MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ROAD SUPPORT IN OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201970001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
2 June 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Road Support in
Operations
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article consists of two critical replies to various articles on road
support published in earlier issues of this series. The first asserts that
joint efforts by various road construction elements are needed to fulfil
present-day operational requirements, and that roads should be geared for
both troop and logistical movements. The author also recommends uniting
engineer and road building functions under a road support directorate in a
formation such as a front. The second repeats the need for integrating the
road support of troop maneuvers and logistical movements, and cites the
results of exercises in the Baltic Military District in establishing heavy
road equipment requirements, which the authors claim the engineer troops
cannot meet. This article anneared in Tgmip Nn ? f7l;1 -Fr), IQF,C
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ee ' n have been 50X1 HUM
assigned
William W. Wells
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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50X1-HUM
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1965
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Road Support in Operations
SOURCE Documentary
Summa
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Thought". This article consists o two critical replies to various articles
on road support published in earlier issues of this series. The first, by
General-Mayor of Engineer Troops V. Makarevskiy, asserts that joint efforts
y various road construction elements are needed to fulfil present-day
operational requirements, and that roads should be geared for both troop
and logistical movements. The author also recommends uniting engineer and
road building functions under a road support directorate in a formation
such as a front. The second, by Colonel General M. Milovskiy and Engineer
Lieutenant o onel N. Varlamov, repeats the need for integrating the road
support of troop maneuvers and logistical movements, and cites the results
of exercises in the Baltic Military District in establishing heavy road
equipment requirements, which the authors claim the engineer troops cannot
meet. E
d f S
Comment :
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually
and was distributed down to the level of division
ceased publication at
the end of 197
n
o utrnnary
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Road Support in Operations
by
General-Mayor of Engineer Troops V. Makarevskiy,
Colonel General M. Milovskiy
and
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel M. Varlamov
In recent years the subject of road support has been discussed
repeatedly on the pages of the military press. Apparently the importance
and, at the same time, the vulnerability of roads and road installations in
modern operations is too obvious; the gap between the number of road and
bridge works and the forces and means available for their restoration is a
wide one; and finally, the dissociation of forces and means designated for
building and maintaining the roads cannot help but cause alarm.
The efforts of authors of articles published in the Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" are also directed toward a
solution of the numerous problems that have arisen in considering questions
of road support.
A special response was received by the article by Marshal of the
Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, "On the Road Support of Modern Operations"*
in which the author calls for "the reliable control over the preparation of
roads and their use first of all in support of the troops", pointing out
that up to 80 percent of the entire enormous motor transport inventory of a
front is in the battle formations of the troops and not more than 15 to 18
percent is available in the rear areas of the army and front.
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov believes that a special
directorate for transportation lines must serve as the single center for
planning the road support of operations in support of the maneuvering and
transport of troops as well as their materiel and technical support.
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 2 (52),
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Similar thoughts were expressed in an article by Colonel General of
Engineer Troops A. Tsirlin, "The Question of Road Support in Offensive
Operations".*
The authors of other articles published in the Journal resolve the
questions of the preparation and use of roads chiefly in support of the
operational rear and not the maneuvering of troops, which in our opinion
cannot be considered a correct approach.
In our view an even more erroneous viewpoint was taken by
General-Mayor P. Fomichev in the article "Problems of the Road Support of
Modern Offensive Operations'**although on the whole the article contains a
number of interesting thoughts and useful suggestions on the organization
of road and bridge works. Certainly the author is correct when he says
that roads should be readied during an offensive without disrupting the
battle formations of the troops, and that there is a need to increase the
combat readiness of road repair units. His comments on organizing
cooperation with Civil Defense organs, bringing construction units of the
Ministry of Defense into road-building work, improving the national-economy
road construction equipment, and standardizing water crossing equipment
sets, are appropriate.
At the same time it is our opinion that General-Mayor P. Fomichev has
taken a one-sided view of the function of roads, seeing them only as
arteries linking the operational rear with the front.
It is for this reason that in the calculations which he gives the
extent of the road system in a front has been reduced by nearly a factor of
two. In our opinion the extent oF-'the road system at the start of an
operation should be up to 10,000 kilometers and not 4,000 kilometers; and
toward the end of the operation it should be not 12,000 to 15,000
kilometers but three times greater. This occurs because the author has not
considered another, unquestionably more important function of the roads,
particularly in the initial period of a war: the fact that they serve as
ways for moving the troops to the front lines.
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought," No. 2 (57),
1961.
** 1 "Milita Thou ht", No. 3 (70),
19631 F__
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Calculations show that to support the movement forward of an army
consisting only of five divisions and army units to a depth of 1,300 to
1,500 kilometers where four to six through roads have been prepared, it
will be necessary to prepare 9,000 to 10,000 kilometers of axial and
lateral roads which will have up to 150 bridges 50 meters or more in length
with a total length of 18,000 to 20,000 linear meters.
The preparation and maintenance of such a large number of roads
requires the allocation of at least 50 road-building and bridge-building
battalions, while all (or almost all) of the engineer units (subunits) of
an army comprise only 40 percent of the number of men and equipment that
would be necessary. The remaining equipment would have to come from road
units in the rear, road contingents of the Ministry of Motor Transport and
Highways, military construction detachments, and subunits and units of the
branch arms.
In our view, only through the joint efforts of all of these special
units under centralized control will it be possible to prepare roads and
crossings in a -timely manner under present-day conditions.
It should be pointed out that General-Mayor P. Fomichev and several
other authors examine the preparation of the road network and the
organization of the road service from the position of the "classical"
approach, which calls for the division of the entire network of roads in an
army (front) into two parts: tactical roads (from the front line to the
divisional supply depots or the forward branches of army depots) and roads
of the rear area (operational). It is envisioned that the former
(tactical), intended to support the movement and maneuvering of the troops,
will be prepared by engineer units, while the latter, used for the delivery
of materiel and for evacuation, will be prepared by road units of the army
(front) rear.
We believe that the division of roads into "tactical" and "rear" in
modern operations, particularly in operations in the initial period of a
war, is an outdated concept.
One may be convinced of the correctness of this viewpoint if he
examines, even in the overall plan, the tasks of any of our border or
interior military districts. Their main task in the initial period of a
war will be to ensure the timely movement forward of troops in a state of
constant combat readiness and newly deployed to the line of armed contact
with the enemy, and then the movement forward of deeper reserves. It is
precisely to the fulfilment of this task that almost all available and
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deployable engineer units may be assigned: a significant number of the
military construction detachments of the district, road contingents of the
Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways, road units of the rear, troops on
their own routes of movement and, if necessary, second-line contingents and
replacements. In addition, Civil Defense units will be allocated to
restore roads and build bypasses in the event of damage in large cities and
road junctions.
Can one really draw a line here and divide road preparation works into
"tactical" and "rear area" as in the "classical" method?
The "battle formation" of forces and means allocated for the
preparation of roads frequently finds itself reversed, that is, the road
contingents of the rear or the Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways
find themselves closer to the enemy than the deployed engineer units, or
the units may be mixed up. The tasks of preparing bridges and crossings
and repairing damage can be carried out only when there is the most rigid
centralization in the employment of all these forces and means and precise
control over them.
Therefore, it is our view that there has long been a need for the
unification within a front and an army of all the forces and means capable
of preparing and main'' inaing unimproved roads,* bridges and crossings in
support of troop maneuvering and the organization of supply deliveries, as
well as the establishment of a single control center for these units.
In some articles the authors have expressed the opinion that the role
of organizer of all of these forces and means should be given to the
combined-arms staff which would develop a road support plan on the basis of
the decision of the troop commander.
There is no doubt that the staff should solve the operational part of
the problem of moving and regrouping troops and determining the procedure
and time periods involved in moves. However, the staff is not in a
position to handle the technical part of the problem -- the organization of
road preparation work, the utilizatio of all the forces and means
allocated for road support, and the supervision of all the work.
*We have in mind all classes of roads, including cross-country routes.
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The authors of such proposals forget that the staff is overworked with
many other problems and cannot act as arbitrator in the distribution of the
efforts of engineer, road and other units allocated to road preparation
work. What is needed is a single authority with the appropriate control
organ which could be responsible equally for the preparation of tactical
and rear area roads and could exert well-qualified technical supervision
over all works.
In our opinion, therefore, it is now necessary to unite the engineer
and road units (large units) within the armies and fronts (districts) and
establish road support departments (directorates) under t e command of a
special assistant (deputy) to the commander of the army (front).
The idea of establishing such a directorate, which would have the
appropriate control organs and communications means, was suggested by
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, who called it a directorate for
transportation lines.
Road contingents of the Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways,
construction units and other contingents and units of the branch arms
allocated to road construction in support of the army (front, district)
should also be subordinate to the road support directorate.
Not long ago the control of road units was reorganized -- the road
departments in the military districts (fronts) were made a part of the
Military Transportation Service. Thus it would seem that the idea of
unifying the command of road work has found a practical solution. But in
fact there occurred a joining of completely different organizations,
dissimilar with respect to their operating techniques, tasks and final
results (outputs).
What reasons can be given for combining these organs of the road
service and the military transportation service? Apparently as a result of
combining all road and transportation organs in the hands of a few there
was hope of having direct operational command, by the chief of the rear, of
road preparation work and over shipments of all types in the operational
rear (although, as is known, those who build and restore the railroads --
the railroad troops were left out of this union and were not made
subordinate to the chief of the rear).
What can be said against such a unification? First of all that the
means and methods used in the preparation and operation of railroads and
unimproved roads are absolutely dissimilar, and that the equipment of
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railroad and road units, methods of carrying out the work, the repair base
and methods of combat training are different. We should also not forget
the fact that in most cases neither the chief of the military
transportation service nor the chief of the rear of a front (district) is
in a position to exercise the necessary technical (much less operational)
command over the road units for the simple reason that they have as a rule
a different military training profile and are fully occupied by other more
specific tasks.
It seems to us that at the present time the rear has combined so many
services and functions that it could not possibly perform them in a
sufficiently qualified way. Under these conditions the unification of
military transportation service organs with the road service may mark the
limit of (word missing) in the activity of the rear.
What can be said "for" and "against" the combining of engineer and
road units in an army and a front (district)? The case for would include:
organizational ties, similar equipment and repair base, similar methods of
organizing work and combat training, and the single type of "output",
although the tactical and technical requirements for the quality of roads
and bridges are still somewhat different. A very important factor is the
capability for flexible utilization of engineer and road units, and the.
loads on each unit can be made more uniform. Finally, both the engineer
and road units will receive well-qualified operational as well as technical
supervision from a special deputy (assistant) to the commander of the front
(army) and the corresponding directorate (department).
It is now impossible to say who could become the head of this union --
the chief of the engineer troops of the front (district, army), the
corresponding chief of the road service, or someone else. It is important
that he be a person with sufficient authority and competence to resolve all
questions of an operational-tactical and technical nature. The question
arises whether such a unification would weaken the influence of the chief
of the rear on the preparation of roads required for the delivery of
supplies. But of the two functions served by the roads, the main one is
the support of troop maneuvering, and then deliveries of materiel will be
made over these same roads. In addition, it would obviously be an
advantage for the chief of the rear of an army to have an engineer
battalion (one engineer company, one or two road and bridge companies and
one road traffic control company) instead of the existing engineer company,
while a front should have an engineer brigade (one or two engineer
battalions, two road battalions, one bridge-building battalion and one road
traffic control company). These forces could perform all of the engineer
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tasks directly in support of the rear area of the army (front), including
the job of preparing access roads to army and front fieles and roads
within these areas, and could perform the engineer measures required for
the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction.
If the responsibility for the command of all road support in an army
and a front is placed upon the chief of the engineer troops, he could
handle the assignments through an appropriate organ -- a road support
directorate (department).
We cannot consider normal the present situation in which the main
reporting officer at command-staff exercises and war games on questions of
the road support of the troops, the presence and status of the road network
and bridges is the chief of engineer troops of the front (district) and
army and not the chief of the rear, even though the persons responsible for
monitoring the development and preparation of highways in peacetime and
wartime and examining the technical specifications for the design,
construction and repair of roads and bridges and other tasks are the chief
of the rear and the chief of the road service. Under the existing
conditions the chief of the engineer troops is actually removed from all of
these tasks. A certain paradox has developed: the materiel and all data on
roads and bridges flow to the chief of the rear, while the person primarily
responsible for their preparation and for road support in operations is the
chief of the engineer troops. This contradiction would be eliminated if
the road and engineer services were to be combined.
In conclusion it should be pointed out that the present practice of
military districts in planning operations for the initial period of a war
has been to assemble all available forces and means for the preparation of
lines of troop movement, to utilize them in a centralized manner and to set
up improvised control organs, where necessary bringing in officers from the
road service, the construction directorate and other services under the
overall supervision of the Chief of the Engineer Troops. However, the
limitations of the existing tables of organization make it difficult to
adopt effective measures for improving the command of road support. The
decisions made in some areas are not backed up by the necessary materiel
and there is a lack of continuity in the work.
Conditions require that the solution of this most important problem be
reinforced by the necessary organizational measures.
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Some very important questions were raised in the article by
General-Mayor P. Fomichev "Problems of the Road Support of Modern Offensive
Operations This explains the great interest which the article caused
among the readers.** The comments of Colonel L. Chernolupkiy and
General-Mayor of Engineer Troops G. Bulakhov contain a number of
interesting propositions to which we have no objections. But we cannot
agree with some of the statements made by General-Mayor of Engineer Troops
G. Bulakhov.
Let us refer to the main thesis presented in the article. The author
asserts that, "in fact, the task of road support for an offensive operation
by a front at the start of a war will be solely the function of engineer
support". He bases this assertion on the division of road support into the
following types: the support of supply deliveries and the support of troop
maneuvering and movements. Additionally, he feels that at the start of a
war the engineer troops will have a large amount of equipment (1,000 sets
of dozer attachments, up to 150 route clearers, more than 1,300
mine-clearing attachments, up to 130 bridge-layers and others).
It is now obvious to everyone that under modern conditions operations
will acquire an enormous spatial scope from the very beginning of a war and
will be carried out at high speeds with the continuous buildup of efforts
of the advancing troops, making it necessary to move formations and large
units over great distances from the deep rear to the front, between fronts
and within the limits of a front zone.
Questions of supply must also be solved in complete accordance with
the nature of actions of the troops. Therefore, the differentiation of
road support into two types performed in the interests of supply and in the
interests of troop movements -- as General-Ma or G. Bulakhov has attempted
to do, is an artificial one in our opinion. The overwhelming majority of
military researchers have now arrived at a common viewpoint which basically
is that the problem of the road support of operations can be solved
successfully only by the integrated employment of all means both for the
support of troop maneuvers and movements as well as in the interests of
supplying materiel in all echelons: center-front, army-large unit (unit).
Only then will the rational utilization of awl available forces and means
t
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (7n)
1963. 50X1-HU
**Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (73) for
1964.
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be possible (the road troops of our army and of the Warsaw Pact countries,
the engineer troops, special contingents and other subunits of
transportation organizations). This same thought was expressed in the
article by General-Mayor P. Fomichev, and we think there is no reason to
doubt this assertion.
The importance of each of the above road support organs to operations,
particularly in the initial period of a war, will change depending upon the
situation which has developed and the level at which the means are.used;
for example, the road support troops will perform the major part of the
work at the center-front level, while at the army-large unit level the main
burden will fall on t e engineer troops.
As is known, all road support measures in modern offensive operations
will be carried out under a single plan which determines exactly the plan
and tasks of the road support troops, engineer troops and civilian organs
at all levels.
The second argument by the author of these comments -- that only the
engineer troops can perform the tasks of the road support of operations in
the initial period of a war (in view of the large amount of equipment
available to them) -- has also raised some objections. At the present time
it is generally accepted that the main task involved in the road support of
operations is the preparation of roads, which includes their restoration
and the organization of road traffic control service on them.
The need for road restoration equipment stems from the scope and
nature of the work which must be performed with this equipment in order to
ensure the movement of troops and supply columns, including those with
missiles and missile propellant, at speeds of at least 25 to 35 kilometers
per hour.
The accompanying table, compiled on the basis of data from a series of
exercises conducted in the period 1962 to 1964, shows the amount of work
related to the road support of operations.
An analysis of these data shows that the main volume of earth-moving
jobs required in the restoration of roads can be performed by scrapers and
excavators operating in-conjunction with transport means. As far as road
surfacing is concerned, the major part of this work (up to 85 to 95
percent) is performed by excavators and transport means. 50X1-HUM
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This is explained by the fact that, in the restoration of approaches
to destroyed bridges, the construction of bypasses and the restoration of
high embankments in defiles and swamps, the major part of the earth-moving
tasks is characterized by the following figures: 20 to 30 percent of the
total amount of work involves the movement of soil for distances up to 100
meters while 70 to 80 percent involves movement of soil for distances
greater than 100 meters. The equipment used in road restoration work is
distinguished by its highly specific nature. For example, motorized
graders are best used in those situations when it is necessary to move soil
over a distance of 10 to 15 meters, when levelling soil, grading existing
roads and performing radioactive decontamination of them; bulldozers should
be used to shore up embankments and make cuts during the construction of
bypasses and approaches to water obstacles when soil and water conditions
are favorable, to fill ditches, trenches, and craters and, of course, only
in those cases when the distance required for the movement of soil is not
greater than 100 to 200 meters and the height of the embankment is two to
three meters; scrapers and self-propelled scrapers should be used in the
restoration of embankments and the construction of bypasses and approaches
when the distance required to move soil is within the limits of 100 to 200
and 1,000 to 2,500 meters, respectively; excavators working with transport
means (dump trucks) are widely used for the restoration of sub-grade roads
and the construction of bypasses and approaches in those cases when the
distance required for the movement of soil is greater than 1,000 to 2,500
meters.
These data have been verified by the experience of numerous exercises
with the actual deployment of road troops. For example, in an exercise in
the Baltic Military District the following amount of earth-moving work was
performed by the technical means indicated: three percent by motorized
graders, 25 percent by bulldozers, 35 percent by scrapers and 37 percent by
excavators working with transport means. It should be noted that this road
restoration work in the Baltic Military District was carried out in the
summer under favorable soil-geological and water conditions. At the same
time, however, all excavators (18), scrapers (six) and dump trucks (38)
were used in the operations while only about 20 percent of the bulldozers
(four or five of 23) were used.
In other exercises, when road restoration work was performed in marshy
woodland or in the spring in rainy weather, only scrapers and excavators
operating with transport means were used in the earth-moving operations.
Bulldozers were used chiefly on preparatory jobs. 50X1-HUM
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Now let us see whether the equipment available in the engineer troops
and named in the comments by General-Mayor G. Bulakhov corresponds to the
nature and scope of road restoration works.
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the data given
in the table: the engineer troops, while they have ample capabilities for
laying crossings, building bridges and clearing mines and obstacles from
roads, have limited capabilities to perform earth-moving tasks (up to 20 to
25 percent of the total) and are completely lacking in the equipment needed
to restore road surfaces.
One receives the impression that General-Mayor G. Bulakhov, in
determining the ability of engineer units to prm restoration works on
roads, bases his comments only on a consideration of the amount of
technical means and completely disregards an analysis of their tactical and
technical specifications.
In addition, it becomes obvious from an analysis of factual data that
the bulldozers and route clearers available in the engineer units can be
used successfully only for laying cross-country routes, building
fortification works (shelters) and filling all possible types of crater
damage in roadways. But the engineer troops do not have the necessary
machines to perform the major part of earth-moving works required in the
restoration of roads (about 70 to 80 percent) and building protective
cover.
We must also consider the fact that the necessary rate of movement
cannot be maintained when bulldozers and route clearers are used to move
soil on restored roads. Experience shows that cross-country vehicles can
move at speeds of only five to ten kilometers per hour on such road
sections.
In order that troops in wheeled vehicles and supply columns be able to
maintain a speed of 25 to 35 kilometers per hour, it will be necessary
either to surface the destroyed road sections or carry out artificial soil
compacting procedures. Soil-compacting equipment is available only in
certain road construction battalions of the road troops; the engineer units
do not have this equipment.
The second road preparation task is that of the road traffic control
service. The article by General-Mayor P. Fomichev correctly places
emphasis on the organization of communications, since this determines the
efficiency of control and the rational utilization of the entire existing
TOP,SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201970001-7
Page 15 of 16 Pages
network of roads in the front (army) area. This road support task also
cannot be performed by the engineer troops.
Thus, of the main tasks of providing road support for operations in
the initial period of a war, the engineer troops can perform only a few,
chiefly those related to the laying of crossings over water obstacles,
clearing obstacles on roads and the laying of cross-country routes.
Taking into consideration everything that has been said above, we
would like to say that in our opinion there is no need to waste efforts
trying to prove that one or another organ is more important to the
performance of tasks of the road support of the troops. The task simply
involves the more rational utilization of all forces and means available
for road support while precisely defining the tasks of the road support and
engineer troops and the civilian transportation organizations.
TOUP SECRET
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Page 16 of 16 Pages
Amount of work involved in re
storation of
road
network in front
zone
Percent of total and distance
Bridges (linear meters
required to move soil (meters)
Time of exercise, period of
?
'
"-
a
o
?
e c
operation and ntmber of
d
d
m
~
?o N
o
o
o
roa
s prepare
+
., w
r m
eo
0 0
o b
o~
o
~
O U
0
co... o
.- v-
w
U
N
-
M 01.
O O rJ
00
d
o
7 a.
Q
e
W
71 U
9
~
/
vl N
.'fi
75
w,
W N
.
C
r
March-April 1962
In support of the immediate
task (4 rain, 4 secondary and
3 lateral roads)
618,549
S
29 46
20
294.5
10,547
1,335
Same (4 main and 3 lateral)
263,400
4
25 50
21
195.1
3,903
679
Same (2 main, 3 secondary and
3 lateral)
210,750
3
27 54
16
117.6
3,519
612
In support of the subsequent
task (3 main, 3 secondary,
4 lateral)
907,679
3
28 4S
24
493.3
IS,247
2,670
Same (Z main, 2 secondary and
4 lateral)
260,550
5
30 41
24
146.5
4,347
756
September 1962
In support of the immediate
task (3 main, 3 secondary,
3 lateral)
463,025
5
23 52
20
157.0
5,430
1,162
In support of the subsequent
task (3 rain, 2 secondary,
3 lateral)
352,375
3
20 52
25
152.0
5,060
1,740
Same (5 main, 3 secondary
4 lateral)
569,625
3
26 43
28
148.0
7,250
1,450
In support of the entire
operation (5 main, 3 secondary,
4 lateral)
132,790
4
24 46
26
317.0
8,720
1,744
April 1964
In support of the immediate task
(2 main, 2 secondary,
3 lateral)
248,840
5
35 10
50
110.0
6,865
1,200
Same (3 main, 3 secondary,
3 lateral)
369,390
5
32 15
48
163.0
8,645
1,620
In support of the subsequent
task (2 main, 1 secondary,
3 lateral)
216,168
5
30 10
55
95.8
5,283
918
Same (3 train, 3 secondary,
4 lateral)
452,600
5
40 12
43
246.4
7,860
1,830
9P-SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201970001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201970001-7