MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME PROBLEMS IN THE CONTROL OF THE ROCKET TROOPS OF A RESERVE FRONT DURING ITS MOVEMENT FORWARD FOR COMMITMENT TO AN ENGAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302580001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems in
the ontrol o t e Rocket Troops of a
Reserve Front During Its Movement Forward
for Commitment to an Engagement
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Militar Thought". This article is a review of various
matters connected with the control of the rocket troops of a
reserve front which is being committed to battle after a war has
begun. 1I'~'hee authors cover such problems as timely supply of
missile propellant, movement to areas not planned for in advance,
and organizing and maintaining continuity of communications. The
tasks of the rocket troops during their movement, including the
delivery of nuclear strikes, are touched upon, as are procedures
for organizing the march itself, reconnaissance problems, the
content and transmission of combat instructions, and the role of
proposed planning and control rou s. This article in
Issue No. 2 751 for 1965.
50X1-HUM
2. Because the source of this report is extremely 50X1-HUM
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference- renorts from this nuhlica~ion have been assigned
Wil iam W. Wells
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1965
DATE
15 November 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems in the Control
of the Rocket Troops oT a Reserve Front During Its Movement
Forward for Commitment to an Engagement
N
SOURCE Documentary
Summa :
Re following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in,Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Militar Thought". The authors of this article are
General-Mayor of Artillery P. Zherdev, Colonel G. Komarov and
L-ieutenant Colonel I. Yashin. This article is a review of various
matters connected with the control of the rocket troops of a
reserve front which is being committed to battle after a war has
begun. The authors cover such problems as timely supply of
missile propellant, movement to areas not planned for in advance,
and organizing and maintaining continuity of communications. The
tasks of the rocket troops during their movement, including the
delivery of nuclear strikes, are touched upon, as are procedures
for organizing the march itself, reconnaissance problems, the
content and transmission of combat instructions, and the role of
proposed planning and control groups.
End of Summary
-50X1-HUM
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Some Problems in the Control of the Rocket Troops
o a Reserve Front During Its Movement Forward
for Commitment to an Engagement
by
General-Ma or of Artillery P. Zherdev,
Co onel G. Komarov
and
Lieutenant Colonel I. Yashin
In examining the questions of organizing and implementing
control of rocket troops during the movement forward of a reserve
front, we shall proceed from the following conditions: the
movement forward of the front is being carried out from the
interior of the country in a situation of war already begun, for
the purpose of subsequently committing the front to an engagement
from the march.
The experience of a whole series of exercises has shown that
under such conditions, control of the rocket troops of a reserve
front must provide for: first, prompt and secure warning and
ringing to full combat readiness of the missile and missile
technical large units and. units and their removal from permanent
deployment points, and also their all-round preparation in short
periods of time for an extended march; second, maintenance of
high combat readiness of the missile and missile technical large
units and units and their organized carrying out of the march
under conditions of enemy delivery of nuclear and chemical
strikes when it is necessary to negotiate, during the march,
areas of destruction and extensive zones of radioactive and
chemical contamination; third, timely deployment of the missile
and missile technical large units and units in siting areas and
their quick preparation for delivery of nuclear strikes when the
situation is changing rapidly and especially when the troops of
the front are being committed to the engagement.
Having no little significance in the control of missile and
missile technical large units and units while bringing them to
full combat readiness is their warning by transmission of the
established signals in the shortest possible times. Basically,
this problem already has virtually been solved in the troops. We
should just mention the necessity of having, for the purpose of
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shortening the time, a single automated system for simultaneous
warning of all the missile large units and units of the front
(military district) over several channels.
Calling for special concern is the timely receipt by the
missile large units and units of missiles and missile propellant.
For this, it is necessary first of all to establish close
cooperation between the missile and missile technical units and
the units (depots) that store and deliver the missile propellant.
On the solution of these particular problems, as experience has
shown, must be concentrated the attention of the commander and
staff of the front and also of the chief of the rocket troops and
artillery and his staff.
Considering that the receiving of reserves of missiles,
warheads, and missile propellant is a rather complex and lengthy
process, we believe it advisable in missile and missile technical
units to set up storage for reserves of missiles in peacetime, if
only in such quantity as corresponds to their transportation
capabilities. In this case, not only will the time be shortened
for bringing the rocket troops to full combat readiness, but the
dependability of this readiness will increase considerably, since
the missile brigades and battalions will be making the march
having ready missiles.
For those missile and missile technical large units and
units in which missile warheads and missile propellant cannot be
kept in peacetime for some reason, the military district staff
must determine in advance the procedure for receiving them, down
to providing the units beforehand with the appropriate documents
(requisitions) with indication of receiving times and delivery
routes.
Certain circumstances may require moving at a combat alert
signal large units and units to areas not planned for in advance.
Such a variant must also be foreseen earlier. In this case it
will be necessary to plan appropriately the procedure.for warning
the troops, and for assigning tasks to the commanders of the
missile large units and units or refining their tasks.
Considering that also in this case the permanently operating
radio nets will be used, it will be necessary to establish a
special signal and also to work out a single orientational map
with a coded grid so that this signal is quickly apprehended by
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the executors. The instruction to the commander of the large
unit and unit may be sent in the form of a short radio message
composed on the basis of a previously worked out special standard
document. In the radio message it is enough to indicate, in
accordance with the coded grid of the orientational map, the
established signal, the concentration area of the large unit or
unit not planned earlier, the route (according to points plotted
on the map), and the time to carry out the instruction.
From each missile large unit and unit, on being alerted by a
combat alert signal and moved out to areas not planned for in
advance, are sent out previously formed (this also has to be
provided for in the plan) reconnaissance groups for the selection
of concentration areas, reconnaissance and preparation of routes,
and also a team of traffic controllers.
It seems to us that in the staffs of missile large units and
units it is necessary to have previously prepared sets of
topographic maps for any axis within radius of a day's march from
the permanent deployment point. These sets must be in such
condition that they can be quickly given out to the commanders of
subunits upon declaration of a combat alert. But this is still
not enough. All the main possible routes of movement in any
direction from the permanent deployment points should be gone
over beforehand with the officer personnel of the missile units
and large units.
In carrying out control of the rocket troops while they are
being brought to full combat readiness, the commander of the
front, through his staff and also through the chief of rocket
troops and artillery, as under other conditions, refines the
tasks for their all-round support, especially for the
organization of protection against weapons of mass destruction,
reinforcement of security, and engineer preparation of the
concentration areas. A special concern of the staff of the front
in this period must be the timely organization of stable
communications, without which the organized movement and
deployment of the missile brigades and battalions in 50X1-HUM
concentration areas is impossible.
The experience of many exercises conducted in the troops of
the Belorussian Military District testifies that the basic, and
often the only, means of communications with missile and missile
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technical large units and units during the period of bringing
them to full combat readiness and during their preparation for
the march, is radio. The transmission of nearly all
instructions, the collection of data on the status of the rocket
troops, and also cooperation between the missile and missile
technical large units and units, are carried out chiefly with the
use of radio means.
In this connection, the staff of the front, and also the
staff of the rocket troops and artillery, in the practice of
everyday combat training, must systematically organize training
in coordinating radio nets. In missile and missile technical
large units and units there have to be permanently assigned crews
that work on the nets and links of the staff of the front, just
as in the front communications units there have to be crews
permanently assigned to these nets and links. This requires
prior preparation of secure communications equipment, in
particular of coding machines, mutual tuning of this equipment
for all the radio sets operating on radio links with the missile
and missile technical units and large units, and extensive use of
various automatic devices. Nor must one fail to mention the
necessity of advance working out and distribution to rocket
troops of special signal tables and also of standard instruction
and report forms.
In the publications it has already been said more than once
that the questions of communications with the rocket troops are
still far from resolved. For instance, communications personnel
who are placed, for the time of exercises, at the disposal of the
staffs of the rocket troops and artillery of the front and armies
have to work, as a matter of fact, on newly set up radio nets and
radio links. In such a situation, much time is usually lost
during which the radio operators are getting accustomed to one
another, beginning to understand one another, as it were.
The communications system of the front is organized, as we
know, ahead of time. For stable communications with the rocket
troops, based on the experience of exercises, it is most
desirable to organize the following radio links (morse and
printer): command post and forward command post of the front --
each missile brigade and separate missile battalion of front
subordination; chief of rocket troops and artillery of tie front
-- chief of missile and artillery armament. Radio nets of the
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chief of rocket troops and artillery of the front are also formed
that include the radio sets of the commanders of the army missile
brigades and of the chiefs of rocket troops and artillery of the
armies (figuring one net for one or, at most, two armies).
Besides that, the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery of
the front and armies must have radio means for direct
commun cations personally with the commanders of the missile
battalions forming a part of the missile brigades of front and
army subordination.
To control the missile technical units, the chief of missile
and artillery armament of the front also needs radio nets: one
net for two or three missile technical units of front
subordination, and one net to one or two armies for
communications with the chiefs of the missile and artillery
armament departments of the armies, the army mobile missile
technical base, and the front mobile missile technical base
supporting the army.
The experience of exercises has shown that at the command
post and forward command post of the front it is necessary to
have reserve sets so that a subscriber can at any time be
switched from the radio net onto a radio link.
The conditions of moving a reserve front forward over great
distances in a situation where the military actions of the sides
have already begun have a considerable effect on the control of
troops during the march; like the control of all other troops, it
is organized on the basis of the decision of the commander of the
front for movement, which he makes in conformity with the
directive of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command.
In the part of the decision dealing with the movement
forward of the rocket troops are usually determined the objective
and general tasks of the march, the grouping of troops in the
area of commitment of the front to the engagement and the time of
forming the grouping, the times the missile brigades and
battalions are to be ready to deliver nuclear strikes, the number
of missiles to be issued them with nuclear and chemical warheads
and the times they are to be prepared for launch. Directly
concerning the march of the rocket troops, in the decision are
indicated the method and order of their movement, the routes, the
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number of day's marches and the average length of them, the
beginning of the march and time of passing movement phase control
lines (points), and measures for support of the march.
The basic tasks of the rocket troops during the movement
forward of a reserve front consist in their arriving on time at
the assigned siting areas, quickly occupying them, and, in
cooperation with the rocket troops of the fronts operating
forward and with the aviation, delivering a massed nuclear strike
for the purpose of decisively destroying the nuclear means,
aviation, and main grouping of ground forces of the enemy. This
brings about favorable conditions for the deployment of the
troops of the front, their commitment to the engagement from the
march, completion of the defeat of the enemy, and successful
conduct of the front operation.
Massed strikes have already been discussed in our military
press, and we will not dwell on them. Let us merely mention that
under certain conditions it is precisely a massed strike that is
necessary to decisively build up efforts or abruptly change the
situation in our own favor and develop the offensive at high
speeds. A massed strike is especially necessary if, by the time
of deploying the troops of the reserve front, the situation has
developed in favor of the enemy, who will be able to seize the
initiative and undertake aggressive actions himself.
To deliver a massed nuclear strike under these conditions,
the rocket troops must in advance, even before the deployment of
the advancing troops of the front, not only occupy siting areas
but also get completely ready for a launch.
On the matter of how and when to move the missile brigades
and battalions forward there exist the most diversified opinions.
In our view, one thing is incontrovertible: their movement
forward must be organized with a lead of at least one or two days
relative to the times of completing the march and deploying the
main forces of the front. Such a lead also has to be maintained
by the missile technical units, which, on arrival in the
deployment area, must immediately begin checking out and
assembling the delivery missiles and the warheads to them. On
this basis is also determined the place of the missile and
missile technical large units and units during the movement of
the troops of the front. It seems to us that, in making the
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march under their own power, the missile and missile technical
large units and units should move immediately behind the march
security forces or, in individual cases -- ahead of them. It
stands to reason that in this case the missile and missile
technical large units and units have to be reinforced with
motorized rifle units and subunits for their immediate security
on the march and also be covered by the air defense means.
For effective delivery of a massed nuclear strike, it is
necessary, of course, to know the enemy targets to be hit. This
requires appropriate reconnaissance data, which can be obtained
first of all from the fronts operating forward. At the same
time, the staff of the reserve front must also organize
reconnaissance with its own means w ile still making the march.
Unfortunately, this important question, which is an independent
topic for research, still has not been treated in our
publications. Offering special interest, as it appears to us, is
the examination of the specific features of organizing
reconnaissance on the march, of the effectiveness of various
types of reconnaissance, and of the procedures for receiving,
collating, and delivering reconnaissance data to the authorities
concerned for the purpose of timely preparation of a massed
nuclear strike.
It should be taken into consideration that when the rocket
troops are making a march under their own power (and this is the
basic method of regrouping them), the employment of heavy-load
trailers will be required. The experience of exercises has shown
that the average moving speed with the use of MAZ-537 prime
movers amounts to an average of up to 25 kilometers per hour at
night and 30-35 kilometers per hour by day. With this, the
length of a day's march may be up to 250 kilometers. A day's
march of the units that have launchers on wheeled mountings
(separate missile brigades), under favorable conditions, reaches
300 kilometers per day with an average march speed equal to 35-40
kilometers per hour.
Based on this, the staff of the front, jointly with the
chief of rocket troops and artillery and his staff, on the basis
of the decision made by the commander of the front, plans the
march (regrouping) of the rocket troops and issues combat
instructions to the missile and missile technical large units and
units.
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We will recall that in the combat instructions (and this is
confirmed by the experience of exercises) should be indicated
brief conclusions from the assessment of enemy actions, the
nature of the combat tasks which the missile brigades and
battalions have to accomplish not only at the end of the march
but also during it, and the routes and order of movement of the
troops. In the instructions must also be indicated the time of
finishing the march, the siting areas, the time of deployment of
the rocket troops in them, and their time to be ready for a
missile launch. Besides that, it is necessary to determine the
procedure of crossing movement phase control lines and water
obstacles in cases of the'destruction of crossings, and also of
bypassing areas of destruction and radioactive contamination of
the terrain.
It is necessary to indicate to the missile technical units
(to the extent that it can be foreseen from the situation that
has taken shape) the tasks of preparation and assembly of the
missiles and their delivery to the missile large units and units,
and to indicate to the missile units and large units -- the order
and times for receiving the missiles.
We should like to emphasize the importance of the timely,
first-priority assignment of tasks to the missile technical
units, inasmuch as, in practice, they are still not always
assigned on time and correctly. This is occasioned by the fact
that it is sometimes forgotten that missile technical support is
not exclusively a rear services problem but a very important
operational one, and the front commander and his staff, together
with the chief of rocket troops and artillery and his staff, must
personally concern themselves with it.
In the instructions to the missile and missile technical
large units and units, it also is necessary to indicate the
procedure for support of the march, and also questions of
organizing control, including the places for accommodating the
command post, forward command post, and operations groups of the
front during the movement by lines and time periods, and also the
time and procedure for submitting reports.
From what has been said, it is obvious that the number of
matters that must be transmitted to the commanders of missile
brigades and battalions and missile technical units is very
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large. Taking into consideration that the transmission of combat
instructions, as we have already said, is done mainly by radio in
the form of radio messages, we believe it advisable to suggest
the following.
First, to draft combat instructions in such a way that the
executors receive orders in the form of separate matters
successively, as they have to be carried out. For example, in
the first combat instructions for each missile brigade are
determined the general tasks for the march, the routes of
movement, and the times of passing control points. Having
received such orders, the brigade commanders can give out
preliminary instructions to the units about preparation for the
march and devote themselves to defining the task, assessing the
situation, and making decisions for the march, while the staffs
will be able to set about planning and performing calculations
for the march.
Then the commanders of the missile brigades are given orders
on the procedure of movement and support of the march, on missile
technical support, the procedure and time of deployment and
readiness for the launch of missiles, etc.
Such a procedure for transmitting instructions makes them
still shorter and facilitates getting the tasks to the large
units and units by radio. With this, the load on the technical
means of communications is distributed more evenly, but the main
thing is that time is gained for carrying out the decision of the
commander of the front.
Second, with any procedure for transmitting the decision of
the front commander to the missile brigades and battalions and
the missile technical units, the instructions sent by radio must
be sure to be backed up by sending officers of the staff of the
rocket troops and artillery out to the large units and units or
by sending written documents using messenger means of
communications. Unfortunately, in the practice of exercises, this
still is not always done. Sometimes they limit themselves
without good reason to written documents alone; therefore, there
are cases of tardy transmission of instructions to the executors.
Third, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery must
devote itself to immediate working out and transmission of combat
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instructions both during the organization of the march and
subsequently during its conduct. For this we consider it
advisable, using officers of the operations department, to form
two groups: a planning group made up of four or five officers,
and a group for control.
The officers of the planning group participate directly in
working out proposals for the front commander about the
organization of the march of the rocket troops, in drawing up, in
conjunction with the operations directorate, the decision of the
commander for the movement forward of troops, and in working out
the regrouping plan. This same group works out a map of the
regrouping of the rocket troops of the front and maintains it
during the entire movement of the troops.
The officers of the control group are allocated by axes,
each of which involves a missile brigade or a separate missile
battalion. The main tasks of this group are working out, drawing
up, and transmitting combat instructions to the large unit or
unit on their own axis, collecting data on their status,
preparing proposals on matters of their combat employment and
also monitoring the fulfilment of instructions issued.
At the staff of the rocket troops and artillery it is
necessary to have a group of officers from the directorate of
missile and artillery armament of the front, which must prepare,
in short periods of time, sound calculations on the missile
technical support of the troops for the period of the march, take
part in planning the march of the missile technical units, draft
and transmit to them the necessary combat instructions on the
basis of the decision of the troop commander, and also monitor
their fulfilment.
It should be taken into consideration that already during
the march, including during its conclusion, the situation may
change abruptly in the enemy's favor, which will require the
deployment of all or a certain part of the rocket troops to
deliver nuclear and chemical strikes. Therefore, in the process
of moving troops forward it becomes necessary not only to
systematically collect and study data on the situation and status
of the large units and units of rocket troops, but also to assign
and refine the combat tasks for them in good time.
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If in the beginning of the march the refinement of tasks
usually comes down to changing routes, refining the times of
individual marches and the procedure for materiel-technical
support, etc., in the final stage of the march, the tasks of
delivering nuclear and chemical strikes can already be assigned
or refined, i.e., the tasks directly according to the plan of the
impending operation of the reserve front being committed to the
engagement or in support of the fronts operating forward if the
situation requires this.
It is necessary to keep in mind that carrying out control
during the march, when the command posts of the brigades and
battalions are being relocated simultaneously, is extremely
complicated, since the existing means of communications do not
provide communications at great distances on the move. And the
use of messenger means (helicopters) for communications is, to a
certain degree, limited, inasmuch as marches basically are made
under night conditions.
Therefore, in organizing control for the time of the march,
it is necessary to provide for a number of measures that ensure
the continuity of communications with the commanders of the large
units and units of the rocket troops of the front. In
particular, considering that the control posts of the front will
be moving during the march in echelon, it is advisable that the
staff personnel of the rocket troops and artillery be allocated
among the command post, the forward command post, and the
operations groups of the front staff. The operations groups
absolutely must have radio and messenger means specially for
communications with the missile and missile technical large units
and units. The officer missile specialists within the operations
groups must have the necessary radio data so that, if they have a
limited number of radio sets at their disposal, they can, at the
necessary moment, get into any radio net or radio link that
includes the radios of the missile and missile technical large
units and units.
If maintaining continuous radio communications with the
large units and units on the march does not work out, radio
traffic sessions should be organized. They can be used by the
commanders of the missile large units and units for reports, and
by the staff of the rocket troops and artillery for transmitting
instructions to the executors. For such radio traffic, it is
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necessary to determine in advance the time and lines for setting
up the radio sets of the staff of the rocket troops and artillery
and the missile brigades and battalions, and also to establish
the duration of their manning in the places where they are set up
and on the march routes. Experience has shown that, with good
organization of radio traffic, the stops and setting up of radio
sets have almost no effect on the rates of march.
In the operations groups of the front staff that are sent
out to the staffs of the fronts operating forward should be
included officers of the stoma f-of the rocket troops and
artillery. They must collate data on the nuclear strikes
delivered against enemy targets by the means of the operating
fronts, refine the data on their capabilities, study the terrain
and ether it is provided with a topogeodetic grid, for the
purpose of determining the possible deployment areas of the
missile and missile technical large units and units of their own
front. Besides that, if resubordination of operating armies or
divisions to the reserve front is foreseen, these officers
collate all the necessarydata on the combat strength of their
rocket troops.
The areas and times of deployment of the missile technical
units during the march must be specified in such a way that, by
the moment of commitment of the troops of the front to the
engagement, they will be able to prepare and supply the missile
large units and units with the necessary number of missiles which
will suffice for at least two or three days of the operation. If
it is desirable to have the missile technical units of the
operating fronts participate in the preparation of missiles when
necessary, all that is required is to coordinate this matter
beforehand with the commanders of the fronts.
The staff of the rocket troops and artillery must constantly
have accurate data on the number of missiles in the missile
technical and missile large units and units, and on the times for
completing their assembly, preparation, and delivery.,For this
purpose, in exercises, an appropriate report system has been
worked out and practiced according to which each missile
technical unit reported at an established time to the staff of
the rocket troops and artillery of the front about the completion
of the assembly and preparation of its available missiles, their
dispatch to the missile large units and units, and the receipt of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302580001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302580001-8
Page 16 of 16 Pages
missiles from the central point. The missile large units and
units in turn report on the receipt of each missile and the time
of dispatching the unloaded transport vehicle to the mobile
missile technical base of the front. The reports must be
transmitted, as a rule, over the technical means of
communications at "above precedence", just like the commands for
carrying out the launch of missiles.
Such are a few observations on the questions of control of
the rocket troops of a reserve front during its movement forward
for commitment to an engagement. It seems to us that this timely
and complex topic requires further working out and discussion on
the pages of the Collection and exchange of the experience of
operational exercises of the military districts, as well as of
special exercises conducted with the rocket troops.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302580001-8