MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): WARFARE AGAINST ENEMY RADIOELECTRONIC MEANS DURING THE INITIAL NUCLEAR STRIKE BY A FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302720001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Warfare Against
Enemy Radioelectronic Means During the
Initial Nuclear Strike by a Front
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". This article examines various
electronic warfare measures which can be employed in a front
operation to disrupt enemy control and warning systems and cover
the front during a nuclear strike. Radioelectronic means may be
destroyed by missiles, bombing and artillery, or neutralized by
jamming produced by SPETSNAZ units. Coverage against strikes
requires both active jamming of bombsights and the use of radar
camouflage. Control of air defense may be disorganized by
destroying air and missile control posts and by jamming the
radars and radio communications. This article appeared in issue
No. 2 (69) for 1963.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this publication have been assigned
William W. Wells
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1963
Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
N
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Warfare Against Enemy Radioelectronic
Means During the Initial Nuclear Strike by a Front
Documentary
Summar :
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is
General-Mayor o Engineer-Technical Service B. Ratts. This
article examines various electronic warfare measures which can be
employed in a front operation to disrupt enemy control and
warning systems an7 cover the front during a nuclear strike.
Radioelectronic means may be destroyed by missiles, bombing and
artillery, or neutralized by jamming produced by SPETSNAZ units.
Coverage against strikes requires both active jamming of
bombsights by SPB-7 jammers and the use of corner reflectors and
other radar camouflage. Control of air defense may be
disorganized by destroying air and missile control posts and by
jamming the radars and radio communications. Radioelectronic
targets and front capabilities and methods for neutralizing them
are discusse with reference to equipment presumed to be
operating in US and NATO forces. The author concludes that the
electronic warfare plan should be tied closely to the plan for
combating enemy nuclear means and that certain technical and 50X1-HUM
organizational improvements are required.
End of Summary
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Warfare Against Enemy Radioelectronic Means
During the Initial Nuclear Strike by a Front
by
General-Mayor of Engineer-Technical Service B. Ratts
The initial nuclear strike against an enemy can be delivered
by a front under various circumstances. In delivering the
strike, 7e front must, certainly, also be ready to repulse a
nuclear stri the enemy at the same time.
In this connection, warfare against enemy radioelectronic
means during the initial nuclear strike by the front will have
the purpose: first, to guarantee the maximum possible
effectiveness of the nuclear strike by the front against enemy
troops and installations; and second, to weaken the nuclear
strike by the enemy against the troops and installations of the
front.
Warfare against enemy radioelectronic means can be waged by
destroying them, producing jamming and by setting up radar
camouflage. As is known, all of these methods of warfare are
included under the term "radioelectronic countermeasures", the
essence of which is interpreted differently by many comrades. For
this reason, in order to more correctly reflect the essence of
the problems being examined, we are going to discuss warfare
against the radioelectronic systems and means of the enemy.
During the initial nuclear strike, the front will perform the
following tasks with regard to neutralizing the enemy's
radioelectronic means:
-- disorganize the control of enemy missile units and
aviation that deliver strikes against the troops
and installations of the front;
-- provide cover for the troops and installations of the
front against strikes by enemy aviation;
-- disorganize the control of the enemy's air defense
forces and means;
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- disrupt the enemy's system for warning about the
radiation situation.
Let us consider what is involved in these tasks and how they
can be accomplished.
The disorganization of the control of enemy missile units
and aviation can be executed in two ways: by destroying enemy
communications centers and the organs which control and guide
surface-to-surface missiles and aviation against the troops and
installations of the front; and by neutralizing, by means of
jamming, the control and guidance nets of the enemy missile units
and aviation.
In the table below are shown the enemy missile and aviation
control organs that are to be destroyed, and what forces and
means are required for their neutralization. Since the
disorganization of the control of enemy air defense forces and
means also requires the destruction of his radioelectronic means,
the table includes also the organs for controlling enemy
surface-to-air guided missiles. The number of control organs
given in the table corresponds approximately to the number that
presently exists in the Central Army Group of the NATO countries.
The total number of radioelectronic means that should be
attacked is rather large. But there is no need to destroy all of
them at the same time. In each individual case, taking into
account the specific situation and the forces available, we
should determine the most important systems, centers, and posts,
and allocate forces to destroy them. If with the initial strike
we must put out of operation five or six large communications
centers, eight to ten aviation control and guidance organs, five
to ten surface-to-surface missile control organs (posts), and 20
to 25 surface-to-air guided missile batteries, this would require
five or six nuclear warheads, 1.5-to two divisional
fighter-bomber sorties, and three or four artillery battalions.
Here we must point out that the control means for Corporal guided
missiles and surface-to-air guided missiles are destroyed at the
same time as the launchers, since they are located in the
immediate vicinity of the launchers. If we exclude these means
from the calculation, then three or four nuclear warheads and
approximately one divisional fighter-bomber sortie would be
required to neutralize the radioelectronic means.
Tar~L
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Radars are best destroyed by missiles with passive homing
heads. Whenever the rapid location of mobile targets and the
determination of their coordinates becomes an acute problem
difficult to solve, homing missiles of the surface-to-surface
type can increase considerably the capabilities of the front to
destroy not only radiotechnical installations, but also other
important targets (missile launchers) that are in the immediate
vicinity of the radars and other radio-frequency emitting
devices.
The task of disorganizing enemy control of missile troops
and aviation can be accomplished not only by destroying his
radiotechnical means, but also by jamming the control nets of the
missile and aviation units and large units and the nets which
guide enemy tactical fighters to our troops and installations.
Operational shortwave communications for controlling enemy
aviation and missile large units and units can be neutralized by
the means of the front SPETSNAZ "F" radio battalions and partly
by the means of the army SPETSNAZ "A" radio battalions. The
successful neutralization of these communications while the enemy
is delivering his initial strike leads to late missile launchings
and aircraft sorties, to the delivery of strikes against
unoccupied areas or unimportant targets, to non-synchronized
strikes, and in certain cases even to the disruption of strikes
by missiles and aviation. If some enemy units are situated near
the border, i.e., sufficiently close to the shortwave jamming
means of the SPETSNAZ "A" battalions (25 to 40 kilometers), then
part of these means can be used to neutralize the warning nets of
the opposing troops by surface wave, and part of the means to
neutralize the control nets for aviation and missile large units
and units by space wave. From this follows the important
conclusion that during the initial nuclear strike it is necessary
to centralize control not only over the front units for jamming
radio communications, but also over the army units.
For the successful execution of the task discussed above it
is very important to deploy the SPETSNAZ units even in peacetime.
The means of SPETSNAZ "F" radio battalions, in our view, should
be deployed 150 to 250 kilometers from the state border, since,
as we all know, the field intensity of a space wave reaches
maximum values at distances of 300 to 800 kilometers from the
jammer. When the jamming means of SPETSNAZ "F" separate radio
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battalions are so deployed, the majority of targets (enemy
operational control organs) that are to be neutralized fall into
the zone of maximum jamming levels. At the same time, such a
deployment of jamming means will guarantee the neutralization of
operational communications during the attack by the front which
follows the initial strike. SPETSNAZ "A" battalions,, whose means
operate at short ranges, should in peacetime be deployed in the
garrison area of those armies to which they should be attached
according to the plan for the first operation. During the
transition of the troops to increased combat readiness and the
move into the departure areas of the divisions of the first
echelon, as is known, the ultra-shortwave jamming companies move
into these same areas, and the shortwave jamming company of the
radio battalion moves into the area of the army command post.
Under modern conditions of mobile warfare, the command posts
for enemy formations, large units, and missile units will
frequently be deployed at a depth of 50 to 100 kilometers and
more, particularly during the initial period of a war. It is not
possible to neutralize shortwave, ultra-shortwave (20 to 60 MHz)
and radio-relay communications at this depth with ground-based
surface-wave means. The use of ultra-shortwave and shortwave
means of SPETSNAZ "A" separate radio battalions can increase the
Jamming range (neutralization by surface wave) up to 100 to 150
kilometers, if the means are mounted in helicopters. This measure
does not require any complicated technical solutions, and can be
done rather easily.
Means for jamming ultra-shortwave communications can be used
to jam the nets for guiding tactical fighters against our troops
and installations during the repulse of the enemy's first nuclear
strike. This task must be considered very important and urgent,
since the tactical fighters of our probable enemies are still the
primary means of delivering nuclear weapons, and the method for
training them is based on the use of control centers and posts
for guiding the aircraft to ground targets. These posts were
widely used for guidance in the FALLEX-60 and CHECKMATE exercises
of the NATO countries. In the FALLEX-60 exercise the posts were
used for executing more than 100 guidances and strikes against
ground targets in three days. At the guidance post, in the
process of "ground-to-air" guidance, ultra-shortwave radio
communications means are used first, and then the MSQ-1 radar. 50X1-HUM
By jamming radio communications, we can prevent a tactical
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fighter from communicating with its control organ which assigns
the fighter its task, retargets it, and also issues the commands
for the approach to the target area. Without these data a modern
high-speed fighter is not capable of finding and destroying a
target independently. In such a case, the strike would most
probably be delivered against an empty area. The ultra-shortwave
band (225 to 400 MHz) can be jammed by the jammers that are part
of the organic equipment of the SPETSNAZ "S" radiotechnical
battalions and part of the organic training equipment of the
SPETSNAZ radio battalions of an air army of a front. However,
actually these jammers have not yet been issued to the troops.
Experimental models have shown rather good results. As far as
the MSQ-1 guidance radars are concerned, jamming them is
difficult since they operate not on the principle of reflection,
but on that of the re-emission of electromagnetic energy by a
transponder on the aircraft. Because of this the return pulse of
energy has such a high intensity that extremely powerful jammers,
the development of which would be infeasible, would be required
to neutralize it. Thus, it is better to neutralize the MSQ-1
radar by means of artillery and fighter-bomber fire.
The task of covering the troops and installations of the
front against air strikes requires, first of all, the employment
oofJamming against the radiotechnical means for air navigation
and bombing and, secondly, the use of passive jamming means
(various reflectors) for camouflaging the troops and
installations against radar observation from the air.
Those enemy aircraft that will participate in the first
nuclear strike against the front's troops and installations will
be tactical fighters and medium tactical) bombers, but not
excluding part of the strategic bombers. For bombing, the medium
and strategic bombers use radar bombsights as an integral
component of their navigation and bombing system; tactical
fighters use the MSQ-l system (American F-84, F-100; French
Breguet 1100, "Talon", etc.) or even the R14A (R21A) of the
NASARR system (F-104, F-105). Both the bombsights of the bombers
and R14A radars, which operate in the three-centimeter band, are
jammed by our SPB-7 jammers that are found in the SPETSNAZ "S"
radiotechnical battalions. With better tactical characteristics
and specifications than the older SPB-5 jammers, the SPB-7 jammer
has a wider zone of cover of radar reference points in the area
where troops and installations are deployed. We can assume that
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a jamming company of the SPETSNAZ "S" separate radiotechnical
battalion will provide cover for troops and installations in a
circular area 20 kilometers in radius, provided the density of
the bomber attack does not exceed three aircraft per minute.
Consequently, a battalion can cover an area consisting of three
circles, each having a diameter of about 40 kilometers. Thus,
the battalion will provide cover mainly for the main grouping of
one of the armies, or for a front missile brigade and one or two
of the most important installations of the front, such as the
command post, front base, etc.
The above approximate norm applies for the use of jammers on
semi-rugged terrain in the absence of contrasting radar reference
points (large cities, characteristic bends in large rivers or
coastal strips) which produce on the screens of the bombsights
considerable "open" zones around a target, i.e., zones in which
the aircraft crew, as they enter the zones, can begin to observe
the target against the background of the jamming. To cover such
targets within the air defense system of the country requires
deploying around the targets a considerable number of jammers in
a set arrangement.
The necessity of setting up a comparatively large number of
SPB jammers to cover the troops is explained by the fact that
they are inadequate: one jammer can neutralize only one bombsight
at a time. The development of an automatic jammer with rapid
electric frequency switching within a certain frequency range
will afford the possibility of sharply reducing the number of
jammers required to cover the troops and installations of a
front.
The use of the SPB-7 active bombsight jammer aimed at
depriving the enemy of the capability to find bombing targets
must be combined with the use of radar camouflage means (corner
reflectors and various screens). Camouflage is particularly
important for confusing reconnaissance aircraft that use
side-looking radars. It is well known how important it is to
reconnoiter enemy troops in peacetime, particularly during a
period of threat, so that the first strike can be delivered
against targets whose locations have been precisely fixed.
Essentially, the success or failure of a first strike to a
considerable degree is determined by the availability or lack of
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precise data on the location of enemy troops and installations at
the moment the strike is delivered. Reconnaissance aircraft
equipped with side-looking radars -- which are in service with US
army mechanized and armored divisions -- even in peacetime can
continuously, day and night, keep track of all movements of our
troops and combat equipment to a depth of 60 to 80 kilometers
while flying along the state border. There is information that
the new side-looking radars have a range of up to 150 kilometers.
This obliges us in our operational camouflage plans to provide
for the simulation, with fixed and mobile corner reflectors, of a
concentration of troops and combat equipment in areas where the
situation would require them, in order to distract the enemy's
attention. On the other hand, actual installations must be
concealed from observation with screens. The missile launchers
of front and army units should be camouflaged especially
carefully during their moves to new launch areas. Wide use
should be made of dummy launch areas and launchers. The
utilization of folds in the terrain will be very important for
concealing troops.
It is important to keep in mind that side-looking radars are
installed at present by the Americans not only on aircraft of
army aviation, but also on F-104 and F-105 tactical fighters.
Consequently, at the beginning of combat actions we should also
expect the appearance of reconnaissance aircraft even deep within
our territory. In this connection, we will have to take measures
to camouflage those troops and installations that are located
within the operational depth.
The disorganization of the control of air defense forces and
means of an enemy who is repelling a strike by the missile troops
and aviation of a front is achieved by the following measures:
-- by destroying the control organs of fighter
aviation and surface-to-air guided missiles;
-- by neutralizing air defense radar means with jamming;
-- by neutralizing the radio nets controlling the
air defense forces and the warning radio communications
with jamming.
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The matter of destroying the air defense control organs was
considered earlier.
Neutralizing air defense radar means with jamming is done by
airborne jamming means that can be installed on jamming aircraft
and in some units of bomber aviation, as well as on the regular
aircraft of all types of aviation. In bomber aviation the
jamming aircraft can be equipped with group jamming means with
which they can neutralize the detection and guidance radars of
fighters as well as the target indication radars for
surface-to-air guided missiles. Combat aircraft from fighter,
fighter-bomber and bomber aviation must have individual jamming
means for jamming the guidance (automatic tracking) radars for
surface-to-air guided missiles and the intercept radars of enemy
fighters used to guide air-to-air guided missiles.
If the group jamming means prevent the enemy from correctly
appraising the air situation and from making the correct decision
regarding the use of the air defense forces and means of fighter
aviation and surface-to-air guided missiles, and also prevent the
guidance of fighters, then the individual jamming means will
frustrate the attack by the fighters and missiles. The guidance
of fighters into the attack can also be countered by jamming the
fighters' radio communications and guidance network by means of
jammers carried aboard jamming bomber aircraft.
With the above-mentioned jamming means, an air army will be
able to negotiate the present-day air defense of the NATO
countries with minimum losses and deliver an effective strike
against their forces and installations. However, we must mention
the fact that more should be done so that losses in aviation
inflicted by enemy air defense will be reduced to a minimum.
Until recently, radars were jammed primarily by passive
jamming means -- chaff. However, the neutralization of modern
radars with moving-target selection (allocation) devices requires
such a large quantity of chaff that it would be difficult, indeed
even impossible, to find space for it on a modern aircraft. A
more categorical change to active jamming means is needed, to
jammers of various types and ranges. It is very important to
develop homing missiles of the air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface types to destroy radars having various ranges
and purposes, to equip fighter-bombers with homing radars, i.e.,
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with a special receiver with which the pilot could engage an
operating enemy radar or radio station and destroy it by firing
its guns or launching its missiles. Such a receiver, very simple
ii design, would also solve the problem of night flight. At the
present time the fighter-bomber can have only very limited
employment at night because of the difficulties of locating
targets.
The automatic jammers for jamming detection and guidance
radars and surface-to-air guided missile guidance radars must be
mounted on helicopters and aircraft, so that the latter can be
used in standing patrol zones over our own territory 30 to 50
k=.lometers from the state border. The jamming from these zones
w:_ll support actions by cruise missiles, fighter-bombers and
reconnaissance aircraft, which have very limited individual
defensive means and no group defensive means. This measure is
most necessary, particularly for the reconnaissance aircraft
which have the task of reconnoitering enemy missile launch areas
beginning immediately after the initiation of combat actions.
Reconnaissance aircraft are forced to penetrate the enemy rear
singly, which puts them into a most difficult position in respect
tc enemy air defense. For this reason, the front must use all
available means to neutralize the air defense: surface-to-surface
and air-to-surface missiles, including homing missiles; strikes
by fighter-bombers; jamming of enemy radars by all possible
methods, including from standing patrol zones.
Finally, the problem of developing automatic jamming means
which could be mounted on cruise missiles (for example on the
FKR-180 front cruise missile), is urgent.
During the first nuclear strike the jamming of enemy radio
communications within his networks for issuing warnings about the
air and radiation situation is very important. This type of
jamming is performed in the shortwave band by the means of the
SPETSNAZ "F" radio battalion and, partially, the SPETSNAZ "A"
radio battalion.
The disruption of the network for issuing warnings about the
air situation should prevent the use of active air defense means,
and also the use of passive air defense measures, by enemy
forces. Disruption of the network for issuing warnings about the
radiation situation includes the neutralization by jamming of the
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network for issuing warnings about the ground zeroes of nuclear
bursts, the radiation levels in various areas, and the directions
and rates of movement of the radioactive clouds. Neutralization
of warnings on the levels of radiation can lead to a sharp
increase in the effect of radiation on enemy troops because of
the delay in receiving information needed to rapidly make a
decision to move the troops into uncontaminated areas.
From the above it follows that warfare against enemy
radioelectronic means, in its significance and in the role it
plays in the front's first nuclear strike, goes beyond the limits
of those technical measures that earlier made up the concept of
"radioelectronic countermeasures". In our opinion, warfare
against enemy radioelectronic means must be considered an
essential part of combating enemy nuclear means. From this we
arrive at the important conclusion regarding the necessity of
closely coordinating the plan for this warfare with the overall
plan for combating enemy nuclear means, rather than drawing it up
in isolation from the overall plan, as is done so often.
The development of the plan for warfare against enemy
radioelectronic means must be directed by the operations
directorate of a front, with active participation by
representatives of the rocket troops and artillery, air army, air
defense troops, communications troops and engineer troops.
In the determination of targets to be destroyed or
neutralized, the destruction or neutralization that will produce
the required effect must be selected on the basis of careful
analysis and comparison.
From what has been said above we can draw a second important
conclusion, that the solution of a whole series of technical
problems must be accelerated, including: developing homing
missiles of different classes and purposes, ultra-shortwave (20
to 60 MHz) jammers for mounting on helicopters and used for
neutralizing the ultra-shortwave communications of the enemy
ground forces to a depth of 100 to 150 kilometers, ground-based
automatic sets for jamming the bombsights of tactical fighters;
ground-based ultra-shortwave (225 to 400 MHz) jammers for
neutralizing enemy aviation guidance communications, etc.
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Finally, we must solve certain problems associated with the
organization of those SPETSNAZ radio units without which the
jamming equipment could not be used: aircraft, helicopter, and
ground-based radio units equipped with modern jamming equipment.
The accomplishment of these tasks will facilitate the
successful delivery of a first nuclear strike by the troops of a
front and simultaneously weaken a strike by the enemy against our
troops and installations.
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Control Organs and Radioelectronic Means in the Front Zone Subject to
Destruction and the Forces and Means Required for the
Neutralization of One Target
Control Organs
(Radioelectronic
Means)
Number
in
Army
Group
Forces and Means Required for
Neutralizing One Target
Large radio centers
(army group, field
army, allied tactical
air force, tactical
air army)
Control groups (posts)
for the operational-
tactical missiles:
Aviation control
centers and posts
Posts for guidance
of aviation (MSQ-1
radars) against
ground targets
Radars for detecting
and spotting of nuclear
artillery
Surface-to-air guided
missile control means
(by the number of
batteries)
Missile with nuclear or
chemical warhead, or one or
two squadrons of fighter-
bombers.
Missile with nuclear warhead,
or two or three flights of
fighter-bombers.
Flight of fighter-bombers
with conventional means
Artillery battalion with
conventional means of
destruction
Two or three flights of
fighter-bombers with
conventional means of
destruction. Homing
missile.
Flight of fighter-bombers
with conventional means
of destruction. Artillery
battalion or battery.
Artillery battalion or
battery
Two or three flights of
fighter-bombers with
conventional means of
destruction or a homing
missile.
TOP T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302720001-1