MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A UNIFIED ORGAN FOR THE COMMAND OF PROTECTION AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302230001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 16, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
NINDRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Unified Organ
-for the Command of Protection Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction
16 August 1976
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article presents two individual comments on the advisability of establising
a unified organization to take command of all functions relating to
protection against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The first
examines problems of inefficient organization of protective measures and
inadequacy of protective, detection, and decontamination means. A unified
service, headed by a deputy commander, would replace and reorganize Vd2-WMD
chemical service in the table of organization of units up through
formations. The second also recommends central organization of protection,
based on the chemical service and headed by an assistant commander, with a
combined committee on weapons of mass destruction and protection against
them at the Ministry level. This article =eared in Issue Nn 2 (7c) fnr
1965.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned
William W. Wells
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1965
SOURCE
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
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DATE 16 August 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Unified Organ for the
Command of Protection Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The authors of this article are Lieutenant Colonel I. Borisov
and Engineer Lieutenant Colonel S. Savenkov. This article presents their
individual comments on the advisability of establising a unified
organization to take command of all functions relating to protection
against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The first examines
problems of inefficient organization of protective measures, inadequacy of
protective clothing, detection equipment and decontamination means in
making a case for a unified service for protection against weapons of mass
destruction. The service, headed by a deputy commander, would replace and
reorganize the chemical service in the table of organization of units up
through formations. The second also recommends central organization of
protection, based on the chemical service and headed by an assistant
commander, to improve reconnaissance, warning, preventive measures and
elimination of aftereffects. The corresponding organization at the
Ministry level would be a combined committee on weapons of mass destruction
and protection against them.
End of Summary
Comment:
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A Unified Organ for the Command of Protection Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction
by
Lieutenant Colonel I. Borisov
and
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel S. Savenkov
In our opinion, the status of the preparatiol of troops, staffs, and
rear installations to protect themselves against weapons of mass
destruction requires attention. It is acknowledged that this protection is
a key element in the combat training and combat readiness system of all
branches of the armed forces. Nevertheless, large unit and formation
commanders and their staffs frequently are accused of paying little
attention to this important subject. But in reality, they do not have the
machinery for control, nor the appropriate equipment, nor adequate forces
and means, to carry out the very great volume of work for protection
against weapons of mass destruction. This has led to conventionality in
the combat training process and has lowered the combat readiness of the
troops
The primary shortcoming which leads to all other deficiencies lies, in
our view, in the fact that at the present time there is no unified organ in
charge of preparing to the fullest ext.i.nt troops, staffs, and rear
installations for protection against weapons of mass destruction.
In accordance with current regulations and instructions, when
formation commanders and commanders at all levels arrive at a decision on
an operation or battle, they determine the tasks for protection against
weapons of mass destruction. The staff, together with the chiefs of branch
arms and services, organizes and monitors the accomplishment of the
assigned tasks. A large number of persons are assigned to participate in
the organization of this protection: the chief of staff, the deputy
commander for the rear, the chief of the chemical service, the unit
engineer, the chief of the medical service, and others. Since the majority
of them are directly subordinate to the commander, only he or the chief of
staff can coordinate their actions.
But practice has revealed that because of his heavy work load, a
formation commander or a commander is in no position to take personal
command of the entire system of measures for protection against weapons of
mass destruction and to coordinate the actions of subordinate commanders
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staffs, and chiefs of branch arms and services in this field. Thus, in an
experimental exercise in the Belorussian Military District in 1962, the
military district staff, even when a specially created protection staff was
present, was unable to accomplish this task by itself; inevitably it had to
call upon the chiefs of the branch arms and services.
As a result, the attempt to make the staff, or more accurately, the
chief of staff, the main organizer of the troops' protection against
weapons of mass destruction, did not lead to success. The staffs could not
take on this function during the exercise, and with their existing
structure they cannot, in our opinion, do so in the future.
The commanders of units and large units and their staffs, realizing
the necessity of having a single organ, as a rule are trying to make the
chief of the chemical service responsible for organizing and monitoring the
accomplishment of all measures for protecting the troops against weapons of
mass destruction. We should also note that when exercises and inspections
are being conducted, the higher authorities encourage this situation.
The experience of a number of regimental, divisional, army, and front
exercises, and also the daily activities of troops, have revealed that In
order to resolve almost any problem associated with preparing for
protection against weapons of mass destruction, the chief of the chemical
service is called upon. But, all the other assigned personnel do not fully
resolve their own peculiar problems, and therefore the complete
organization of protection on the whole is not carried out properly.
The lack in the troops and in the headquarters of operational
formations of a unified organ for the command of protection against weapons
of mass destruction has given rise to the fact that a number of the
problems connected with assessing the radiation and chemical situation,
with organizing the monitoring of radioactive radiation, with eliminating
the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction,
and with providing the troops with great quantities of varied protective
equipment and items, are resolved, in our opinion, extremely slowly and
half-heartedly.
In a present-day war, wide-scale radioactive and chemical
contamination will become a constant occurrence, not only for the troops,
but also for rear area installations. If we take into account that fact
that the enemy may use by surprise quick-acting toxic chemical agents like
"V-gas" in order to kill personnel, the personnel will have to stay in
their individual protective means at all times.
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The status of protective means and the ways of improving them, as well
as other problems of protection against weapons of mass destruction, have
already been dealt with in our military press, and specifically in the
Collections of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Numbers 1 (71)
and 3 (73) for 1964 and others. Permit us to recall them briefly. Thus,
the individual protective means of the insulating type available to the
troops possess good protective properties, but they are designed for
short-term usage (for not more than 30 to 50 minutes when the air
temperature is plus 20 to 25 degrees centigrade), they are very awkward to
handle, and when they are used for an extended time, they sharply reduce
the combat effectiveness of the personnel. The protective means are almost
unsuitable for use in winter conditions: the protective overboots cannot be
worn over felt snow boots and the protective cape cannot be worn over the
greatcoat nor over the three-quarter-length sheepskin coat, the rubber
facepiece of the gas mask markedly loses its elasticity in low temperatures
and requires systematic warming-up, and the outlet valve freezes.
Consequently, present individual protective means do not fully satisfy
the requirements of modern warfare and they do not permit personnel to
conduct combat actions for an extended period of time in all seasons when
the terrain and air are contaminated with radioactive, chemical and
bacteriological substances.
The radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments supplied to the
troops are deficient; they do not have adequate discrimination nor adequate
operating reliability and they show excessive reading errors.
At present, a number of the problems of organizing special
decontamination treatment still remain unsolved; in particular, we do not
have a common chemical solution for the chemical, radioactive, and
biological warfare decontamination of weapons and equipment nor for the
partial decontamination treatment of personnel. Instruments and vehicles
in the table of equipment which are designated for the special treatment of
combat equipment are not adapted for the preparation of chemical and
radioactive decontamination solutions, nor do they permit servicing crews
and teams to carry out the special treatment of this equipment in a short
period of time.
Subunits and units of all branches of the armed forces do not have TIE
means for the complete decontamination treatment of personnel. In view of
the high toxicity of present chemical agents, the decontamination treatment
of personnel should be carried out immediately after they are contaminated,
but without the means in the table of equipment, it will be very difficult
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to accomplish this, especially under winter conditions.
The present-day level of development of our country's science,
technology, and industry makes it possible for us to solve many of these
problems now; however, the development of means of protection,
reconnaissance, and decontamination and the equipping of our troops with
them unfortunately are proceeding extremely slowly.
One of the key elements of protection is the elimination of the
aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction.
Under actual conditions, to carry out rescue work, restore the troops'
combat effectiveness, and restore rear services installations will require
considerable forces and means, which at the preseent time are not available,
with a few exceptions, in our units and large units. Taking into account
the probable enemy's ever growing capabilities to employ nuclear and
chemical weapons as well as bacterial means, we must have for the purpose
of this protection specially designated and previously trained subunits
which are provided with the requisite equipment.
We believe a regiment should have in its table of organization a
company for protection against weapons of mass destruction and a division
should have a battalion made up of two or three companies. With these
forces a division can simultaneously organize the elimination of
aftereffects in three to four centers of mass destruction without calling a
halt to the fulfilment of its combat mission. Operational formations also
should have the necessary number of units and large units for protection
against weapons of mass destruction.
The methods and forms of command over the preparation of troops,
staffs, and rear installations for their protection against weapons of mass
destruction must also, in our view, undergo a fundamental change like the
one that took place in the means and methods of armed combat. We must
resolutely get rid of old and deep-rooted habits and views associated with
the command of this protection.
In Order No. 021 of 1964, the Minister of Defense pointed out that
when assessing the combat training and overall status of units and large
units, the key element is the knowledge all personnel have of the combat
characteristics of the weapons of mass destruction and of the methods of
protection against them, as well as the skill with which the commanders and
staffs organize and support such protection of the troops. From this
requirement it follows that "weapons of mass destruction and protection
against them" is the leading subject in the training program for all
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branches of the armed forces and, correspondingly, the overall assessment
of the status of a unit or large unit cannot be higher than the assessment
in respect to this subject. The role and importance of the given
requirement can hardly be overestimated, since it has been brought to the
fore by actual practice and by realistic prospects for developments in the
means of waging war.
All of this once more corroborates the fact that in order to raise the
level of readiness of the troops to protect themselves against weapons of
mass destruction it is necessary, we are convinced, to establish in units,
large units, and formations a unified organ -- a service for protection
against weapons of mass destruction, which would be fully charged with the
command of the full-scale preparation of troops, staffs, and rear
installations for this protection.
Taking into account the novelty, versatility, and special importance
of this service, it can be headed, in our opinion, by a deputy formation
commander or a deputy commander foryrotection against weavons of mass
destruction. Introducing this post into the taBle oi organization will not
lead to a drastic disruption of the established structure of our staffs and
headquarters, and it will cause almost no increase in their numerical
strength, while at the same time it will to a considerable degree relieve
commanders and staffs of a wide variety of complex responsibilities and
simplify control.
With such a deputy present, the formation commander or commander would
require a minimum amount of time to solve at least the basic problems, and
the deputy with full authority -- a highly skilled specialist in his field
who knows his business to perfection -- would exercise direct, continuous,
and full command over the actions of subordinate commanders, staffs, chiefs
of branch arms, and chiefs of services in ensuring protection against
weapons of mass destruction. He also would be a permanent consultant and
adviser to the commander on the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons
and should command the supplying of troops with equipment and items
protecting them against weapons of mass destruction. Centralized command
would spare us the need for lengthy sessions for agreement and coordination
in the organization process and would ensure the rapid implementation of
the entire system of measures for protecting the troops against weapons of
mass destruction.
So as to avoid increasing the number of assigned personnel directly
subordinate to the commander, we consider it expedient to eliminate the
post of the chief of the chemical troops (chemical service) and assign the
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duties he performs to the deputy formation commander, or deputy commander,
for protection.
In discussion of this matter, the view has been expressed that it will
suffice to rename the chemical service the service for protection against
weapons of mass destruction. We fully agree that the chemical service, by
the nature and scope of the tasks it accomplishes in actual practice,
has actually been transformed into a co mletel new service. The chemical
service, estania-R more an irty years ago, s gone eyond the scope
of its past characteristic activities. However, formally renaming it the
service for protection against weapons of mass destruction, without
changing its administrative and legal status in the troops, headquarters,
and staffs, will not produce positive results. At present, the chief of
the chemical service has at his disposal extremely limited forces and means
and, in accordance with his service status, he cannot be the fully
authorized organizer of the full-scale preparation of the troops, staffs,
and rear installations to protect themselves.
Therefore, we also believe that the service for protection against
nuclear and chemical weapons and bacterial means, as it was conceived and
in fact exists now in the troops, must be made legal by the tables of
organization which are in force and headed by a deputy formation commander
or deputy commander possessing the necessary authority and powers. We
should not forget the fact that during a nuclear war it hardly will be
possible for us to succeed in refining and verifying the most desirable
forms of the command and organization of protection against weapons of mass
destruction.
Taking into consideration the actual function of existing chemical
troops, we should also rename them, in our opinion, the troops for
protection against weapons of mass destruction and subsequently reorganize
and equip them properly.
So that protection against weapons of mass destruction will fully
correspond to the level of development of the means of mass destruction and
meet the requirements of modern warfare we must solve a variety of problems
involving science, production, actual practice, the prior and comprehensive
preparation and training of all branches of the armed forces, and the
equipping of the branches with modern protective equipment and items.
These problems can be solved successfully and with the necessary feel for
what is new only when there is present a single centralized organ for
command of the preparation of the armed forces and of the country as a
whole for protection against weapons of mass destruction.
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Some of the material costs, which will be unavoidable upon
implementing the proposed measure, will be more than repaid and justified
should a nuclear war be unleashed.
* * *
Commanders and chiefs at all levels are charged by the regulations and
instructions with the responsibility of organizing the protection of the
troops against weapons of mass destruction. A commander must direct and
unify the efforts of the different services and branch arms in this area.
The correctness of this rule is beyond all question. But a
commander's activities are many-sided and he and his staff, as a rule,
focus their main efforts on accomplishing the missions of the operation and
battle. But in most instances, proper attention is not devoted to the
problems of preparing the troops to protect themselves against weapons of
mass destruction and of organizing this protection. Mainly, the
organizational problem has not been adequately resolved, in our opinion.
Thus, up to now it has been established who is responsible for the
precise organization of the forecasting of radioactive contamination, and
specifically, for fixing the coordinates of nuclear bursts, determining
their parameters, transmitting the data to forecast centers, and also
monitoring the performance of these tasks. At the same time, we can now
achieve great effectiveness in forecasting with the aid of artillery
reconnaissance means, air defense radiotechnical means, and communications.
Whereas the warning of staffs, large units, and combat units and
subunits is being carried out reliably with the existing communications
system, an unresolved problem at the army, front, and military district
level is that of warning the supporting and rear services subunits, units
and facilities about the danger of being affected by radioactive and highly
toxic chemical agents or by bacterial means.
The problem of eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes and of
rendering assistance to the stricken in the centers of destruction cannot
be considered to have been resolved satisfactorily. Difficulties have
arisen in training regimental subunits to operate in the center of a
nuclear burst: to extinguish fires, evacuate injured personnel, render
first aid and medical assistance, etc. At the level of the large unit,
army, and military district there is no single person or organ responsible
for solving this problem for the divisional, army, and front units.
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In our opinion, regiment, battalion, artillery battalion, company, and
battery commanders, chiefs of the chemical service, medical service
specialists, engineer troops, rear services, and others are being trained
with inadequate efficiency and expertise on how to operate under conditions
of the widespread employment of nuclear and chemical weapons and bacterial
means.
It is well known that formation commanders and commanders at all
levels are personally responsible for the status of combat equipment, the
organization of the air defense of the rear, and so forth, as well as for
the political education of the personnel, but for each one of these they
have a deputy or an assistant who has been trained in the particular field
and who directly organizes the necessary activities.
Since one of the key measures in the troops' combat support is their
protection against weapons of mass destruction, a formation commander or a
commander should also have, in our opinion, an assistant who knows all
protective measures in detail and who is the principal reporter and adviser
on all questions involving the preparation of the troops for protection
against weapons of mass destruction, the organization of the protection and
the elimination of the aftereffects of the employment of these weapons, and
who also reports and advises on the problems of the safety of our awn
troops when we use these weapons.
In our opinion, the common measures for protecting troops against
weapons of mass destruction must be centrally organized.
The lack of a centralized organization and unified organ engaged in
preparing the troops for protection against weapons of mass destruction has
also led to the fact that in supplying the troops we have adopted types of
weapons, combat equipment, and also clothing and personal equipment which
in most cases do not ensure protection for the personnel servicing them
against injury from toxic chemical agent vapors, radioactive dust, and
bacterial means. Furthermore, this equipment does not respond well to
radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological decontamination because of its
complex and frequently poorly conceived exterior shapes as well as
unfortunate choice of materials (wood, canvas, etc.).
The chemical service, which developed after the first world war and
has undergone substantial changes, is unable, however, to carry out the
entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass
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At present, a situation has developed wherein the chemical service
organizes anti-chemical protection, the staff organizes anti-nuclear
protection, and the medical service, to a certain degree, organizes
anti-bacteriological protection. This has resulted in the familiar
fragmentation. Although the staffs and the medical service are charged
with the responsibility of organizing the protection of the troops against
weapons of mass destructicn, nevertheless, in the main they are engaged in
accomplishing the traditional missions assigned to them in an operation.
The work of the chemical service officers and of the chiefs of the chemical
service long ago extended beyond the scope of this service, but the
organizational form has immobilized their initiative and impeded the
expansion of their knowledge.
In our opinion, in the interests of setting right the organization of
the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction and of
defining the persons responsible for it at the levels regiment to front
(military district), we should establish a service for protection against
weapons of mass destruction subordinate to the respective commander and
formation commander and responsible for preparing the troops for protection
against weapons of mass destruction, organizing this protection, and for
eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of these weapons.
We must charge this service (the corresponding departments and directorates
in the staffs) with monitoring the accomplishment of the entire system of
measures for protection against weapons of mass destruction and with
rendering skilled assistance.
In so doing, the role of the chemist, as a specialist, will not be
depreciated, but will be enhanced since under the existing organization the
Military Chemical Defense Academy will train broad specialists capable of
efficiently resolving the problems of the entire complex of measures
relating to protection against weapons of mass destruction.
At the regiment and division level the reorganization we have
recommended can be implemented primarily by using the chemical service.
What is required is to recertify and retrain the regimental chiefs of
chemical service, primarily, so that they will be able to carry out the
entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass
destruction.
At the operational level, in our opinion, the reorganization will
apply to the departments (directorates) of the chiefs of chemical troops
and to the combat training, operations, and medical departments
(directorates), and others. In doing so, the department (directorate) for
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protection against weapons of mass destruction should have four groups
(sections, departments): for forecasting the radiation, chemical, and
bacteriological situation, reconnaissance, reporting, and warning;
operations (planning and the command of troops); preventive measures; and
supply.
In connection with the fact that almost all departments (directorates)
and services of the field headquarters of a front or army must be involved
in solving the problems of protecting the troops against weapons of mass
destruction, the chief of the department or directorate for protection must
be by table of organization an assistant to the army or front commander.
At the central level, in our opinion, the directorates connected with
resolving scientific and technical problems in the field of nuclear,
chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and also the facilities engaged in
training cadre personnel, in developing instructions and manuals, and in
preparing industrial requisitions, should be combined into a single organ
called a committee on weapons of mass destruction and protection against
them.
The essence of the problem set forth is perhaps not new, but the time
has come to solve this problem. It will be difficult to find among the
troops a man who would not be in agreement with this. The next step is to
improve the structure of the units and subunits providing assistance to the
troops in organizing the protection against weapons of mass destruction and
in eliminating the aftereffects of their employment.
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