MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RAISING THE LEVEL OF THE FIELD TRAINING OF OPERATIONAL STAFFS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302640001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 29, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Raising the Level of the Field Training
of Operational Staffs
by
Colonel General G. Khetagurov
Increased demands are being made on troop control under
present-day conditions. Whether they can be successfully met
depends entirely on the preparedness of the operational staffs
and on the level of their field training, which during both
peacetime and wartime constitutes the principal condition for
raising the efficiency and teamwork of the control organs. Only
a well-trained, coordinated and smoothly functioning staff is
capable of actively participating in and providing reliable troop
control. This is why the Minister of Defense in his 1967
directive on operational training emphasized the need to improve
the training of control organs, to persistently raise their level
of field training and to improve the methods employed by the
command and staffs in controlling combat operations.
The level of field training of the staffs -- this determines
the level of their training, strong skills, knowledge and
capability to creatively and efficiently carry out tas s in
controlling forces and means during an operation and attle. It
encompasses the entire range of operational training measures,
the purpose of which is to develop skills in controlling combat
operations, and it constitutes the basis of the combat readiness
of the operational staffs. Improvement in the field training of
control organs can best be achieved by conducting training
measures in the field. Here, in a situation that maximally
approximates combat conditions, the operational levels of the
command and staffs organize their teamwork, and the generals and
officers acquire the practical skills necessary for commanding
troops and for staff service.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the staffs can
acquire a high level of field training only by conducting
operational training measures in the field. Troop control
comprises a wide range of extremely diverse measures relating to
the organization, preparation, and conduct of an operation, and
staff training should therefore be varied and many-sided.50x1=HUr,1
training sessions and exercises provide only the very basic.
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training of the control organs, since the level of this training
is directly influenced by a number of other measures unrelated to
a compulsory field exercise.
We therefore feel justified in suggesting that the
improvement of the field training of operational staffs should
proceed simultaneously in the following basic directions:
-- raising the level of the theoretical and practical
training of staff officers and generals to enable them
to carry out their functional duties creatively;
- achieving coordinated and efficiently organized
work;
-- further improving work methods;
-- improving the organizational structure and
developing the technical equipping of control
organs.
The above measures are interrelated and mutually
complementary. Therefore, only by implementing them in an
integrated manner throughout the entire staff training process
can the achievement of the desired results be ensured. However,
the most important measure is raising the level of the
theoretical and practical training of every officer and general,
for nowhere can poorly qualified officers be more harmful than in
staff work.
The purpose of theoretical training is to raise the
operational-tactical and military technical level of officers and
generals, to teach them to think independently and creatively,
and to train them for practical work in controlling the combat
activities of the troops. Very diverse types and methods of
operational training are employed for this purpose, but in our
opinion, the most effective ones are independent work on the part
of the generals and officers, seminars, scientific and
theoretical conferences, papers and reports, group training
sessions, and short operational problems. 50X1-HUM
Independent work is directed first and foremost toward the
in-depth study of manuals, regulations, theoretical works,
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textbooks, periodicals, the experience of the last war, and
postwar exercises and war games. It is implemented at the
initiative of the officers in accordance with their individual
plans. However, there must not be a total lack of organization
in so important a matter. Judging from experience, the
independent study of generals and officers, like all operational
training measures, must be purposeful and entirely subordinated
to the tasks of operational training; therefore, it must he
highly organized and systematically monitored.
In the Baltic Military District, for example, the
purposefulness of the theoretical training is demonstrated by the
study of operations conducted on a coastal axis and of questions
of raising the combat readiness of the troops. Of course staff
officers also study many other urgent problems of military art,
but the above topics of study have been the dominant ones for a
number of years. Independent work in the staffs of the military
district and army is directed, monitored, and assisted by
conducting examinations and by carrying out individual
assignments in working out theoretical problems and subsequently
discussing them. Essentially, seminars supplement independent
study, deepen the knowledge of the participants and broaden their
operational-tactical outlook, and thus promote a uniform
understanding of the theory and practice of operational art.
They should be conducted systematically by experienced
instructors and held monthly, not only during officer training
courses.
Scientific and theoretical papers and reports are now widely
disseminated. They are produced twice a month at the level of
the headquarters of the military district and of the armies, and
once a week in the departments, directorates, and services. They
are without doubt helpful: they promote a better understanding of
complex theoretical problems and a greater knowledge of combat
equipment, and they make it possible to constantly follow the
development of new combat means, branch arms and branches of the
armed forces, and new methods of employing them in a battle and
operation. 50X1-HUM
Short operational problems are conducted within the system
of individual training in all courses of instruction for military
district command personnel, in officer training courses, when
staff training is being checked, and also at other times. The
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advantages of short problems are obvious. Although they can be
worked out and conducted in a short time, they make it possible
to gradually accumulate knowledge, to progress from the simple to
the complex, to follow the development of each officer, and to
promptly detect and eliminate shortcomings.
In our opinion, both short operational problems and seminars
offer an extremely dynamic, flexible, and effective method of
training staff officers, and each should occupy its proper place
in the operational training system.
It is essential not only that the theoretical knowledge be
increased but also that the practical skills of the generals and
officers doing staff work be improved. They must not only know
how to draw up documents and make necessary operational-tactical
computations by employing means of mechanization and how to
operate the communications means, but they must also be able to
do so quickly, accurately, and clearly. In other words, they
must achieve total mastery. A situation cannot be allowed where
the training of the officers of the operational staffs consists
merely of teaching them to draft the exact same type of combat
document over the course of many years. This practice is harmful
and does not conform to the main principle of staff work -- the
wide-scale interchangeability of officers.
Practical skills are best acquired in staff training
sessions and exercises, during command operational war games, and
during demonstration, experimental, and other types of exercises.
However, they will be maximally effective only if the staff
generals take a thoughtful approach to their work and constantly
endeavor to display initiative and creativity. The working out
by the military district staff of the graphic document form for
the first front missile/nuclear strike is an example of the
harmonious wor7 of the entire collective. The initiative of the
military district officers was supported in the staffs of the
armies and divisions.
The process of improving the practical skills of
subordinates should be continuous and should progress in sequence
from the simple to the more complex. It should not necessarily
be limited only to staff training sessions and exercises. 6X1-HUM
solving of short problems is of great benefit when all the
officers are handed a situation map and told to draw up one or
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another combat document within a given time limit without
referring to any textbooks.
When staff officers participate in troop training exercises,
especially in those that involve field firing, they acquire
practical skills in the planning of combat operations. The
actual launching of missiles, field firing of artillery, tanks,
and small arms, and aviation bombing, increase their competence
in fully working out such problems as the planning and delivery
of nuclear strikes and the organization and carrying out of
preparatory fire and fire support, as well as the organization of
cooperation between the combined-arms (tank) large units and
units and the rocket troops and aviation.
Periodic courses of instruction are an excellent method of
training staff officers. As a rule, however, they are held
jointly with the officer training courses even though it is known
that staff work has its own specific character and its own
principles and work methods, which can only be studied in special
courses. It is desirable to allocate for these special courses
not only the main category of officers from operational staffs,
but also those from the tactical level. In 1966 the first course
of this type. was held at the army level under the direction of
General-Mayor A. T. Altunin. The results obtained were extremely
encouraging.
To a very large extent the level of the field training of
the operational staffs is determined by the level of preparedness
and the amount of teamwork of the staffs as a whole. To control
means to command men efficiently, to unite them in the cause of
achieving the overall tasks and objectives, to organize their
work wisely, and to coordinate and focus their efforts on the
fulfilment of worthwhile tasks. Separate and joint training
sessions, operational and command-staff exercises and war games,
and special and experimental exercises largely promote the
achievement of this.
Separate staff training sessions in our military district
headquarters are conducted at the level of departments,
directorates, and staffs of branch arms and services; josoxi-HUM
exercises, which include field exercises and the use of
communications means, involve the participation of the entire
military district (army) headquarters. Staff and operational
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command-staff exercises are conducted in the field under the
direction of the military district command. The staffs of the
armies and of individual large units are usually allocated to
take part in them, and in a number of cases troops are allocated
as well.
Operational war games on maps play an important role in the
training and the organization of teamwork of the operational
staffs. They enable generals and senior officers to develop
skills in quickly and thoroughly assessing the situation, to make
correct decisions, and to develop their operational thinking,
volitional qualities and the language of command. The ability to
concisely and clearly draw conclusions from assessments of the
situation, to make a proposal for employing one or another branch
arm in an operation, to competently issue orders or assign tasks
-- this is a very valuable quality in a staff officer and general
and one which must be continuously cultivated.
Experience shows that when war games are properly organized
not only the command personnel of the military district and of
the army but also the primary personnel of the operational staffs
can and should participate in them. This promotes the
organization of teamwork in the work of the command and all the
main levels of control. Staff officers gain useful experience in
preparing the data used to make the decision, in drawing up the
decision, in making various calculations, in drafting combat
documents within a short time limit, and in settling questions of
cooperation.
Integrated special exercises are conducted for the purpose
of organizing the teamwork of the individual levels of control in
the military district. They provide an opportunity to work out
in detail the problems involved in controlling the rocket troops
and the forces and means of air defense, aviation, and the rear;
problems of setting up communications, of combating
radioelectronic means; etc.
However, the diversity of forms of training cannot alone
improve the field training of the operational staffs. Actual
results can be achieved only if all the indicated measures are
carefully organized and carried out on a high methodological
level. During exercises and war games a critical, comple50xl-HUM
fluid situation must be created which would promote the
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development of initiative and creativity in the trainees. The
command and staffs should be placed in the position in which they
may find themselves at the beginning of a war, while the forces
of the sides, their combat readiness, their supply situation and
their operational position should conform to the actual situation
on the day of the exercise.
It is most desirable to conduct two-sided and two-level and
three-level exercises and war games, since the methods of
conducting them and their composition complicate the operational
situation, increase the responsibility of the commanders and
executors, and at the same time promote the organization of
teamwork between the operational and tactical levels. To ensure
continuity of control, some of the division staffs allocated for
operational war games and exercises must be trained at an
organizational level that is one step higher than their own. For
example, for a number of years the staffs of some of the
divisions in the military district have been allocated to take
the place of the army organization in front command-staff
exercises.
Since the scale of the exercise and the categories of
participants have increased, there is a danger that the exercise
will be overburdened with a large number of training problems.
This can be avoided if these problems are strictly differentiated
and a considerable portion of them are worked out in. special
exercises.
Solving the problems involved in further raising the quality
of the field training of the operational staffs does not depend
solely on improving the training of staff officers and on
organizing the teamwork of the staffs, but also on improving the
style and methods of their work.
The main requirement of command and staff work is that it
must respond quickly to the situation and immediately affect the
course of events. Therefore, any improvement in their style and
methods must take the form of reducing the amount of time spent
on the most important, labor-consuming processes of controlling
combat operations, which constitute the basis for the practical
activities involved in the preparation and conduct of operations.
Foremost among them are making the decision, drawing it up,
assigning the troops their combat tasks, planning the operation,
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and collecting and collating data about the situation.
Our experience shows that at the time the commander makes
the decision he is usually well acquainted with. the situation and
foresees possible future developments in it. In connection with
this, a few brief reports from specialists on individual
questions, or an exchange of opinions with the primary
responsible personnel is usually sufficient for the commander to
prepare and make his decision.
The decision must be drawn up at the same time that it is
made. Parallel to this, the front staff and the chiefs of the
branch arms and services transmit the combat tasks to the troops.
It is the practice of our staffs to transmit tasks to subordinate
troops in the form of brief preliminary instructions sent via
technical communications means. In some instances the tasks are
assigned orally by the responsible personnel and subsequently
confirmed in written combat documents.
It is also advisable to begin planning the operations at the
same time that the decision is made. Even while the command is
in the process of working, certain elements of the plan of the
operation are plotted on the map in the staff, and when
necessary, the chiefs of the branch arms and services are called
upon to do this. Thus, planning is simultaneously carried out on
a broad front at both the operational and the tactical levels.
The planning process at all levels should also be hastened
by shortening and simplifying the planning documents. We have
done a considerable amount of work along these lines in recent
years, but nevertheless operational plans are still quite bulky.
Obviously, though, we must return to this problem another time.
Experience shows that the basic operational planning
document is the plan of the operation, which is set forth on a
map with brief explanatory notes. The main elements of the
commander's decision are shown on this map, primarily questions
of the organization of the employment of missile/nuclear weapons,
aviation, and airborne landing troops; the combat tasks of the
troops; methods of destroying the opposing enemy; and also the
most important matters of the cooperation of all forces and
means. 50X1-HUM
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The detailed planning of the employment of the branch arms
and services and also the matters of providing support for the
operation must, in our opinion, be shown on the maps of the
appropriate chiefs of the branch arms and services. They should
be allowed to exercise a reasonable amount of independent
initiative in resolving these matters.
At the same time the entire existing information reporting
system must be radically improved and regulated, for it is based
on strict compartmentation, and data sent through the
command-staff channels, whether it is sent up from below or vice
versa, must pass through numerous levels. This system of
obtaining information has long been obsolete. Reporting_must now
be implemented in such a way that the most important
information, first and foremost data on nuclear means of attack
and the radiation situation, should be transmitted by the
collective call method simultaneously to all command levels in
approximately the same way that warning is carried out in the air
defense forces.
Information should also be passed more quickly within field
headquarters. That the staff officers of different branch arms,
services and the rear should receive data on the situation
separately is intolerable. Q. great deal of time must be spent in
order to collect all the necessary information in the operations
directorate.
Experience shows that the improvement of the work methods of
the operational staffs is closely tied to the wide-scale
introduction of means of mechanization and automation into
control processes and to the changing of the organizational
structure of control. At present, technical means of control are
being widely used within the rocket troops, aviation, and the air
defense system. With few exceptions, however, means of
mechanization and automation have not yet been sufficiently
utilized in operational staffs. For this reason the effort to
reduce the time required to organize and prepare operations is
proceeding slowly and any success achieved is primarily the
result of severely overburdening the personnel of the control
organs. Any minimal changes that have already been made in the
organization of the staffs basically amount to a reduction in the
number of generals and officers in them. This is hardly the way
to achieve mobility in staff work. It would make more sense to
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first establish the necessary organization of the control organs,
and then reduce the personnel on the basis of mechanization and
automation.
Without examining this problem in detail (it merits
discussion in a separate article) let us only mention that the
organization of the operational staffs should be viewed primarily
as the establishment of those control posts that have been
provided for in our official guides. The field headquarters of
the front and of the army must be structured as though they are
made up of control posts so that in time of war, when necessary,
they could be deployed quickly to carry out their assigned tasks.
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