MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ORGANIZATION OF THE CONTROL OF FRONT TROOPS FROM POSTS DESIGNATED TO REPLACE THE MAIN COMMAND POST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302470001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Organization of the Control of Front Troops from Posts
Designated to Replace- the 'Main Command Post
by
General-Mayor N. Reut
Because of their significance, an enemy will regard troop control
posts as the most important and first targets to be destroyed by nuclear
weapons. This applies to both sides. Consequently, it is impossible to
conceive of continuous troop control unless there is advance or anization
of the assumption of control of the front troops by the posts esignate to
replace the main command post in the event the enemy delivers a nuclear
strike against it.
The experience of operational exercises and of practical work in the
troops confirms that these problems have not yet been fully worked out and,
above all, that all the conditions necessary to ensure command of the front
troops from control posts other than the command post have not yet been
created. One begins to fear that the forward command post and the rear
control post of the front and the command post of one of the armies, from
which control of the front troops could first be organized in the event
that the front command post is put out of action, would not be in a
position to ensure stable troop control in an extremely complex situation
unless they were allocated additional officers and reinforced with
communications means.
As we know, the front command post always exercises command over:
reconnaissance, the rocket troops and aviation, the air defense troops, the
combined-arms and tank armies, the reserves, the special troops of the
front and the front rear services, as well as continuous cooperation
between the forces and means and adjacent units. It also maintains
communications with the General Staff. The appropriate organs are located
at the front command post. 50X1-HUM
To successfully control the troops, these organs must be able to:
continuously collect and collate information on the position, status and
nature of actions of the enemy and of their own troops; thoroughly assess
the situation and make timely decisions or report their views on a decision
to the front commander; plan the combat operations of the troops and assign
them tas support cooperation within the front troops and between them
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and adjacent units; provide the troops with everything they need to carry
out their assigned tasks and continuously monitor their execution; and
submit timely reports to the senior chiefs and the General Staff and keep
adjacent units informed.
In connection with this, it is above all necessary that the organs
capable of ensuring ccntrol of the branch arms, services, and of the front
as a whole be located (although at reduced strength) at any control post
from which command of the front troops can be carried out. It is important
that the enemy not detect this post ahead of time and destroy it and the
front command post simultaneously.
According to established views, these tasks can be assigned to the
forward command post of the front, which, as a rule, is set up for the
purpose of controlling the troops operating on the main axis. The
commander of the front will exercise command from this post in the event
that it becomes 0i-cult to do so from the command post or it is necessary
that he exert a direct influence on the course of combat operations. The
chiefs of the primary directorates, branch arms and special troops and
their subordinate officers usually come to the forward command post with
the commander of the front in order to control the troops on the main axis,
while the remaining large units and units are controlled through the front
command post. Accordingly, the forward command post establishes direct
communications with the troops that are operating on the main axis and
carrying out the main tasks within a given period of time, while
communications with the other troops and adjacent units are set up through
the command post.
The practice of exercises shows that while the commander of the front
is at the forward command post, it becomes the main control post, and-its
personnel and communications means are fully able to ensure control of the
front troops in the event that the enemy delivers nuclear strikes against
time command post. During this period control of the troops operating on
the main axis can be set up from the front command post if the enemy
delivers a nuclear strike against the-forward command post, since the
command post has the appropriate organs and communications with the troops
have previously been set up.
A completely different situation arises when the forward command post, soxl-HUM
is designated to control the troops only during the period of the
relocation of the front command post to another area. According to the
experience of exercises, under these conditions the following personnel
usually go to the forward command post: the first deputy commander of the
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front; the front deputy chief of staff; the deputy chief of the operations
Ti-rectorate accompanied by two to four officers; the deputy chief of
intelligence or a senior officer of the intelligence department accompanied
by one to two officers; the department of the communications directorate
authorized for the forward command post; two to three officers from the 8th
department; the deputy chiefs of the rocket troops, air defense troops, and
the engineer and chemical troops, each accompanied by one to two officers;
and a representative from the staff of the air army accompanied by one to
three officers. Because it is assumed in advance that the work at the
forward command post is of a temporary nature, officers with less training
are usually assigned to it, and they are primarily drawn from the officers
assigned to the given directorate or department.
In the event that a nuclear strike is delivered against the command
post at that moment, a forward command post thus staffed will not be able
to quickly collect information on the situation and provide the senior
commander located at this post with sufficiently competent assistance in
controlling the air defense troops and aviation during the repulsing of an
air attack; in organizing and effecting the delivery of nuclear strikes by
the rocket troops and aviation against the main groupings and nuclear
attack means of the enemy; in refining the tasks for the combined-arms and
tank armies, the front reserves, and the special troops; and in restoring
disrupted cooperate no and control. A forward command post with a working
organization this variable and uncoordinated can only appear to assume
control of the front troops; it will not carry out all tasks during the
course of the operation.
In our opinion, and as the experience of exercises shows, in order to
eliminate this shortcoming, in addition to the deputy chiefs of the
directorates and branch arms and services, the forward command post should
have a working organization staffed as follows: two officers from the
operations directorate to take turns in maintaining a map of the situation
on a front-wide scale and one officer from each of the primary departments
for each axis; two officers from the intelligence directorate to work on
the map together with the operations personnel and one officer from each of
the primary departments to collate information from the different types of
reconnaissance; the authorized communications department for the forward
command post from the communications directorate; one officer from the
staff of the rocket troops fcr each front missile brigade or unit and one
or two officers to work on the maps an prepare the instructions for the
missile brigades to deliver nuclear strikes; and also, a reduced complement
from the command posts of the air defense and the air army. Also, SolVi50X1-HUM
the problem by manning the forward command post with the remain--g
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personnel is a possibility.
Moreover, it must be noted that at the present time the front forward
command post does not have an adequate number of communications means; the
communications battalion of the front forward command post is able to
monitor the operation of less than one-third of the most important radio
nets and radio links of the command post with its own radio means and
thereby switch them over to itself when necessary. At the same time the
main wire and radio-relay communications between the forward command post
and the troops are set up primarily through the communications centers of
the front and army command posts, and should they be destroyed by nuclear I
stri eTc s, these communications would also be destroyed. These
communications means and the methods of setting them up clearly do not
ensure the rapid organization of control of the front troops by the forward
command post under conditions of mass jamming. ''5e radio means at the
forward command post operate at the same time as the radio means of the
front command post. This makes it possible for the enemy to determine in
a vance the location of both control posts and deliver nuclear strikes
against them simultaneously.
Frequently the plan of the operation, the operational directives,
combat orders and instructions, and other basic operational documents are y,
not sent to the front forward command post since the existing regulation
calls for making an extremely limited number of copies of them.
Consequently, to make the front forward command post a full-fledged
post capable of providing control of the front troops and stable command
over them under conditions of extremely rapid-changes in the situation such
as arise when the enemy delivers nuclear strikes against the front command
post, it is necessary to make it sufficiently autonomous and tolly
conceal it; to set up, train, and integrate in advance the working
organization necessary to it; to increase the number of communications
means and improve the organization of communications, with due regard for
the interchangeability of control posts; and to allocate a reduced
complement from the command posts of the rocket troops, the air defense
troops, and aviation.
The rear control post is customarily regarded as another control post
capable of exercising command over the front troops during an operation.
However, at present it is designated to command the front rear only, and
therefore, only organs associated with the control ogre numerous rear 50X1 HUM
services units and facilities of the front, army, and tactical rear are
located at it.
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Accordingly, direct communications between the rear control post of
the front, the rear control posts of the armies, and the large units and
units subordinate to the front are set up by radio, while radio-relay and
wire communications are set up through the communications centers of the
command posts of the front, armies, and large units. Should these
communications centers be destroyed, then communications between the rear
control post and the troops as well as the control organs of the army rear
and the tactical rear would be disrupted. Even if the communications
battalion at the rear control post uses more than half of its radio
communications means for the purpose of controlling the front troops, its
capabilities permit it to monitor less than one-third of tT e most important
radio nets and radio links of the command post, and this is clearly
inadequate.
The experience of everyday activities and of war games and exercises
shows that if the rear control post is to assume control of the front
troops and effectively command them, it is necessary to allocate to it
ahead of time a certain number of operations officers and intelligence
personnel to ensure the collection of information on the situation, the
maintenance of maps for all the front troops, and the preparation of
information needed by the chief oft~ie rear and the chief of the rear staff
to make operational decisions, plan the combat operations of the troops and
assign them tasks. It is also necessary in advance to send to the rear
control post a reduced complement from the command posts to control the
rocket troops, the air defense troops and aviation. Perhaps this
complement should have a somewhat smaller number of officers than that sent
to the forward command post of the front, since the rear control post is
the second post designated to assume control of the front troops. On the
whole, the officer specialists of the various branches of the armed forces
and branch arms should be capable of carrying out from the rear control
post the tasks entrusted to them, which primarily consist of commanding
reconnaissance, the rocket troops and aviation, the combined-arms and tank
armies, and the front reserves.
To alleviate the situation that arises when it becomes necessary to
control all the front troops from the rear control post, the command of the
engineer, chemical and other special troops during the initial period may
be assumed by the communications section of the front rear staff and by the
officers of the directorates of communications, engineer troops and
chemical troops that are in charge of the materiel-technical supply of
their special troops and services. However, this is possible only if these
officers are given appropriate operational training in advance. 50X1-HUM
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The command post of one of the combined-arms or tank armies
constitutes a third post which can be designated to control the front
troops. However, in this case special difficulties arise, primarily
because the complement of officers and the communications means at the
command post are intended to control only the army troops. For it to
assume control of the front troops, the commander of the given army and its
command post must have operational orientation on a front-wide scale and an
additional number of officers to maintain maps of the istuation throughout
the front and to maintain contact with its troops; also, the command post
requires considerable reinforcement of its communications means, and
communications must be organized to enable the army to maintain
communications with the rest of the front troops.
The commander of the air army and its staff would have a certain
advantage if control of the front troops were turned over to them in the
event that the front command post is put out of action. This advantage
lies in the fact t t the commander of the air army knows the concept of
the front commander for the conduct of the operation and the tasks assigned
to all the front troops to a greater degree than the other army commanders.
Since a map of the situation throughout the front is constantly maintained
at the command post of the air army, all that- s iecessary is to give it
further detailing. The air army staff has the closest connection with the
front staff, and the officers of both staffs keep in personal contact which
creates better conditions for the air army staff in the event it controls
the front troops.
The commander of the air army and its staff always maintain very close
cooperation with. the rocket troops and air defense troops of the front that
carry out combat tasks jointly with aviation. The air army staff s nds
operations groups to the command posts of almost all the armies of the
front first echelon and as a result the commander of the air army and its
stoma 'f constantly have stable communications with the other armies of the
front. This communications system operates parallel to and independently
of the communications organized by the front staff. The staff of the air
army is in a favorable position to organize and conduct reconnaissance as
well as to restore control of the front troops, employing for this liaison
officers in aircraft and helicopters.
The staff of the air army is located closer to the front command post ?I
than the other staffs, and therefore can more quickly learn from it the 50X1-HUM
results of a nuclear strike delivered by the enemy against the front
command post; this will aid it in ascertaining the situation and in making
use of the officers remaining at this post for troop control. It goes
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without saying that the front command post and the command post of the air
army must be located at a safe distance from each other in case a large
yield nuclear warhead strikes one of them. Finally, the commander of the
air army usually is a member of the front Military Council, and this gives
him a certain legal authority over the other army commanders.
In our opinion, all this indicates the capability of the commander of
the air army and its staff to assume control of the front troops in the
event the enemy delivers a nuclear strike against the front command post.
For this purpose the commander of the air army and its staff need
appropriate training in the control of the front ground forces, and the
staff needs to be somewhat reinforced with offers of the ground forces
and with communications means.
It is obvious from the above that all posts that may be designated to
control the front troops must be additionally reinforced with officers from
the operations and intelligence directorates, from the rocket troops, the
air defense troops and from the air army, as well as with communications
means. At the present time, the table of organization of these
directorates clearly is not designed to allocate this number of officers
without detriment to troop control from the front command post. Thus, if
in accordance with calculations, 13 to [missingTofficers are assigned to
work at the forward command post and the rear control post of the front,
there will not be enough officers left to carry out such important wor as
collating information about the situation throughout the front and
maintaining maps for the commander of the front troops and the chief of
staff, planning combat operations, drafting reports for the General Staff,
and informing adjacent units about the situation. The situation of the
intelligence directorate is the same. The dispersal of the efforts of its
small departments would cause considerable difficulties in command over
radio and radiotechnical, tactical, special, and other types of
reconnaissance. This applies equally to the staff of the rocket troops and
artillery, the organization of the chief of the air defense troops, and the
operations personnel of the staff of the air army. The communications
directorate is in a somewhat better position. It has an authorized
communications department for the forward command post, and at the rear
control post -- a communications department (section) of the staff of the
front rear and the officers of the communications directorate who are in
charge of supplying the troops with communications means. 50X1 HUM
The procuring of communications means to further reinforce the forward
command post, the rear control post of the front and the command post of
one of armies presents serious difficulties, since the capabilities of
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the front communications units are not geared to the allocation of these
means without detriment to the organization of communications at the two
positions of the front command post.
From everything that has been said it follows that in order to make
each control post autonomous and to create the conditions for their
interchangeability, it is necessary to revise somewhat the table of
organization of the control organs of e ront troops and their
communications units.
Control posts that are in continuous operation are usually designated
to assume control of the front troops. However, the enemy may determine
the location of these posts y the operation of their radio means and
deliver nuclear strikes against them simultaneously with strikes against
the front command post. In connection with this, it becomes necessary to
concea some of the posts designated to assume troop control so that the
enemy cannot detect them in advance by the operation of their
communications means and other identifying features. The forward command
post and the post occupied by the reserve troop control organs may be
included among them.
In the interest of security, the forward command post should be
designated to control the front troops only in the event that the enemy
delivers a nuclear strike against the front command post. It should not be
used to control the front troops during the period of relocation of the
front command post to a new area, since the forces and means available to
the two positions of the front command post make it fully possible to
organize the consecutive relocation of the front commander and the front
chief of staff with the appropriate officers from one command post position
to the other without disrupting the stability of troop control. It is also
essential to alter the work schedule of the communications means at the
forward command post to improve its camouflage and to better conceal its
location and operation.
Conducive to a positive solution to the question of designating the
forward command post as a concealed control post is the fact that the
commander of the front is able to command the modern means of armed warfare
and the highly mobile large units only from a post where the main control
means are concentrated. The command post meets this description. In
connection with this, the con man der of the front obviously will go to the
forward command post to control the troops, even those on the main axis.
only extremely rarely. 50X1-HUM
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The experience of our troops' two-sided operational exercises and of
the exercises cf the probable enemy has demonstrated that reciprocal
nuclear strikes delivered against control posts cause great losses of the
personnel of the control organs. Frequently these losses cannot be
compensated for within a short period of time, and this undoubtedly affects
the stability of troop control. Obviously it has become necessary to solve
the problem of setting up reserve control organs so constituted as to be
capable of ensuring control of the font troops and also of replacing a
forward command post or a rear control ost, as they are designated today,
that has been put out of action.
It is important that these reserve organs and the control posts set up
by them constitute an integral part of the entire system of control of the
front troops during an operation and that they be concealed from the enemy.
is would substantially increase the survivability and stability of the
control system.
When control of the front troops is assumed, it becomes of primary
importance that there be continuity of knowledge as to the previous
situation, the tasks assigned to the troops, and the reports presented to
the senior commanders and to the General Staff. In this regard, it is
essential that the deputies who take over the appropriate official duties
have a detailed knowledge of those aspects of the situation that affect
them.
The deputies (replacements) should be briefed as to the details of the
concept of the commander of the front for conducting the operation and as
to the contents of the plan of the operation, the operational directives,
and the combat orders (instructions). Therefore, one copy of the basic
operational documents prepared at the command post should be sent to the
posts designated to assume control of the front troops. This applies
equally to reports sent to the General Staff to the senior chiefs) and to
information for adjacent units. Information about the position, status,
and the nature of the actions of our troops, as well as copies of all
summaries and reports from the staffs of the armies and the branch arms
must be promptly transmitted to these posts.
Of course, all this puts an additional burden on the personnel of the
front command post; however, this is necessary in order to maintain the
stability of control of the front troops during an cperation. 50X1 HUM
It is of great importance that the procedure for assuming control of
the front troops be worked out in advance, particularly the methods
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employed by the deputies (replacements) to obtain information about the
enemy delivery of a nuclear strike against the front command post and the
destruction caused by it, as well as about transmitting to the troops the
time the deputy assumes command of the front troops.
In connection with this, it can be recommended to designate in advance
the signals and the persons who are to transmit them, after first, of
course, personally checking the situation at the front command post. The
command personnel of the staff of the air army anc t e commanders and
chiefs of the staffs of the front communications regiment and the security
and servicing regiment, or the surface-to-air missile unit covering the
command post may be among the persons designated. These persons, as a
rule, are permanently located at a safe distance from the front command
post in view of the possibility that the enemy will employ large yield
nuclear warheads. These signals may also be given to the officers of the
operations directorate and the communications directorate as well as to the
command personnel of the front headquarters that is located at the command
post. Of course, the signals-must be kept in great secrecy and transmitted
as quickly as possible via the communications means that survive the
strike. The signals pertaining to the assumptior_ of command of the front
troops by a deputy may be indicated in the operational directive oppos- e
the assignment of each deputy. In the event the troops receive signals
from several deputies, the authority is given to the deputy who was
designated to be the first to assume command of the front troops.
The speed with which the posts that are to control the front troops
are reinforced by the officers remaining at the front command post after a
nuclear strike has been delivered against it, is oefinite importance to
the effectiveness of their work. For this reason the procedure for further
work in troop control and for assembling at the appointed places should be
determined, and the transport and senior personnel who are to direct the
transfer to the new control post should be designated in advance. The
procedure for switching communications from the former front command post
to the new control post should also be established ahea time.
It is important that the remaining officers immediately display
initiative and resourcefulness in restoring troop control from the front
command post and in replacing commanders who have been put out of action
and also that the switching of communications means be conducted so as to
mislead the enemy as to the results of his nuclear strike. 50X1-HUM
Measures for assisting personnel who have suffered enemy nuclear
strikes must be worked out and implemented in a way that does not affect
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the speed and thoroughness of the transfer of control of the front troops
to the other posts designated to assume it. The personnel of-tYe
directorates of the operational formations and of the communications and
servicing units should study this problem.
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