MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): FRONT AVIATION IN ARMY OPERATIONS AND A COMBINED-ARMS BATTLE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 27, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 11, 1976
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0.pdf | 318.11 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Page 4 of 8 Pages
50X1 -HUM
Front Aviation in Army Operations
and a Combined-Arms Battle
by
General-Mayor of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov
The practical value of the textbook Front Aviation in Army Operations
and a Combined-Arms Battle,* drafted by a team of authors of the Air Forces
Department of the Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze consists in the fact
that it sets forth briefly information about the aviation equipment in
service in front aviation, the principles of combat actions of the
aviation, its purpose, the combat characteristics and capabilities of each
type of aviation, the tasks and methods of accomplishing them, and all the
matters of organizing and conducting the combat actions of the front
aviation in army operations and in a battle.
In examining the principles of combat actions, the authors rightly
emphasize that the front aviation is intended for joint actions with the
ground forces. This isimportant, considering that, in some articles,
assertions are sometimes encountered that the front aviation must support
the actions of the ground forces or reinforce 7ari-trengthen their fire.
By joint actions are understood actions of the troops of the front and
the aviation, coordinated as to time, place, and targets, and directed
toward the achievement of the final objective of the operation in a short
time and with the fewest losses. The actions of the front aviation have
great importance for the success of the operation, being The most effective
means of hitting small-size and moving targets, which constitute more than
half of all existing targets in the zone of an army. Besides that, the
aviation is capable of delivering strikes against targets in the tactical
and operational depth of the enemy, switching its efforts from one axis to
another, conducting constant aerial observation of enemy actions, observing
sizeable areas in his depth and obtaining reliable data about him in a
short time.
* Front Aviation in Army Operations and a Combined-Arms Battle. Textbonv
50X1-HUM
approved by the Commander-In-Chief of the Air Forces. M. V. Frunze
Military Academy publication, 1964. 251 pp.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Page 5 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
In the textbook, the tasks of the front aviation in army operations
are formulated and given a brief definition. These include: support of
troops, cover of troops and rear installations against air strikes, conduct
of aerial reconnaissance, and landing of tactical airborne landing forces.
In revealing the essence of air support, the authors indicate that its
main content is the destruction of the means of nuclear attack and
radiotechnical means, and the neutralization of enemy troops in the
tactical and immediate operational depth. The depth of air support is
determined by the tactical operating radius of pairs and flights of
fighter-bombers at low altitudes and amounts to 150 to 200 kilometers.
The task of cover of troops and rear installations with the forces of
the fighter aviation ought, in our opinion, to have been examined not on an
army but on a front scale. The fact is that fighters must accomplish this
task by intercepting and destroying air targets on the distant approaches
to the zone of actions of the entire front. This is caused by the
following circumstances.
First of all, by the striving of the probable enemy to ever more
widely develop and employ from delivery aircraft air-to-surface missiles,
whose launching against targets can be carried out from far beyond the
range of the front surface-to-air missiles. Thus, the Hound Dog missile
employed by B-52 aircraft can be launched at low altitudes from a distance
of 500 kilometers from the target, and at high altitudes from a distance of
1,200 kilometers.
Secondly, delivery aircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles, after
being hit by surface-to-air missiles, fall into the disposition of the
troops on the ground, which is extremely disadvantageous. Calculations and
actual flights carried out to intercept air targets have shown that, from
an airborne alert zone located near the front line, given a target flight
speed of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers per hour and existing detection radars,
the line of commitment to action of fighters may be 70 to 90 kilometers
forward of the zone. This ensures intercepting and destroying high-speed
air targets and delivery aircraft carrying nuclear bombs and missiles
before their approach to our troops. 50X1-HUM
Thirdly, the command of the US Air Force intends to have in a field
army over 1,000 reconnaissance, transport, and auxiliary aircraft and
helicopters. The intensity of flights of these forces in the 200 to 250
kilometers of the zone beyond the forward edge will be exceptionally high.
Only fighter aviation is capable of penetrating this zone and intercepting
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Page 6 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
and destroying the transport and auxiliary aircraft and helicopters. This
is why the task of covering the troops of the army with fighters must be
accomplished for the entire front and according to its plan.
Naturally, for a tank army operating apart from the remaining forces
of the front, or a combined-arms army operating on a separate axis, part of
the forces of the fighter aviation will be allocated for purposes of their
immediate cover against air strikes.
In speaking of the principles of the combat employment of aviation,
the authors examine in detail its massed employment, centralized control,
cooperation with the ground forces, continuity and surprise of actions.
This is right. But the constant combat readiness of the aviation to fulfil
combat tasks and its employment primarily to hit mobile and small-size
objects (targets) on the ground have great importance now. It has been
established by research that a pair of SU-7B aircraft is capable, with
cannon fire and rockets (54 rockets on one aircraft), of knocking out of
action or destroying a launcher (Honest John, Lacrosse, Mace) or a gun of
the atomic artillery, a radiotechnical station, and other similar
small-size ground targets.
The actions of the front aviation when fulfilling combat tasks by
subunits, flights, pairs, and single crews should be considered new. The
current speeds of the new types of aircraft, the increased power of the
weapons employed by them, and the high effectiveness of the enemy means of
air defense exclude, in present-day conditions, flying to targets of
actions and attacking them in large aircraft groups as was done in the last
war. Nowadays, successful fulfilment of the combat tasks of the front
aviation can be achieved primarily by the skilful actions of small groups
or even single aircraft with their surprise appearance at extremely low (50
to 100 meters) altitudes.
Deserving of attention are the methods recommended by the authors for
determining target coordinates by aerial photographs, by use of the
tactical bombing system, by use of television equipment, and by actual
observation. In this matter, it is stressed that, to ensure the necessary
accuracy -- 150 meters for targets situated up to 100 kilometers, and 200
meters for targets situated beyond 100 kilometers -- the first two methods
will find most application: aerial photographs and use of the tactical
bombing system. The latter method is extremely effective because the time
spent on determining the target coordinates is not great -- 12 to 20 50X1-HUM
minutes.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Page 75af1 8HuPmages
The authors consider that, for air support of the armies, up to 60 to
70 percent of all the resources of the fighter-bombers and part of the
forces of the bombers and cruise missiles can be allocated. The number of
nuclear bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads may constitute up to 20 to
25 percent of the whole quantity of nuclear warheads allocated for an army
operation. Such an allocation of flight resources and nuclear warheads is
possible. However, it can hardly be considered correct that, besides the
fighter-bomber aviation, part of the bombers will be allocated for support
of the armies.
The fact is that the bomber aviation complement of the air army is
usually limited (not more than one division). At the same time, it is
faced with two important tasks to be accomplished for the entire front:
combat with the missile/nuclear means and operational reserves loEFTE
beyond the range of the fighter-bombers and the army missile means.
Bombers are more advantageously used to accomplish these tasks in
cooperation with the rocket troops of the front.
Set forth in sufficient detail in the textbook are the matters of
organizing cooperation of the front aviation with the ground forces.
Attention is drawn to two important principles.
First, as to the role of the operations group of the air army. The
experience of many exercises, especially the exercise conducted in July
1964 in the Moscow Military District with the participation of the
professors and instructors of four military academies, shows that the
operations group is the most rational connecting link between the
combined-arms (tank) army and the air army. The constant presence of the
operations group at the command post of the combined-arms (tank) army and
the availability of radio communications with the command post of the air
army and the aviation in the air, especially the fighter-bomber aviation,
ensures its continuous cooperation with the advancing troops. Under these
conditions, the chief of the operations group knows all the decisions of
the commander of the combined-arms (tank) army, promptly refines the tasks
of the aviation with him and transmits them to those who are to carry them
out, informs the staff of the army about the actions of the air army, and
continually reports to the commander of the air almy about all the events
taking place in the offensive (defensive) zone of this army. 50X1-HUM
Second, in order to maintain continuous cooperation of aviation with
troops, timely airfield maneuvering of the air units is important. Close
basing makes it possible for aviation to appear quickly when requested and
to operate to a great depth. Therefore, the textbook quite rightly
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0
Page 8 V;If_liliptues
emphasizes the necessity of seizing enemy airfields with ground forces --
sometimes even with specially allocated detachments, and the rendering of
all-round assistance to air units in mine clearing and restoration of
captured airfields.
One cannot, however, agree with the authors' assertion that
cooperation of the aviation with the troops on the ground is provided by
allocating them air units (air large units, pp. 196-200). Under
present-day conditions, for support of combined-arms (tank) armies there
are allocated not air units, much less air large units, but flight
resources in terms of aircraft sorties or squadron sorties. Therefore it
would be more correct to speak of air units fulfilling the task of support
of the troops.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302560001-0