MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING ALLIED TROOP GROUPINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302620001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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71113 c incy
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
24 November 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of
Controlling Allied Troop Groupings
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article explores various problems that may be encountered in controlling
groupings which include foreign troops, drawing upon the experience of
World War II and postwar exercises. The author cites differences in
weapons and equipment and problems of standardizing them or trying to work
around these problems. Differences in languages as well as communications
equipment and operating procedure slow the passage of needed information
and compound control problems. The author recommends using the Latin
alphabet for radio traffic rules, using computers for automatic translation
and information processing, and providing special training for units
designated to enter combined formations. This article snneared in Tqc11P
No 1 (621 fnr 1062
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2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference. reports from this publication have been
assigned
William W. Wells
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1962
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (JUSSR): Problems of Controlling Allied
Troop Groupings
DATE
24 November 1976
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The author of this article is Colonel P. Grabovskiy. This
article explores various problems that may be encountered in controlling
groupings which include foreign troops drawing upon the experience of
World War II and postwar exercises. The author cites differences in
weapons and equipment and problems of standardizing them or trying to work
around these problems. Differences in languages as well as communications
equipment and operating procedure slow the passage of needed information
and compound control problems. The author recommends using the Latin
alphabet for radio traffic rules, using computers for automatic translation
and information processing, and providing special training for units
designated to enter combined formations. End of Summary
Comment:
General-Mayor P. V. Grabovskiy has been identified as a candidate of
military sciences who in July 1975 was co-authoring a book on the
automation of troop control. He was associated with the Frunze Military
Academy in the late 1960's and was chief of the department of command scal-Hum
theory in 1971. After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was
published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the prifir of 1970.
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Problems of Controlling Allied Troop Groupings
by
Colonel P. Grabovskiy
There are no doubts whatsoever that a future war, if the imperialists
succeed in unleashing it, will be a war between two coalition groupings.
The socialist countries will constitute a unified military camp in which
the soldiers of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries will fight shoulder
to shoulder.
The combined actions of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the
Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the
German Democratic Republic are most probable in the Western Theater of
Military Operations, within whose borders are found the main forces of the
armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. And one cannot exclude the
involvement of other allied armies in this theater.
In the accomplishment of tasks by the combined efforts of the armed
forces of various countries, it is inevitable that troop groupings will be
established made up of army formations, large units, and units from the
various national armies.
We will call allied those operational and tactical scale troop
groupings that are under a unified command and have the function of
accomplishing tasks by means of the combined efforts of the large units and
units of the armies of the various countries. The establishment of such
groupings within the framework of a single front or army, and sometimes, as
an exception, even of a division, will be a-riqiient occurrence, in our
opinion, in a situation that might arise under conditions of highly mobile
actions and, above all, in the initial period of war.
It is known that war may begin by surprise. Our troops will be forced?
to deliver a powerful attack in order to thwart the enemy's intentions. As
a result of the massive employment of missile/nuclear weapons, both sides
will suffer heavy losses. Under these conditions, the combat effectiveness
of the troops will be determined to a decisive degree by the amount of the
losses in forces and in means, by the level of destruction of the movement
routes to the lines of commitment, and also by the ability of the control
organs at all levels of command to precisely and firmly command the troops.
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The capability of ground forces to immediately initiate combat actions
will depend in significant degree on their mobility, on haw quickly they
will be able to restore the former attack groupings or establish new ones
in the required place. Naturally, under these conditions the establishment
of allied groupings is most probable, in that there might arise the
requirement to reinforce this or that grouping with troops from another
country who have retained their combat effectiveness and are in a position
to arrive at the required area in the shortest possible time. In this
case, there may arise the need to include in the complement of those troops
arriving from the interior of the theater those large units and units which
by this time have already entered the engagement. It is quite possible
that combined-arms (tank) armies located in the territory of another
country will have included in their complement large units and units of
that country which will have had experience in operating in their own
territory or which will have been given the task of providing specific
types of support to the allied troops in the assigned area. In the latter
case, these will be special troops, in particular air defense, engineer,
engineer-road, and other troops who, as they will have had much experience
in operating in their own territory, will be able within a short period of
time to support the march and maneuvering of allied troops, the negotiation
of water obstacles, etc.
The possible putting out of action of a considerable part of the
troops of an army will require the commitment in its zone of actions of
another country's troops that are approaching from the interior.
Furthermore, frequently in these cases, as shown by the experience of the
Great Patriotic War and of postwar exercises, foreign large units and units
that are in the second echelons and reserves of the front or armies, will
be committed.
It should be noted that it will not always be possible or necessary to
employ foreign large units and units immediately even on the axes or in the
zones of action of their own national armies. Sometimes, even when troops
of the given army are available in the second echelons or reserves, it may
be necessary to retain them in order to accomplish special tasks arising
out of military or political considerations (the inadequate combat
effectiveness of the troops of the given country due to losses inflicted on
them, their considerable distance away from the area of the commitment to
battle, the advisability of incorporating foreign troops into the
complement of groupings that have had considerable combat experience, the
need for foreign troops for actions in a specific national area, etc.).
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What has been stated allows one to affirm that the combined actions of
troops from different countries in the complement of allied groupings will
be a very widespread occurrence.
The control of allied groupings has characteristic features. In order
to define these, let us first of all turn to the experience of the past
war.
As is known, during the Great Patriotic War formations, large units,
and units of the armies of other countries were activated in the territory
of our country and with our help. In so doing, the military contingents of
Poland and Czechoslovakia had certain characteristics. The battalions,
regiments, brigades, and divisions were organized basically according to
the regulations of the Red Army. As concerns corps and armies, they were
organized differently.
Equipping the foreign troops with Soviet weapons and equipment,
training them according to the combat regulations of the Red Army, having
them utilize our army's combat experience, and manning them to a
considerable degree with persons who knew the Russian language -- all of
this was responsible for the specific features of the command over the
above-mentioned contingents.
Above all, it should be noted that all foreign troops were under a
unified Soviet command, although certain matters (political, personnel,
etc.) were decided upon by the national leadership.
Depending on the number of forces and means, the Polish and
Czechoslovak troops operated as part of the Red Army corps, armies, and
fronts. Control was exercised over them without supplementary command
77E' and basically using the methods adopted by our army and in the
Russian language. Until the necessary number of large units and units of
the special branch arms and of aviation were established, the Polish and
Czechoslovak contingents were reinforced with the requisite Red Army units.
Subsequently, the rapid development of the allied armed forces was
responsible for making it possible for two combined-arms armies, a tank
corps and an air corps, and many large units and units of the special
branch arms and of aviation of the Polish Armed Forces, and also a
Czechoslovak corps, tank brigade, and composite air division, to
participate in the concluding phase of the war in operations together with
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the Red Army.
Characteristically, in the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, Berlin, and
Prague offensive operations, the combined-arms armies of the Polish Armed
Forces were not reinforced (or scarcely reinforced) with large units and
units of the branch arms and special troops of the Red Army. The make-up
of these armies permitted them to independently fulfil their tasks during
the entire front offensive operation. In certain cases mutual
resubordinaTIOR?Of Soviet and foreign troops took place as a result of the
rapid development of events. Thus, in the course of the East Pomeranian
operation the 1st Tank Brigade of the Polish Armed Forces' 1st Army,
operating as a part of the 1st Belorussian Front, was resubordinated to the
commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army belonging to the 2nd Belorussian
Front. In turn, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front
was subordinated to the commander of the Polish Armed Forces' 1st Army.
Analogous examples can also be cited based on the experience of the
combined actions of the Red Army troops and the 1st Czechoslovak Army
Corps.
All of these resubordinations did not present the kind of difficulties
in the command of the troops that would have made it necessary to use
special methods of control.
The conditions regarding the control of the Romanian and Bulgarian
armed forces developed rather differently. The armies of these countries
differed from ours in their organization, weapons, equipment, training and
educational system, and also in their combat training level. Moreover,
there were pronounced language differences, particularly with the Romanian
army.
The status of the Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces detailed to
participate in the struggle on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition
determined the place, role, and methods of employing them in Red Army
operations. As is known, the Romanian 5th Combined-Arms Army operated
primarily as a part of the 7th Guards or 27th or 53rd Combined-Arms Armies
of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 4th Romanian Army was subordinate to the
command of the 27th or 30th Army and the air corps was part of the air army
of this same front. The newly activated 1st Bulgarian Army was part of the
3rd Ukrainian Frontand completed its tasks primarily by means of its own
forces.*
* Some numbers are uncertain.
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To ensure the best command over the groupings made up, for example, of
Soviet and Bulgarian troops, a front operations group was established in
the Bulgarian army and army (corps) operationsgroups were set up in its
divisions. These groups constituted intermediate links in which the
exchange of information* was carried out between levels of command that
were significantly different and worked using different languages. With
the help of these operations groups reliable mutual understanding was
achieved and the cooperation of the troops making up the allied grouping
was ensured.
The composition of the operations groups varied (ranging from seven to
20 officers) and depended on the degree of difference between the
intersubordinated or cooperating troops. As a rule, the groups included
operations officers, officers of the branch arms and special troops, cipher
officers, translators, and also communications means and the personnel
servicing them.
The different procedures and methods of operating on the battlefield
made it necessary for the officers of the operations groups to actively
participate in the preparation of the combat actions of the allied troops
and in commanding them, especially when the troops were reinforced with
types of weapons and technical equipment which they did not possess.
Sometimes an operations group had to exercise direct command over the
combat actions of allied groupings. For example, the front group of
General A. V. Blagodatov, which was with the 1st BulgaYiaE-Army, at the
time of the battles on the Drava River (January 1945) successfully
exercised command over the combat actions of the 133rd Soviet Rifle Corps
and the 4th Bulgarian Corps.
In certain cases operations groups were not established because it was
enough to exchange liaison officers or to send to the foreign troops
instructors from among the officers who knew the language of the allied
army.
The intersubordination of the troops of the different countries during
the Great Patriotic War was a widespread occurrence. As a result of
research into the principal operations in which troops of our allied
countries participated together with Red Army troops, 175 cases were noted
in which foreign formations, large units, and units were subordinated to
our army and 136 cases in which our troops were subordinated to the
foreigners.
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* Information is taken to mean any type of messages circulating through the
communications channels on various links.
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Under present conditions the very fact of the existence of the armed
forces of the countries of the people's democracy and of the Warsaw Pact
organization dictates the likelihood of the widespread intersubordination
of the troops of the various countries. Thus, just in ten of the combined
exercises conducted in the years 1957 through 1961 there were 86 cases of
intersubordination, in 40 of which our combined-arms large units operated
as a part of foreign armies and corps. The decision on the question of
intersubordination was frequently within the jurisdiction of the front
level of command and, as an exception, of the army level of command.
Theexperience of the past war and of postwar exercises reveals that
the decision concerning the intersubordination (resubordination) of troops
of various countries is made on the basis of the necessity of establishing
attack groupings; in so doing one takes into consideration the number of
combat-effective troops that remain on the battlefield or that have been
committed to the engagement, the capability for reliable control of the
allied groupings, and also the capability for comprehensive support of
them.
As a rule, it is expedient to subordinate the troops of another
country to those formations and large units that retain the initiative,
maintain stable control, possess an adequate number of control forces and
means, and have experience in commanding allied groupings.
To achieve reliable and flexible command over allied groupings, and to
also provide for their comprehensive support, it is necessary to take into
account the differences in organization, weapons, technical equipping, and
combat preparedness of the armies of the different countries and their
language differences. At the critique of a command-staff exercise in
August 1958, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Minister of
Defense, pointed out, "Each socialist country has its own combat experience
gained in past wars, its own military traditions and distinctive military
art characteristics, and its own practices in building and training armed
forces under peacetime conditions."
At the present time there are in existence unified tables of
organization for the large units and units of the armies of the Warsaw Pact
countries. However, in view of the fact that the process of developing
armed forces proceeds continuously, it will be rather difficult to achieve
complete standardization of the large units and units of the armies of
several countries. That is why in a future war there may be in the 50X1-HUM
complement of allied groupings troops differing somewhat in their
organization and equipping.
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The rapid development in the postwar period of the industry of the
countries of the people's democracies has made it possible for certain of
them to equip their armies primarily with their own means. It must be
remarked that as a result of the inadequate coordination of these efforts,
in a number of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries there have appeared
and still are available certain kinds of non-Soviet type armament. At the
present time, with the overall approval of the participants in the Warsaw
Pact organization, standard types of armament are being produced. However,
because of the availability of finite reserves of armament, and also due to
the fact that the complete re-equipping of the armies with the latest types
of armament requires the expenditure of great economic efforts, there are
still certain non-standard types in the allied armies. Consequently,
should a war occur in the near future it will be necessary to deal with
certain facts of the presence of different types of armament in the hands
of the troops making up the allied groupings.
There are even greater differences in the technical equipping. This
is explained, in addition to the above-indicated reasons, by the different
economic capabilities of the countries and, in particular, by the
inadvisability of suspending the mass production of certain types of
equipment that has been initiated in certain countries. In wartime, the
differences in the types of supplies of the troops of the allied countries
might even increase. This relates primarily to transport and to other
means that would be supplied to the armed forces from the national economy.
The combat effectiveness of the troops of the Warsaw Pact organization
at the present time is to a certain degree being equalized, this being
fostered by the presence of a common military doctrine, common regulations
and a combined Supreme Command, the presence of common principles on the
building and training of armed forces, and the standardization of the
principal types of armament. One should, however, keep in mind that an
identical level of combat and political training of the troops cannot be
achieved even within the framework of a single country, not to mention that
of a system of several countries, because in the latter case, with other
conditions being equal, it is affected by the presence in each army of
special characteristic features that are peculiar to it alone, and which
are due to the national characteristics of the personnel, the military
traditions, the combat experience of the army as a whole and of its command
personnel in particular, the level of political consciousness of the people
of the given country, etc. That is why in a future war the allied
groupings cannot be made up of large units and units that have equivaleVo-x, -HUM
combat effectiveness.
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As before, the language differences will give rise to serious
difficulties in the control of allied groupings despite the present widely
practiced study of the Russian language in the armies of the Warsaw Pact
countries. As shown by experience gained in combined exercises, the level
of knowledge of the Russian language on the part of officers of the allied
armies at best permits the personal contact of a certain category of
generals and officers at the levels of division and higher. That being the
case, the conversations in the Russian language over technical
communications means give rise to additional difficulties. And the
completion of documents in the Russian language demands enormous efforts
and the expenditure of large amounts of time by the officers of the
fraternal armies. For example, in the combined exercises conducted by one
of the armies of the Belorussian Military District in May 1961, the staff
of a mechanized division of the Polish Armed Forces required over 20 hours
to draft a combat order in the Russian language and three to four hours to
write out intelligence reports. Working in the Russian language presents
an even greater difficulty to officers of the German Democratic Republic,
Hungary and Romania, whose native languages do not have a Slavic base.
The above-mentioned differences may have an appreciable effect on the
combat capabilities of the troops and consequently on the nature of the
tasks accomplished by them. If these are pronounced differences between
the large units and units of the different countries, then their tasks will
be determined differently. When it is necessary to fulfil tasks that have
the same depth and, consequently, to attain equal rates of advance, in case
the troops of the other country lack, for example, modern crossing means
(as occurred with one of the tank divisions of the Polish Armed Forces in
the combined exercises), one must reinforce the allied troops with the
required means, and when time is available, also train them.
All of this will have its effect on the process of commanding allied
groupings.
In the critique of a command-staff exercise conducted in 1961 with the
staffs of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, and of the National People's
Army of the German Democratic Republic, Minister of Defense Marshal of the
Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy pointed out, "At present, commanders and
staffs are required to have superior skill in controlling troops, and above
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In the light of these requirements, it is necessary to picture more
clearly the special features of control which inevitably confront
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commanders and their staffs in the process of commanding allied troop
groupings.
It is known that the opportune adoption of a decision and the mobility
of the command of troops will depend to a large degree on timely
information. However, in an allied troop grouping, especially in the
fluidity of combat actions, information as a rule will be delayed even more
than under ordinary conditions because when troops of different countries
are engaged in combined actions, either the number of levels through which
information must pass is increased if operations groups with their own
means of communications are established in the subordinate or cooperating
staffs, or else communications are impeded because of the language
differences and the national peculiarities of the station operating service
and the radio traffic rules when there are direct communications between
staffs that are using their own servicing personnel. This means that the
collection, processing, and output of information when allied groupings are
operating is a problem that requires specific solution.
The low power of many radio sets and the excessively narrow range of
their operating frequencies do not permit one to use diverse radiotechnical
means for the purpose of operating on many nets, over long distances, at
nighttime, or while moving. In addition, the organization of control is
impeded because of the presence in the allied armies of technical means of
communications which frequently cannot be coupled due to their different
operating frequency ranges or for other technical reasons. To top it off,
translation over technical means of communications (and sometimes even in
personal contacts) of portions of document texts and of conversations will
hinder the attainment of the necessary mutual understanding within a short
period of time and delay the exchange of information on the position and
status of the troops even more. Calculations have shown that when it is
necessary to translate, 30 to 40 percent more time than usual is expended
in the collection, processing, and output of information. It is pertinent
to note that in this case, only 15 to 22 percent of the time is for
creative work and all of the remaining time is spent in coding,
transmitting, and translating the information.
Based on an analysis of the salient features set forth, one has every
reason to assume that for the reliable control of an allied grouping it is
necessary first of all to clearly appreciate the most characteristic
differences of its component units. Obviously, it is most advisable to
organize the study of the armies of the probable allied groupings ahead of
time so as to use peacetime conditions to acquaint the command personnel of
the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries with the combat experience,
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military traditions, and the practices of building and training of the
armed forces of the allied armies. This applies first of all to the border
military districts and groups of forces of the Soviet Army whose large
units and units will certainly have to operate in the complement of allied
groupings. Such data as the organization of the troops, their weapons,
combat equipment, and other equipment, the level of the combat and
political training, the specific features of the organization of
party-political work, etc., must be available and continuously updated in
the staffs of those formations and large units that already have been
earmarked for combined actions and also in those which possibly will have
to operate in the complement of allied groupings.
Only with a detailed knowledge of the forces and means making up an
allied grouping, and this means also a detailed knowledge of their
differences, can the commander and the field headquarters of an army as a
whole correctly assess the balance of forces, establish the necessary
attack groupings, assign feasible tasks to the foreign troops, implement
their comprehensive support, and also skilfully control them.
It has already been noted above that in the years of the Great
Patriotic War the armed forces of foreign countries had dual subordination.
In our opinion, this subordination will hold good even in the future. This
arises from the fact that the member countries of the Warsaw Pact cannot
decline responsibility for maintaining the combat readiness and high
political consciousness and morale of their own troops nor also for the
organization of their comprehensive support. Consequently, it is required
on the part of the national governments (general staffs) that they monitor
the execution of the orders and instructions issued to their own troops and
that they coordinate their actions with the authorities which will command
the combat actions of the allied groupings. Since the indicated matters
may fall within the sphere of influence (at a different time and in
different degree) of two command authorities, the foreign formations (large
units and units) in the complement of the allied groupings will in many
cases be obligated to carry out the orders of both the immediate authority
exercising control over the combat actions of the troops and also of their
own (national) party, state, and military organs.
In this connection, three problems stand out which affect the process
of troop control: the organization of party-political work, the full
manning of the national troops with personnel; and the organization of rear
services support.
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A number of investigations and the experience of postwar exercises
have provided the grounds for the following conclusions.
The party-political work in foreign large units and units, carried out
by the national party-political apparatus fulfilling the directives of its
own leadership, must be coordinated with the tasks of the troops of the
front (army) of the other country in whose complement these large units and
units are operating. It must be based on the principles of socialist
internationalism, on the standards inherent in all of the armies of the
socialist camp, and must be directed towards strengthening the leadership
of the armies on the part of the communist and worker's parties, towards
consolidating the relations of the army with the people, continuously
fortifying the political unity of the soldiers, officers, and generals,
raising their activeness in accomplishing the tasks assigned by the party,
government, and military command; and towards strengthening the friendship
and combat cooperation of the armies of the people's democracies with the
Soviet Army and the other armies of the socialist camp. At the same time
it is necessary to take into account the historical and national
characteristics of the leadership of the party and youth organizations in
the allied armies, the differences in the forms and methods of
strengthening one-man command, the different military traditions and
customs, the national characteristics of the personnel, and also the
specific conditions of the situation. In addition, all party-political
work requires the integrated utilization of the forces and means available
in the allied groupings.
As a result of the study of the historical and national
characteristics and the specific conditions of the situation, for each
allied grouping one must determine the appropriate system of coordinating
the party-political measures which will ensure reliable mutual
understanding and efficiency and the improvement of the combat
effectiveness of the grouping as a whole and of the large units and units
of each country individually.
The conduct of combat actions by allied groupings requires that the
rights and duties of the controlling authorities be defined relative to the
troop personnel of the other country. This may involve the questions of
the assignment or removal from duty of command personnel in cases of
urgency and of the commendation or punishment of temporarily subordinated
persons, etc. Similarly, when whole subunits and units are put out of
action and it is impossible to rapidly shift troops to the battle area from
their own country, there should be a statement concerning bringing them up
to strength with troop personnel from another country.
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The organization of rear services support will depend on the specific
conditions of the situation. In the initial period of war this is affected
first of all by the degree of difference in the types of supplies; by the
combat strength of the army and of the foreign troops incorporated into it,
the number and strength of the rear services units, the materiel reserves
and rear services control organs in the army and in the large units (units)
of allied troops that are arriving; the nature of the area of combat
actions; the availability of local resources, and so forth.
Depending on the capabilities and requirements of the allied troops,
their rear services support in combined actions may be implemented either
separately -- by way of the national rear services organs, or in
combination -- partially through national organs and partially by drawing
from the army and front resources of the other country, or solely by way of
and by drawing from the army (front) of the other nation.
From all that has been said it is evident that it is necessary to
improve the process of controlling allied groupings. To achieve this, one
should strive above all to erase the differences between the armies of the
allied countries and create the very best conditions for the rapid
coordination of the combined actions.
Erasing differences is a prolonged process. It presupposes the
unification of the organizational structure of the troops and of the
control organs, the standardization of the types of weapons and the
technical equipment of the troops, the equalization of the level of the
combat training and political training, and the specifying of common
methods of controlling troops.
With respect to the establishment of conditions for the rapid
coordination of combined actions, for this it is necessary first of all to
have a reliable system for the collection, processing, and output of mutual
information which is equally accessible to the subordinate or cooperating
troops of the various countries.
The reliability of a system of exchanging information depends
primarily on three conditions: the capability of linking the technical
means of communications, the elimination of the differences in the rules
for the station operating service and radio traffic, and the overcoming of
the obstacles arising from the language differences. 50X1-HUM
The top-priority task is that of linking the technical means of
communications that are intended for operation at the appropriate command
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levels. Its accomplishment has acquired exceptional importance since the
increased rates of advance of the troops and their increased
maneuverability necessitate a greater number of radiotechnical means that
have greater operating range; and also, it is frequently necessary to
receive information through several command levels in order to coordinate
actions in view of the fluidity of modern engagements.
The extensive practice in combined exercises of using operations
groups still remains one of the basic methods ensuring coordination is
achieved in the actions of the troops of the different countries. At the
present time one observes the tendency to somewhat reduce the personnel of
these groups. However, in establishing them it is necessary to select with
special care the officers, the personnel servicing the communications
means, and the communications means themselves. Moreover, it is necessary
to keep in mind that when there are frequent changes in the composition of
an army and of adjacent forces, and also of the army troop grouping, it
will not always be possible to establish the operations groups and have
them shifted around. Therefore, in our opinion, it is more feasible to
exchange information over the communications means of the allied troops
that are serviced by national personnel. In order to ensure the capability
of carrying out this exchange, it is necessary to establish common rules
for station operating service and radio traffic for all of the armies of
the Warsaw Pact countries (or for certain theaters of military operations).
These can be Europe-wide rules based on the use of the Latin alphabet. One
can recommend the rules adopted in the Soviet Army, but this would make it
necessary to appropriately retrain the communications personnel of the
armies of the people's democracies. But if Europe-wide rules are adopted,
it will be necessary to retrain only the Soviet Army's communications
personnel. It is true that they constitute the majority. But because many
of them know the Latin alphabet, and furthermore, because the Russian
alphabet has nine more characters than the Latin alphabet, perhaps it will
be easier for our army to go over to the Europe-wide rules than for the
troops from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to go over to ours.
The adoption of common rules for
traffic will require the coordination
These rules can be drawn on the basis
instructions that are in existence in
station operating service and radio
of certain elements of these rules.
of a creative revision of the
the national armies.
The linking of the communications means and the institution of common
rules for their operation will provide the capability for an easy
establishment of communications by the cooperating and subordinate forces
of the different countries. Constant practice by the radio operators of
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the different armies will be the culmination of the process of preparing
the communications means for reliable and uninterrupted operation.
Before common rules are introduced for station operating service and
radio traffic, it would be desirable to have the staffs of the different
countries practice among themselves the joint preparation of radio
operating data and the exchange of specialists in telephone-telegraph
service and in radio and radio-relay communications. In the course of
combined actions, this method, given of course the capability of linking
the communications means, will ensure the direct exchange of information
among the troops of the different countries. This has been corroborated by
troop experience, particularly by the previously mentioned command-staff
exercise of one of the armies of the Belorussian Military District. Two
Soviet and two Polish divisions operated in the complement of this army.
And wherever specialists were exchanged, information was transmitted and
received over technical means of communications, although with some
distortions. Where this was not done, such an exchange of information was
carried out either not at all or scarcely at all.
The achievement of proper coordination demands that the
intersubordinate and cooperating staffs operate using the most efficient
methods. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Pact Countries, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, pointed out at
the critique of a command-staff exercise in August 1958 that "...the best
method, the one that ensures the correct understanding of tasks and the
cooperation of the armies, is that of personal contact among the commanders
of the fraternal armies operating in the same theater..."
However, for personal contact the help of translators is still
required, especially when it is necessary to discuss problems in detail.
In these circumstances, the process of coordinating combined actions is
always drawn out and occurs at the expense of the time allocated to the
troops.
In wartime conditions, it will be even more difficult to achieve
mutual understanding than in combined exercises because upon the initiation
of war, the armies will be reinforced with cadres who will know foreign
languages even more poorly and who will lack proper skills in the use of
their awn, not just foreign military terminology.
Consequently, there has arisen the need to study in the military
educational institutions and in the troops the languages of the countries
of the socialist camp. A knowledge of the languages of the allied troops
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is particularly necessary for those persons who will be joining the
complement of the operations groups attached to foreign troops, for those
fulfilling the functions of axis officers, and for those who will in some
form or other ensure the coordination of combined actions.
The study of languages should be carried out first of all among the
troops designated to participate in combined actions.
An obvious aid for allied army officers would be the publication of
concise dictionaries of common military terminology in which there would
also be conventional military abbreviations and common conventional signs.
In the instructions (regulations) on organizing the cooperation of the
armies of the socialist camp (if such instructions are prepared), there
should be included the obligatory requirement that the commanders and other
senior command personnel of the intersubordinated and cooperating
formations, large units, units, and subunits, make personal contacts at
every opportunity and especially when they first come into subordination or
when operating as adjacent forces.
Given the fluidity of modern combat actions, control is exercised
primarily through technical means of communication. In so doing, the
mutual understanding of troops of the different countries, as has already
been noted, becomes considerably difficult. The conduct of conversations
via telephone, radio, television with loudspeaker communications, and by
telegraph, observing the measures for secure troop control, can be done
only by persons who know the other country's language well or by
well-trained officers of both armies who have mastered to perfection a
procedure table drawn up in both languages. Regrettably, in view of their
lack of preparedness for this and the lack of sophisticated secure
communications equipment, the troops will most often turn to high-frequency
telephone communications equipment, cipher organs, and combat documents.
The practice of employing cipher organs up to now has been such that
as a rule, Soviet specialists sent to foreign troops as operations groups
are used for this. This approach cannot be the only one, because the
troops have no additional cipher organs. Consequently, branches from the
cipher organs of the foreign troops will have to be attached to them.
Combat documents cannot be rejected completely, even in the most
mobile actions. This is particularly applicable to graphic combat
documents which in the near future may be transmitted over almost all
technical means of communications. When there is available a common system
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of conventional signs and a list of conventional abbreviations, graphic
documents will take on an international character, that is, every officer
of the allied grouping will be able to read them.
In order to translate the text of documents drawn up in another
language, it is necessary to have a large number of translators or groups
of axis officers (liaison officers) that know both languages. It is more
efficient to use axis officers or liaison officers, as has been
corroborated by the experience of the above-mentioned exercises. In this
case, it is necessary to have at each control post one or several officers
who are able to report on the document received from the foreign troops in
the required language immediately or after a preliminary translation.
In the combined actions of armies having a common Slavic-base language
and possessing a considerable number of persons that know other languages
(for example, Polish, Russian, and Czech), it will suffice to have at each
of the control posts one representative of the foreign staff who would be
able in the personal contacts to explain the meaning of the unintelligible
abbreviations in the documents and who would also advise on the problems of
using the unfamiliar equipment which was received as part of the
reinforcing forces and means. Besides, when documents are exchanged among
troops of different countries, it makes sense not to resort to
abbreviations, but to write out all nomenclature in full.
The use of maps issued in different countries can lead to lack of
coordination as a consequence of the varied marking of local features. To
avoid this, it is expedient to prepare maps with designations in several
languages, as was done in the combined exercises of the Far East Military
District in 1957. A common Latin alphabet can also be adopted for maps of
the Western Theater of Military Operations with the local features marked,
not phonetically, but literally. The designations of local features should
be shown the way these are given in the countries where they are located.
The development of the means for the mechanization and minor
automation of the troop control process requires the linking of the
operation of semiautomatic and automatic systems, and in particular, of the
electronic computers that are coming into service in the troops of the
Warsaw Pact member countries. An added difficulty in the employment of
electronic computers in the actions of allied groupings is caused by the
necessity of automatically translating both the data received from the
foreign troops and also that transmitted to them. 50X1-HUM
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If the automatic sensors of the primary information sources,
regardless of their national affiliation, are linked with the
communications means and have a common alphabet and a common coding system,
then the only remaining problem that will require solution is the output of
information to the appropriate control organs in the language required by
these organs.
Terminal documentary equipment, such as the telegraph and the tape
recorder, and also audio equipment, such as the videotelephone and the
telephone, will require automatic translation of the information that is
received or transmitted. Only when transmitting graphic information, that
is, when using visual equipment such as electronic computer and television
screens and also facsimile, will one to a certain degree manage to get
along without translations.
The establishment of methods of translation for the needs of the armed
forces is a difficult task in that the existing methods do not provide for
competent translation of military materials.
In the preparation for automatic translation of Russian, Polish,
Czech, and German texts, it makes sense to use an intermediate language,
which might be Russian. In this case, a lesser number of translation
programs and dictionaries (which by analogy with translation machines for
technical subjects can have no more than 1,000 general-purpose words and
1,000 special military terms) will be required.
A future system of control is impossible without electronic computers.
Consequently, the present organization and methods of operation of control
organs must be a prototype of the future, when these computers will be
extensively employed in the exercise of troop control.
Electronic computers must primarily provide for the collection,
processing, storage, and output of information. The next stage of their
operation must be to perform certain analyses and calculations with the aid
of problems in logic. In such an event, the control organs should have a
element which duplicates the operation of the electronic computer. This
element can be the information and calculation element that ensures, with
the help of all reconnaissance forces and means, the acquisition of
information concerning one's own and enemy troops, the radiation situation,
the weather, the terrain, the status of reserves, etc., and that is also
responsible for preparing data used in making the decision and in
organizing support of combat actions.
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The organization of an external and internal independent system of
information communications that is linked with information output equipment
will make it possible to eliminate parallelism and duplication in the
collection, processing, storage, and output of information and make it
easier to introduce electronic computers.
For the purpose of even greater centralization of planning, and also
for the direct command of the key means of warfare, simultaneously
relieving the commander of the burden of accomplishing secondary tasks, it
is necessary to establish a command element. Its functions must include
planning and directly commanding the troops, that is, making the decision,
assigning the tasks, and leading the troops. The availability of an
independent system of command communications will ensure mobile command
over troop combat activities and lighten the work of the information and
calculation element.
The third element of the control organ is the rear support element.
It must bear responsibility for the organization and implementation of
materiel, technical, and medical support.
If small groups for the control of the troops are established
according to the principle that has been recommended, then when allied
groupings are operating it will be necessary to have in the command element
and in the information and calculation elements only one or two translators
or axis officers in each that know the allies' language.
With the introduction of electronic computers, the translation and
transmission of direct orders to the troops from the command element will
be carried out through these computers.
The improvement of the methods of controlling allied groupings
involves the study and practical resolution of many problems.
Together with the unification of the structure of the armed forces of
the Warsaw Pact countries and the standardization of their weapons and
technical equipment, there is a requirement for profound theoretical
research and for verification of the results in combined command-staff
exercises and troop exercises.
It is possible to speed up the resolution of all difficult questions
by an even greater coordination of the scientific research work within the
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framework of the Warsaw Pact. It would be desirable if the organ that
coordinates this work were able to conduct combined military theory
conferences, to issue a scientific and theoretical journal of the armies of
the Warsaw Pact countries, and to organize mobile exhibitions for the
purpose of exchanging experiences and of determining the most effective and
economically advantageous types of weapons and technical equipment as well
as the most efficient methods, means, and organizational structure for the
troop control organs. This coordinating organ must prepare and recommend
common rules for the operation of communications means, common terminology,
reference dictionaries, standard documents, etc.
The coordination of the scientific research work, the combined troop
exercises and command personnel assemblies, the exchange of scientific
workers, instructors, and students of the higher military educational
institutions, the wider acquaintance of officer personnel with the
characteristics of the allied armies, the greater emphasis on the study of
the languages of the countries of the people's democracies -- all of this
will make it possible, on the one hand, to find the most efficient methods
of controlling allied groupings, and on the other hand -- to more
thoroughly and purposefully prepare officer personnel to accomplish combat
tasks by means of the combined efforts of the troops of the allied
countries. At the same time, all of these measures that are carried out
based on cooperation and mutual assistance will strengthen even more the
fraternal unity of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.
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