MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE INITIAL NAVAL OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000202120001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2050'5
NIEtitORANDL~i FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
~~ William W, Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (I1SSR) : The
nitial aval eration
12 July 1976
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T~4ilita Thou ht", This
article is a review o an ear ier artic e concerning t o ma e-up o the
initial naval operation and the nature of the actions of the participating
forces. The reviewer disagrees with the author's view that actions of
strike submarines and missile-carrying aircraft against carrier strike
large units cannot be combined into one operation with actions of
antisubmarine forces against missile submarines. He asserts that these
actions are tightly interwoven, In addition, he believes that these forces
should be coordinated through a single conce t and Ian.
a eared in Issue
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies . For ease of referPnr-P _ rP?~rr~ frnm *~,; ~ ,,,,~,, ; ,-.,+ion have been
William W, Wells
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TO SECRET
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Distribution:
T0P~SE('RF7
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of tre Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1964
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUCdiT (USSR): The Initial Naval Operaticn
SOURCE Doc~,unentary
DATE 12 July 1976
The following report is a translation from F,ussian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T~li lita
~T,hou~ht". The author of t is article is apt~n first gnatyev.
1'1'h s article is a review of an article by Captain First Rank Ye. Mamayev
concerning the make-up of the initial naval operation and the nature of the
actions of the participatir_g forces. The reviewer disagrees with the
author's view that actions of strike submarines and missile-carrying
aircraft against carrier strike large units cannot be combined into one
operation with actions of antisubmarine forces against missile submarines.
He asserts that these actions are tightly interwoven. In addition, he
believes that these forces should be coordinated through a single concept
and plan. End of St~rmar,~
The SECRET version of I~lilita Thou ht was published three times
annually and twas distributed down to t e level of division coranander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The R s 50X1-HUM
version of this article was disseminated
article to which it refers was "Initial Sava eratlons"
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_The Initial Naval Operation
by
Captain First Rank I. Ignatyev
The question raised in Captain First Rank Ye, i~iamayev's article*
concerning the make-up of the initial naval operation and the nature of the
actions of the participating forces has great practical and theoretical
significance. Its correct solution will allow more effective methods for
the preparation and conduct of the initial naval operation to be worked out
quickly and will allow the operational training of formations and large
units of the Navy to be carried out in the necessary direction. This
question plays an important role in the solution of the problems of
building the Navy.
The author considers that at the beginning of a war a fleet will
conduct actions in the form of~an operation only against the enemy's
carrier strike large u*~its, and that the actions of strike submarines and
missile-carrying aircraft against the carrier strike large units cannot be
combined into one operation with the actions of the antisubmarine forces
against missile submarines. `~~e will try to shrnv that combat between
antisubmarine forces and enemy submarines is also a part of the make-up of
the initial naval operation.
Combating missile submarines is one of the navy's basic tasks, the
carrying out of which from the very beginning of the war will play a very
important role in undermining the nuclear might of the enemy navy and in
protecting our country's installations against missile/nuclear strikes from
the sea. Therefore all the actions of our navy's forces at the beginning
of a war cannot be examined separately, and combat with carrier strike
large units should not be set apart from the search for and destruction of
missile submarines and the delivery of strikes by our missile submarines
against enemy shore installations. tiVe consider that all these types of
actions have a fundamental importance and since they, specifically, lead
directly to the achievement of the basic goals of combat actions at sea in
the initial period of war, they must be examined as one process of the
navy's combat activity. Let us take, for example, combat with enemy
submarines.
*Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Tlilitary Thought", No. 1 (68),
195.E ,
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The author, of course, is right in speaking about the differences in
actions against submarines operating in the depths of the ocean, and
actions against carrier strike large units on the surface of the sea, To
what has been said it can be added that it is these very differences which
make it necessary for the Navy to have special antisubmarine forces which,
at the present level of technical development are distinct, not only in
their purpose but also in the composition of their armament and combat
equipment, from the forces designated to seek out and destroy carrier
strike large units and other surface ships. However, combat with
submarines and actions against carrier strike large units have much in
common, which necessitates examining them as an inseparable unity and
within the framework of one operation,
Generally, this above all is the goal -- all actions to destroy the
strike forces of an enemy fleet are directed toward frustrating its
missile/nuclear strikes from the sea and ensuring favorable conditions for
the subsequent actions of our forces in the naval theaters.
Naturally, in order to achieve this goal, the decisive destruction of
the carrier strike large units and missile submarines is necessary in the
shortest possible time after the onset of combat actions, as Captain First
Flank Ye, ~iamayev justly points out. It is for this reason that even in
time of peace not only missile submarines, but, to a lesser degree the
location and nature of the actions of strike aircraft carriers, should be
regularly watched. As the situation becomes more complex, this
surveillance of the strike forces of the enemy fleet should develop into
continuously conducted reconnaissance and pursuit by forces capable of
destroying it. And this is possible if the actions of all the forces of
the fleet make up one operation.
There also is immediate concern as to the coordinated actions of all
the forces of the fleet which conduct combat with enemy carrier strike
large units and submarines. We have no right to say that the connection
between the actions of our forces against aircraft carriers and missile
submarines is to be confined only to the fact that during these actions we
are destroying various carriers of enemy missile/nuclear weapons, This
connection has a more profound nature. Thus, the deployment of the major
large units of our submarines and antisubmarine forces for participation in
combat actions actually will be carried out from the same basing areas, in
strictly coordinated succession, and along the sane or adjacent zones of
routes, and, what is most important for us, ~vith the indispensable mutual
protection of deplcying forces from the possible sudden strikes of the
enenry who had intended even before the beginning of the war to bring his
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Page 6 50X1-HUM>es
own antisubmarine forces into the paths of deployment of our submarine
forces.
While destroying enemy submarines, our antisubmarine forces should
ensure that our submarines break through to areas of actions against the
carrier strike large units, whereas the submarines and missile-carrying
aviation destroying the aircraft carriers with their strike and
antisubmarine aviation, as well as our other surface ships, will be
ensuring freedom of action for our antisubmarine submarines and aviation
which are carrying out the search for and destruction of the enemy missile
submarines, and at the same time, possibly, his antisubmarine submarines.
All the tasks should be performed at the same time. This means that combat
with carrier strike large units and the destruction of missile submarines,
as well as antisubmarine submarines, are not only contiguous actions, but
they are tightly interwoven. On what grounds then, are the actions of
antisubmarine forces to be examined separately from the actions of
submarines and aircraft aimed at combat with carrier strike large units?
Apparently, the reference to the specific character of submarine warfare,
requiring a special organization and operational disposition of forces,
methods of controlling them and, in the final analysis, of conducting
everyday actions, cannot constitute a substantial argument in favor of the
assertions of Captain First Rank Ye. b'Iamayev,
In order that the actions of all the forces of a fleet in the initial
period of a war be most successful, it is necessary to plan them within a
single plan of the initial naval operation. In so doing, the anticipated
variants of the possible situation must provide for precise allocation of
the efforts of each type of forces according to the targets of strikes,
areas of actions and time; their cooperation, mutual support, and the
organization of their control.
It is desirable to work out the plan of the operation and the
preparation of the forces for its conduct in advance. In so doing, of
course, all possible variants of the situation cannot be accurately
foreseen. The complex dynamics of combat may not coincide with the
proposals which were made before the beginning of the combat actions as to
the most desirable allocation of the efforts of our strike submarines,
missile-carrying aviation and antisubmarine forces. In particular, one can
assume that, in order to achieve surprise, the enemy will not employ his
aircraft carriers in those areas where they conduct exercises and where
they are deployed when local conflicts occur. Also not excluded is the
possibility of the movement of enemy missile submarines from previously
identified areas of syste.~natic combat patrolling into other areas where new
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missile la~ching positions will be established. In connection with this,
it will become necessary- to retarget the forces of our fleet, and to assign
them new targets, time and areas for the delivery of strikes. It will be
more convenient to do this in the case in which a single operation is
conducted by the forces of a fleet and there is one level of command in the
person of the commander of the fleet and his staff. This circumstance also
speaks in favor of our understanding of the matter of the make-up of the
initial naval operation.
The author's assertion that the plan and concept for the employment of
aviation and submarines against missile-car-~ying submarines is set apart
from the plan and concept of the fleet's strike forces, cannot be
acknowledged as correct. It is true that sometimes, for the purpose of a
more thorough definition of the specific character of the actions of
various forces, these questions are examined individually. But in practice
it is necessary that the strike and antisubmarine forces of the fleet,
especially at the beginning of the war, be coordinated through a single
concept and plan.
We have our own opinion about the characteristics of the operation.
It is difficult to predict the spatial scope and duration of the initial
naval operation; the operation is defined by the specific conditions of the
situation in each naval theater. In reasonable approximation it can be
estimated that the depth of the actions of our forces against the enemy
carrier strike large units and missile submarines, which are equipped with
the most improved carrier-based aviation and Polaris missiles, will be
1,500 to 2,500 kilometers from our seacoast. The possibility of increasing
these dista*~ces to 3,500 to 4,500 kilometers in the next few years is not
excluded.
The duration of the actions of the main groupilZgs of our forces
against the aircraft carriers and missile submarines is approx'~~tely
several days. During this time the enemy's carrier strike large units and
\the grouping of missile submarines will either be destroyed or, having
,sustained losses, they will run out of on-board reserves of nuclear weapons
and attempt to break away from our forces.
Somewhat later, but nevertheless taithin the framework of the initial
naval operation, the actions of our submarine forces directed toward
combating the antisubmarine submarines of the enemy probably will proceed.
Hrn~ever, they too will be limited by the time our strike submarines are in
the ocean which is required for the defeat of the carrier strike large
units, and by the period during which the main grouping of these submarines
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50X1-HUM
.
biamayev, of course, is right in asserting that the most promising forces
for combating missile submarines, especially in their distant combat patrol
areas, are nuclear antisubmarine submarines and long range aviation. The
advantages o~ these types of forces are indisputable, and it 'is~c~esirable
to exert the maximum efforts to establish them in the necessary numbers.
However, it cannot be asserted that, as a rule, only submarines with
nuclear power plants will be capable of conducting combat with enemy
submarines at the beginning of a war. The desire to emphasize the great
effectiveness of the new nuclear antisubmarine submarines is completely
natural. But it is inadmissible, in so doing, to reduce to zero the
importance of the existing diesel submarines which are part of the armament
of the Na~~y~ and will be employed for a long time to come to carry out
various tasks, including the task of combating nuclear missile submarines,
The process of establishing new nuclear submarine forces is complex,
long, and requires great material expenditures. For example, the US
stopped building diesel submarines ire 1957 and after that has been building
only nuclear submarines for six years. Yet, with excessively large budget
appropriations and a powerful shipbuilding industry, only 19 percent of the
submarine forces of their nary- are nuclear submarines. There are grounds
to assume that even by 1970-19'2 the number of nuclear submarines in the US
navy will be approximately equal to or a little higher than the number of
diesel submarines. Consequently, now as in the next few years, by force of
historical necessity diesel submarines will be in existence ai:d be employed
along with nuclear submarines in the event of war. This means that they
must not be left out of consideration for armed combat at sea.
Speaking about the possibility cf employing diesel submarinnes in
combat with nuclear missile submarines, it must be noted that the latter
cannot always effectively use their inherent characteristic of a high le~r~i
of maneuverability- under water. ~~'hen located in launch positions, 50X1-HUM
especially during the preparation ana launching of Polaris missiles,
maclear missile submarines have to maneuver on fixed courses with speeds of
returns to our bases or is redeployed to carry out the next tasks,
The subsequent continuation of combat with the enemy's antisubmarine
forces at sea, including submarines, will most likely go beyond the bounds
of the initial naval operation. It will take the form of systematic
actions, which should be organized depending on the outcome of the initial
operation to defeat the missile-carrying naval forces.
tiv'e will e.~cpress same views about the role of diesel submarines in
actions against enemy nuclear missile submarines. Captain First R;~nk Ye
TQP~SE~RET
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four to six kilometers per tour. Under these conditions the probability of
their being detected by diesel submarines may amount not to 20 percent, as
the author asserts, but to SO to 60 percent. It is true, to achieve such a
probability would require that there be more diesel submarines than nuclear
submarines, and their employment would be more complex.
The experience of recent years shows that even with the existing
technical equipment, when properly employed under present-day conditions,
diesel submarines can detect nuclear submarines,at~sea, and in doing so the
conditions of establishing contact with them and the duration of the
maintenance of contact are sufficient in the majority of cases for the
employment of weapons. In order to achieve better results, it is necessary
to modernize the means of hydroaceustic detection and the antisubmarine
weapons of the diesel submarines.
Along with the development of new forces and means, our task consists
of constantly searching for more effective methods for the employment not
only of future, but also of existing forces and means. It is necessary to
ersure in every tray possible their high level of combat readiness for
actions in the system cf ccmbat with the nuclear missile sub;arines of the
probable enemy.
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