaging and sheltering them. The high mobility
and relatively small size of the targets, which are dispersed over the
area, and the absence of a stable front substantially impede the
organization and conduct of a counterpreparation. The difficulty lies not
only in determining the axis where the main forces of the enemy are
concentrated (and, consequently, the sector of the counterpreparation) but
also in deciding upon the time for initiating the counterpreparation and in
selecting the targets of strikes. The defending forces will have a limited
amount of time to carry out reconnaissance and regrouping of the artillery.
Also, the continuing possibility that the enemy will deliver nuclear
strikes makes it risky to concentrate the artillery in the sector of the
counterpreparation by movement from the flanks and the second echelons.
Since the matter of the organization and conduct of a
counterpreparation when an offensive is launched by the enemy from the
march (as distinguished from an offensive launched under conditions of
close contact) has not yet been adequately studied, we shall examine it in
greater detail in this article.
In accordance with the views of our probable enemies, when they
conduct an offensive from the march from concentration areas of a
first-echelon division they occupy them 30 to 80 kilometers from the
forward edge of the defense; only the covering units of the attacking
forces will be in direct contact with the defending forces. When the
troops begin their movement forward from the concentration areas, the
artillery occupies prepared siting areas and will be in a state of
readiness to fire.
When the first-echelon units reach a line that is 12 to 15 kilometers
from the forward edge of the defense, the artillery preparation begins;
under its cover the troops close, deploy, and attack the defending forces.
Thus, to disrupt enemy artillery preparation and to forestall the
enemy in deploying, it is desirable to begin the counterpreparation the
moment the enemy artillery occupies the siting area and his troops resoL-Hum
the line for deployment into battalion columns (i.e., when they are within
20 kilometers of the forward edge of the defense). At this point
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conditions become favorable for the destruction of the enemy columns by our
aviation and for the delivery of surprise fire strikes on his artillery and
mortar batteries and command posts. It is desirable to conclude the
counterpreparation when the enemy troops approach a line that is six to
eight kilometers from the forward edge.
From this line all the artillery of the defending forces conducting
fire on observed targets will be able to destroy the enemy as he deploys
into company columns and into combat formation for the attack. This
creates the conditions for continuity of transition from the
counterpreparation to the destruction of the enemy troops on his lines of
deployment for the attack and while the attack is in progress.
The duration of the counterpreparation is determined by the amount of
time the enemy troops require to advance from the line for deployment into
battalion columns (from the moment the counterpreparation begins) to the
line for deployment into company columns, and may be an average of 30 to 40
minutes.
The structure of the counterpreparation will depend on the volume and
nature of the tasks to be carried out, the extent to which enemy targets
are to be damaged, the amount of artillery allocated for the
counterpreparation, and the duration of the counterpreparation.
Accordingly, there may be two to three fire strikes against enemy artillery
batteries and command posts and one to two against enemy personnel and fire
means. One variant of the structure of a counterpreparation is shown in
the diagram.
The amount of ammunition expended in counterpreparation depends
primarily on the volume of tasks carried out by the artillery and the
specified degree of destruction of the targets. Thus, approximately 0.5
unit of fire of ammunition is needed to neutralize one enemy artillery
battery at a range of up to ten kilometers (converted in terms of a 122-mm
battery) and approximately 0.9 unit of fire is needed for one
self-propelled battery. During the counterpreparation one six-gun battery
can neutralize one to two enemy batteries. Thus, the total expenditure of
ammunition by one battery amounts to 0.9 to 1.0 unit of fire. These
figures were confirmed during a scientific-research game that was conducted
in February 1968 in the Military Artillery Academy, when the artillery
allocated for a counterpreparation lasting 35 minutes was allotted from 0.8
to 1.0 unit of fire of ammunition (amounting to about 0.5 of an army unsoxl-Hum
of fire).
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In contrast to the variant examined, when there is direct contact with
the enemy, the volume of artillery tasks during the counterpreparation will
be somewhat smaller since aviation will assume responsibility for a portion
of them, and the duration of the counterpreparation will be determined by
the amount of time needed by the artillery to damage the enemy targets,
within the limits of the amount of ammunition issued for the
counterpreparation. Given an expenditure of 0.5 to 1.0 unit of fire, the
counterpreparation will last approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
The following may be allocated to participate in the
counterpreparation: the organic and attached artillery of first-echelon
divisions, an army artillery group, and also the divisional artillery of
the second-echelon divisions of the army.
The most favorable conditions (from the point of view of the
capabilities for allocating artillery) will exist when counterpreparation
is conducted simultaneously in two separated sectors (before the defensive
front of two non-adjacent divisions). Under these conditions 80 to 90
percent of the entire army artillery can be allocated, firing from indirect
fire positions.
To more fully employ the artillery of the second-echelon divisions in
the counterpreparation, it is desirable, in our opinion, to move this
artillery forward ahead of time to the probable axes of enemy operations
and into concentration areas (15 to 20 kilometers away from the forward
edge of the defense) or into areas of fire positions of the army artillery
group.
How fully the artillery is employed will depend on the conditions of
the situation and on the capability for carrying out maneuvering of fire
and battle formations to the sector of the front where the
counterpreparation is being conducted. An army consisting of four
divisions can allocate up to 20 artillery battalions or 55 to 60 artillery
batteries (330 to 360 guns) of its organic artillery for the
counterpreparation.
If the army is reinforced by one to two regiments of an artillery
division this number will increase to 370 to 420 guns. What are the
capabilities of this artillery? 50X1-HUM
As calculations show, the minimum density of artillery in a
counterpreparation (in which 50 to 60 percent of enemy artillery and mortar
batteries and 25 to 30 percent of enemy personnel are reliably neutralized
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in a given zone) is 25 to 30 guns (four to five batteries of 122-mm and
higher caliber) per kilomeuter of front. Based on this, with the
aforementioned quantity of artillery, a counterpreparation can be conducted
in a sector up to 15 kilometers wide. If a counterpreparation is planned
on not one but two axes, the overall front of the counterpreparation
sectors should not exceed the artillery capabilities cited above, since it
is difficult to achieve effective results with lower artillery densities.
At the same time, we believe that the front of the counterpreparation
sector should be no less than eight to ten kilometers wide, since otherwise
the capabilities for effective support of the attacking troops by artillery
fire from adjacent axes would be hampered.
Since counterpreparation is a measure that is carried out on an army
scale, the army commander should determine the axes (sectors) where it is
to be conducted and the allocation of the targets to be destroyed among
aviation and the artillery (and in a number of cases also establish its
duration and the expenditure of ammunition). In addition, he determines
the time for readiness and for initiation of the counterpreparation.
The volume of work and the work procedures of the chief and staff of
the rocket troops and artillery of the army when planning a
counterpreparation depend, above all, on the amount of time available for
organizing it and the comprehensiveness of the reconnaissance data.
However, under all conditions, he determines: the tasks of the artillery
(area of the counterpreparation) of the first-echelon divisions in whose
zone the counterpreparation is being conducted (taking into account
artillery moving into their zones); the specific fire tasks for the army
artillery group; the nature of and procedure for artillery movement; the
schedule of fire of the counterpreparation; and the expenditure of
ammunition by types and calibers. As for the conduct of reconnaissance and
specific planning of fire, the responsibility, obviously, falls entirely on
the first-echelon divisions in whose zone the counterpreparation is being
conducted and on the army artillery group.
No less complex a problem is the organization of the movement of the
artillery for participation in the counterpreparation. Its solution is
made difficult on the one hand, by the ever-present threat of nuclear
strikes on the artillery grouping being formed, and on the other hand, by
the extremely limited amount of time available for regrouping and preparing
to conduct fire from new siting areas. Consequently, when adopting a
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decision for a counterpreparation, it should be based, above all, on the
amount of time available to the troops for organizing the
counterpreparation and on what forces and means can be allocated to conduct
it.
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"A.
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an enemy offensive from the march
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LEGEND
1. 15th tank division
2. 14th motorized infantry division
3. Army corps headquarters
4. Hawk surface-to-air missiles
5. Beginning of counterpreparation with reaching the line
6. Division headquarters
7. Honest John free rockets
8. Area (2 words missing) of artillery
9. End of counterpreparation with reaching the line
10. Artillery of 14th motorized rifle division
11. Artillery of 27th motorized rifle division
12. Army artillery group of 16th Army and artillery of
11th tank division
13. Artillery of 16th motorized rifle division
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Schedule of Artillery Fire in a Counterpreparation of the 16th Army
Structure of
Counterpreparation
Army artillery group of the 16th
Army and artillery of 11th tank
division
Artillery of 14th,
27th and 16th
motorized rifle divisions
Required
Time
38 minutes
1st fire
strike
TRaniites
against artillery, mortar, and antiaircraft batteries,
command posts and radar stations
2nd fire
strike
18 minutes
against enemy troops
3rd fire
strike
ITTrimutes
against artillery, mortar, and antiaircraft batteries,
command posts, and radar stations
Destruction of the enemy
at a line for
deployment
neutralization of the portion
of the artillery of the army
within range of the batteries
neutralization of manpower
and tanks at the lines
for deployment
InIf1H-TXOS
TAlf1H-TXOS
saaed ET Jo ET G2Ed