MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000202030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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16 June 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between
the Armed Forces and Civil Defense
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". This article examines the
possibilities for civil defense assistance of the different
branches of the armed forces in outlining areas for military and
civil defense cooperation and identifying existing shortcomings.
The author points out the lack of an overall concept and plan for
employing military and civil defense forces, and the need for a
central organ at the Ministry of Defense level to organize
cooperation. The organization of civil defense at the military
district level requires allocation of more military forces and
better cooperation planning by the civil defense department to
cover mutual assistance procedures, control over civil and local
defense, and a composite plan for basic civil defense measures at
the local level. This article appeared in ISSUE:, Nn 9 ( 9) for
1963. 1
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this pUblicAtinn hp7e:3 hin,c3n =ccir-tync.A
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1963
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
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DATE
16 June 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between the Armed
Forces and Civil Defense
SOLACE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is
General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok. This article examines the
possibilities for civil defense assistance of the different
branches of the armed forces in outlining areas for military and
civil defense cooperation and identifying existing shortcomings.
The author points out the lack of an overall concept and plan for
employing military and civil defense forces, and the need for a
central organ at the Ministry of Defense level to organize
cooperation. The organization of civil defense assistance at the
military district level requires allocation of more military
forces and better cooperation planning by the civil defen X1-HUM
department to include mutual assistance, warning and
communications procedures, control, and support. The civil
defense department must have another plan to cover control over
civil and local defense, and a composite plan for basic civil
defense measures at the local level. The author also asserts
that the assistant military district commander for civil defense
must have a control post. End of 55O-711Hum
Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three
times annually and was distributed down to the level of division
commander. It reportedly ceased publication at thp ganc9 nf 1q7n
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Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense
by
General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok
The civil defense of the USSR, as we know, is a system of
state-wide defensive measures to be carried out for the
protection of the population and the national economy against
weapons of mass destruction, and for conducting rescue and urgent
emergency restoration work in centers of destruction. Civil
defense is a new type of strategic support for the defense of the
state in war. It comprises one of the most important defensive
functions of the Party and Soviet organs and is a new way for the
entire population of the country to participate in protecting the
socialist state.
The conduct of rescue and urgent emergency restoration
operations in major cities and industrial areas which have been
subjected to an enemy nuclear attack will take the form of
large-scale civil defense operations in which participate tens
and hundreds of thousands of people, organized into non-military
civil defense contingents and operating with the active
assistance and direct participation of troops. Rescue operations
must be begun immediately after centers of destruction have been
created, and they must be carried out within an extremely short
time limit by all available forces, otherwise the people who are
in the centers of destruction will perish.
It is natural that close intercoordination and
interdependence exist between the civil defense and the armed
forces. Now, it is difficult to achieve victory without well
organized and well trained civil defense forces at our disposal
which, in a nuclear war, must ensure the preservation of human
and material resources and the maintenance of a stable economy.
Even in the Great Patriotic War, civil defense forces5(T_E
engineer units and non-military contingents -- provided
substantial assistance to the troops of the fronts. Many civil
defense engineer units, by order of the commanders of fronts,
were allocated to construct defensive works and defensive lines;
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they took part in battles against the fascist German troops,
dismantled obstructions, reconstructed industrial and residential
buildings and structures, disarmed unexploded aerial bombs and
artillery shells, cleared mines from buildings and passages,
built shelters, and carried out other combat assignments. Thus,
civil defense did not fulfil its tasks separately, but in
cooperation with the armed forces.
At present, the role of such cooperation has grown
immeasurably. Unfortunately, this has not been fully reflected
in documents specifying the tasks of civil defense and its
cooperation with the armed forces. They only discuss what
military-methodological assistance has to be given to civil
defense organs by the Ministry of Defense, military districts and
garrison chiefs, and what kind of assistance must be given in
strengthening civil defense, raising its combat readiness, and
also in conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration
operations in stricken cities and at installations of the
national economy.
In our opinion, it is time to abandon the mistaken view that
only unilateral assistance (only from the armed forces) is
possible for civil defense in carrying out its complex and
important tasks. This view inevitably leads to a serious
underestimation by many generals, officers, civil defense chiefs
and their staffs of the problems of cooperation between troops
and civil defense. It is necessary to reveal those great
capabilities which civil defense has at its disposal for
supporting combat actions by all branches of the armed forces in
a future war.
The experience of joint exercises conducted in 1962 with the
staffs and troops of military districts and military garrisons,
and the civil defense of republics, krais, oblasts and cities,
confirms this conclusion. Civil defense engineer units and
non-military contingents of the medical, firefighting and
engineer-technical services, supply services and several others
can be of great assistance to the troops.
We should also keep in mind that civil defense forces will
be of substantial help to installations of the Ministry of
Defense in eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes
against them. In addition, assistance can be given to all
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branches of the armed forces in fulfilling their combat tasks
both in the country's rear and in the operational rear.
Such assistance can be given to the Strate7ic Rocket Forces
and Air Defense Forces of the Country in repairing badly damaged
lines of transportation leading to launch sites, launchers and
surface-to-air missile launchers, in camouflaging them, in
restoring the control system and airfield network of air defense
aviation, and in other ways.
Civil defense can assist the Ground Forces in ensuring the
movement of troops from the interior of the country to areas of
combat actions when enemy nuclear strikes have begun. This is
done by repairing severely damaged sections of roads, bridges and
crossings. In the operational rear civil defense forces will
assist troops on the march when roads are impassable, when troops
are regrouping, and when a defense is being organized, in
particular by installing defensive works, shelters, camouflage
means, etc.
Civil defense engineer troops and non-military contingents
will be able to assist the Air Forces in reconstructing damaged
airfields, in constructing takeoff and landing strips and sites
and camouflaging them, and in restoring damaged transportation
lines.
The Navy can be helped in eliminating the aftereffects of
enemy nuclear strikes against naval bases, ports and other
installations, in setting up temporary points for basing a fleet
or individual combat and auxiliary ships, and in laying
transportation lines to them.
Civil defense forces will play quite an important role in
eliminating sabotage and airborne landing groups which the enemy
intends to drop on a wide scale during the initial period of a
war into the rear of the country and especially the rear of
fronts.
The troops of the Soviet Army and civil defense forces will
undoubtedly make local medical bases and rear hospitals available
to one another for treatment of casualties among the population
and servicemen, as well as transport means, fuel, provisions,
etc. Of great importance also are cooperation between the troops
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and civil defense in conducting joint radiation, chemical and
bacteriological reconnaissance, the mutual reporting of data from
this reconnaissance, and forecasting of the spread of clouds from
nuclear bursts. In connection with this, we feel it is advisable
to hasten the solution of the problem of setting up a unified
state-wide system of reconnaissance and warning about nuclear
bursts and radioactive, chemical and bacteriological
contamination on the basis of the state hydrometeorological
service, all branches of the armed forces, and special posts set
up within the civil defense system (of engineer units, organs of
the militia, installations of the national economy, collective
farms and state farms).
The timely and efficiently organized warning of civil
defense control posts and the population by the radiotechnical
troops of the Air Defense of the Country regarding the threat of
an enemy air attack plays an important role. At present, such
warning has been set up without regard for the special features
of modern means of attack. The "Air Alert" signal, as a rule, is
transmitted from the Air Defense Forces of the Country to civil
defense control posts, and they duplicate it for the population
and installations of the national economy, which leads to a great
loss of time. Only major cities and industrial centers are
warned of the threat of an attack; there is no warning of rural
areas, which could in a number of instances lead to heavy losses.
The combined use of state and ministry communications nets,
especially those which are necessary for the uninterrupted
control of civil defense and troops both while they are moving
from the interior of the country to areas of combat actions and
in the operational rear, particularly when there is heavy
jamming, is quite important in a nuclear war.
The cooperative use of roads for moving troops and carrying
out civil defense tasks (evacuation and dispersal of the
population, manual and office workers, institutions, and valuable
materiel into a non-urban zone) is of some interest to the
command of the troops of military districts and fronts, and to
the civil defense leadership. It is necessary to precisely
specify the time for using one or another road or crossing with
regard for the importance of the tasks being carried out by
troops and civil defense. Along with this, if the appropriate
measures are not provided for in advance, moving great masses of
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the population (those being evacuated and refugees), especially
from border areas and major cities, could have a considerable
effect on the movement of troops, their support and their
actions.
An important role is also played by decisions coordinated
between the commanders of the troops of military districts and
the civil defense leadership on the use of a non-urban zone for
accommodating the population and facilities evacuated, for
dispersing manual and office workers, valuable materiel and
transport, and for dispersing non-military contingents, control
posts, etc. This, in turn, will ensure the well-organized full
mobilization of the armed forces.
Not less important are also coordinated actions by troops
and civil defense forces in zones where disastrous flooding will
probably occur when major hydraulic engineering structures are
destroyed.
Of course, this is hardly an exhaustive list of those
measures whose accomplishment will require close cooperation from
the military command and civil defense leadership in peacetime,
in a period of threat and during a war.
We observe that the solution of problems of cooperation
between the armed forces and civil defense at the center suffers
from substantial shortcomings which, in turn, negatively affect
the organization of cooperation locally. This cooperation
consists of the following. First, the Civil Defense Staff of the
USSR coordinates measures for protecting the population and
national economy against weapons of mass destruction with the
General Staff and the staffs of the branches of the armed forces.
We should mention that this coordination is sporadic in nature.
Second, scientific research institutions and military academies
participate in the research of civil defense subjects. Third,
joint command-staff exercises are conducted. In other words, as
yet only individual problems of cooperation are solved, and there
is no overall concept and plan for employing civil defense forces
and troops not participating in operations.
While in the matter of cooperation between civil defense and
the ground forces the situation is more or less satisfactory
since the direct organizer of the cooperation, the
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,
/Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, is at the same time the
/Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR, cooperation with other
Ibranches of the armed forces is carried out poorly or is totally
nonexistent. Moreover, no one is properly studying and working
out the problems of cooperation between the branches of the armed
forces and civil defense.
How can we explain this situation? In our opinion, it is
due primarily to an underestimation both of the capabilities of
civil defense to assist the armed forces, and of the importance
of cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces on the
whole. One of the reasons for this, we feel, is the lack at the
center (in the Ministry of Defense) of a single organ for matters
of civil defense which would unify the efforts of civil defense
and all branches of the armed forces, and would be the organizer
of cooperation.
Based on the experience of two years of work on civil
defense by the civil defense departments of the military
districts and the assistant commanders of military districts, it
is advisable to have a corresponding organ in the Ministry of
Defense, headed by a Deputy Minister of Defense, or to have such
an organ in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
* * *
In peacetime cooperation between the armed forces and civil
defense occurs mainly in military districts and in military
garrisons. The staffs of military districts, the civil defense
departments of military districts, and garrison chiefs help civil
defense staffs to: organize the training of civil defense
command personnel and staffs, enginer units, services,
non-military contingents and the population; prepare for and
conduct civil defense exercises and staff training practices;
organize control and warning about the threat of an enemy air
attack; and monitor the status of civil defense in the republics,
krais, oblasts, cities, raions, in installations of the national
economy, in ministries, agencies, in economic councils, and civil
defense services. They also help in every way possible to
provide control, to work out plans of civil defense, to organize
mobilization measures, to train military civil defense cadres, to
work out and implement measures for protecting the population and
national economy, and to conduct work in military science.
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Joint exercises of the troops of military districts and
garrisons and the civil defense staffs of the republics, krais,
oblasts and cities located within the operational boundaries of
these military districts are of special significance in working
out problems of cooperation between troops and civil defense.
Such exercises were conducted in 1962, for example, with troops
of the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Moscow, Leningrad and other
military districts. During the exercises problems were studied
regarding cooperation between civil defense and the troops of the
military district in a period of threat and during an enemy
nuclear attack, and regarding cooperation with the troops in a
front offensive operation in the initial period of a war, when
the troops are moving from the interior of the country to areas
of combat actions. They tested the practicability of plans which
had been worked out for cooperation between civil defense and the
troops of the military district allocated for rescue operations
in cities and installations of the national economy which had
been attacked. The exercise conducted between the civil defense
of the Primorskiy Krai and troops of the military garrisons in
1962, for example, attests to the great usefulness of joint
exercises. By decision of the commander of the troops of the
military district, the civil defense department of the military
district, military garrisons, military construction units and
subunits of the Navy were enlisted for the exercise. Along with
many other matters, the procedure for using military units of the
district for rescue operations in centers of destruction and
landing craft for evacuating the population, and the procedure
for deploying first aid detachments, firefighting subunits and
other non-military contingents for assisting in the local defense
of military installations, were studied in the exercise.
The civil defense departments of military districts along
with the civil defense staffs of republics, krais, oblasts and
cities work out coordinated plans and then carry them out
jointly.
The work of the military councils of a number of military
districts (Volga, Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Transbaykal,
Leningrad and others), which, in their sessions in 1962,
discussed the condition of civil defense in the republics, krais
and oblasts located within the operational boundaries of the
district, and measures for increasing the combat readiness of
civil defense, deserves our full approval. This attests to the
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fact that the civil defense departments of military districts
have played a positive role in organizing cooperation between the
troops and civil defense. The form of this cooperation must be
improved even further, and effective methods must be found for
providing practical assistance in fulfilling civil defense tasks.
The civil defense departments of military districts have been
assigned to assist, in every way possible, the civil defense
organs of National Economic Councils which, in accordance with
decisions of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPSU "On developing the economy of the USSR and restructuring
Party control over the national economy", have been greatly
consolidated and now embrace the territory of several autonomous
republics, krais and oblasts (for example, the Central Asian
National Economic Council embraces the territory of four
republics).
While previously national economic councils, as a rule, were
set up within the limits of one republic, krai or oblast and the
civil defense staffs of these republics, krais and oblasts
directed civil defense matters, now the entire volume of work
involved in directing civil defense in the national economic
councils is assigned to the civil defense staffs of the USSR of
the corresponding union republics and to the civil defense
departments of the military districts.
This revision of the organizational structure of Party and
Soviet organs and national economic councils in accordance with
the decision of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of
the CPSU obligates all civil defense chiefs, their staffs,
ministries, agencies, the national economic councils, military
districts, main staffs of the branches of the armed forces, and
the Ministry of Defense as a whole to exert their joint efforts
to further improve cooperation between the troops and civil
defense.
* * *
How will cooperation between the armed forces and civil
defense be organized in wartime? We should note that this
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Cooperation as it is now being organized still does not
correspond, in our opinion, to the nature of modern warfare.
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The civil defense departments of military districts together
with the staffs of the military districts and the civil defense
staffs of the corresponding republics, krais and oblasts must
work out plans for the military districts to lend assistance to
civil defense chiefs. However, due to insufficient practical
experience in this matter and sometimes to underestimation of the
role of such cooperation, the plans which have been worked out,
in our opinion, suffer from substantial shortcomings. Not all
commanders of military districts provide for the allocation of
the forces necessary to help civil defense in eliminating the
aftereffects of an enemy air attack. As the experience of joint
exercises with troops and civil defense shows, commanders of
military districts must allocate considerably more forces to
carry out rescue operations in cities which have been the target
of nuclear strikes than the number stipulated in the plan for
cooperation.
Frequently, the time limits for the arrival of troop units
at destroyed cities, the march routes for their movement, and the
type of transport are not specified in the plans for providing
assistance. These plans do not reflect the problems of
controlling the units allocated for lending assistance, the
measures to be carried out by forces of troops and civil defense
in zones where there is disastrous flooding, or the problems of
cooperating with adjacent districts. They do not provide for the
creation of reserves for accomplishing ... (missing) ... of civil
defense ... (missing) ... with means ... (missing) ... of civil
defense ... (missing) ... of the armed forces (for assisting
installations of the Ministry of Defense in eliminating the
aftereffects of an enemy air attack) or else they plan for this
assistance in very insignificant amounts.
There is absolutely no plan for using civil defense forces
to assist in fulfilling other combat tasks of the troops,
especially in the initial period of a war. These matters are
also not properly reflected in the civil defense plans of
republics, krais and oblasts.
We also need to find a better method of compiling a
composite plan for the civil defense of a military district. All
civil defense measures to be carried out by republics, krais and
oblasts in a period of threat and in wartime are mechanically
combined in one plan; it does not reflect the tasks to be carried
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out by the troops of the military district in the interests of
civil defense, for example, in evacuating the population and
institutions, in dispersing manual and office workers and
valuable materiel, and in other measures (determining march
routes and dispersal areas, ensuring public order in major cities
and on march routes during evacuation and dispersal, and others).
We must also mention that, when plans for organizing
cooperation between the troops and civil defense have been drawn
up, the decision of the commander of the military district on
conducting the civil defense and local defense of Ministry of
Defense installations has not been drawn up and relayed to the
executors. Instructions for working out plans have become
largely obsolete and are in need of serious reworking and
revision.
Experience shows that, instead of the plan being worked out
now for assisting civil defense and the plan for conducting local
defense at Ministry of Defense installations, it is advisable to
have in the district a single "Plan for the Civil and Local
Defense of the Military District". Such a plan must, in our
opinion, take into account the plans for civil defense of the
corresponding republics, krais, oblasts and national economic
councils, and the tasks of local defense at military
installations. The decision by the commander of the military
district on conducting civil and local defense, which sets the
main tasks of cooperation between troops of the district and
civil defense, must precede the working out of this plan.
In his decision, the commander of the military district must
draw conclusions from an assessment of the situation which could
develop within the military district and adjacent districts as a
result of the employment of weapons of mass destruction by the
enemy; he must estimate what aftereffects are possible in the
event of the destruction of cities, industrial installations,
bridges, junctions of transportation lines, roads, and
communications centers. The commander must further determine the
level of troop participation and the amounts of forces and means
to be allocated for assisting civil defense in a period of
threat, for rescue operations in centers of destruction and for
conducting local defense, and also determine the procedure for
employing civil defense forces. It is also necessary to provide
for the organization of control over troops who are allocated for
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civil defense, and also over the engineer units and non-military
civil defense contingents allocated to assist in local defense
and in carrying out the other tasks of the troops of the
district. The procedure for cooperation between the troops of
the district and the civil defense of republics, krais, oblasts,
national economic councils and adjacent military districts, as
well as the tasks involved in providing combat, materiel,
technical and other types of support for troops and civil defense
forces, must be stipulated.
On the basis of the commander's decision, the civil defense
department of the military district, together with the staff of
the district, must work out a plan for the civil and local
defense of the military district. This plan must, in our
opinion, basically include the following individual plans: plan
for cooperation between the military district and the civil
defense and local defense of the military district; plan for
organizing control of the civil and local defense within the
district; plan of the basic measures to be taken by the military
district for civil and local defense; and a composite plan for
the civil defense of the republics, krais, and ()blasts located
within the operational boundaries of the district. The plan for
cooperation between the military district and the civil defense
of the corresponding republics, krais, oblasts, national economic
councils and adjacent districts is the most important document.
It is advisable to reflect the following in it;
-- the composition and grouping of troops to be allocated by
the military district to assist the civil defense of each
republic, krai and oblast; and also the forces to be allocated by
the chiefs of civil defense of the republics, krais and oblasts
to help in the local defense of the district and in carrying out
other combat tasks;
-- measures to be carried out by civil defense in a period
of threat; and the tasks of the troops in offering assistance to
the corresponding chiefs of civil defense in carrying out these
measures;
-- the tasks of the troops of the military district and the
non-military civil defense contingents allocated to eliminate the
aftereffects of an enemy air attack at civil and local defense
installations;
-- the procedure for calling up military units and
non-military contingents, their concentration areas, march routes
to centers of destruction, the type of transport, the time for
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arriving in the specified areas, and to whom they are to be
subordinated;
-- the organization of control of troops and non-military
contingents, communication with them, the warning procedure, and
cooperation with adjacent military districts;
-- the organization of combat, materiel, technical and
medical support to troops and non-military contingents;
-- the composition, deployment areas, tasks and procedure
for using reserves of the civil defense and the military district
which have been allocated for carrying out tasks which arise
suddenly.
Experience shows that the plan for cooperation should be
worked out graphically on maps (diagrams), and clarified with the
necessary legends and tables.
The chiefs of garrisons make their decisions for offering
assistance to civil defense and conducting local defense on the
basis of the commander's decision and excerpts of the plan for
cooperation between the troops and civil defense. They work out
detailed plans for cooperation with regard for local conditions,
and coordinate them with the corresponding civil defense chiefs
of the oblasts, cities and individual installations. The plan for
cooperation between the troops of a garrison and civil defense is
approved by the garrison chief and the corresponding chief of
civil defense.
In our opinion, the civil defense department of the military
district must also have a plan for organizing control over civil
and local defense within the operational boundaries of the
military district. In this plan, it would be desirable to
indicate: the location of the control posts of the civil defense
chiefs of the republics, krais, oblasts, cities and national
economic councils, of the assistant commander of the military
district for civil defense, of the chiefs of garrisons, and of
the chiefs of the local defense of Ministry of Defense
installations; the organization of wire and radio communications
between these control posts; measures for warning the civil
defense system of the republics, krais, oblasts and cities, civil
defense engineer units, military units allocated for offering
assistance according to the plan for mutual assistance, and
Ministry of Defense installations about the threat of an enemy
air attack and about radioactive, chemical and bacteriological
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contamination.
There is also the practical necessity of having in the civil
defense department of the military district a composite plan of
basic measures for the civil defense of the republics, krais,
oblasts and national economic councils located within the
operational boundaries of the district. This plan covers such
matters as the location of civil defense forces, their
composition and grouping, the location of the materiel resources
of civil defense, a plan for evacuating the population and
dispersing manual and office workers, facilities, non-military
contingents and valuable materiel, the areas for accommodating
casualties and deploying civil defense engineer units, and the
provision of the population and non-military contingents with
means of group and individual protection.
Also, practical measures of the military district, providing
for assistance to civil defense and the maintenance of close
cooperation, are indicated in the composite plan.
Depending on local conditions and the decision of the
commander of the military district, other necessary documents may
be included in the plan for the civil and local defense of the
district. However, we must observe the general requirement that
the plan should not be unwieldly,and that it should contain the
necessary data and be simple and convenient to use.
For implementing cooperation between troops and civil
defense and for controlling troops allocated for the purpose of
assisting civil defense, the assistant commander of the military
district for civil defense must have a control post with wire and
radio communications means providing reliable communications with
the chiefs of civil defense of the republics, krais, oblasts and
national economic councils, with chiefs of garrisons and troops
allocated to assist civil defense, with Ministry of Defense
installations, and with reserves. Without this, it is impossible
to ensure control and implement cooperation. It is necessary to
establish reliable control also because a considerable number of
separate units and subunits, military schools, academies, and
schools will come under the command of the assistant commander.
It is self-evident that the assistant commander will control
units through the chiefs of garrisons, who in turn must have the
necessary means of control at their disposal. Besides this, in
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major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and others), where the
commanders of the military districts are the chiefs of the
garrisons, their assistants for civil defense will have to
directly control a considerable number of units which have been
allocated to assist these cities.
Unfortunately, the assistant commanders of military
districts for civil defense do not have any means of control and
actually lack the capability to control troops and maintain
cooperation, which leads to a lowering of the combat readiness of
civil defense and the troops. This has been confirmed by
numerous joint exercises.
* * *
In conclusion let us remark that, in a nuclear war, close
cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense is one of
the important conditions for achieving victory in the war.
Unfortunately, the bases for cooperation between the Armed Forces
and civil defense in the initial period of a nuclear war still
have not been thoroughly investigated. Regardless of whether or
not they have been allocated to assist civil defense according to
the plans for cooperation, many units of troops will nevertheless
have to participate in eliminating the aftereffects of the
employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy in cities and at
installations of the national economy. Consequently, along with
the advance working out of problems of cooperation, it is very
important to train staffs, all officers and troops in organizing
and conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations
in centers of destruction. It is impossible to accept a
situation where many officers of large units and units do not
have the necessary conception of civil defense, its tasks and the
methods of carrying them out.
It is advisable to include matters of organizing and
conducting civil defense within the officer training program of
large units and units, and within the program for the operational
training of personnel from both the staffs of armies and military
districts, and the staffs of the branch arms and branches of the
armed forces. It is also desirable to examine the possibility of
including these matters in the programs for training the cadets
of military schools, officers taking advanced courses, and
students of military academies.
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Special attention, in our opinion, should be devoted to
training and preparing civil defense engineer units for action.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War attests to the fact
that these units must be combat units in the full sense of the
word, and must be well trained not only for rescue operations in
centers of destruction, but also for fulfilling other combat
tasks in support of the actions of the armed forces. They must
become the combat reserve of the armed forces. This circumstance
urgently requires that systematic combat training be conducted
for them, and that the use of engineer units for anything other
than their function be prevented.
The elimination of the deficiencies in the organization of
cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense, and
further improvement of this cooperation, will to a considerable
degree promote the raising of the level of combat readiness and
combat effectiveness of the armed forces and civil defense.
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