MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME FEATURES OF PREPARING AND CONDUCTING A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BEGINNING WITHOUT THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN MOUNTAINOUS AND DESERT TERRAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 50X1-HIJM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Page 4 of 9 Pages
Some Features of Preparing and Conducting a Front
Offensive O eration, Beginning Without
the Employment
of Nuclear Weapons, in Mountainous and
esert
Terrain
(Based on the experience of exercises
in
the
Turkestan
Military District)
by
General-Mayor P. Maltsev
and
Colonel Ye. Safonov
A front offensive operation in mountainous and desert
terrain may begin with the use of conventional means of combat.
Such an operation will have its own specific features.
Based on the experience of command-staff exercises and war
games conducted in our military district, the following average
data characterize the scope of a front offensive operation under
the conditions examined: the width of the front offensive zone
reached 700 to 800 and sometimes 1,000 kilometers or more; the
depth of the operation reached 650 to 850 kilometers, with the
depth of the immediate task of the front -- 250 to 350
kilometers, and that of the subsequent task -- 400 to 500
kilometers. The immediate task included breaking through the
enemy defense*in mountain passes, destroying his main grouping,
negotiating the first mountain line, moving into the valley and
seizing other accessible areas and installations supporting the
commitment to the engagement of the second echelon (reserves) of
the front for the purpose of developing the offensive to the
entire depth of the operation. The subsequent task included
destroying the enemy operational reserves and seizing those
important operational-strategic areas and installations by whose
capture the goal of the operation is achieved and conditions
favorable to the conduct of the next operation are established.
The rate of advance of troops in mountainous and desert
terrain depends to a considerable degree on climatic conditions.
In springtime, the most favorable period, the troops can cover up
to 30 kilometers per day in the mountains and up to 60 to 70 5OX1-HUM
kilometers per day in the desert. The rate of advance will be
lower during the time of year when it is hot, owing to the high
air temperature and the increased shifting of the sand, and also
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Page 5 of 9 Pages
50X1-HUM
during the period of rains, when the flat, clayey plains sectors
(salt marshes) are flooded and become difficult or impossible to
negotiate. When it is hot, the air temperature in tanks and
other combat vehicles climbs as high as 50 to 60 degrees, and
consequently the driver-mechanics and drivers tire quickly and
sometimes suffer heat stroke.
The decision of the commander of the front for the operation
under consideration would also have its own specific features.
First, to allow for the conduct of subsequent actions employing
nuclear weapons, it is desirable that the axis of the main attack
be defined to the entire depth of the operation, since
maneuvering of the forces and means along the front is complex,
and in many cases simply impossible. It is permissible to
partially alter this axis if the enemy in the operational depth
attempts to deliver a counterattack on a new axis against the
main grouping of attacking front troops. Second, the main attack
of the front in an offensive in mountains that are difficult to
negotiate will often be delivered on the axis that is most
accessible to troop actions, which coincides with the mountain
passes where the enemy, as a rule, establishes a strong defense.
As a result, troop combat actions will be severely hampered by
the small capacity of these passes.
In a situation of this specific character, the commander
will be forced to set up several groupings, including some on
relatively accessible axes that are a great distance from each
other. Each should be capable of conducting independent combat
actions to the entire depth of the operation, for it is very
difficult to provide help. However, even under these conditions
the main forces and means are concentrated on the axis of the
main attack, and a substantial superiority is established over
the enemy in manpower and fire means, especially in artillery,
tanks, and aviation. The number of offensive groupings may
change during the operation. Thus, after having negotiated
mountains that are difficult to traverse and reached spacious
valleys, individual groupings may be combined into a single,
stronger grouping. 50X1-HUM
Because of the limited capacity of the operational axes and
the relatively low operational density of the enemy troops in
mountainous and desert terrain, the offensive groupings will be
of lower strength than those in ordinary theaters of military
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
g a D.. Ro
Pa e 6 O 50X1-HUM`S
operations. The main grouping of front troops may include up to
two army corps (taking into account the commitment to the
engagement of the second-echelon corps), composed of four to five
motorized rifle and tank divisions, an airborne division, an
artillery breakthrough division, one or two tank-destroyer
brigades, a missile brigade, and large units and units of
engineer, chemical, and other special troops. The strength of
the other groupings may fluctuate from that of a reinforced
division to that of an army corps.
If the main efforts of the enemy are concentrated in the
tactical depth, the main forces of the front should be in the
first echelon. If, however, the main forces of the enemy are
located in the operational depth, the bulk of the forces and
means of the front should be placed in the second echelon or in
the reserve.
A single operational plan is formulated for troop actions
which employ nuclear weapons and those which do not. It is
essential that the plan also provide for measures related to the
seizure and negotiation of mountain passes and gaps, especially
on the axis of the main attack of the front; the capture of
oases; the support of independent troop actions by axes; the
control of detached troop groupings; and measures during the
transition to actions employing nuclear weapons.
When combat actions are conducted in which nuclear weapons
are not employed, the main burden in carrying out fire tasks
falls on the artillery, aviation, and tanks. Under these
conditions the authorized strength of the artillery will be
inadequate to carry out its extremely diverse tasks. Up to 12
artillery battalions must be attached to each army corps, and
approximately 13 battalions from the reserve of the Supreme High
Command must be placed directly under the command of the front.
If when the operation begins only organic means are available,
then to ensure a sufficient density of fire in the breakthrough
sectors, it is desirable, in our opinion, to allocate
second-echelon artillery and tanks to conduct fire from indirect
fire positions and by direct aiming during the period of 50X1-HUM
preparatory fire.
Experience shows that in contrast to normal conditions,
during actions in mountainous and desert terrain, corps artillery
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Page 7 of 9 Pages
50X1-HUM
groups, as a rule, are not formed; divisional artillery groups
may be organized on the axes where the centralized use of the
artillery is feasible, and during actions of the main forces of a
division in narrow sectors. It is desirable that the divisions
operating on the main axes have artillery antitank reserves.
Front aviation has a special role in the destruction of
enemy installations in a mountainous theater. Estimates show
that a front air army, in order to carry out the tasks assigned
to it, must have a minimum of one or two fighter air divisions, a
fighter-bomber air division, and one or two bomber air regiments.
It is recommended that an aviation grouping be formed on the axis
of the main attack of the front and on the axes of the actions of
army corps engaged in important independent tasks.
Based on the experience of exercises and war games, a front
offensive operation may begin suddenly with an attack by the
troops in constant combat readiness and the simultaneous full
mobilization and deployment of the remaining forces. Under these
conditions, the large units in constant readiness move directly
from their permanent deployment points to the line of commitment
to battle, bypassing the alert concentration areas, and go over
to the offensive from the march. Since the troops are at varying
distances from the state border, they may go over to the
offensive at different times.
When there is a period of threat, the large units in
constant readiness move out to the alternate alert areas, and are
brought up to full strength, and the remaining large units
complete their mobilization in assigned areas; then the front
troops deploy and go over to the offensive simultaneously.
The attack should always be preceded by the delivery of
powerful air and artillery strikes against the manpower and fire
means of the enemy situated at the forward edge and in the
immediate tactical depth, and against the most important targets
and installations in the operational depth. The first fire
strike ensures the effective neutralization or destruction of the
enemy on the approaches to the mountain passes and gaps and,
above all, the destruction of the demolition teams and their
control posts so as to preclude the destruction of the mountain
passes.
TS # 768213
Copy # ~,,LI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Page 8 of 9 Pages
50X1-HUM
The success of the initial stage of the operation will hinge
on the swift capture of the mountain passes by the flanking and
forward detachments and the airborne landing forces, which
generally consist of from a reinforced company up to a reinforced
battalion or regiment, and also on the overall negotiation of the
mountain passes by the first-echelon large units. It is
desirable to have tank large units in the second echelon of the
army corps and to commit them to the engagement for the purpose
of developing the offensive after the mountain passes have been
negotiated.
If the situation changes abruptly during the operation, it
may be necessary to shift the main efforts of the front to a new
operational axis. This will occur most frequently inn two
instances. First, when the enemy on the axis of the main attack
of the front has set up an extremely strong defense in the
operationa depth on mountain lines that are difficult to
traverse, has concentrated large forces and carried out extensive
demolition work, and the front does not have sufficient forces
and means at its disposal to negotiate this defense.
Continuation of the offensive would in this case result in great
losses, a sharp decrease in the rates of advance, and possibly,
the disruption of the operation as well. Second, when the goal
is to eliminate the danger of an enemy counterattack on the flank
and rear of the main grouping of the front troops.
The regrouping of the main forces of the front to a new axis
while an operation in mountainous and desert terrain is in
progress will also have several specific features. It may be
accomplished over greater than normal distances, from several
hundred up to 1,000 kilometers or more. For example, the
regrouping of the main forces of a front during the command-staff
war game in April 1965 was planned oar a distance of 450 to 1,000
kilometers.
The regrouping of troops will have to be accomplished when
road networks are poorly developed and in the almost total
absence of railroads, sources of water, and water reserves. The
maximum rate of march, as has been shown by the experience of
exercises, may be 150 to 180 kilometers per day. A division will
be assigned one to two routes, and occasionally several large5OX1-HUM
units will use the same route. It will be extremely difficult to
negotiate the massive demolition work carried out by the enemy in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6
Page 50X1 HUM Pages
mountain passes, ravines, and canyons. Strong movement support
detachments will have to be sent out in advance.
The regrouping should be planned while the operation is
being prepared, and only in case of emergency while the operation
is in progress. In addition to the usual matters, the plan
specifies measures suitable to mountainous and desert terrain to
be taken when taking the troops out of action, restoring their
combat effectiveness, concealing a regrouping, and preparing for
a long march.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302690001-6