MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): MEETING ENGAGEMENTS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302660001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
30 November 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Meeting Engagements
in Offeri-s-IV7?DTeTiliaiis- in the Initial Period
of War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". This article provides general
guidelines for the conduct of a meeting engagement in offensive
operations in the initial period of a war. The author defines
two periods of the meeting engagement: the fire period,
primarily nuclear, which largely determines the outcome of the
engagement, followed by the direct encounter of large units of
advancing troops. He points out that under present-day
conditions preemptive strikes should be replaced by a series of
nuclear strikes, presents guidelines for their conduct, and
indicates that operational-tactical missile/nuclear targets will
be the most important. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76)
for 1965.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this publication have been assigned
vWilliam W. Wells
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1965
SOURCE
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE
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30 November 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Meeting Engagements in Offensive
Operations in the Initial Period
of War
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is
General-Leytenant N. Ogarkov. This article provides general
TUTTJTTnes for the conduct of a meeting engagement in offensive
operations in the initial period of a war. The author defines
two periods of the meeting engagement: the fire period,
primarily nuclear, which largely determines the outcome of the
engagement, followed by the direct encounter of large units of
advancing troops. He asserts that the nature and scope of the
meeting engagement has changed and expanded under present-day
conditions. In this regard, he points out that preemptive
strikes should be replaced by a series of nuclear strikes,
presents guidelines for their conduct, and indicates that
operational-tactical missile/nuclear targets will be the mcsoXi-Hum
important. In addition, the role of aviation, operational
disposition of troops, and operational maneuvering in a meeting
engagement are examined. End of Summary
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Comment:
General of the Army Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov has been
identified since March 1974 as a Deputy Minister of Defense.
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Meeting Engagements in Offensive Operations in
the Initial Period of War
by
General-Leytenant N. Ogarkov
The problem of meeting engagements is the most complex and
least investigated one of all. The most contradictory opinions
are expressed with regard to the substance of this problem.
Thus, in some instances it is maintained that with the advent of
nuclear weapons, meeting encounters between large groupings of
belligerents are not possible and "to speak of a meeting
engagement is hardly justified".* In other instances, it is
maintained that the first offensive operation is, in essence, an
aggregate of broad-scale meeting engagements and should be
regarded and planned as a "meeting operation".**
We adhere to the point of view that meeting engagements
under conditions of a nuclear war will be the predominant type of
offensive. This can be explained primarily by the decisive
nature of the objectives confronting the armed forces in the
initial period of a war, by the desire of the belligerents to
gain these objectives by employing the most aggressive
operational means, and by the abrupt and rapid changes in the
situation. The probability of a frequent occurrence of meeting
engagements is confirmed in a number of large-scale
operational-strategic exercises held in recent years by our army
and by the NATO forces. Meeting engagements can be carried out
at the outset of combat operations or in the course of these
operations, upon meeting the enemy's counterattack groupings, or
when the enemy goes over to a counteroffensive.
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* The Military Science Conference of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
Military Publishing House, 1963, page 82.
** Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 5
(60), 1961.
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However, all this does not mean that an offensive operation
will be only an aggregate of meeting engagements. These
engagements must necessarily alternate with the negotiation of a
mobile defense, the pursuit of routed groupings, or a defense on
individual axes. A modern operation can be viewed only as an
aggregate of the most varied operational methods.
In contrast to the past, when meeting engagements usually
began when forward units became involved in battle, they now
begin, and will continue to begin, long before ground groupings
encounter one another with strikes by nuclear weapons and other
long-range means of destruction. However, meeting engagements
will not consist solely of nuclear strikes, which can force the
enemy to abandon an offensive even before the forward detachments
encounter one another, as is depicted in an article by General
Skvirskiy.* In these instances, meeting engagements are simply
excluded as a type of offensive action.
A modern meeting engagement includes, as it were, two
periods: a fire period, which is principally nuclear; and a
direct encounter of the large units of the advancing troops. The
first period, which earlier could not be decisive, now will
predetermine the outcome of the engagement. The second period is
meant to bring about the defeat of the enemy. It is precisely
here that the essence of the problem lies.
Meeting engagements will be characterized also by the large
number of forces and means participating in them. Unlike the
past, when they were usually carried out by forces no larger than
an army, they now may involve the main forces of a front,
especially at the beginning of the first operation in the initial
period of a war. And even if a front conducts a meeting
engagement with only a part of its forces, it still may employ
its main missile grouping, airborne troops, aviation, and the air
defense means of the front, all of which have increased sharply
in maximum range and capabilities.
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* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 5
(60), 1961, P. 9.
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Meeting engagements will also be characterized by their
broad scope. While, for example, in the largest meeting
engagement of the Great Patriotic War at Prokhorovka in 1943, the
5th Guards Tank Army operated in a zone up to 12 kilometers wide
and 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, under modern conditions an army
may conduct such an engagement on a front of up to 100 kilometers
or more to the entire depth of the operational disposition of the
enemy's meeting grouping; and a front -- in a zone of 400
kilometers or more.
The organization of a meeting engagement will also have a
number of special features. A preliminary outline of how it will
be conducted must be worked out while the offensive operation is
still being planned. In this period, on the basis of a
prediction of the probable actions of the enemy and his troops,
an approximate determination can be made of the time and area
where a meeting engagement will occur. When there are positive
signs of an imminent meeting engagement (this can be determined
several hours or even a day in advance), the commander of the
troops must announce his concept of operations and procedure for
the delivery of nuclear strikes and employment of other
long-range means of destruction. He must also assign tasks to
reconnaissance, aviation, and the rocket troops. These tasks are
subsequently refined in such a way that at any given moment the
front rocket troops and aviation are prepared upon signal to
deliver the appropriate series of nuclear strikes. Thus, there
is first organized the fulfilment of the tasks of the first
decisive stage of the meeting engagement; and only after this are
tasks specified and assigned to the ground troops.
Several words about the so-called preemptive nuclear strike,
in which several authors see the essence of a modern meeting
engagement. They think that this strike is a guarantee of
success. Thus, for example, General P. Stepshin maintains that
the "outcome of a meeting engagement always depends primarily on
which side will be able to preempt the other in delivering
nuclear strikes."*
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* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought " No. 3
(70), 1965, P. 14.
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We believe that the concept "preemptive" nuclear strike, as
a one-act phenomenon, is more characteristic of actions on a
strategic level, especially at the moment of the outbreak of war.
A surprise preemptive nuclear attack by one of the belligerents
can actually predetermine the outcome of the war in its favor.
But it is another matter with regard to "preemptive" strikes in
the course of an offensive operation, especially when the enemy's
counterattack groupings have been defeated. Nuclear strikes will
be delivered constantly on these groupings, as well as on our
own, the moment they are detected, and it will be difficult to
judge which side was the first to deliver these strikes.
Moreover, nuclear strikes will most often be delivered not in one
powerful salvo (a massed preemptive strike), but rather, as
important targets emerge, at an advantageous moment and with
those means which can conduct fire at the time and at the
appropriate range. This is a whole series of primarily grouped
and single strikes from the beginning until the end of the
meeting engagement.
It should also be taken into consideration that the
so-called preemptive strike, if delivered well before the troops
engage in an encounter (otherwise it is not "preemptive"), will
not completely achieve its objective. The enemy may be able,
after this strike, to regroup and move into an engagement in an
organized manner. Therefore, the most powerful strikes must, it
seems, be delivered at a time which would preclude such a
situation and which would provide the ground forces an
opportunity to most effectively exploit their results. From what
has been said above, it is, in our view, desirable in examining
the essence of a meeting engagement to speak not about a
preemptive, one-act strike, but rather about a system of nuclear
strikes prior to and in the course of an encounter of advancing
troops.
When is it advantageous to begin such a series of nuclear
strikes? In order to resolve this matter, we think one can he
guided by the following general principles. 50X1-HUM
It is more desirable to deliver the first series of strikes
against the enemy area of concentration at the moment the
counterattack grouping is about to move out forward units into
the area of the probable meeting, as well as against troops on
the march, especially when they are passing through a defile and
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crossing river barriers. If the army is conducting the meeting
engagement, then it is desirable to allocate mainly front means
for the strike. The bulk of the armies' nuclear warheads should
be employed in a second series of strikes, approximately one to
two hours before the encounter of the main forces. This is to
enable the troops to effectively exploit the results of the
nuclear strikes to destroy the counterattack grouping and prevent
the enemy from committing to action his numerous tactical nuclear
weapons.
With the beginning of the encounter of the main forces of
the advancing sides, a third series of strikes (individual and
grouped strikes) should be delivered, and at times brief
preparatory fire should be carried out (on the scale of large
units) and, exploiting their results, one should finally complete
the destruction of the enemy counterattack grouping with
subsequent troop actions.
In view of the considerable advantages the enemy has in
tactical weapons, a large part of the operational-tactical means
for delivering nuclear warheads must at this time be directed at
carrying out combat tasks, mainly at the request of large unit
commanders. All the means of the armies and large units, and
partly those of the front, must participate in delivering nuclear
strikes at this stage.
Between series, individual nuclear strikes can definitely be
made on the most important targets.
Which targets are the most important for nuclear strikes in
a meetin engagement? Usually the enemy means of nuclear attack
are considered to be the most important targets, followed by the
combined-arms large units. Recently this has literally turned
into a stereotype used for all aspects of the situation.
However, simple calculations show that this recommendation, from
a theoretical point of view, is far from always being correct,
and in practice can lead to serious errors. To confirm this, we
will cite the most elementary example. Let us suppose that a US
army corps (three divisions) is deployed for a meeting engagement
against an army. ,Its nuclear grouping, counting the Davy
Crockett guns and 155-millimeter howitzers, numbers about 400
pieces. Cf these, the Sergeant and Honest John launchers, and
203-millimeter howitzers alone come to about 100 pieces, counting
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reinforcements. Moreover, all operational-tactical launchers
are, as a rule, autonomous and are located independently for
launches. Under these conditions, even if the army were not
restricted to a limited number of nuclear warheads, it would
still be impossible to carry out the task of destroying this
nuclear grouping, the more so within a short period of time.
Of course, not all these means will have nuclear warheads.
However, it is practically impossible to determine this.
Consequently, the problem of combating them has to be resolved
differently than has been proposed heretofore. Nuclear strikes
must now be delivered only on the most important
operational-tactical missile/nuclear targets. Tactical nuclear
means must be destroyed along with the large units to which they
are assigned. The majority of the nuclear warheads and the means
for their delivery must be directed at the destruction of these
large units in a meeting engagement. Conventional weapons,
chemical ammunition, special detachments, sabotage groups,
forward units, etc. must be more broadly allocated for combat.
The employment of aviation. In a meeting engagement, when
most of the targets are on the move, the most important role in
destroying them belongs to aviation, which is capable of quickly
destroying mobile targets both with and without the employment of
nuclear weapons. Manned and unmanned aircraft will also be the
most reliable means of acquiring information about the enemy in
the shortest time. On the whole, it is impossible to conduct
meeting engagements without the most aggressive activity of
aviation. In connection with this, the grouping whose task it is
to conduct a meeting engagement must be supported by the bulk of
the front aviation.
Inasmuch as offensive operations in the initial period of
war will be characterized by high troop mobility, the problem of
a sharp quantitative and qualitative increase in modern front
aviation is now very acute. Troops will especially need close
air support on the battlefield, just as during the Great
Patriotic War. Unfortunately, experience in the employment of
ground-attack aviation has been undeservedly forgotten.
Supporting aviation by its nature should be highly maneuverable,
should not require involved servicing, and should be principally
of the vertical take-off type; simply put, it should be an arn* cal-Hum
type of aviation. The creation of this type of aviation will
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permit a sharp rise in the rate of advance of the combined-arms
large units. Organizationally it should be part of each
combined-arms army.
The operational disposition and deployment of troops. We
cannot agree with the opinion that in a meeting engagement, in
order to ensure a strong initial attack, the first echelon of
troops should, as a rule, be the most powerful, even at the
expense of eliminating the second echelons and the reserves. The
point is that a meeting engagement is distinguished by
exceptional rapidity and abrupt changes in the situation. Under
these conditions, without strong reserves and second echelons, it
is impossible either to develop significent success or to parry
sudden enemy attacks on the open flanks and rear of our troops.
We also differ with the recommendations many authors have
made in articles to resolve the problem of a preemptive
deployment of forces in a meeting engagement. In our view,
premature deployment of troops may result in their becoming an
advantageous target for enemy nuclear strikes, their
maneuverability will be seriously hampered, and their rate of
advance will be decreased. The enemy, being in a march
formation, will be capable of quickly changing the direction of
his movement and delivering a strike on the most vulnerable
places in the disposition of our troops. Therefore, it seems,
preemption in the deployment of an operational troop grouping
under modern conditions, should be understood first of all as the
preemptive deployment of rocket troops, aviation and air defense
means, as well as the assumption by large units of an approach
march formation or march formation permitting them to penetrate
at high speeds into the depth of the enemy disposition, deploy
quickly, and deliver an attack against his flanks and rear.
The forms of operational maneuvering. The thought is
usually expressed that now, as earlier, the main form of
maneuvering in an encounter of advancing groupings is flank
attacks. This is mentioned particularly in General Stepshin's
article.
We believe that this view does not correspond to the nature
of modern operations. Nowadays, to carry out this type of 50X1-HUM
maneuver, it is not enough to move army troops 10 to 15
kilometers to the flank or to make a small enveloping movement,
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