MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): METHODOLOGY FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL COMMAND-STAFF WAR GAMES ON MAPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302400001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Methodology for Conducting Operational
Command-Staff War Games on Maps
by
General -Leytenant M. Ivanov
The organization and conduct of modern operations levy high
requirements on the operational-tactical and technical training of
commanders and staffs. The military knowledge of generals and senior
officers is improved by various forms of training. Operational
command-staff war games occupy an important place among them, as is known.
They are conducive to the development of operational thinking and
volitional qualities in generals and officers, as well as the skills for
rapid and comprehensive appraisal of a situation and the making of
appropriate decisions, and make it possible to achieve teamwork and mutual
understanding in the work of the command and all the principal levels of
control.
In this article we would like to share the experience accumulated in
the Baltic Military District.
First of all we think we must emphasize that when organizing a
command-staff war game one should determine its theme. In resolving this
question, the military district commander is guided primarily by the tasks
allocated by the Ministry of Defense for the academic year, and by the
operational assignment of whatever formations and large Units he has in the
district. The need for more thorough study of those matters which,
according to the experience of previous operational training measures, were
not adequately worked out, is taken into consideration in the process.
Then the content of the theme is determined. It usually is stated as a
compound theme including a number of subthemes.
In the command-staff war games we conduct the main problems of the
theme usually are: mobilizing the troops and bringing them to combat
readiness in a short time; delivering the initial nuclear strike in
cooperation with the strategic rocket forces; conducting a meeting
engagement with large enemy operational reserves; eliminating the
aftereffects of an enemy nuclear attack, restoring the combat effectiveness
of the large units and units, and operating with the limited forces soxl-Hum
(composite detachments) surviving an enemy nuclear strike.
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Special attention is devoted to studying the problems connected with
conducting joint operations using front, naval and airborne landing forces
along the seacoast, and also with organizing and conducting the assault
crossing of large water obstacles from the march and in cooperation with
airbcrne landing and fleet forces.
Organizing an antilanding defense of the seacoast with limited forces,
routing enemy landing forces at ports and embarkation points, during the
sea transit and while landing, carrying out a counterattack on shore to
destroy the amphibious and airborne landing forces which have already
landed, and restoring the position, are considered the main defense
subjects.
All this allows us to more purposefully resolve the problems in
keeping with the assignment of the district troops.
Task directives specifying the operational tasks are developed for the
operational staffs participating in the command-staff war game. They are
sent to the staffs in advance in a sealed packet, and opened upon the
established signal of the game director.
During the game the trainees operate on the basis of existing tables
of organization and actual troop status, and the availability of materiel
reserves, weapons and combat eql4ipment. Such an approach makes it possible
to sty the actual capabilities of one's own troops more thoroughly, and
considergqy reduce the volume OTtasks and time required to compile data
on the status and level of manning andequipping oT the troops.
As a rule a command-staff war_game 11QZins,...with.bringing the troops_tc
combat readiness and their mobilization expansion. All the main problems
of the theme are resolved in combination with the operational tasks.
Besides the staffs of the military district formations, operations groups
from the branch arms and branches of the armed forces, and sometimes the
military commissariats and certain civil defense staffs are allocated to a
command-staff war game. Thus in 1967 at the front two-sided, two-stage
command-staff war game, the republic and oblast military commissariats,
operations groups from the large units of the Air Defense of the Country
and cf the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the republic Civil Defense staffs
and the border guard district staff participated in working out
mobilization problems. This permitted working out during the game a number
of problems concerning the mobilization expansion of the military district
troops and cooperation with Civil Defense. 50X1-HUM
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Resolving the question of whether to conduct command-staff war games
as two-sided or one-sided games is of great importance to competent
development of its theme. We, for example, are convinced of the advantage
of the former, although other opinions have been expressed here recently.
Certain comrades have insisted that some of the trainees acting according
to foreign army organization and tactics in a game do not acquire working
skills corresponding to their functional responsibilities, and the director
is unable to direct the course of the game in the necessary channel to
accomplish the established training objectives.
We think that a two-sided war game considerably complicates the
situation, making it more realistic, increases the responsibility of the
directors and executors and, most important -- involves a larger number of
trainees. It is easier for the director and staff to avoid subjectivism in
setting up an operational situation during a two-sided game. True, the
role of the director in this case is complicated by the need to make a
thorough analysis of the decisions of both sides when developing the next
move.
Usually in a command-staff war game the headquarters of the military
district and armies, headed by the first deputy commander, participate on
one side, and a small group composed of the deputy chiefs of the branch
arms and services of the district, tasked with learning foreign army
organization, armament and tactics, on the opposite side. The group is
commanded by the deputy district commander for combat training or the first
deputy Chief of the district staff. While the command-staff war game is in
progress the officers of this group (usually no more than 12 to 15 men)
confine themselves to working out maps on the decision for the operation,
and the working maps of the chiefs of the branch arms and services for
support of the operation.
The allocation of operations groups from the headquarters of certain
divisions to a command-staff war game in the capacity of an army
organization has proved itself to a significant extent. This makes it
possible to train staffs for the next higher level, and to train the front
staff to carry out troop control tasks to the full extent, with a view
toward maintaining continuity of control.
It is especially important to organize the playing out of the combat
actions properly. In so doing we proceed from the fact that the more scal-Hum
complex the operational situation set up by the director, and the more
sudden its changes in terms of time, the more intensively and close to
actual conditions the trainees must act. Thus, in working out the problems
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of regrouping troops over long distances, we strove to complicate the
situation with data on the enemy employment of nuclear, Chemical and
bacteriological weapons on the routes of troop movement, by creating vast
zones of radioactive contamination and destruction, and by disrupting
communications for control and cooperation. For working out the problems
of antilanding defense a situation was set up in which the enemy had
superiority of forces in the landing sectors, and cur troops operated at
limited strength, having sustained heavy losses, etc. Of course, all the
difficulties the director set up for the trainees followed the objective
determined and provided for by the game plan, for the working out of any
one training problem. This placed the playing commanders and staffs in the
complex conditions of a rapidly changing situation and allowed them to
acquire skills in analyzing it, making the appropriate decisions and
transmitting tasks to the troops.
In war games the question often arises as to how to combine
operational and sidereal time and play out the combat actions hour by hour,
while working out a series of training problems connected with the conduct
of in-depth operations, in the relatively short time allotted by the game
plan. It seems to us that at the operational level the requirement for
playing out the course of combat actions hour by hour must not be taken
literally. The point is that while certain problems really can and must be
played out strictly according to sidereal time, others, let us say,
connected with conducting combat actions in the depth without operational
transitions, are almost impossible to work out within the limits of a
three-day command-staff war game.
Obviously operational and sidereal time must be combined more
flexibly. We will examine this in more detail. From the beginning of each
stage of the game until the decision is made, operational and sidereal time
coincide, i.e. the situation is built up hour by hour. At this time the
staff trainees, in keeping with their plans and requests, are given
reconnaissance data on the enemy, his nuclear weapons delivery means, troop
regroupings, and the preparation and delivery of nuclear warheads to his
positions and stockpiling of materiel-technical means. All this is done
right up until the belligerents deliver a nuclear strike and the players
make decisions to eliminate its aftereffects and develop the operation
further. During the period in which the game director monitors the
trainees on various problems, which usually takes place as they are working
and right at their places of work, the staff of the directing body
continuously builds up the situation. Thus, the combat actions actuaYoxl-Hum
are played out hour by hour during the first hours. Subsequently,
depending on the training problems being solved in the game, the director
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plans the operational transition worked out after a thorough analysis of
the situation and the decisions of the players, and also with regard for
the possible development of the operation. In the introduction, besides
the operational-tactical situation, are given data on all the branch arms
and services. Having turned the situation over to the trainees, the staff
of the directing body continues to build it up until a decision is made and
tasks are transmitted to the troops.
When conducting an antilanding defense of the seacoast we work hour by
hour on the problems of combating the enemy landing forces at their ports
and bases, on their sea transit and upon landing on shore. However, when
working out training problems connected, let us say, with the organization
and conduct of army and front counterattacks against the forces which have
landed on our shore, we resort to small operational transitions.
The practice of many years has demonstrated that this method of
playing out the combat actions on the one hand ensures achieving maximum
effect in carrying out the various tasks stipulated in the plan, and on the
other hand allows working out the main problems to "the entire depth" of
the operation in the time allotted for the game.
As the combat actions are played out, the directing body naturally
tries to take the decisions made by the belligerent sides into account in
developing the next moves. However, in so doing something very often
arises in the situation which develops objectively that does not correspond
to the plan for working out the training problems. Suppose, for example,
that according to the plan for conducting a game a situation develops which
calls for one of the sides to make the decision to conduct a counterattack.
However, the directing body cannot set up such a situation on the basis of
the decisions made by the trainees without resorting to subjective
intervention, which is extremely undesirable. Sometimes a way out of such
a spot is found by imposing the desired decision of one of the sides, which
frequently provokes justified criticism on the part of the trainees, and
stifles their initiative and interest in the game. How should we act in
order to bring the trainees to work out the desired training problem
without imposing decisions on them from above?
One of the procedures we sometimes use is to hand supplementary
situation data over to one of the sides (usually the one which has made the
less desirable decision). For example, during one war game a situation
developed in which, had they assessed it correctly, the "west" troops 50X1-HUM
should have decided to commit the second operational echelon to the
engagement, and the "east" -- to repulse the counterattack of large enemy
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operational reserves. However, the "west", underestimating the
capabilities of the "east", decided to use their second echelon on a
secondary axis, on which the outcome of the operation hardly could have
been decided.
The directing body decided to give the "west" supplementary data to
force them to acknowledge and correct the assumed mistake. This
hypothetical situation was worked out outside the operational time and only
by the "west". The "east" at this time drew up the decision adopted and
issued combat instructions to the troops. Having corrected the mistake of
the trainees, the game director handed out the next hypothetical situation
to both sides at the same time.
It seems to us that using this method skilfully can ensure that the
course of combat actions is played out instructively enough in accordance
with the decisions of the trainees and, then, that the assigned training
problems are completed.
Conducting a command-staff war game by situating staffs in their
permanent garrisons produces much that is useful for working out problems
of troop control. In this instance the operative technical and messenger
communications means of the military district are used for the game. Tasks
are transmitted to the troops via these means. To report the decisions for
the situation, the army commanders travel to the front staff on aircraft or
helicopters. Tasks are transmitted to the staffs, situationdata
collected, and information reports transmitted in reply, also via plain
text and secure communications channels, with the use of procedure and
coding tables. With the war game organized this way, the commanders and
staffs acquire a greal deal of practice in communicating via various
communications means, and especially by radio, using secure troop control
documents. In addition, the director and his staff can monitor the passage
time of operational information and make certain the information is
reliable.
The speed of passing instructions and information reports via
communications means is, as we know, of primary importance for making
timely decisions and transmitting tasks to the troops. The speed of
passing instructions and reports comprises many factors: the time required
for drafting the document, encoding (enciphering) it, transmitting it via
communications means, decoding (deciphering) and reporting it to th,.
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addressee.
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To determine the time required for operational documents to pass
through these levels, and to find the bottlenecks, while conducting war
games we make a special study which reflects data on when the document was
signed, how long it was in the cipher office and at the communications
center, and the time spent transmitting it via communications means and
handing it to the addressee. All this is entered in a table from which can
easily be seen not only the total time required for passing documents to
subordinate staffs, but also where the greatest waste of time occurs. An
analysis of these data allows us subsequently to more purposefully organize
work to eliminate the defects in transmitting instructions and reports via
communications means.
A check on the ability of staff officers to correctly and without
distortions, receive the operational situation from subordinate staffs
using voice transmission via technical communications means, is made in the
following manner: the situation developed by the directing body is handed
at a certain time to the subordinate staff, which transmits these data to
the staff of the front (directing body) by radio, using procedure tables
and coded maps. The latter compares the previously developed situation
with the data received from the subordinate staff and plots it on the map
in a different color. All the inaccuracies which occurred in transmitting
and receiving the situation are graphically visible on this type of map,
and the game director can correctly judge how well the individual generals
and officers have been trained to operate the communications means.
We also can recommend checking on the practicability of the decisions
made or calculations performed during an operational command-staff war
game. By way of illustration, at the command-staff war game on the theme
"Organization and Conduct of a Long-Distance Troop Regrouping", to make
more certain of the calculations performed by the players, it was possible
to allocate a motorized rifle or tank regiment and with it conduct an
exercise consisting of a day's march using the routes planned by the
players, and then compare the actual time spent on the march with that
planned for the game. A similar exercise may be conducted with pontoon
bridging units to lay crossings over water obstacles. For this purpose the
game director sets up a group of officers in advance, which flies out to
the unit, alerts it on the basis of a signal and conducts the necessary
exercise, and reports its results to the commander in the time stipulated
in the plan. Using the data of the exercises conducted with the troops and
comparing them with the planning documents from the command-staff war game,
the director can draw a conclusion as to the practicability of the
calculations made by the trainees. This makes the critique of the war game
more considered and instructive.
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Recently a great deal of attention has been devoted to the questions
of automating control processes. The possibility of using the URAL-4
electronic computer (of a civilian ministry) for solving operational
problems during a front two-stage command-staff war game, was verified for
the first time in our district. Since the generals and officers of the
headquarters did not have enough experience in using the computer, lessons
(practices) were organized beforehand to familiarize them with the basic
principles of solving operational problems with the use of a computer.
Information was exchanged between the command posts of the front (district
staffs) and the computer via one secure telegraphic communications channel
and messenger means, and between the front rear control post, the air army
command post and the computer -- by messenger means and a telegraphic
communications channel.
Eleven operational-tactical and rear services problems corresponding
to the concept and the training objectives established for the war game
were selected for solution on the computer. In choosing them we tried to
cover the work of all the primary directorates, departments and services in
order to research the possibility and desirability of using the computer.
Thus, for the operations directorate the problems of determining one's own
troop losses from enemy nuclear strikes were solved, and a march and
results of a nuclear strike on a major industrial installation were
calculated. The staff of the rocket troops and artillery calculated the
yield of the nuclear warheads and the number of missiles required to
destroy its targets, as well as the losses to one's own missile units and
artillery from an enemy nuclear strike. The chief of the air defense
troops made an assessment of the fire effectiveness of the front
antiaircraft means, and the staff of the air army determined the status of
the aviation forces of both sides and the probable change in the combat
strength of the air army during the operation, and made a number of
calculations on the delivery of bombing strikes.
Voluminous and labor-consuming calculations also were performed by the
front rear staff. Its departments and services obtained detailed data for
moving front troops by railroad as well as on rations and the transport
attache7777-supply bases. Some problems were solved over and over.
Solving operational-tactical and rear services problems by use of a
computer during the game permitted the participants in the command-staff
war game to gain initial experience in using computers in troop control.
The trainees in the practical exercise were convinced that the rate of
performing calculations on a computer was three to four times faster than
working them out manually, and that accuracy was significantly increased.
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The director and his staff must pay a great deal of attention to
monitoring the work of the directorates, departments and services while the
command-staff war game is in progress. The monitoring, in our view, should
be carried out in two main directions. First, to constantly build up the
situation and see to it that all trainee activities are structured in
accordance with its changes, and secondly -- to carefully study the work of
each directorate (department) from the standpoint of the quality and
timeliness with which it draws up the planning and combat documents, its
speed of transmitting tasks to the troops, and the teamwork of the
executors.
In the first case monitoring is relatively uncomplicated, since the
game director personally monitors and checks the work of all the chiefs of
the directorates (departments) and playing staffs on the main problems of
the situation. It is a more complex matter to organize monitoring of the
work iimediately within the directorates and departments. The game
director can study only the basic documents, and it is very difficult for
him to observe the work inside the directorates.
We think the work of the directorates and departments may be monitored
successfully by using two basic methods: first, when all the chiefs of the
branch arms, services and directorates (departments) act in the game as
both trainees and assistants to the director at the same time, i.e., they
organize and monitor the work inside the directorates (departments)
themselves; the second is when the chiefs of the directorates (departments)
act only as trainees, and the directing body checks on the work inside the
directorates (departments) through an umpiring organization. Both methods
of organizing the monitoring have their positive and negative aspects.
The positive aspect of using the first method is that the front of the
work is broadened, and each chief has an opportunity to personally monitor
the fulfilment of responsibilities by his subordinates, to identify
whatever shortcomings there are and take steps to eliminate them. This, in
addition, makes a large umpiring organization unnecessary. However, it
should be taken into consideration that in this instance the opportunity to
assess the work of each directorate (department) objectively is lost to
some extent. Using the second method, the game director gets an
opportunity to give a more objective assessment of the work of the
subordinates, but this involves assigning a large number of umpires, which
under the conditions existing in the military district, cannot always be
done. 50X1-HUM
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As a whole, then, in our view, the selection of any one variant for
monitoring the work of the directorates (departments) while the game is in
progress will depend on the training objectives established and the
availability of a large enough qualified umpiring organization.
In conclusion a few remarks on the strength of the staff of the
directing body and the umpires. In articles on operational training
methods, authors have proposed various strengths and structures of a staff
of the directing body for conducting operational exercises and games. It
is difficult to agree with those who recommend having 45 to 50 men for this
purpose.* In the first place, separating officers from the fulfilment of
their functional responsibilities in this way cannot be justified and,
secondly, with a large staff the director or chief of staff cannot be in
close contact with each officer of the directing body, which has a negative
effect on working efficiency.
The basic element of our staff of the directing body usually is the
department of operational training. Besides this the staff includes
officers of the branch arms and services (10 to 13 men), representatives of
the air army (two men) and a critique group (two or three men) . Army
commanders and staffs have assigned to them one umpire and one or two
officers from the combat training directorate to assist them. Thus, a
total of about 25 men. This relatively low strength of the directing body
and umpiring ol'iganization permits fully carrying out all the tasks of
supporting the conduct of a command-staff war game.
The recommendations set forth in the article do not claim to be
complete. A broad exchange of experience on the questions of methods of
conducting operational exercises and war games will be conducive to
successfully resolving the great and complex problems confronting
operational staffs.
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