MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): MOBILE CONTROL POSTS OF GROUND FORCES FORMATIONS AND LARGE UNITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302730001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Mobile Control Posts of Ground Forces Formations
and Large Units
by
Colonel P. Murashko
and
Colonel A. Troshkin
Changed conditions and increased requirements for troop
control have given rise to the necessity of seeking ways of
improving this control, and particularly the system for
organizing and technically equipping control posts.
As shown by the experience of troop and staff exercises, the
established system for organizing control posts basically
satisfies present-day requirements and ensures troop control in a
battle or operation. However, we must emphasize that certain
elements of the system require all-round improvement,
particularly such factors as mobility and survivability.
It seems to us that the system of control posts would be
more flexible, mobile, and versatile if existing regulations on
organizing the forward and alternate command posts of formations
and combined-arms large units were broadened and supplemented
with data pertaining to the changes which occur in their
operating procedure and role, depending on the conditions of the
combat situation and the tasks they are fulfilling. Thus, for
example, during an offensive the forward command post can, in our
view, adopt the operating procedure of an alternate command post
and fulfil its role. This will occur when the commander
(formation commander) is not at the forward command post, and
communications between the command post and the troops, and troop
control, are reliable. In defense, when preparing and conducting
a counterattack (counterthrust), the alternate command post can
fulfil the role of a forward command post if its composition and
operating procedure are changed.
At present it is assumed that an alternate command post is
meant to control troops only if the command post is placed out of
action. In our opinion, it can assume control, when, for
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example, the command post is relocating to a different area.
From the alternate command post it is also possible to monitor
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the troop groupings conducting combat actions on the axis on
which it is located.
The mobility of control posts. Many authors of studies and
articles on the problems of troop command take mobility of
control posts to mean their capability to relocate right behind
advancing troops and their ability to ensure the continuance of
work on maps and other documents while moving. The concepts of
the mobility of transport means and the mobility of a control
post should not be equated.
During the Great Patriotic War it was also the practice to
set up mobile control posts by equipping improvised command-staff
and staff vehicles and mobile communications centers. Tanks,
self-propelled artillery, and also various types of motor
transport vehicles were used for this.
Considerable impetus in this direction was provided by the
adoption of nuclear warfare means into service and by the changes
in the conditions of control associated with this. Ground forces
large units and units were equipped with BTR-50PU and R-125 (on a
GAZ-69 chassis) command-staff vehicles. New diversified types of
staff vehicles have been developed on the basis of the existing
inventory and through the efforts of the troops themselves. The
communications means intended for the control posts of units,
large units, and formations of the various branches of the armed
forces have been improved.
With the aim of improving troop control, a number of special
exercises, troop and staff exercises, and also various studies
have been carried out. However, in the field of providing the
control posts of formations and combined-arms large units of the
ground forces with technical equipment, very little has changed.
The bulk of combined-arms large units have mobile control
posts set up on the basis of mass-produced equipment rooms for
communications centers, the above-mentioned types of
command-staff vehicles, and also various staff buses. Also, the
latter are still being equipped and adapted to the needs of
control by troop motor vehicle repair subunits.
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Communications centers installed in motor vehicles have been
developed for formation control posts. Staff vehicles for this
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level also are being produced by the troops using transport in
the existing inventory of motor vehicles. Mass production of
industrial models of command-staff vehicles for the army-front
level has not been set up.
In this connection, the transport used for the control posts
of ground forces large units and units has substantial
shortcomings and does not fully satisfy the operational-tactical
and tactical-technical requirements imposed upon it.
First of all, we must note that it does not provide
personnel and control means with reliable protection against
radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological contamination, or
against the effects of enemy fire. The bodies of the vehicles
are not airtight nor are they equipped with filter-ventilator
units. The BTR-SOPU amphibious tracked armored personnel
carrier, which in a number of its indices surpasses other
vehicles, constitutes an exception.
A common shortcoming of control post vehicles is their lack
of thermal protection against detection by enemy infrared
reconnaissance devices.
The cross-country capability of most of the vehicles is
inadequate, particularly if we take into account that control
posts at the tactical level must move up right behind the troops
on torn-up roads or cross country.
The cargo capacity and dimensions of a number of the types
of vehicles used do not provide for the convenient placement of
an efficient array of equipment and working positions for
personnel. From this aspect, it is not advantageous to use
vehicles with limited cargo capacity and small body area,
particularly at the operational level of control, since this
causes an unwarranted increase in the number of transport means
and personnel.
Even the vehicles for tactical level control posts are not
all air-transportable. As a rule, they cannot be fitted within
the dimensions of the aircraft, and they exceed the lift
capabilities of helicopters and the basic types of aircraft of
military transport aviation. 50X1-HUM
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The variety of types of vehicles used has led to a profusion
of give-away signs by which enemy reconnaissance can easily
differentiate combat and transport vehicles from control post
vehicles and, by their design and external appearance, also
determine that a control post is affiliated with a specific
control level.
The BTR-50PU amphibious tracked armored personnel carrier,
which has communications means and navigational equipment (course
plotter), has displayed good cross-country capability. However,
a number of shortcomings -- the so-called "track effect", loud
noise inside the vehicle while it is moving, small body area,
inconvenience entering and leaving the vehicle -- sharply reduce
the feasibility of using it in large unit and formation control
posts.
The R-125 command-staff vehicle is widely used when
commanders go out to the field and when control posts are
relocated. But as a control vehicle it is not suitable: it is
overloaded with communications means; it completely lacks
protection against enemy fire means and weapons of mass
destruction; it does not afford even minimum conveniences for
work with maps and other documents; and its body is covered by a
canopy and does not retain heat.
Taking into account the conditions under which command-staff
vehicles operate, the technical requirements imposed on them, and
also the availability and status of armored and motor transport
equipment, it can be assumed that in the near future, for the
needs of control at the tactical level, we may use specially
equipped infantry combat vehicles and the new BTR-60P wheeled
amphibious armored personnel carrier; and at the operational
level -- the URAL-375 truck with a body of increased strength and
also one of the types of artillery prime movers with an
armor-protected airtight body. Using ordinary mass-produced
tanks, without substantially altering them, will obviously not
produce the necessary effect as their capacity and usable area
for the placement of personnel and control means is very limited.
As concerns the vehicles with AVS, KUNG-1, and KUNG-2 type
heated bodies with shelving intended for the installation of
communications means, their principal shortcoming is their lack
of protection against fire means and the casualty-producing
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elements of nuclear bursts, as well as their lack of airtightness
and of filter-ventilator units.
The most promising staff and specialized vehicles for
formation control posts may be the ZIL-131 truck with the K-66
general-purpose, reinforced cellular plastic body and the
URAL-375 truck with the K-375 body, both with filter-ventilator
units, control means, and other equipment installed in them. We
also must not exclude the use of the GAZ-66 truck with the K-66
body.
Specially equipped high-speed amphibious armored personnel
carriers also may come into use at the army-front level in the
future -- these are shelters on tracks, which should afford
better protection and more usable area for the placement of
personnel and control means.
However, we must emphasize that preference should be given
to vehicles having not only increased cross-country capability,
but also a body with considerable usable area. The introduction
of such vehicles, and also the "merging" of communications means
with the working positions of the officers will make it possible
to reduce the number of transport means for formation control
posts by approximately 20 to 25 percent.
When developing and improving bodies for staff vehicles, it
is advisable to also take into consideration the possibility of
connecting and joining them together to increase the usable area
needed for the work of departments and services.
At the control posts of units and large units we should use
staff and special vehicles which are more resistant to enemy
nuclear strikes, protected, and have high cross-country
capability, and which are equipped with self-entrenching and
self-winching out means. Combining in the same vehicles the
capabilities of transporting personnel and control means and of
protecting them will considerably reduce the volume of engineer
work needed to prepare sites for control posts. The entire set
of measures for the engineer support of a system of control posts
could be reduced basically to preparing roads and placing a
cushioning layer over these armored vehicle-shelters. These
activities will, of course, be completed in a shorter time than 50X1-HUM
when various portable shelters of the prefabricated sectional
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type are used.
We should standardize the command-staff, staff, and special
vehicles intended for the control posts of large units and
formations. In doing this, the vehicles for each purpose should
undergo several modifications. In our view, this will have a
favorable effect on the training of driver personnel, and on the
operation and repair of the vehicles.
It is clear that at this stage in equipping and improving
mobile control posts, those command-staff, staff, and special
vehicles earmarked primarily for a specific level of control can
also be used at another level by making the necessary changes in
the equipment and by replacing the control means.
Control means. Recently some changes have occurred in the
technical equipping of the mobile communications centers of all
levels of control. Complex equipment rooms with secure
communications equipment have been incorporated into these
centers. Command-staff vehicles, radio sets, and all equipment
rooms of communications centers have means for internal
communications along the column during movement, and radio sets
and separate receiver vehicles are equipped with remote control
means. All of this as a whole has allowed us to improve troop
control somewhat in a modern battle or operation.
At the same time, the experience of exercises indicates that
existing mobile communications centers do not yet fully satisfy
control requirements. Their principal shortcomings are: poor
mobility, inadequate communications reliability and security,
poor protection against the effects of weapons of mass
destruction; and the special vehicles for communications centers
and command-staff vehicles have different speeds and
cross-country capability.
The radio sets of command-staff vehicles provide
communications while on the move only to a certain range: at the
tactical level, up to 20 kilometers; at the operational level, up
to 30 kilometers. Furthermore, they do not have automatic secure
communications equipment for use with messages and telephone
conversations, thus sharply reducing the efficiency of troop
control.
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It is true that from any mobile control post having
radio-relay sets of the R-405 (401-M, 403-M) type, it is possible
in some cases to provide communications up to a range of 120
kilometers from brief halts, by going through supporting
radio-relay sets operating from a site. These sets might be the
intermediate radio-relay sets of the communications main artery,
or radio-relay sets of auxiliary communications centers or
control posts. In such cases, communications are possible if the
mobile control post is within 20 kilometers of the supporting
set.
However, in present-day operations the basis for a
communications system must be direct communications between
control posts (command levels). This most fully satisfies the
requirements for control under the complex conditions of mobile
warfare, when combat actions are rapid in nature and the
situation changes drastically in short periods of time.
The introduction of more powerful ultra-shortwave radio sets
with a wide frequency band, and also an automatic retuning
device, will be very important to mobile control posts. This
will greatly increase their capabilities for providing
communications to ranges of up to 150 kilometers when working
from a site, and up to 70 kilometers from short halts under
conditions of jamming.
By further improving single sideband shortwave radios we can
considerably increase the reliability, resistance to jamming, and
quality of communications channels (particularly telephone
channels). Also very promising is the introduction of
tropospheric communications from the division level and higher.
But how can we accomplish the task of providing secure
communications for mobile control posts?
At the present time, automatic secure communications
equipment is installed primarily in special equipment rooms which
can be connected by cable lines with all of the channeling means
of a communications center. This procedure makes it possible,
first of all, to use each and every equipment set to work on any
communications channel in operation at a given time (radio,
radio-relay, tropospheric, wire), which reduces overall
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which are more conducive to ensuring the security of the secure
communications.
However, when adopting this variant for placing equipment,
it is necessary in the control post to set up channeling means
(radio, radio-relay, and tropospheric sets) and equipment rooms
for secure communications, to extend the internal junction
circuits in the communications center, to check them, and then to
tie the automatic secure communications equipment into the
communications channels. This requires considerable time, since
what actually must be done is to set up a communications center
for operation from a site. The time required to set up the
communications center of a division command post is 40 to 60
minutes, and that of an army command post -- 1.5 to two hours.
This same amount of time also will be expended to close down
communications centers when preparing to change locations.
Taking this into consideration, and also the requirements
pertaining to the mobility of communications centers, we may
conclude that the mobile control posts of the division and lower,
where commanders and staffs are on the move approximately 50
percent of the time during combat actions, it is advisable to
place the secure communications equipment directly in the
command-staff vehicles, and in the radio and tropospheric sets.
In the communications centers of operational formations,
particularly front formations, the variant of locating secure
communications equipment in specialized equipment rooms may be
used more extensively.
To ensure the protection of personnel and communications
means against the effects of enemy fire, the communications
centers of mobile control posts should be set up in the following
manner: at the tactical level entirely within armored personnel
carriers; but at the operational level, only the means providing
commanders with communications when they go out to the field and
to forward command posts are to be in armored installations.
When developing new command-staff vehicles we must not be
carried away by the idea of installing a large number of varied
communications means in them, since this impedes using these
means simultaneously due to mutual interference. An example of
this might be the BTR-50PU command-staff vehicle in which four
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radios, one radio-relay terminal set, and a radio receiver are
installed. Experience in operating it shows that, as a rule,
communications are carried out via only two or three radio sets
at any one time. The radio-relay terminal set installed in this
vehicle is hardly ever used. It is true that installing a large
number of radio means in the BTR-50PU has been warranted by the
fact that we did not have wideband radio sets; therefore, a
commander could be assured of communications with senior
commanders, and subordinate and cooperating units (subunits) when
there were several radio sets operating on various frequency
bands
New radio sets are more versatile. Therefore, when they are
used in a commander's (formation commander's) command-staff
vehicle it is advisable to have two radios with two sets of
secure communications equipment in order to ensure communications
with the senior chief and subordinates, as well as to have one
low-power radio for internal communications along the column by
the control post.
Internal communications are provided for existing mobile
control posts via a radio using R-105 radios (while on the move)
or else via wire cable lines (when located at a site). These
communications are conducted on a single common frequency. The
transmission capacity of such a net is extremely limited.
Practically speaking, when there are 10 to 20 correspondents in
the net, it is possible to transmit primarily radio signals, and
in rare cases, short messages. We must also take it into
consideration that these communications require the use of secure
troop control documents.
The internal communications of mobile control posts should
be improved by way of increasing their transmission capacity and
providing for the automatic security of conversations. This task
can be accomplished by using duplex ultra-shortwave radio sets.
The interdependence and future development of means for
equipping these posts, means which have highly diverse
characteristics and capabilities, pose very important tasks in
coordinating their further improvement and ensuring the
survivability of the control posts of large units and formations.
Survivability is of particular importance because these posts are
the places where personnel and control means are concentrated soxi-Hum
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they are the centers of troop control and, consequently, the most
important targets to the enemy for the delivery of nuclear and
other strikes.
An analysis of the statistical data of the experience of
recent exercises shows that the control posts of an army included
the following numbers of various types of vehicles: a forward
command post -- 30 to 40, a command post -- 100 to 150, and a
rear control post -- SO to 70. And, the communications centers
of the respective control posts accounted for 30 to 50 percent of
the vehicles. In one of the exercises, there were approximately
200 different vehicles assigned to the front command post, and
its deployment required up to eight hours. Atthe same time, 130
vehicles were located at the rear control post.
The survivability of control posts is closely tied to the
mobility of their transport means and the degree to which these
means are protected. In ensuring survivability, the correct
choice of areas to locate them in also plays an important part;
the areas should provide convenience in setting up
communications, concealed and sheltered positions for personnel
and equipment, and camouflage for the access routes and
approaches.
In connection with the problem of increasing the
survivability of control posts we must mention the article by
General-Leytenant of Engineer Troops G. Samoylovich.* His
proposals, in our opinion, are acceptable for the most part only
when the theaters of military operations are given engineer
preparation in peacetime, and also during defensive actions and
actions involving little movement, but not under conditions of an
offensive at high rates of speed where weapons of mass
destruction are used.
The enemy indeed does have varied effective reconnaissance
means and devotes a great deal of attention to detecting and
destroying the control posts of our troops. The more time,
forces, and means are spent on the engineer preparation of these
posts, the more difficult it will be to conceal the engineer
measures, and the more effective nuclear strikes will prove to
be. In a number of cases, the enemy can find out about the
selection and engineer preparation of the new location site for asoxi-Hum
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control post even before the principal communications means are
set up in it. The operation of these communications means will
merely corroborate that a control post has been deployed in this
area.
From what has been said we can see how difficult it is now
in an offensive operation to count upon preparing control posts
according to the previously used "classical" variant recommended
by the author: to select a location site from a map, reconnoiter
it, give it engineer preparation in advance, set up
communications means, and so forth.
General Samoylovich's proposal to position groups in a
dispersed manner at the control posts, and also to use the
aforementioned standard structures, will require the allocation
of a considerable number of personnel and transport. But when
there are heavy losses and there is not enough time to put up the
structures, a variety of simplifications are possible, which will
entail the violation of technical regulations on the performance
of engineer work.
It is very difficult to base the mutual separation of
control post groups or components and the areas these posts
occupy only on yields -- even if they are those of the most
standard enemy nuclear warheads -- as was done in the article.
When necessary, several nuclear strikes using warheads of the
required yield can be delivered against the very same target.
Increasing the degree of dispersal and the area occupied by
each control post will require the allocation of a large number
of personnel and technical means (cable and transport) to set up
internal communications. At present we use primarily heavy cable
(TTVK and PTRK) for this. A GAZ-63 truck is needed to transport
three kilometers of the first cable or approximately two
kilometers of the second cable. We can appreciate the increased
volume of work and time needed for this work by communications
subunits, as well as the increased expenditure of cable, when the
distance between the groups at control posts is increased
according to the proposals made in the article.
We are convinced it is more expedient to expand not the
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General Samoylovich discussed, but rather the network of the
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control posts of each formation, including auxiliary and reserve
posts in the network when necessary.
In order to ensure the survivability of mobile control posts
in a present-day offensive operation, in our opinion, emphasis
should be placed primarily on using protected armored
command-staff and staff vehicles capable of digging themselves in
and out of the ground, as well as on achieving mobility for each
control post, exploiting favorable terrain conditions, and
transferring control from one post to another depending on the
conditions of the situation.
Radio camouflage of a system of control posts has acquired
great importance. When setting up this camouflage we must keep
in mind that greatest accuracy of detection is achieved when
direction finding is used against shortwave radio sets operating
on a surface wave. For example, bearings can be taken on the
medium-power shortwave radio transmitters of an army command post
with a linear error of two to four kilometers. At the same time,
it is extremely difficult for ground direction-finding sets to
get bearings on radio and radio-relay sets operating in
ultra-shortwave bands, and particularly in the decimeter and
centimeter wavebands. And direction finding from airborne means
produces linear errors of several dozen kilometers.
Hence, a practical radio camouflage measure for control
posts at the operational level is to move groups of medium-power
and high-power shortwave transmitters beyond the boundaries of
the posts. But as concerns tactical level control posts,
shortwave radio communications are used to a limited degree here
and control posts change locations often; therefore, individual
shortwave radio transmitters can be positioned near the control
posts or directly within them.
Furthermore, in ensuring the camouflaging of control posts,
growing importance is attached to the thermal protection of
vehicles and other installations radiating thermal energy against
detection by the enemy's infrared reconnaissance devices.
We must ensure that control posts have high survivability,
not only when they are located at a site but also when they are
moving to new areas. To attain this, all changes in location
must be carried out rapidly, not wasting any unnecessary time
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closing down or setting up control-posts. The driver of each
vehicle must know the prescribed signals and his place in
relation to other vehicles of the control post, both while
located at a site and also while on the move as part of the
column. This is achieved by drawing up standard diagrams for the
disposition of every control post, by calculating the composition
of the columns, and also by training the personnel of the control
organs, especially the drivers.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that mobile control
posts open up new opportunities for improving troop control and
raising the combat readiness of large units and formations.
In order to solve, in a more purposeful manner, the problems
of developing means for equipping control posts, it is necessary:
to study continuously the experience of troops and
staffs, and also the results of military science work
and scientific research work in the field of troop
control;
to coordinate the efforts of troops, military educational
institutions and scientific research institutions in
developing, testing, and improving transportation
equipment and various control means;
to expand the capabilities and the range of problems
being solved by one of the scientific research
institutes for communications in developing means
for equipping control posts, taking into consideration
the latest achievements of science and technology;
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-- to organize the production of industrial models of
command-staff, staff, and special vehicles, and also of
control means intended for the equipping of unit, large
unit, and formation control posts.
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