MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE ROLE AND CONTROL OF MISSILE UNITS IN THE GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302570001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
22 November 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Role and
Control o Missile Units in the Ground
Forces
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". This article examines various views
on how rocket troops should be employed and controlled in an
attempt to better define their capabilities and role in combat
actions. The author concludes that tactical missile units, with
their more powerful nuclear weapons, must be held distinct from
artillery and must be considered the basis for combined-arms
operations. He examines both sides of the question as to whether
the combined-arms or rocket troops and artillery staff is in the
better position to control the missile units, asserting a need
for clearer delimitation of functions between the two with the
combined-arms commander having overall authority. T le
appeared in Issue No. 4 (6S) for 1962-F -
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2. Because the source of this report is extremely 50X1-HUM
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this nuhl;cation have been assigned n
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 20 Pages
XTOPCREIT
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Intelligence Intormation '~pecial Report
Page 3 of 20 Pages,
50X1-HUM
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1962
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Role and Control of
Missile Units in the
Ground Forces
N
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Militar Thou ht". The author of this article is
Colonel General o Artillery N. Fomin. This article examines
various views on how rocket troops should be employed and
controlled in an attempt to better define their capabilities and
role in combat actions. The author concludes that tactical
missile units, with their more powerful nuclear weapons, must be
held distinct from artillery and must be considered the basis for
combined-arms operations. He examines both sides of the question
as to whether the combined-arms or rocket troops and artillery
staff is in the better position to control the missile units,
asserting a need for clearer delimitation of functions bet5oX1:HUM
the two with the combined-arms commander having overall
authority. Other topics touched upon include the need to shorten
the time required for reconnaissance and assignment of targets,
and to retain the brigade headquarters in the chain of command.
End of Summary
C'nmmant
e au or, now retire has written
articles concerning the importance of artillery in modern warfare
DATE
22 November 1976
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The Role and Control of Missile Units in the Ground Forces
by
Colonel General of Artillery N. Fomin
In, spite of the enormous attention. which has been paid in
recent years to questions of the theory and practice of the
combat employment of rocket troops, so far one observes quite
contradictory views on their role and place in the ground forces.
Everyone acknowledges the effect of rocket troops on the methods
and forms of conducting a battle and operation and on their end
result; however, the extent of this effect is appraised
variously. If, in respect to the strategic rocket forces,
everyone agrees that their strikes are able to decide the outcome
of a war, operational-tactical and especially tactical missiles
are often assigned the overly modest role of an, albeit
extraordinarily powerful, nonetheless auxiliary means. Many
believe that the strikes of the army and front missile brigades
-- even massed strikes and those directed at the destruction of
the main enemy grouping -- in the final analysis only support the
accomplishment of tasks, only create favorable conditions for the
actions of troops.
The leading role of missile/nuclear strikes is formally
acknowledged and the working out of a combined-arms decision
begins with them; however, time and again, the main thing in the
concept is considered to be the selection of axes of the actions
of the armies and divisions and the correct drawing of the arrows
designating these axes. It is enough to take a look at many of
our operations plan maps to be convinced of this: among the
arrows piercing through the whole operational disposition of the
enemy and his territory we often have difficulty finding the
targets to be subjected to missile/nuclear strikes, which, in
addition, are scattered over enormous spaces. We are not even
mentioning the cases of separately representing the use of
nuclear means and the actions of ground forces on different maps
-- here, as it were, not only is the leading role of nuclear
strikes graphically denied, but the very organic connection of
nuclear strikes and troop actions is even torn apart.
There are very definite opinions about the auxiliary role of
tactical missiles. Such a point of view was asserted, for
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instance, in the main report at a conference in one of our
leading academies, where tactical missile units were regarded not
as the main means in the hands of the command, but as a means
supporting the actions of divisions.
Along with this, a considerable number of comrades, although
they do not belittle the role and importance of rocket troops,
regard them as a distinctive kind of artillery -- with brand new
qualities, it is true -- to which all the fundamental doctrines
proper to classical artillery are supposedly applicable. They
try to resolve nearly all the questions of the organization and
control of rocket troops by analogy with artillery. These views
were reflected, in particular, in the proposal to establish
missile corps, which resurrects the unjustified idea of artillery
corps, or in the demand -- again by analogy with artillery -- to
give rocket troops their own means of reconnaissance without
taking into consideration that these troops do not have the right
to act upon the reconnaissance data, i.e., to independently
select a target and independently open fire.
Underlying these and other views on the role and importance
of rocket troops, in our opinion, is chiefly an underestimation
of the power of nuclear means. Even for one who has seen the
effect of one actual nuclear burst it is still not easy to
imagine the whole enormous picture of desolation from a massed
nuclear strike. It is all the more difficult to do this on the
basis of those simulated "nuclear" bursts, immeasurably removed
from reality, which we carry out in exercises, where the troops
of the sides often safely continue to operate in spite of the
losses inflicted on them by "nuclear strikes".
In the final analysis, both those who blindly copy the
methods of employing rocket troops from artillery and those who
see the actions of the ground forces large units, instead of
nuclear strikes, as the basis of every decision, and consequently
consider rocket troops a means or even a branch arm that merely
establishes favorable conditions for the successful development
of an operation, are essentially placing rocket troops on a level
with artillery.
Finally, it should be said that, although most of our
commanders correctly understand the role and place of rocket
troops, many of them, however, in our opinion, draw incorrect
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conclusions in the area of their actual employment in a battle
and operation.
The chief merit of missiles, by virtue of which they are
rapidly developing and forcing such long-tried means as aviation
and artillery to make room, as is known, is their capability for
delivering a nuclear warhead to virtually any distance. The
increase in range by tens and hundreds of times and in the yield
of a strike by millions of times in comparison with artillery has
caused missiles to occupy the first place in the system of fire
means of the ground forces. Rocket troops are the main force in
the hands of a combined-arms command through which it endeavors
to accomplish the main part of the tasks confronting it.
Missile/nuclear means are superior to the capabilities of
combined-arms large units for destroying an enemy (a whole unit
of fire of artillery shells of a motorized rifle division
destroys sheltered personnel in an area less than half that of
one 20-kiloton tactical missile); therefore, a combined-arms
commander cannot turn their use over to anyone.
The rocket troops, being the ground forces' main means of
delivering nuclear warheads, to a considerable degree determine
the actions of these forces and, as it were, set the tone of the
whole operation. Their strikes constitute the basis of the
combined-arms decision for the operation. These strikes, as it
were, lead the ground forces large units along after them. It is
not the axes of ground forces actions that determine the strikes
of the rocket troops but, on the contrary, the series of
missile/nuclear strikes that determines the axes of movement of
the troops who exploit their results.
Tactical missiles are no exception in this respect, as some
comrades think; after all, for a division in the zone of its
actions the nuclear strikes of tactical missiles with yields of
10 to 20 kilotons each have the same importance as the strikes of
operational-tactical missiles do for an army. The actions of
divisions and the success of their advance (or defense) are
determined by correctly delivered nuclear strikes independently
of to whom these strikes belong or by whom they are delivered --
the army or the division itself. The commander of an army will
carefully consider how and where to deliver missile/nuclear
strikes and then direct the actions of his army for the purpose
of best exploiting their results. Every division commander will
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approach the solution of the question of using his
missile/nuclear means in exactly the same way. He will also hit
the most important targets with them and exploit the results of
his own nuclear strikes. Therefore, not assigning tasks to
operational-tactical missiles in the form of "support",
"assistance", etc., neither should we do this in respect to the
missile means of divisions. Nuclear weapons will not cease to be
nuclear weapons, no matter whose hands they are in or how few
they are.
In striving to assign rocket troops a place corresponding to
their capabilities we are far from having any idea of exalting
them beyond measure and transforming them into a universal means
meant to accomplish all tasks. Such means do not exist, and
success is achieved only by the joint efforts of all branch arms
and branches of the armed forces on the basis of properly
executed cooperation among them. However, this achievement is
not possible without a clarification of the characteristics and
capabilities, of the role and importance of each of the branches
and branch arms.
Having a negative effect on the development of correct views
on the role and place of rocket troops was the regulation
definition of rocket troops as missile artillery, as a result of
which many provisions, including terminology, began to be
automatically carried over from the area of artillery to the area
of missiles. And this, in turn, introduced no little confusion
into the employment of rocket troops. We propose discarding the
term "missile artillery" as incorrect.
Of course, it is not by accident that missiles, the youngest
type of weapon, happened to be combined in the same hands with
artillery, that very ancient type of armament. Although there is
a great difference between them, the basic combat characteristic
of both is fire. It is also perfectly obvious that all fire
tasks cannot be accomplished by missiles; many of them must be
performed by the fire of artillery, which is now consequently
called upon to assist missile units. In addition, missiles will
by no means always dominate in this or that battle and engagement
-- in these cases artillery must, though to a feeble degree,
replace the action of tactical missiles. 50X1-HUM
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Thus, missiles and artillery have been bound by firm bonds,
with artillery, which was once called the "god of war", having
now become, as it were, the assistant and deputy of missiles. In
this unequal union, the roles are distributed such that the more
tasks missiles accomplish, the less, generally speaking,
artillery is required. This dependence of missiles and artillery
can best be exploited, naturally, by one chief, who is the chief
of rocket troops and artillery.
To note a dependence does not transform rocket troops into
artillery nor change their status. If artillery, whose tasks
stem entirely from the tasks of the ground forces large units and
are completely subordinate to them, may in this sense be called
the servant of the ground forces, then missiles necessarily play,
as has already been said, a leading role since their tasks
constitute the basis of the combined-arms decision.
Artillery, being a sort of servant of the ground forces, is
even more dependent on missiles, since it hits those targets (of
the number supposed to be hit, of course) which have been left
untouched by missiles.
The role of missiles and artillery does not change even in
those cases where the greater part of fire tasks are accomplished
by artillery means and where it would appear the role of
artillery prevails. No matter how few missiles there are, the
idea would never come into anyone's head to first determine the
fire tasks of artillery and then turn over the rest of the tasks
to the missile/nuclear means.
All that has been said inevitably leads us to the conclusion
that rocket troops are not artillery, that operational-tactical
missile large units and units are a completely new, and the most
powerful, branch arm of the ground forces, capable, by virtue of
its unprecedented strength, of accomplishing the main part of the
tasks confronting the troops. The employment of this branch arm
underlies every combined-arms decision, forming its core, and is
therefore the personal prerogative of the combined-arms
commander.
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The different understanding of the role and place of rocket
troops,,which was spoken of above, naturally also leads to
differences in the area of their practical employment. Moreover,
this can be seen in the control of rocket troops, some questions
of which we intend to dwell on, without touching on all aspects
of it.
In conformity with the viewpoints examined on the role and
place of rocket troops, we can observe in the area of their
control two basic and, to a certain degree, contradictory
tendencies and one, as it were, intermediate one.
Underlying one of the tendencies is, undoubtedly, the
correct view of rocket troops as the main destructive means in
the hands of the combined-arms command. This is the tendency
toward maximum concentration of the functions of control of
rocket troops and their fire in the hands of the combined-arms
commander and, by the same token, toward the inevitable
diminishing of the role of the chief of the rocket troops and his
staff in this matter and their transformation into technical
executors supporting the decision.
The second tendency, to a considerable extent determined by
the view of rocket troops as a sort of artillery, wherein many
methods and rules of control of artillery are mechanically
carried over to the rocket troops, consists in the endeavor to
preserve for the chief of rocket troops and his staff the
functions which belong to them in the area of the use of
artillery.
And, finally, the "intermediate" tendency is expressed in
the voluntary transfer on the part of the combined-arms commander
of all the functions of fire control to the chief of the rocket
troops, which took place, for instance, in the command-staff
exercise in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany in May 1961,
where the chief of the rocket troops and artillery was assigned
only so-called "operational tasks".
The first two tendencies, especially the second, had their
effect on, for instance, the exercise in the Carpathian Military
District in July of last year, where, on the one side, "...the
matter reached the point that targets for the delivery of nuclear
strikes which had to be hit by army means were determined not by
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the commander of the army, but by the chief of rocket troops and
artillery of the front and transmitted to the army by his staff
directly to the staff-of the rocket troops and artillery of the
army" (from the presentation at the critique by Marshal of the
Soviet Union, Comrade V. I. Chuykov). The army commanders often
did not know that their subordinates were delivering nuclear
strikes. On the other side, we see in the same place the removal
from the authority of the chief of rocket troops and artillery of
even such a technical function as computation of the coordinates
of the aiming points.
A study of these tendencies shows that the correct solution
of the questions of fire control of the rocket troops lies
primarily in the area of a rational distribution of the functions
of control among the various command levels. In practice, we
usually have different variants of this distribution. We believe
that, without a solution of this question, without a precise
distribution of the responsibility, rights, and duties of each
level, the normal control of troops in general, and more so of
the fire of rocket troops, is impossible.
Above all, it is necessary for everyone to agree that rocket
troops, as has already been said, are not artillery, that, by
virtue of the very great effect of their strikes -- even with the
launch of one nuclear missile -- they have to participate in the
accomplishment of the main task; therefore their employment,
which is in no way "supporting", cannot be transferred to the
authority of anyone else, and that means that not one nuclear
missile can be launched without the decision of the combined-arms
commander. Here one cannot fail to see the enormous fundamental
difference from artillery, where it is reprehensible not only for
the chief of artillery, but even for the commander of an
artillery battery not to open fire independently on an
advantageous target. Those chiefs of rocket troops and artillery
who try to control the fire of rocket troops in exactly the same
way and on the same principles as artillery fire are absolutely
wrong.
Fire control, as is known, begins with reconnaissance and
the assignment of tasks. And if'in respect to artillery we often
consider this "beginning" to be the moment when reconnaissance
data are received in the artillery staff and the ensuing decision
of the artillery chief to hit the target, then the "beginning" of
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the fire control of the rocket troops should be considered the
moment when reconnaissance data are received in the combined-arms
staff and the decision is made by the combined-arms commander to
employ a nuclear missile.
It does not, of course, follow from what has been said that
the chief of rocket troops and artillery must be deprived of all
creative functions and converted into some sort of relay level
for the decisions of the formation commander. Going in this
direction, one might easily come to the idea of also abolishing
the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery. After all, if the
formation commander must himself indicate to the chief of rocket
troops and artillery the coordinates of the target, the yield of
the warhead of the missile, and other data, and he can do this
only with the help of his staff (for he will not have time for
all these calculations), then it is natural that either the
combined-arms staff must have its own T/0 specialists, or those
persons who work on these matters in the staff of the rocket
troops and artillery will have to be transferred at least
temporarily to the combined-arms staff. And this is the
abolition of staffs of rocket troops and artillery as such. It
is therefore not by chance that statements are appearing (for
instance in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", No. 4 5 or which propose to e iminate them.
Considering such proposals an extreme, and explaining them
by an inadequate representation of the content and volume of work
of artillery staffs, we think that the delimitation of functions
of the staffs must be done in such a way that not one principally
combined-arms function is infringed upon and that the role of the
chief of rocket troops and artillery and his staff are not
reduced to a level that makes the desirability of their existence
dubious.
Thus, we consider it unwarranted to endeavor to force the
combined-arms commander (even with the assistance of his staff)
to indicate the coordinates of a target to be destroyed. In
actual fact, to a combined-arms commander making a decision for a
missile/nuclear strike, it is important not what coordinates it
is delivered upon, but that precisely the target assigned be
destroyed; even the yield of the warhead is not important, but
getting the necessary degree of destruction of the target is --
which, as is known, in itself already determines the yield
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required. The question arises, what if an error has slipped into
the coordinates received -- who will bear the responsibility for
the miss? If the subordinate is going to check his commander and
make corrections in the figures received or doubt them
altogether, then this will not facilitate, but hinder, fire
control.
In our opinion, the chief of rocket troops and artillery in
all cases of the delivery of a missile/nuclear strike must
receive from his commander the following data: the strike target
and the required degree of its destruction, the permissible
number of missiles to use (not necessarily with an indication of
their yield), the type of bursts, and the time of delivery of the
strikes. All the remaining data are obtained in the staff of the
rocket troops and artillery by means of calculations and are
acted upon, of course, after approval by the formation commander.
When the question is resolved in this way there is no violation
of the prerogatives of the formation commander, the combined-arms
staff is not burdened with jobs that do not much pertain to it,
and at the same time, the chief of rocket troops and artillery
and his staff are not deprived of their inherent functions and
necessary responsibility. And control as a whole is built upon a
more precise foundation.
Of course, it is necessary to resolutely overcome the
tendency to do everything only through one's "own"
(combined-arms) staff on the basis of the current conviction that
it "must know all" and be "posted" on every single thing. This
leads not only to a detrimental duplication of work and to
impersonality and lack of responsibility, but also to an
excessive overloading of the combined-arms staff. This last will
inevitably entail an enlargement of its T/O, which in no way
agrees with present requirements to have small but efficient
control organs.
Having no opportunity to examine the delimitation of all the
contiguous functions of combined-arms and artillery staffs, we
should like to turn our attention to only one of the questions of
planning. In a report at one of the science conferences, for
instance, the demand was put forth to transfer the planning of
the relocation of rocket troops to the combined-arms staff. The
reason for this demand was the necessity of considering the
nature of tasks and time 'Limits for fulfilling them by the
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troops, their rates of advance, the range of fire of the missiles
and other capabilities of the rocket troops, and also the
specific features of the theater and "other operational factors".
It was considered that all this can be done only by the
combined-arms staff.
The question arises, why can the staff of rocket troops and
artillery not take all this into account? Is it possible that,
in planning the employment of rocket troops and artillery, it
will not be aware of the nature and time limits for fulfilment of
tasks by the troops? Is it possible that it knows less well than
the combined-arms staff the range and capabilities of the rocket
troops? Who, if not the staff of the rocket troops, is to best
know the position and status of the rocket troops and best
calculate the distance of the moves or leapfrogs for the
relocation of any of the battalions in the brigades? Who, if not
the staff of the rocket troops, can most easily coordinate with
all this the reconnaissance of routes and positions and the
timely topogeodetic and other types of preparation of the rocket
troops?
One of the main requirements for the relocation of rocket
troops must be to ensure the constant readiness of the batteries
on alert. The question is, how will the combined-arms staff be
able to take this requirement into account if all the work of the
batteries on alert is planned and organized by the chief of
rocket troops and his staff?
As one can see, the reasons for the proposal being examined
are clearly unconvincing. Here we have a definite manifestation
of the tendency to gather everything into the combined-arms
staff, regardless of whether this is necessary or not.
Finally, one more question -- what fundamental points are
there in the calculations for the relocation of rocket troops
which would force a combined-arms staff, overloaded even without
this, to involve itself with them? After all, what is important
is not that the relocation begins when the distance is settled --
and this is known not only to the combined-arms staff, but also
to every commander of a missile launcher -- what is important is
something else: that, when the troops reach their areas the
rocket troops be ready in a certain strength for the delivery of
strikes. It is precisely this that must be required of the staff
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of the rocket troops and artillery, and it is precisely in this
that the whole substance determining the relocation of rocket
troops lies.
We believe that the relocation of rocket troops must be
planned by the chief of rocket troops and artillery and his
staff, with the closest coordination of all questions with the
operations directorate or department of the staff of the front or
army.
We would especially like to emphasize the intolerability of
having command of missile units which bypasses the appropriate
army or division commander, which took place in the
above-mentioned exercise in the Carpathian Military District.
With such a practice, one cannot demand full responsibility of
the bypassed army or division commanders for the successful
accomplishment of the tasks confronting them, and they are
altogether deprived of the a independence absolutely necessary
under present conditions, as well as of confidence in the success
of their planned methods of actions, since at any time and
utterly unexpectedly their main weapon may be employed contrary
to their concept.
The allocation of the missile means of lower command levels
to the preparation and delivery of massed strikes must be done
through the commanders of these levels, i.e., through the
corresponding army and division commanders. As is known, the
proponents of controlling the fire of rocket troops the same way
as artillery fire object to this. By way of an argument for
having to go over the head of the army commander (or the
appropriate division commander) in individual cases, they usually
cite the necessity of gaining time. However, this is
unconvincing, since massed strikes with the allocation of the
means of lower levels are delivered relatively rarely and in most
cases, taking into consideration the dimensions and nature of the
targets, plenty of time is allotted to their preparation. Besides
that, there is still by no means any certainty that the
transmission by the front commander of his instruction to the
army missile brigade through the army commander and not through
his own chief of rocket troops, and hence the simultaneous
preparation of the strike at the front and army levels, will take
more time than the transmission of the same instruction to the
army through his own chief of rocket troops with "centralized"
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preparation of the strike in the headquarters of the latter. In
both cases, to reach the chief of rocket troops of the army, the
instruction must pass through one level -- through the army
commander in the one case, and in the other -- through the chief
of rocket troops of the front (bypassing the army commander).
The communications of the front commander with the army commander
are undoubtedly better than those of the chief of rocket troops
of the front with the chief of rocket troops of the army, and one
can hardly doubt that they will operate faster in the first case.
As for shortening the time expended in the fire control
process, it is not enough to consider it only within the
framework of the activity of the chief of rocket troops and
artillery. We have already mentioned that the "beginning" of
this control lies higher up -- in the sphere of activity of the
troop commander and his staff. An exercise conducted in the Kiev
Military District in November 1960 gives us very interesting data
(essentially unchanged even now). Thus, within missile brigades
an average of six minutes was spent on assigning tasks; on
assigning tasks to brigades -- an average of 30 minutes; and on
making a decision from the moment data on the enemy were obtained
-- from 60 to 97 minutes. Consequently, 60 to 70 percent of the
total time was spent in the sphere lying outside the work of the
chief of rocket troops and artillery. Further, we know that an
aircraft spends not less than one hour on reconnaissance of a
target and forwarding of its coordinates. And if we take it into
consideration that the batteries on alert open fire in 15 to 20
minutes, then we will see that the whole process of control (when
it is necessary to open fire on one target) takes a lot of time
(around three to 3.5 hours). If one compares this figure with
the time the enemy missile means stay at positions (two to three
hours), then we come to very disturbing conclusions about our
capability for using rocket troops to combat hostile nuclear
means.
In the chain of the control process under examination, we
can see that the weakest links slowing down the whole process the
most are the reconnaissance process and the decision-making
process. This is why, wholeheartedly welcoming measures for
maximum condensation of time in the sphere of activity of the
chief and staff of rocket troops and artillery as well as within
the rocket troops, and fully supporting the demands of creating
for them a specialized automatic control system (forming part of
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the combined-arms system), we wish to turn special attention to
the necessity of most resolutely shortening the time which is
spent at the top.
Unless this is done, automation within the rocket troops
will not substantially change anything. We believe that
improving the process of reconnaissance, accelerating the
transmission and processing of information, speeding up the
process of making the decision for a strike, as well as somewhat
lightening the load of the combined-arms commander and his staff,
which was spoken of above, will help us reduce the intolerable
expenditures of time in the process of controlling the fire of
the rocket troops.
It is to be assumed that the procedure whereby the launch of
nearly every nuclear missile required approval from above has
receded into the past. The fluid nature of an engagement, the
rapid changes in the situation, and the extensive zones of
actions demand that all levels of command be granted greater
independence, in particular, the full right to use the means
entrusted to them. Based on demands to save time, as well as on
the necessity of ensuring the above-indicated independence, we
picture the fire control scheme during the delivery of a nuclear
strike as follows.
The data about every important target than can be subjected
to a nuclear strike which are received by the intelligence
directorate of the front, in the staff of the air army, or in the
staff of the rocket troops, are immediately reported to the
commander of the front, who decides right away who hits the
target with what means and when, and right there he issues an
instruction either to the commander of the air army or to the
chief of rocket troops and artillery of the front (if it is
necessary to use front missile means) or to ti-Fe appropriate army
commander (when army missiles are used). Such a procedure
eliminates the possibility of bypassing the army commander in
assigning a task, as well as wasting time in a number of urgent
cases on analyzing the incoming data in the intelligence
directorate. This general scheme will look about the same in an
army.
The question arises as to whether the chief of rocket troops
should not, for purposes of shortening time, be given the right
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in certain strictly limited cases to independently carry out the
launching of nuclear missiles. We do not see such a possibility.
Even under the conditions of a meeting engagement or the
perfectly clear necessity of delivering a strike on a most
important target, for instance on a means of nuclear attack, the
chief of rocket troops and artillery cannot be certain that its
destruction will be entrusted to him and not to aviation or other
means. No one but the commander of the front or the army can
decide this question. It would seem that another approach to
this question is possible with respect to the firing of chemical
missiles and more so with respect to high-explosive missiles.
However, here too the possibility of fulfilling tasks with other
means and the necessity of a direct decision of the commander on
what means to use in a given case exclude such a supposition.
Nor, in examining the questions of controlling the fire of
the rocket troops, must we lose sight of such factors as the
number of all kinds of missile/nuclear strikes and the possible
daily work load on staffs and units which is directly connected
with the delivery of missile/nuclear strikes. As practice shows,
for an offensive operation a front receives two or three nuclear
missiles per launcher, which averages 12 to 18 missiles for each
front and army missile brigade, and four to six tactical missiles
oo r each division. If we exclude from this the initial nuclear
strike, which is prepared ahead of time and is consequently not
so strictly limited by time as strikes during the offensive, then
we will see that, in the course of an eight- to ten-day
operation, each brigade will have occasion to expend about ten
nuclear missiles, i.e., approximately one missile per day, and
the divisions, fewer than that.
Noting that, from this point of view as well, control of
rocket troop fire sharply differs from control of artillery fire,
which is conducted for days with immeasurably greater intensity
that requires the constant and, in fact, incessant work of staffs
and communications means, we see that the firing of nuclear
missiles is conducted sporadically and very rarely, and timed
mainly to decisive events in the operation. This circumstance to
a considerable degree facilitates controlling the fire of the
rocket troops and forces us to believe that the basic form of
missile/nuclear strikes during an operation will he single and
grouped strikes.
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In search of ways to improve control of the rocket troops,
no few recommendations are expressed about changing their
organizational structure. Thus, for instance, the necessity in a
number of cases for the transmission of commands by the chief of
rocket troops and artillery directly to battalions sometimes
gives rise to proposals about eliminating the brigade
headquarters. We consider these proposals unacceptable, since
they are made without taking into account the other activities of
the brigade commander or the minuses connected with the necessity
of controlling a large number of subordinates. If it is a
question of eliminating intermediate levels, then these should,
in our opinion, rather be the battalions. We cannot forget that
the classical triangle organization, which is still experienced
in our troop structure, corresponded to earlier, now already
obsolete, means of control. The introduction of such new means
as electronic computers, which are rapidly changing the whole
system of control, must inevitably have its effect also on the
organization of troops. We believe that the use of the
electronic computer at the brigade level with the preparation of
the necessary calculations immediately for all its batteries will
undoubtedly be more economical than the availability in a brigade
of three such computers operating with one-third the load. This
is why we lean more toward eliminating the battalions in brigades
than the brigades themselves if they are equipped with the
appropriate electronic computers.
The above-mentioned proposal to establish major missile
large units of the missile corps type also is based on the
interests of "convenience" of control, with the most "convenient"
method of control being considered centralized control regardless
of the situation. Such a proposal is in sharp contradiction to
the requirements for strengthening the independence of large
units and formations, requirements stemming from the new features
of modern operations, changing methods of troop actions, and the
very picture of modern engagements.
The recommendations, which have something in common with
this proposal, to increase the total number of missile launchers
twofold or threefold stemming from the desire to somehow or other
bring the number of launchers we have to a level with the number
of launchers in the armies of the probable enemy, are based on
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the false notion that the ratio of launchers alone can play a
noticeable role in achieving superiority. It is perfectly
obvious that launchers themselves do not inflict damage and that
the decisive factor is the ratio of warheads (which we do not
always take into account) and the skill in employing them.
Increasing the number of launchers will not entail an
automatic increase in the issue of nuclear missiles; and if the
issue of missiles for a front offensive operation now provides,
as we have seen, for the launch of an average of only one nuclear
missile per day per brigade from six launchers, then the question
is, how many launchers will stand idle every day if there is only
one missile for 18 launchers?
In conclusion, let us touch upon one more question.
Many comrades quite reasonably propose increasing the
maximum range of all types of missiles in service with the ground
forces. In supporting these proposals, we would only like to add
that 1,000 kilometers and even more, along with the indisputable
advantages, will at the same time entail also a good number of
difficulties which will complicate control to an extraordinary
degree.
Endeavoring to reduce the number of relocations or even to
acquire the capability to accomplish tasks with missiles during
an entire operation from basically one area will lead to such an
extension of communications as will not only require completely
new and accordingly cumbersome radio sets, but it will also make
these communications not too dependable. It is obvious that the
fire control of units hundreds of kilometers away will be
complicated drastically and the time necessary for it, which we
are endeavoring to shorten as much as possible, trying to save
even minutes, will certainly increase. It also appears obvious
that the maintaining of cooperation between the missile/nuclear
means and the troops exploiting their strikes will be highly
complicated. Finally, new difficulties will arise in controlling
the missile technical rear services, the various levels of which
will be many hundreds of kilometers from one another. It is not
out of the question that part of them, together with the missile
brigade itself, may happen to be beyond the range of the control
radio station and the rear control post.
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In this brief article we have not, of course, been able to
examine fully enough the theme we have touched upon. In
particular, we have intentionally not dealt with all the
questions of fire control which lie in the sphere of activity of
the chiefs of rocket troops and the commanders of missile large
units and units. From the sum total of questions making up the
content of the theme, we have endeavored to single out those
which have fundamental importance and upon the correct solution
of which the successful combat employment of rocket troops
depends. In setting forth our views on these main questions, we
are by no means inclined to consider our treatment of them the
only correct one, since we understand quite well that in
resolving the questions raised, by no means have all the
arguments yet been exploited. If the article to some extent
reduces the difference in viewpoints and helps work out more
correct views on the rocket troops and control of them, then the
objective established in this article can be considered to have
been achieved.
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