MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): METHODOLOGY OF PREPARING AND CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISES AND WAR GAMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302710001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 8, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Methodology of Preparing and Conducting Operational
Command-Staff Exercises and War Games
by
Colonel N. Pavlikov,
Colonel N. Pustovalov
and
Colonel V. Bulatnikov
(Based on the experience of operational training of the
Transcaucasus and Carpathian military districts and the staff
of the airborne troops)
Operational command-staff exercises and games provide our
generals, officers, and staffs with extensive opportunities to
acquire and improve their practical skills in troop control.
We know that the preparation for an exercise (war game)
begins by specifying the theme and training goals. A broad
operational content is characteristic of the thematics of
command-staff exercises, and this requires the integrated working
out of the most important problems of organizing and conducting
present-day operations. In our opinion, it is inadvisable to
conduct command-staff exercises on themes with a narrow
orientation where only individual problems are worked out, even
if these are important. The great effort invested in organizing
an exercise and the material costs must be compensated for by
carefully working out the maximum possible number of problems.
As is shown by practice, no fewer than six to seven days should
be devoted to army and front command-staff exercises. As for war
games, particularly command games, individual tasks can be worked
out in them, therefore, the time required to conduct them can be
limited to two to three days.
To correctly formulate the training goals means to answer
the question of what result the director expects from the
exercise (game). If it is conducted on a new theme, then
obviously it will be advisable to pursue the goal and study it,
but if the basic content of the theme is already well known to
the trainees, then we will strive to improve our practical skills
-HUM
or obtain necessary experience, while in a number of cases w2c)xl
will strive simply to check the level of training of one or
another control organ. Since the themes of operational exercises
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and games, as a rule, should be combined themes, the goals may be
consolidated or differentiated.
The correct choice of the exercise area is very important.
It should permit all the central questions of the theme to be
worked out in a specified sequence and should enable control
posts to be positioned and relocated "under combat conditions".
It is also necessary to examine the possibility of having the
directing body visit them with the least expenditure of time;
i.e., it is necessary to take into consideration the availability
of airfields, landing sites, motor roads, etc. Leasing lines
from the Ministry of Communications to provide control is a
frequent occurrence, therefore, when selecting an exercise area
we must not fail to take into account the links that these lines
pass through and how to utilize them with the least expenditure
of funds in lease payments.
We believe that the aforementioned initial data are
fundamental when developing the concept, plan of execution, and
other basic documents of the exercise (game).
As we know, the main method of training in a command-staff
exercise and war game is to have generals and staff officers
fulfil in actual practice their functional duties in troop
control with the complement of their table of organization organs
or only their operations groups, set against a background of a
specific and continuously developing operational situation which
must be established and built up avoiding oversimplification.
Let us take as an example the situation which might develop in
the zone of a front or army as a result of massed enemy nuclear
strikes. It is regrettable that often in exercises the situation
is presented in an oversimplified manner; staffs are able to
"quickly collect" precise data on the location and yield of
nuclear bursts and on the position and status of their own
troops. In this case, they do not take sufficiently into account
that as a result of nuclear strikes, individual levels of control
may be put out of action for a considerable time, communications
will be disrupted, extensive zones of destruction and radioactive
contamination will occur, and the trainees will have to exert
considerable efforts to refine the situation in the front and
rear areas and restore the combat effectiveness of the411
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order to fulfil the tasks.
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We feel that it is necessary to employ training films and
simulation extensively during a command-staff exercise. It is
difficult, of course, to simulate a large number of nuclear
strikes and even more so their aftereffects and results with the
simulation means employed in tactical exercises. But there is no
need for this. In our opinion, training films could provide a
visual and audible perception of the situation which develops as
a result of nuclear strikes. It would be advisable to produce
films from sequences showing the aftereffects of nuclear strikes
delivered against model targets. For example, the aftereffects
of grouped strikes against a motorized rifle division, a missile
brigade or a regiment; of single strikes against command posts,
airfields, towns, railroad junctions, and other installations. A
viewing of the appropriate material, together with the receipt of
data on the situation throughout the exercise, will allow
trainees to "sense" the picture of present-day combat operations.
We all know the attention the enemy devotes to the
disruption of troop control. Control posts are the primary
installations which he will strive to destroy and neutralize by
various means. Therefore, it is advisable to practice the
following measures on a wide scale in all command-staff exercises
in order to force staffs to work under conditions which maximally
approximate a combat situation: air attacks employing
conventional and chemical bombs; attacks by sabotage groups;
putting individual elements of command posts out of action,
particularly communications centers; and jamming the operation of
radio means.
The experience of the last war shows that staffs endeavored
to collect data about all aspects of the situation. Various
elements of the battle formation and operational disposition of
the troops were carefully plotted on maps, analyzed, and assessed
in order to make a decision. However, even then, particularly
during the course of operations, this was not always possible,
despite the persistence of the staffs. The speed with which
present-day operations develop is several times greater.
Therefore, to demand from staffs that they engage in collecting
data on the situation in as much detail as was done in the last
war, is, in our opinion, inadvisable. What is important is to
obtain the most necessary, most essential information, but to do
this in a timely manner, so that the commander may react :41_211i-/JV
to the development of events.
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It seems to us that hypothetical situations employing data
generalized for a specific time period should be eliminated from
the practice of command-staff exercises as being contrary to the
principle "teach what is needed in a war and teach just how it is
done in a war". Only in individual cases, when the complement of
participants is limited, can we forgo this principle and furnish
data on the situation in a somewhat generalized and summarized
manner.
How do we give out data on the situation to the trainees? It
is difficult to give a simple answer to this question, since the
sequence of changes in a situation is determined primarily by the
content of the situation. For example, it is advisable to pass
on information about nuclear strikes immediately after they are
delivered, but the results or aftereffects of these strikes
should be passed on as the staff takes measures to ascertain
them. Data on the status of our own troops, as well as on the
large units of the enemy conducting combat actions, may be
received in the front (army) staff every two to three hours when
the operation is developingaccording to plan, and immediately
when the nature of combat actions changes drastically.
Information on enemy reserves in the depth should be sent
depending on how the staff was able to organize reconnaissance.
The recommended frequency for receiving data on the situation is
disrupted during so-called operational transitions. But in this
case too it is inadvisable to give the situation in summary form
to the trainees. The situation must be built up using
fragmentary data as events develop, gradually bringing the
trainees up to that moment when new decisions must be made or
previously made decisions must be refined considerably. This
methodology induces trainees to show purposefulness and
persistence in obtaining the information they need. The need for
this is dictated by the complexity of troop control in
present-day operations.
In our opinion, one of the important methods of training in
operational exercises and games is for the director to be briefed
from reports of formation commanders (commanders) and staff
officers on the developing situation. This is particularly
applicable to war games and also to exercises which are of a test
nature. Experience shows that this method of training is used by
the director of the command-staff exercise in first-level 5t5oX1-Hum
from two to four times and in second-level staffs -- once or
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twice. However, we have recently observed the tendency, and a
natural one, besides, of reducing not only the number of
briefings, but especially the duration of each of them. For
example, in operational exercises and games in the Transcaucasus
Military District in 1965-1966, the duration of briefings on the
average was one to two hours for a front (army) headquarters and
one to 1.5 hours for a division headquarters. This was enough
time for the director to be briefed by the formation commander
(commander), the chief of staff, chief of the operations
directorate (department), chief of intelligence, and also the
chiefs of the branch arms, services, and the rear. Also worthy
of attention is the practice whereby during the exercise the
chiefs of the branch arms, special troops, and rear of the
second-level staffs briefed, not the director, but his assistants
in the appropriate branch arms and services. This enables us to
evaluate more thoroughly the level of training of the trainees
and provide them with timely and skilled assistance.
The efficiency of the training depends greatly on the
personal qualities of the director, his training on the given
theme, and character. Therefore, it would be desirable if each
briefing had a planned basis and were prepared with the
participation of the staff of the directing body, which should
prepare for the director a map with the front (army) commander's
decision and a brief plan specifying the briefing schedule and
the main problems stemming from the theme of the exercise and the
specific situation.
As we know, the trainees prepare themselves thoroughly for a
briefing. This finds expression primarily in the preparation of
reports and illustrations in the form of maps, charts, tables,
etc. This is both proper and necessary. However, in practice we
observe instances when colorfully drawn up maps exert decisive
influence on the rating of the trainees; although they evidently
spent considerable effort and time on this work, it was to the
detriment of the quality of the decisions, plans, calculations,
and their very foundations. Overemphasizing the showy side of a
subject to the detriment of its basic content cannot be
justified. Of course, we do not wish to belittle the role of the
pictorial and precise drawing up of graphic documents for a
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report, but this must be done within reasonable limits. And
general, it is better in practice for trainees to brief from
working maps and documents since under actual combat conditions
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there will be neither the time nor the opportunity to prepare
labor-consuming poster diagrams, charts, etc.
During a briefing there is no justification for "chewing
out" trainees for their mistakes and deficiencies and it is
gratifying to observe that this occurrence is more and more
decidedly becoming outdated. A businesslike atmosphere and the
ability to patiently hear out a trainee without interrupting him
with numerous questions will, in our opinion, be conducive to a
favorable solution to the problems being studied.
Employing the training method of having trainees present
briefings on the decisions in two-sided command-staff exercises
involves certain difficulties. Thus, working with only two army
headquarters, together with flights to their command posts, may
take up to five or six hours, and if it is necessary to also
visit the headquarters of divisions, then the time expended is
almost doubled. As a result, great difficulties arise in playing
out the combat actions of both sides in accordance with the
decisions made, and forced and extended pauses occur during the
exercise. To avoid this, it is advisable to combine the method
of having trainees brief the director personally in their command
posts with the method of briefing over communications means and
of studying the combat documents submitted to the directing body
of the exercise.
The concluding and very important part of an exercise (game)
is the critique. As we know, its preparation is begun early and
continues during the course of the exercise (game). It is most
often prepared in the form of two reports -- by the chief of the
staff of the directing body and by the director.
The chief of the staff of the directing body usually
presents the themes, the main goals and initial situation, and
the composition, tasks and plans of both sides according to the
concept of the directing body; he presents the content of the
decisions of the formation commanders (commanders) based on the
initial situation, and gives a brief outline of the specific
features of the situation, and their decisions for the subsequent
stages of the exercise (game). The principal problems, which
arise during the course of a long exercise, concerning the work
of staffs in supporting combat actions and providing troop
control are analyzed in the concluding portion of the report.
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The report or critique proper of the exercise (game)
directing body can be presented in five sections.
As a rule, the introduction presents the specific
characteristics of the given exercise (game), a brief account of
the nature of the military-political situation in the theater of
military operations, certain requirements of the directive from
the Ministry of Defense on operational training, and theoretical
propositions pertaining to the theme and problems being studied.
The second part of the critique is the main part. In it,
the decisions of the formation commanders (commanders) are
analyzed by stages for their positive and negative aspects. The
assessment of the decisions should be objective, persuasive, and
supported by the appropriate provisions from manuals and
regulations, and by examples from combat practice.
In the third part, the most significant problems of
employing the branch arms and special troops and of supporting
combat actions may be discussed. Allocating this group of
problems to a separate section permits the critique to be
prepared more quickly.
The content of the fourth part is an assessment of the work
of the exercise (game) participants and of the staffs as a whole.
It is generally known that this part of the critique customarily
arouses lively interest among the trainees and therefore the
director, the staff of the directing body, and the umpires must
take an especially careful approach to the assessment of the work
of the trainees. It is advisable to supplement assessments, and
particularly unfavorable ones, with a brief description of the
activity of the trainee and recommendations.
In the conclusion, overall conclusions are customarily made
about the degree to which the training goals were achieved and
specific measures to eliminate the shortcomings uncovered are
defined.
Some comments about the strength of the staff of the
directing body and the umpire complement. In recent years wesoxi-Hum
have observed a steady tendency to reduce them. And this is
completely natural. However, it seems to us that the strength of
the directing body and the umpire complement can only be reduced
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within reasonable limits, i.e., taking into account the tasks
assigned to these organs in preparing, and particularly in
conducting, the exercises and games. The organization of the
staff of the directing body, its strength, and the umpire
complement will depend largely on the scale of the exercise (war
game) being conducted.
The primary organ of a staff, as we know, is the operations
department. Its minimum complement can be five to six, but when
two-sided exercises are being conducted -- eight to ten fully
trained operations officers, whose work, as a rule, is organized
with a precise allocation of functional duties. Some of the
officers of the staff of the directing body are organizationally
combined into groups: assistant directors of the exercise for
the rocket troops and artillery (four to five officers); for the
rear services (three to four); for air defense, engineer and
chemical troops (three to four); for aviation (one or two); and
deputy chiefs of staff of the directing body for intelligence
(two to three) and for communications (three to four officers).
In addition, it is advisable to have groups in the complement of
the staff of the directing body for preparing materials for the
critique (two to three men), for controlling radio deception,
radio jamming, and radio monitoring (three to four men), and also
a support group. When conducting one-sided exercises and war
games a group of five to six men acting as the enemy should be
set up, and in two-sided exercises and games -- a group playing
out combat actions. Thus, there can be from 45 to SO generals
and officers in the directing body of an operational
command-staff exercise or command-staff war game.
The umpire complement is also determined on the basis of the
tasks assigned to them. There is the opinion that the main task
of umpires is to train senior personnel and staffs allocated for
the exercise or game. We cannot fully share this point of view.
Generals and officers in exercises and games learn under the
supervision of their own direct superiors. In our opinion, the
main task of the umpires, particularly when attached to the
second-level senior personnel and staffs, consists of building up
the situation in an instructive manner and watching over 5+.wl,Kr_Frk
of the trainees.
If we adhere to these views, then reducing the number of
umpires is fully justified. This has been done repeatedly in
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practice. Thus, in the last front command-staff exercise and
game conducted under the direction of the military district
commander, practically no umpires were designated to be attached
to the front headquarters, and their tasks were fulfilled by
assistant directors and officers of the staff of the directing
body. In armies the number of umpires was limited to 10 or 12
and in division headquarters -- four or five generals and
officers. Three to four officers were allocated to the senior
umpire attached to the second-level commander and staff in order
to build up the situation in a timely manner and to maintain
continuous contact with the director and the staff. We are not
inclined to call them the final umpires since their main task was
to provide technical assistance to the senior umpire in playing
out the combat actions.
These, in our opinion, are some of the problems in the
methodology of preparing and conducting operational exercises and
games whose positive solution will help improve the operational
training of operational staffs.
* *
In our Carpathian Military District, as in other military
districts, command-staff exercises and war games are the
principal undertakings for operational training of the command
and staffs. The military district commander customarily directs
a front command-staff exercise and simultaneously assumes the
role of front commander. The deputy chiefs of the branch arms
and services aredesignated as his assistants and the deputy
commanders act as umpires attached to the headquarters of the
armies with operations groups of from five to six officers of
various specialties allocated to assist them. The staff of the
directing body, as a rule, is headed by the first deputy chief of
staff of the military district. This staff is made up of groups
to plan and conduct the exercise, axis officers to put together
the situation, for critique, radio deception and the production
of jamming, and the organization of communications and
materiel-technical support. In all, 25 to 30 generals and
officers are allocated to work in the staff. 5 OX1-HUM
The main content of the theme of the exercises and games
conducted recently was to organize the movement of troops forward
over long distances under conditions of the active exchange of
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nuclear strikes by belligerents, to prepare and conduct an
offensive operation and a meeting engagement, to commit the
front's second echelon to action, etc. In this manner, we worked
out in the exercises and games the main problems of preparing and
conducting front and army offensive operations carried out by
employing weapons of mass destruction. No more than three or
four training problems were posed, and those which actually would
have to be solved with the initiation of military operations were
worked out first.
Certain problems were worked out in the form of research.
These were, for example, determining the effectiveness of
employing a computer post to solve operational problems at the
army level, the procedure for the transfer and technical
servicing of tanks when a rail movement already initiated is
disrupted or stopped, seeking methods of raising the combat
readiness of the troops, rear services support when troops are
advancing over long distances, etc.
Research on these problems allowed us to draw a number of
practical conclusions and give our troops recommendations for
raising their combat readiness and improving the quality of
operational and combat training.
The area for conducting the command-staff exercise was
selected so that it enabled all control posts to be realistically
deployed on the terrain and repeatedly shifted over actual
distances. This area usually measured from 120 to 150 thousand
square kilometers. This permitted army control posts to deploy
from 150 to 250 kilometers away from their permanent deployment
areas and to shift two to three times over a distance of 100 to
200 kilometers during the exercise. The staff of the directing
body in this instance was located in the center of the area at a
distance of 100 to 200 kilometers or more away from the staffs
being trained. To communicate with them, messenger means,
including aircraft and helicopters, were widely employed. In
those cases where the areas of the combat actions of both sides
far exceeded the limits of practical positioning of the command
posts, a number of these problems were worked out on maps
cix-fli-ium
The main document of an exercise is the concept, which we
work up on a 1:500,000 (1:200,000) scale map with an attachment
of explanatory notes. On the concept map we depict the initial
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positions of the troops of both sides at the beginning of the
exercise, the decision of the senior commander, the tasks and
procedure for employing weapons of mass destruction; the
strength, position, and tasks of the formations being trained,
adjacent units and boundary lines between them, control posts of
the directing body and of the trainee staffs, and operational
indicators. In the explanatory notes we basically indicate the
theme and training goals, the strength of the trainee staffs and
troops, the time and area for conducting the exercise, a brief
outline of the operational-tactical concept and the initial
situation of both sides, the combat strength of the troops, their
immediate and subsequent tasks, the number of nuclear and
chemical warheads allocated for the operation, the time of their
arrival, the possible balance of forces, flight resources and
materiel, the stages of the exercise, their content, and the
approximate time periods for carrying out the exercise.
Let us discuss certain matters which we consider to be
fundamental in the methodology of training subordinates based on
the example of a command-staff exercise conducted in 1966. It was
divided into three stages: first -- the movement forward and
organization of the commitment to the engagement of front troops;
second -- the control of troops during the development ofthe
offensive to the depth of the front's immediate task; third --
the commitment of the second echelon of the front to the
engagement and the planning of combat actions to the depth of the
subsequent task. Each stage lasted one to two days.
The exercise began by alerting the staffs and troops by a
combat alert signal and moving them out to unfamiliar
concentration areas up to 100 kilometers or more away from their
permanent deployment areas. The time for the combat alert signal
was kept a strict secret.
Upon arrival at the departure areas, staffs were handed an
operational task and 1.5 to two hours later an operational
directive to prepare and carry out the operation. The directive
indicated only the subsequent task, the number of nuclear
warheads and aircraft resources allocated for the operation, the
axes of attack of adjacent units, and the boundary lines between
them. All other problems -- the axis of the main attack, the
time period for fulfilling the task, the rate of advance, scal-Hum
others -- were decided by the trainees themselves.
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Both
es
Both sides were set up under approximately equal conditions,
especially during the movement forward to the line of the
commitment to the engagement. This afforded the trainees the
opportunity to demonstrate greater creativity, resourcefulness,
and initiative in preempting the "enemy" in delivering nuclear
strikes and deploying troops, thereby ensuring the success of the
engagement.
One of the important problems of the exercise, to which the
directing body devoted close attention, was the method of making
the decision for the operation and of transmitting the tasks to
the troops.
Having received the combat task, the formation commander,
together with the chief of staff and chief of the operations
directorate, refined it and specified the principal troop
preparation measures. Within 20 to 30 minutes he conducted the
operational orientation of the chiefs of the branch arms and
services and then issued preliminary instructions to the troops.
While continuing work on making the decision, the formation
commander in addition allocated for this work the chief of rocket
troops and artillery and the chief of intelligence, and listened
to some reports from other subordinates.
As the decision was being drawn up, the axis officers who
were present transmitted it immediately to the troops on all
communications channels. Two operations officers each prepared
one map of the decision. In order to save time, the tasks were
transmitted to the subordinates in sections and then confirmed by
a written combat order or instruction. This method of working
permitted a considerable reduction in the time needed to make the
decision and transmit the combat tasks to the troops.
Simultaneously with this, attention was devoted to
shortening the time required to work up planning documents and to
reduce their volume. A great deal of attention was devoted to
this problem while the exercise was still under preparation.
The briefing on the decisions of trainee commanders and
chiefs was conducted at their command posts under routine working
procedures. Primary attention was focused on the skill of 50X1-HUM
generals and officers, in utilizing their working maps, to
concisely and accurately report the tasks, the conclusions based
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on an appraisal of the situation, and the decision backed up by
the necessary calculations, as well as on their skill in
assigning tasks to subordinate troops with the utmost conciseness
and precision.
The most demanding stage of an operational exercise, in our
opinion, is that of playing out the combat actions of both sides,
which is conducted in a specific operational-tactical situation
and is based solely on decisions of the trainees. The directing
body and umpires play a special role in this. In essence, the
instructive value of conducting the exercise and the quality with
which the training problems are worked out depend on them. The
combat actions are played out hour by hour when operational and
sidereal time coincide. During the exercise, depending on the
decisions of both sides, the director, acting in the role of
front (army) commander, refined the tasks for the formations
(ra-TTe units) and assigned new tasks. At times, when working out
particular problems, trainees were given authority to
independently determine the subsequent course of combat actions.
The buildup of the situation was carried out by final
umpires, umpires attached to the staffs of large units and units,
and officers of the staff of the directing body. To work out the
most important problems of the theme, operational transitions
were employed, for example, when committing the front's second
echelon to the engagement, when joining in a meeting engagement,
when repulsing an enemy counterattack, and so forth. The
situation for the operational transitions was transmitted to the
trainees as hypothetical information which presented the status
of the troops of both sides for a specific time. As a rule, the
information on the situation was not comprehensive and
considerable work was needed to refine it.
Particular attention is devoted to the correct and timely
playing out of massed nuclear strikes. In a two-sided exercise
this play begins after refining the status and readiness of the
rocket troops and aviation, the overall situation, and the
targets of the nuclear strikes. The directing body, having the
strike decisions of both sides, assesses each strike and checks
the procedure for transmitting the tasks to the immediate
executors and their readiness to fulfil them. The right to
deliver nuclear strikes first is granted to that side whose5?x1 -HUM
decision is most desirable and comprehensively supported.
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In a one-sided exercise and in war games the delivery of a
massed nuclear strike on behalf of the enemy is played out
according to the plan of the directing body, which is worked out
in advance and refined during the exercise. The playing out of
the strike is conducted exactly according to the time during
which its delivery has been planned. In the same manner as when
playing out the entire course of combat actions, the staffs do
not receive complete information about enemy nuclear strikes.
Only the staffs of the troops subjected to the attack are
informed. This being the case, complete data about the results
of the strikes are not given to the trainees. Based on the
characteristic features of nuclear bursts, they themselves must
determine the ground zeroes, the type and yield of the bursts and
their results. This obliges the trainees to continuously study
the radiation and chemical situation, to require reports on it
from subordinates, and to expand the mutual exchange of
information with adjacent units.
Considerable attention is devoted to methods of working out
problems of troop control. For this purpose, control posts are
placed at actual distances and during an exercise they change
positions several times. The difficulty of maintaining
communications over great distances and under conditions of
active enemy jamming is obvious. And the main thing is that this
compels trainee staffs to seek methods of improving control and
to carry out in an organized and systematic manner the relocation
and deployment of command posts and communications centers in new
areas. For this purpose, the practice of putting certain posts
out of action and of transferring control to others is employed
extensively in exercises. The principal indices in evaluating
the work of generals and officers, and also of units allocated
for command-staff exercises, were the quickness with which
communications means, principally radio means, were brought to
operating readiness, the skill of trainees in making a decision
and transmitting it to executors in a short period of time, and
continuous monitoring of the passing of commands.
In our opinion, such a method of preparing and conducting
these undertakings enables us to increase the combat readiness of
troops and staffs and the teamwork of control organs, promotes
the fullest study of the problems of preparing and conductin .50X1-HUM
present-day operations, increases the individual
operational-tactical training of generals and officers, and also
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50X1? HUM
enables us to uncover deficiencies in troop and staff training
and plan practical ways of correcting them.
* * *
Under present-day conditions high demands are imposed upon
the training of troop control organs. This also fully applies to
the staff of the airborne troops. Besides the individual
military-theoretical training of officers, which is improved
systematically in operational training assemblies and officer
training periods, organizing the teamwork of the headquarters of
the airborne troops as a whole, as the organ of troop control in
an airborne operation, is of primary importance.
The basic methods of training the staff of the airborne
troops, as in other operational staffs, were operational games on
maps, and command-staff training practices and exercises on the
terrain with communications means.
The first undertaking at this level was a war game directed
by the formation commander which permitted us to investigate the
capabilities of the staff of the airborne troops to plan an
airborne operation within a short period of time and to control
troops during the landing and conduct of combat actions. The
strength and capabilities were specified for the operations group
of the staff which was landed in the enemy rear. Staff
departments and chiefs of the branch arms and services obtained
practice in joint work in planning an operation. During the game
possible methods were determined for cooperation of the airborne
landing forces and military transport aviation with the Strategic
Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces of the Country, long range
aviation, naval forces, and front troops in the zone used for the
landing.
Since the concept was developed taking into account the
actual grouping of enemy forces in the Western Theater of
Military Operations, generals and officers had the opportunity to
study closely the NATO troop groupings in the areas where we
proposed to employ a large airborne landing force, to research
the conditions of setting it down by parachute and landing
methods, and to determine probable changes in the enemy grouping
and the nature of the terrain as a result of massed nuclear 50X1?HUM
strikes.
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During the game the existing airfield network in the
departure areas for the landing of airborne divisions was
carefully researched; and the optimal variant for troop movement
to the waiting areas, the forces and means required for this, and
also the time to get ready were specified.
The game began with the delivery of a directive from the
General Staff to the staffs of the airborne troops and military
transport aviation to prepare and conduct an airborne operation.
Based on this, the staffs worked out an operation plan which was
reported to the director. A relatively short time was allocated
to prepare the operation; this time was determined mainly by the
capability of large units of airborne troops and military
transport aviation to concentrate near the airfields (at the
airfields) of the departure area for the landing operation.
After the operation plan was approved, the staff drafted
orders for the large units and refined the cooperation with the
staffs of the rocket troops, the air defense forces of the
country, and the front staff within whose zone military transport
aviation was carrying outits flights. In actuality, the
operations groups and staffs of the cooperating troops were not
sent out and the directing body implemented the play for them
Although the commanders and staffs of the airborne divisions
worked out planning documents, their role basically consisted in
assisting the staff of the airborne troops with the play, and
supplying it with necessary information during the game.
In the second stage of the game -- the landing and combat
actions of the airborne troops -- as the airborne landing forces
were built up, the role of their commander and staff was assumed
by an operations group, which, in accordance with the situation,
landed with one of the airborne divisions. When the battle was
under way, the director was briefed on the decisions of the
commanders of the divisions, the commander of the airborne
landing force, and also the chiefs of the branch arms and
services concerning all-round support for the battle of the
landing force and the organization of the delivery of materiel to
it. 50X1-HUM
This methodology of conducting games allowed us to follow in
sequence the work of all the command levels and quite accurately
determine each one's volume of work and role during the
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50X1-HUM
preparation and conduct of an airborne landing operation.
In 1966 a command-staff training practice on the terrain was
conducted with generals and officers of the Headquarters.
Operations groups from several airborne division staffs and
communications units and subunits were allocated for it.
During the training practice, the problems worked out were
mainly those of practical troop control and the organization and
operation of communications means; for this purpose umpires were
sent from among officers of the Headquarters of the Airborne
Troops to the staffs of the large units which had been positioned
near their permanent deployment areas. These umpires were
charged with the duty of issuing data on the situation (primarily
after the landing force was dropped) at specific times and
recording the passage of information and instructions.
Furthermore, two operations groups were allocated from the
staff of the airborne troops to work in the staffs of the fronts
in whose areas military transport aviation was flying on the
landing operation and the airborne landing force was being
landed. One group worked in the staff of the North Caucasus
Military District, where the necessary radio communications means
had been placed at its disposal; the other group worked
independently with its own communications means but it was
positioned at a considerable distance (several hundred
kilometers) from the staff of the airborne troops.
This separation of the participating staffs allowed us to
test the capabilities of communications means and their
suitability for the requirements of troop control during the
preparation and conduct of an airborne operation; it also placed
the participating staffs in conditions which closely approximated
actual conditions. All information was sent by radio only, since
in the second stage of the training practice all staffs were
taken out into the field.
Unfortunately, we were forced to allow conventionalities
here, as well. As before, the directing body played the parts of
the staffs of large units and units of the cooperating troops 50X1-HUM
from the branches of the armed forces. The trainees received
prepared data upon request or inquiry (on nuclear strikes, the
actions of combat aviation, etc.), which is hardly possible under
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50X1-HUM
actual conditions.
However, by and large the measures carried out helped in
working out a unity of views on the main points of preparing and
conducting an operation, they made the generals and officers of
the headquarters regard their role in a new light and reorganize
their personal training accordingly, helped resolve a number of
controversial and important problems, and finally, provided the
staff of the airborne troops with the basic practical skills for
work as the organ of troop control during an operation.
At the same time, their results showed that the methodology
of operational training of the staff of the airborne troops (the
headquarters as a whole) requires further improvement. It is
advisable to allocate generals and officers of the main staffs of
the branches of the armed forces and branch arms for operational
games and exercises of the headquarters of the airborne troops at
any level as well as large units or units which may participate
directly or indirectly in an airborne operation. In all games
and exercises, it is decidedly necessary for an operations group
(or the staff as a whole) of military transport aviation to
participate. Only through joint work can we acquire the
necessary skills, resolve "contradictions", and when "conflicts"
arise, find mutually acceptable solutions.
We may take as an example of this the joint work of the
headquarters of an airborne division and the headquarters of a
heavy bomber air corps of long range aviation in a command-staff
game. Before the game began it seemed that everything was clear.
However, when representatives of the staffs started to resolve
problems together, many "blank spots" were discovered.
We considered it necessary, for example, to establish direct
radio communications between the staff of the landing force and
the staff of the bomber air division after the landing, but later
on it proved more expedient to do this through the staff of the
corps and the operations group from the airborne troops attached
to the front staff. It was expected that a group of aircraft
guidance officers from the corps staff would be dropped in the
complement of the landing force, but as was ascertained later, it
is almost impossible to allocate such a group of officers.
Finally, it turned out to be far from simple for the landing f50X1-HUM
staff to receive reconnaissance data from on board long range
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aviation reconnaissance aircraft. As a result, the joint work has
shed light on many problems and indicated the need to carry out
certain changes in the organizational structure and technical
equipping of units.
In our opinion, special attention should be devoted to the
participation of operations groups from the staffs of military
districts in operational command-staff exercises and games
carried out by the command of the airborne troops. This does not
require great material expenditures or additional organizational
work. A small group of officers with communications means can be
allocated from the military district staff and it can be located
either immediately in the military district staff or near it.
Joint work between the staff of the airborne troops and the
staffs of the military districts is needed to develop common
views on the solution of the central problems of conducting
airborne operations, to provide the refueling of military
transport aircraft at front airfields, to neutralize enemy air
defense installations with front means in the overflight zone of
military transport aviation during a landing operation, to
support the combat actions of the airborne landing force after it
has landed, to organize the supply of the landing force with
materiel during combat, to conduct aerial reconnaissance in
support of the landing force, and also to receive from the
landing force the necessary reconnaissance information, maintain
communications with it, etc.
The joint participation of the indicated staffs in
operational games and command-staff exercises will in turn be of
great benefit to the military districts since we cannot yet say
that their staffs have acquired sufficient experience in
organizing the landing of airborne troops and in supporting them.
During present-day operations, front-line formations have to
employ both tactical and operational airborne landings. In a
number of cases the task of directly controlling the operational
airborne landing forces may be assigned to the front staffs.
Hence a wide variety of questions will have to be specially
treated in the front operation plan and they will have tn hp
resolved within short periods of time. 50X1-HUM
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1 I
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In conclusion, it must be mentioned that at present it has
become advisable to allocate generals and officers of the
headquarters of the commander of the airborne troops more widely
in large-scale exercises and games. Also, this headquarters
should play the part of the staff of the front commander in an
airborne landing operation. This situation and the nature of the
work in large-scale operational exercises comes closest to
approaching actual combat conditions. In them we are given the
opportunity to test in practice the validity of all theoretical
propositions and calculations.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
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