MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME RESULTS OF THE USE OF THE PLATFORMA MOBILE COMPUTER POST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201930001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 25, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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50X1-HUM
COUNTRYUSSR
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Results of the Use of the
PLATFORMA Mobile Computer Post
25 May 1976
50X1-HUM
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SCtv1E RESULTS OF THE USE OF THE PLATFORMA MOBILE COMPUTER POST
(Based on the experience of a front command-staff war game)
by
Colonel V. Popov
Lieutenant Colonel I. Apanovich
The basis of any radical improvement in the entire system of troop
control is the equipping of operational staffs, as well as staffs of large
units and units, with integrated systems of automated control. The nucleus
of this system, as is known, must be small, mobile,multi-purpose electronic
computers and new communications means with automatic secure communications
equipment.
One type of computer device is the PLATFORMA mobile computer post
developed on the basis of the RAZDAN-2 electronic computer. The system is
mounted in two motor vehicles with trailers and has in its library 16
standard operational computer problems designed to meet the requirements of
the field headquarters of a front in matters of planning the employment of
nuclear weapons and determining tlhe effectiveness of nuclear strikes;
assessing and predicting radiation doses sustained by personnel; assessing
the combat capabilities of an air defense system; planning a regrouping of
troops and establishing the balance of forces and means in an operation;
performing bomber and engineer-navigator calculations for basic types of
aircraft.
Experience gained by the staff of the Odessa Military District during
a front two-level command-staff war game on maps using a mobile computer
post enables us to draw certain preliminary conclusions about its
advantages and disadvantages.
In order to utilize to the fullest all the capabilities of the
PLATFORMA mobile computer post and to study questions of employing it when
preparing and conducting a front offensive operation, a great deal of
preparatory work was carried out in the district. A group of officers was
allocated in advance, selected according to the nature of the prob1f7Zj_xuM
be solved on the electronic computer. The groups consisted of
representatives from the operations and intelligence directorates and of
the chiefs of the rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, chemical
troops, and the staff of the air army.
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All the problems to be solved by the computer were assigned in advance
to specific operations officers, specialists, and engineers of the computer
post, which ensured purposeful preparation for the fulfilment of duties in
the war game and a more complete working out of the problems, including the
study of new questions related to the operation of electronic computer
equipment.
During the war game a front command post was not set up. All the
generals and officers worked in their directorates and departments. The
mobile computer post was positioned near the operations directorate.
The person in charge of the group was an operator with no duties
other than that of solving problems on electronic computers for the
operations directorate. The other officers worked in the directorates and,
to the extent necessary, came to the computer post to perform calculations.
The officers allocated to the mobile computer post, together with the
engineers of the post, were located at a site allotted especially for this
purpose. This arrangement enabled the officers of the computational group
to maintain the necessary contact between the mobile computer post and the
directorates and departments.
Most of the calculations were performed in order to make direct use of
data when making decisions appropriate to the initial and developing
situations. The remaining calculations were performed by way of
monitoring, as it is done by the staff of a directing body.
The experience of using a computer complex in a war game led to the
discovery of certain general shortcomings in the preparation of problems
for solution at the PLATFORMA mobile computer post.
First it was learned that prob ems concerning matters of regrouping
troops, determining the balance o orces and means, assessing the combat
capabilities of a front air defense system and the effectiveness of the
employment of chemical weapons by rocket troops, artillery, and aviation, and
certain other problems, lack sufflqientoReratiZal. n~
based on obs t in' ta. a result the calculations obtained do
not fully meet the needs of a front field headquarters.
In the problems that were developed, no consideration was given to the
special features of front troop actions on a coastal axis and calculations
were not planned for ampTiibious and airborne landings or assault cross:5OX1-HUM
of sea straits and other water obstacles. The computer cannot even
regularly produce information that would take into account the nature of
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the grouping of our own ground forces, naval forces and means, or of enemy
groupings deployed in the Southwest Theater of Military Operations. For
certain branch arms and services no problems were developed at all, despite
the fact that during the operation and when preparing for it they must
perform many computations.
The input data cards used at the mobile computing post are cumbersome
and contain part of the data that could be stored in the computer's memory.
For example, the dimensions of standard targets by width and depth, the
numerical composition of our troops and those of potential enemies,
technical data on the means of employing nuclear, chemical, and
conventional weapons, etc. The absence of frequently used data results in
a loss of time when filling in the input data cards. For example, the
input into the computer of new constant information on the organization of
certain foreign armies and the organization of troops adopted in the
district took 23 ours in the war game and delayed b more than a day the
solution of the pro em of determining the ba ance of forces an means in
the operation. Moreover, it is desirable to reduce as much as possible the
number of columns on the input data cards. All this will greatly simplify
the preparatory process.
The input data cards for problems to be solved must be modified in
content and form so as to approximate the combat documents developed by the
field headquarters of the front. The operators find them unsatisfactory,
since filling them out takes a great deal of time, in some cases several
times as much as the solution itself. In any technical modification of the
system it would be desirable to develop an alpha-numeric pr' to that
immediately produces data based on the prescribed terminology and the forms
of the combat documents.
It seems to us that the computer post has not as yet been fully
perfected from the configuration standpoint. The input unit is attached to
the computer, whereas it would be better to operate it remotely. For the
purposes of the field headquarters of the front it would be desirable to
place the alpha-numeric printer as well in the same vehicle as the input
unit. This would make it possible to place the input and output units in
the front command post system as near as possible to the operations
directorate, which should greatly reduce the time required to obtain the
response to a problem. In this case, those electronic computers with power
supply units that make noise and hinder the work of the command post
personnel could be placed a sufficient distance away from the work areas of
the command post. 50X1-HUM
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Of the 16 standard problems normally executed by the PLATFOPMA mobile
computer post, the situational conditions in the war game required the
solution of only nine. At the same time the need often arose to perform
other operational calculations, but they could not be executed since
appropriate programs had not been developed.
The amount of time required to solve the problems, the labor expended,
and the frequency of resorting to the computer for assistance are shown in
the Table.
To make this data more meaningful we must point out that the duration
of the war game, from the moment of the delivery of the operational
directive to the stand down, was 69 hours. The computer was in operating
status for 54 hours and idle for 15. Of the 15 hours, eight were spent
moving and setting up the complex, while for seven hours the computer stood
idle due to overheating of the semiconductor units, when the outside air
temperature rose to 30 degrees centigrade in the shade.
From the table it may be seen that the breakdown of the total number
of problems solved was as follows: for the operations directorate -- 10,
for the chief of rocket troops and artillery -- seven, the chief of the air
defense troops -- three, the chief of chemical troops -- four, the air army
staff -- four. The need to solve the different problems during the war
game arose as follows: No. 1 -- two times, No. 2 -- two times, No. 3 --
three times, No. 4 -- three times, No. 6 -- two times, No. 8 -- four times,
No. 9 -- one time, No. 12 -- three times, No. 15 -- one time.
The total amount of labor time expended that was directly related to
the solution of problems came to 22 hours, 53 minutes, broken down as
follows: filling in the input data cards -- nine hours (39.3 percent),
feeding in the information -- nine hours, seven minutes (39.4 percent),
solving problems on the electronic computer -- three hours, 18 minutes
(14.4 percent), and filling in the output data card -- one hour, 28 minutes
(6.7 percent). Thus the bulk of the time (79 percent) was spent filling in
the input data cards and feeding in information.
A positive feature of the use of the mobile computer post is the high
degree of accuracy in its responses, since the electronic computer makes it
possible to take account of a very large number of factors and to compute
an enormous number of variants (at the war game 4,128 variants were
computed). Moreover, the elimination of shortcomings in the preparatory
cycle will greatly reduce the amount of time needed to perform comple5oxl HUM
calculations and will free officers for creative work in troop control.
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In the practical solution of standard problems on the theme
"Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Coastal Axis"
the following shortcomings were discovered, which were due mainly to
inadequacies in the programs and the methodological formulation of the
problems.
Problem No. 1. Allocation of nuclear means against enemy targets
based on their relative importance.
The program for the solution to this problem makes no provision for
the temperature of fuel components before launching. Therefore, when
targets must be struck from maximum distances and a sharp deviation from
normal occurs in the average fuel temperature, the computer's response is
incorrect. Nor does the program provide for any calculations of the
probability of hitting point targets.
Problem No. 2. Assessment of the results of nuclear strikes delivered
against our troops and those planned against the enemy in a front
operation.
In time required for the solution and the preparation of input
documentation, the problem on the whole meets the requirements of the
operations directorate and the chief of the rocket troops and artillery of
a front. But to obtain more precise firing indices we must introduce not
average probable deviations as is done now, but the actual deviations for
each target.
Problem No. 3. Calculation of anticipated doses of radiation to
personnel from enemy nuclear strikes.
It would be preferable to begin the calculation of radiation doses to
personnel negotiating an area of radioactive fallout, from a distance
closer to the center of the burst (500 to 1,000 meters) and to produce data
not only for the head of the column, but also taking into account the depth
of the march formation.
Problem No. 4. Assessment by the computer of the combat capabilities
of the air dense system of a front. In accordance with a program that
has been worked out, the computer calculates the capabilities of
surface-to-air missile units and fighter aviation, which does not exhaust
all the capabilities of the air defense system. Combat against the a5OX1-HUM
enemy is, as is known, conducted in addition by antiaircraft artillery,
antiaircraft machineguns, and radiotechnical units. Data are fed into the
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50X1-HUM
computer which permit the solution of a problem only if there is a strictly
established allocation of the efforts of surface-to-air missile units and
fighter aviation according to altitude. It would be desirable to expand
the range of altitudes and also provide for the possibility of performing
calculations during operations by surface-to-air missile units and fighter
aviation in one zone. Furthermore, the problem takes no account of
probable losses of front air defense means and does not permit an
assessment of the capabilities of individual means as, for example, fighter
aviation or surface-to-air missile units.
Problem No. S. Assessment of the effectiveness of the employment of
chemical weapons Ty rocket troops, artillery, and aviation.
The basic shortcoming of this problem is the fact that it deals with
only one type of toxic agent -- sarin -- and does not take account of other
types of chemical weapons.
Problem No. 6. Calculations of the balance of forces and means in
tanks anartillery.
These calculations must be performed in all cases where the front
commander adopts a decision for an initial or radically altered situation.
Unfortunately, the program does not consider, besides tanks, artillery, and
missile launchers, other indices that are no less important for the
adoption of the decision: nuclear warheads, aviation, and air defense
means. A major shortcoming of the program is the fact that the level of
manning and equipping in terms of personnel, armament, and combat equipment
is assumed to be equal for all similar large units, whereas losses during
an operation vary, both in operating divisions and in the means of
destruction of the same large unit or unit. A single coefficient of losses
leads to gross errors in the computation. The problem gives a more or less
accurate picture of the balance of forces and means only in the initial
situation.
Problem No. 8. Calculation of the requirements in nuclear means for
the destruction of enemy targets. 50X1-HUM
The program for the problem takes no account of the use of the
medium-range strategic rocket forces or the nuclear means of a cooperating
fleet, whereas the resource of these means for a front operation usually is
allocated and taken into account by the front troop commander. In
particular, in the front offensive zone at the war game the employment of
nuclear warheads of t e medium-range strategic rocket forces, as well
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as those of the fleet forces, was planned for the first nuclear strike.
For the destruction of enemy targets that have been detected, the
warheads requirement for the initial nuclear strike was found to be 54
using a manual method, and 47 using the computer. The difference in the
number of warheads is due to the fact that front means, for technical
reasons, were unable to destroy with their own forces all the designated
enemy targets at one time. For this reason the computer, on the basis of
the relative importance of the targets, eliminated seven targets from the
strike.
Problem No. 9. Determination of the overall capabilities of a front
in the employment of chemical weapons,by rocket troops, artillery, and
aviation.
The program for this problem suffers from the same shortcomings as
those in Problem No. 5. There must be constant data put into the computer
for calculating the capabilities of aviation in employing all types of
chemical warheads and for performing calculations of the total area,
measured in hectares, contaminated with toxic agents by rocket troops,
aviation, and by tube and rocket artillery.
Problem No. 12. Bombing calculations.
This problem does not meet the requirements of an air army, since the
calculations are made only for bombs and do not take into account all types
of armament on modern aircraft.
Problem No. 15. Calculation of the materiel requirements of an air
-
army for an operatT.ion.
At the war game, the only requirement of an air army that was computed
was for ammunition of all types. The computer's solution to the problem
showed that the input data card is inconvenient and that the percentage of
individual types of ammunition relative to the total amount cannot be
determined. The latter is the most time-consuming operation when doing the
computation by the manual method. 50X1-HUM
As experience in working with the PLATFORMA mobile computer post
showed, it would be desirable to program the following additional problems:
1) the calculation of forces and means for the landing of an amphibious
force, separately for the forces of a motorized rifle regiment and
motorized rifle division, as well as the drop of an airborne landing force
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made up of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, a motorized rifle
regiment, and an airborne division; 2) the calculation of assault crossing
means for the assault crossing of sea straits of a set width by forces of a
motorized rifle regiment, motorized rifle division, and a tank division; 3)
the allocation of nuclear and chemical warheads according to the tasks of
the operation, armies, and front units; 4) the determination of the amount
of ground artillery ammunition required in a front operation and the
allocation of it according to armies, large units,, and the tasks of the
operation; 5) the determination of the requirements for air defense means
in an operation; 6) the determination of the necessary amount of ammunition
for air defense means for an operation and the allocation of them according
to tasks and units; 7) the determination of the optimum detail of air army
forces and means for the fulfilment of tasks in the initial nuclear strike
of a front; 8) the anticipated result of the employment of nuclear and
chemical warheads by an air army against enemy targets; 9) the capabilities
of an air army for repulsing a massed attack by an air enemy; 10) the
combat capabilities of a fighter aviation division for repulsing an attack
by enemy aviation and unmanned means; 11) the combat capabilities of a
fighter-bomber regiment for destroying enemy targets with the employment of
nuclear and chemical weapons and conventional means of destruction; 12) the
determination of the probability of an aircraft penetrating an enemy air
defense system that includes fighter aviation and surface-to-air guided
missiles; 13) the calculation of the probability of detecting small-size
targets located in open and rugged terrain when using various types of
aircraft at different altitudes; 14) the calculation of requirements for
materiel and transport in an operation, taking all types of supply into
account.
In future undertakings it will be very important to make the input and
output data cards for the problems closer in form and content to the combat
documents worked out by a front field headquarters, and also to provide the
electronic computers with autonomous input and output units.
In modifying the PLATFORMA mobile computer post and developing new
calculating machines for military use, the possibility must be considered
that the equipment will be operated in both high and low temperatures and
that it will have to be transported at a higher speed over various types of
terrain and in various seasons of the year and weather conditions. 50X1-HUM
The experience of using the mobile computer post in the war game
showed that the electronic computer does not eliminate the need to perform
certain calculations on means of minor mechanization. The use of these
means adds considerably to the solution of problems by computer and in a
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number of cases makes it possible to perform calculations independently.
The choice of one means or another to solve a problem will depend on the
specific situation that has developed.
It would be desirable for the appropriate scientific organizations
using computer equipment to develop more convenient tables, rules,
nomograms, and other aids that will facilitate the performance of simple
calculations by operational staffs and other organs of a front field
headquarters.
But on the whole electronic calculating systems unquestionably
facilitate and expedite the performance of numerous operational
calculations and enable us to make sounder decisions on the use of forces
and means in an operation. A thorough mastery of this equipment by staffs
will exert a positive influence on its further improvement and development.
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Directorate or
Department for
Mhaa 'robian
Vu Solved
Operations
Directorate
Chief of Rocket
Troops and
Artillery
Chemical
Department
Chief of Air
Defense Troops
Chief of Racket
Troops
and Operations
Directorate
Chemical
Departsmmt,
Operations
Directorate
Chief of Rocket
Troops
and Artillery
Chemical
Department,
Operations
Directorate
Operations
Directorate
Chief of Rocket
Troops and Artillery
Air Army
Chief of Rocket
Troops and .Artillery
Ch mlical
Department,
Operations
Directorate
Chief of Air
Defense Troops
Chief of Air
Defense Troops
Air Army
Air Array
Problem
Amber
Filling
iaof
Input
Data
Cart!
3 30
8 10
8 20
2 18
1 20
3 8
4 25
4 40
12 90
Feeding
is of
Information
solution
of the
Problem
on the
COMM"
Filling
in Of
Oxtput
Data
Card
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'timber
of
Variants
7 1 6
2 90
2 410
2 8
2 9
2 U 50X1-HUM
8 1,900
3 1,040
9 hours 19 hours I 3 hours
7 minutes 18 m inutes ~7 I hour th tes E 4 I28
Vote: -Amberrg of problems is as per General Staff Directive No. 179892 (1966)
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