MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ACTIONS OF FRONT AVIATION IN THE FIRST OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF THE FRONT IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302510001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
27 October 1976
M TJRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Actions of Front
Aviation in the First Offensive Operation
of the Front in the Initial Period of War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'TJ.ilita Thought". This
article presents critica comments on a previous article on the subject,
taking particular issue with the operational disposition of air forces and
removal of aircraft to dispersal airfields. The author also criticizes the
previous article's presentation of air support, stating this concept as a
specific group of tasks to be carried out with conventional weapons in
cooperation with ground forces. He agrees that air defense should have one
overall conviander for aviation and surface-to-air missiles and that the air
army commander is in the best position to assume this function and
reallocate air forces as required. This article appeared in Issue No. 1
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. tion have been
assigned
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1964
N
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Actions of Front Aviation in the First Offensive
Operation of the Front in the Initial Period of War
Documentary
Summa
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Though". The author of this article is General-fl yor o Aviation S.
Sokolov. This article presents critical comments on a previous article on
the subject, taking particular issue with the operational disposition of
air forces and removal of aircraft to dispersal airfields. The author also
criticizes the previous article's presentation of air support, stating this
concept as a specific group of tasks to be carried out with conventional
weapons in cooperation with ground forces. He agrees that air defense
should have one overall commander for aviation and surface-to-air missiles
and that the air army commander is in the best position to assume this
function and reallocate air forces as required. End of Summary
The SECRET version of :Military Thought was published three times annually
and was distributed down to the level of division comman e
ceased publication at the end of 970
Tank Army" in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962
e author also wrote "Operations of a Front Air Army in Support of a
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Actions of Front Aviation in the First Offensive
Operation of the-Front in the Initial Period of War
by
General-Mayor of Aviation S. Sokolov
In their article, Generals S. Shimanskiy and V. Povarkov* speak about
the necessity of a new organization of the combat actions of the troops and
front aviation in the operations conducted by a front under present
co nditions. We can agree with this in principle owever, in explaining
the content of the combat actions of the aviation, the authors, in cur
opinion, tolerate inaccuracies and fail to argue certain new propositions
sufficiently.
For example, it is indicated that a change in the conditions of
carrying out the initial strike will call for corresponding changes in the
operational disposition of the air army of the front and therefore, they
say, it cannot be stereotyped (p. 54). The thesis is not open to question.
But, only one paragraph later, the authors recommend having, regardless of
the time of day and weather conditions, the same operational disposition of
the grouping of forces participating in the strike.
We cannot, of course, agree with such a proposal. In this case,
striving to simplify the organization of combat actions and not change the
operational disposition of the air army in accordance with a charge in
conditions is exactly that stereotyping which the authors themselves have
come out against.
There is no need to demonstrate that the grouping of the forces of the
front aviation participating in the initial strike will have a different
operational disposition depending on the situatior-, time of day, and
weather conditions.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 2 (63),
1962. F
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Nor can we agree with the reasoning on moving the fighter aviation out
from under a strike. The authors propose immediately moving the fighter
aviation at the first opportunity, just as the other large units of the air
army, to dispersal airfields without awaiting the signal for a sortie to
repel the enemy. But such actions, under certain conditions of the
situation, may not be desirable. Removal to dispersal airfields
immediately reveals the entire airfield network of the front air army,
which was not manifest to the enemy to such an extent earlier; and, too,
actually determining the moment for removal is not all that simple. In
reality, it can be roughly established only when something definite is
known about the initial enemy strike (about which the authors express
doubt) or when a so-called period of threat has set in, and, incidentally,
there may not even be one for the aviation. Thus, determining the moment
for moving the aviation to dispersal airfields is just as complicated as
determining beforehand the time the enemy will deliver his initial strike.
Therefore, we consider it possible to carry out the first sortie of front
fighters to repel the air enemy from permanent airfields, and to effect
their rebasing to dirt airfields (or dispersal airfields) only after they
have fulfilled their tasks. The actions of which the authors speak must be
kept in mind as a possible variant, but far from the best one. At the same
time, let us note that this is a passive method of combating the air enemy
and not always acceptable for fighter aviation. It is supposed to operate
aggressively and try to intercept and destroy the air enemy and not to
escape his attack, flying from airfield to airfield.
If it is allowed that the fighter aviation be removed to dispersal
airfields before a sortie to repel the air enemy, then it is not excluded
that the landing on the new airfields may coincide with the beginning of an
enemy air raid. In such a case, the situation for our fighter aviation
will be less advantageous than that in which an airfield maneuver is not
carried out.
Finally, regarding the question of moving the fighter aviation cut
from under a strike, it is necessary to keep in mind not only the process
itself
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whole series of modifications in questions of
taking over control, basing, and servicing of the redeployed units. But
for this, first of all, it takes time, and, secondly, all the measures
being carried out cannot remain urnoticed by the enemy, which will provoke
definite countermeasures on his part that will hamper the actions of the
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aviation.
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In respect to the other air large units of the air army, especially
those that are not participating in repelling the initial raid of the air
enemy and are not allocated to deliver the initial strike, moving them out
from under the enemy strike in advance should. be recognized as desirable.
Now, concerning air support. In the article being reviewed it is
asserted that air support, both as a term in itself, and even more as a
task of the air army, has lost its significance under present conditions.
Unfortunately, in the final analysis, the authors did not come to a
well-founded conclusion on this question. Having begun correctly with the
idea that the concept of air support has been preserved among us from the
time of the Great Patriotic War, they have not analyzed this phenomenon,
but have limited themselves to a mere assertion: air support reflects the
character of the operational employment of the aviation of the front. Such
a judgment is true in a general way, but its essence is not quite clear and
precise. If we recall the recent past, we can find a stricter definition
of the concept of air support. Let us quote an excerpt from two 1944
documents (Manual on Combat Actions of Ground-Attack Aviation, and Manual
on Combat Actions of Bomber Aviation): "To implement cooperation of the
aviation with ground troops on the battlefield, air large units may s port
the ground troops or be temporarily attached in operational subordination
to them," and further: "Support of ground troops is the basic method of
using the aviation, ensurin its centralized control
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battlefield."
air army, assisting ground troops on the
Thus, by air support was understood coo eration of the aviation with
.ground troops carried out by the forces of the air army with centralized
control. This is, as it were, one form or type of cooperation. The second
type of cooperation of the aviation with ground troops which was employed
during the Great Patriotic War and is written down in the manuals is when
air large units were temporarily attached in operational subordination to
combined-arms commanders.
The question arises: just what are the authors denying? If it is
cooperation of the air army with the ground troops, which formerly was
carried out according to the plan of the air army with its centralized
control, then it is possible that they agree with the other type of
cooperation, in which aviation was temporarily attached in operational
subordination to the combined-arms commanders. But nothing is said about
this in the article. And it comes out that, with the loss of the meaning
of air support, they deny the possibility of cooperation of the air army
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with ground troops altogether. Well, this does not at all agree with the
basic tenet of Soviet military doctrine -- success in a battle and an
operation is achieved by the joint efforts of all the branches of the armed
forces.
We agree that it is really necessary to bring clarity into the concept
of air support. We shall try to set forth what, in our opinion, should now
be understood by the term "air support".
Under present-day conditions of conducting front operations, only
centralized employment of aviation is considered desirable, and its
operational subordination to combined-arms commanders may take place only
in exceptional cases. However, one rust not generalize this and assert
that the air army must carry out all its tasks exclusively according to the
plan of the commander of the front (according to the plan of the air army).
Actually,
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if one analyzes the materials
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for the last five to six years, it can be noted that the commander of the
front formulates the tasks of the air army in the following manner:
-- destroy enemy missile/nuclear weapons and aviation in the offensive
zone of the front;
-- conduct combat with enemy reserves;
-- cover troops and installations of the rear of the front against
enemy air strikes;
-- conduct aerial reconnaissance in the zone of actions of the front
troops (depth of reconnaissance is indicated);
-- support the troops of the tank and combined-arms army (it is
indicated what flight resources of fighter-bombers and bombers to plan for
each of these armies), and other tasks.
We will note that, in the group of front tasks of the air army, under
air support is understood precisely the specific group of tasks of the air
army which it is going to carry out in cooperation with the tank or
combined-arms army. Every commander of a tank or combined-arms army, or.
learning the quantity of flight resources planned for his army, can
determine to which of them air support will be offered to a greater degree.
So, in the practice of military district exercises, the concept of air
support exists; consequently, it has not lost its significance. `Moreover5QXl-HUM
all the combined-arms and air commanders in the military districts
recognize air support and understand it as the specific combat actions of
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the air army (aviation) which are conducted in cooperation with a tank or
combined-arms army according to its plan. Therefore, obviously, it will be
more correct under air support of the troops of a tank or combined-arms
army under present conditions of conducting operations to understand the
combat actions of the air a (front aviation) for destroying
HALF LINES MISSING
tank (combined-arms) army within the scope of the established flight
resources for the given army. It should be stressed that air support
combines only those combat actions of the air army that are conducted
employing only conventional means of destruction. The purpose of air
support is to provide for a rapid offensive y the troops of the
combined-arms or tank army.
The employment of nuclear warheads by the aviation is carried out
according to the decision of the commander of the front in the form of
nuclear strikes for the accomplishment of specific front tasks and may not
be regarded as air support. The results of the accomp sll hment of tasks by
delivering nuclear strikes with the aviation according to the plan of the
front are exploited by the ground troops exactly the same way as the
results of the delivery of nuclear strikes by the rocket troops.
Such a conception of the combat actions of the front aviation makes it
possible to understand the content of air support correctly and it
corresponds to reality without in any way contradicting the principle of
employing nuclear weapons.
Finally, let us dwell on the question of restructuring the
organization of the air defense of the front. In examining the activity of
the front air defense, the authors are right in saying that one commander
muster ear the responsibility for the air defense of the front, and not two,
as happens with the existing organization. In practice, a t e present
time, the commander of the air army bears the responsibility for air cover
of the front troops against enemy air strikes, but the chief of air defense
of the r font has the responsibility for the cover of troops with all the
remaining surface-to-air missile means. In this, they are both subordinate
to the commander of the front and in every individual case they implement
cooperation on the basis oiis instructions. Such cooperation is rather
complex. The rapid changing of the situation or conditions of a nuclear
war will be common, and the commander of the front, in order to provide 50X1-HUM
reliable cover of the front troops, will have to be continually giving
instructions about cooperation between the aviation and the surface-to-air
missile units of the air defense of the front. Such a practice complicates
the work of the front command.
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The problems of air defense of the front would be solved differently
if one commander were to command the fighter aviation and all the
surface-to-air means. The organization of cooperation. between the various
forces of air defense will not require the intervention of the front
commander. Everything will be decided by one person, to whom bot'i the
aviation and the surface-to-air missile units are subordinated.
We fully agree with the authors' proposal to subordinate all the
surface-to-air means of the air defense of the front to the commander of
the air army, and here is why.
First, the quantity of fighter aviation necessary for destroying enemy
air targets may vary, depending on the air situation, and sometimes it will
happen that fighter aviation is not needed at all. In these cases, the
commander of the air army has the opportunity to allocate the fighter
aviation to fulfil other tasks, namely, to support the combat actions of
the bomber or fighter-bomber aviation, and sometimes also for actions
against ground targets. In this case, for fulfilling this task, the
commander of the air army, in case of necessity, always has the capability
of switching over even all the fighter aviation. But if the fighter
aviation is subordinated to the chief of air defense of the front (and
there is such a view), then it will be difficult to utilize it so flexibly.
Second, in case the enemy carries out a massed air raid, the commander
of the air army has the capability, for the time of repelling it, to
allocate part of the forces or all the fighter-bomber aviation. This will
be out of the question if the fighter aviation happens to be subordinated
to the chief of air defense of the front.
Third, the commander of the air army can, to a greater degree,
allocate the forces and means of the fighter-bombers, bombers, and cruise
missiles for strikes against the airfields and the launching positions of
the cruise missiles of the enemy, and consequently, also conduct intensive
aerial reconnaissance of these targets in order to increase the reliability
of averting strikes of the enemy aviation against the troops of the front.
The chief of air defense of the front, though, will not have such
capabilities and means at his disposal.
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