MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): QUESTIONS OF MODERN DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201900001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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ur JtcKti F urrr
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
24 May 1976
D'IEMOPANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Questions of
r ern Defense
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article is a critical commentary on a work by General- Mayor Petrenko,
entitled Modern Defense, in which he considers nuclear weapons and troop
maneuvers to have a decisive role. The author takes issue with Petrenko's
view of the goal of defense as the disruption of an offensive in
preparation or in progress, considering it instead the repulse of an enemy
offensive and the holding of occupied areas; he also disputes Petrenko's
view on the ability of defending troops to go over to an offensive. Other
topics considered include a preference for close combat fire means over
nuclear weapons in a defense and the distinction between antinuclear
defense and antinuclear rote No. 1
68 for
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of re have been 50X1-HUM
assigned
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRYJSSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1963
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Questions of Modern Defense
24 May 1976
SOURCE Documentary
Summa :
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (68) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Milita
Thought". The author of this article is Colonel e vs iy. This
article is a critical commmentary on a work by General-Mayor V. Petrenko,
entitled Modern Defense, in which he considers nuclear weapons and troop
maneuvers to aave have decisive role. The author takes issue with Petrenko's
view of the goal of defense as the disruption of an offensive in
preparation or in progress, considering it instead the repulse of an enemy
offensive and the holding of occupied areas; he also disputes Petrenko's
view on the ability of defending troops to go over to an offensive. Other
topics considered include a preference for close combat fire means over
nuclear weapons in a defense and a fire strike over a counterattack, the
advisability of an attack in front of the forward edge, the disposition of
a defense, conditions for going over to a defense, and the distinction
between antinuclear defense and antinuclear protection. End of Summary
Comment:
Colonel A. e imovskiy has been identified as a candidate of military
sciences and as the author of several
Historical Journal,
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Questions of Modern Defense
by
Colonel A. Yekimovskiy
Equipping ground forces with nuclear weapons and missiles, and
employing them in a modern battle and operation on a mass scale, has
decisively influenced the nature and methods of conducting not only an
offensive but also a defense. Therefore, the comprehensive research and
working out of theses on the organization and conduct of defensive actions
have great theoretical and practical significance.
Among the theoretical works dedicated to questions of defense, the
recently published work of General-Mayor V. Ya. Petrenko, Modern Defense*,
is of the greatest interest.
This work in rather great detail identifies and substantiates new
factors exerting some influence on the nature and methods of organizing and
conducting defensive actions. The decisive role of nuclear weapons and
maneuvers by the troops in achieving the goal of the defensive actions is
shown. The basic premises characterizing modern defense as
mobile-positional are properly portrayed; the predominent role of mobile
forms over positional forms is shown; and based on this, the forms of
organizing and methods of conducting an aggressive defense on the scale of
units, large units and formations are examined. However, in our opinion,
the work also has serious shortcomings which we would like to deal with.
First of all, we question the correctness of General Petrenko's view
on the goal of defense. The author feels that the goal of modern defense
should be to disrupt an enemy offensive which is in preparation or has
already begun, to rout his attacking groupings, and to create the
conditions for going over to the offensive. Many sections of the work (pp.
18, 37, 42, 65, 89, 99, 105-109) discuss this in various formulations.
* General-Ma or Petrenko, V. Ya., Modern Defense, Moscow, Publishing House
o the Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze, , 114 pages and 2 insets.
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The question of the goal of defense has fundamentally great
importance, since many other questions of organizing and conducting
defensive actions are connected with it. Therefore, it deserves rather
detailed examination.
In our opinion, repulsing an enemy offensive and holding the defensive
areas occupied should more properly be considered the goal of defense.
This definition will be more suitable for the overwhelming majority of
cases, regardless of the scale of the defense and the specific conditions
of the combat situation. This, in essence, also includes as one of the
integral parts of the overall goal of defense disrupting an enemy offensive
which has begun.
Regarding disrupting an enemy offensive in preparation, routing his
advancing groupings and creating the conditions for going over to the
offensive, there are no grounds for setting such goals for defense, as if
they were goals common to all or a majority of cases.
If we turn to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, we see that
defense, as a form of combat actions, was widely employed by our troops on
various scales. This being the case, depending on the conditions of the
situation, the role and tasks, and hence also the goals of defense, varied.
Thus, defense on a strategic scale and withdrawal of the Soviet Army
were carried out in the summer and fall of 1941, and again in the summer
and fall of 1942, as a result of the treacherous attack of fascist Germany
and the unsuccessful outcome of the initial period of the war. Under these
conditions, it was the task of defense to weaken the force of the strikes
by the advancing German-fascist army, to decrease the rate of its advance
by holding successive defensive lines, and, finally, to stop the enemy's
offensive. The question of disrupting the enemy's offensive while
conducting one or another defensive operation was not brought up in the
majority of cases, since it was extremely difficult to achieve this under
those conditions.
After conducting large-scale offensive operations in the winter
campaign of 1942-43, the Soviet Army again went on the defensive along the
entire Soviet-German front. But the role and tasks of the defense were
already completely different, for by this time the overall balance of
forces had formed in favor of the Soviet Army, and the strategic initiative
was finally wrested from the hands of the enemy. "It was decided to use
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the advantageous aspects of defense in order to wear down the enemy in
defensive battles and then, by going over to a counteroffensive, to
completely rout the enemy troops concentrated in the area of the Kursk
Bulge."*
As we know, this goal was achieved, the enemy offensive was disrupted,
but not before he had gone over to the offensive. In determined defensive
battles with enemy groupings which had penetrated our defense, our troops
also went over to a counteroffensive.
It should be mentioned that during the last war this was, perhaps, the
only case in which we had enough ready forces to go over to the offensive,
but decided to wear the enemy down in defensive engagements first.
Can we act this way under present-day conditions? In our opinion,
this would not be advisable. The availability of means of mass destruction
on both warring sides now deprives defense of those advantages which it had
before. Previously, before going on the offensive, the enemy was not able
to inflict heavy casualties by fire on troops who were on the defensive in
previously prepared defensive works. The defending troops, making use of
advantageous terrain features and shelters, were able to employ their fire
means more effectively to destroy an attacking enemy located on open
terrain. Modern means of combat enable heavy losses to be inflicted on
defending troops. Therefore, when the balance of forces and means is
approximately equal, and especially in the case of superiority, it is
necessary to preempt the enemy in delivering nuclear strikes and,
exploiting their results, go over to the offensive immediately rather than
after repulsing the enemy offensive, so that, by aggressive and decisive
actions, the final rout of the enemy can be accomplished.
Thus, premeditated defense which counts on a transition to the
offensive after enemy strikes have been repulsed is unacceptable under
present-day conditions. Now, the transition to the defense will occur as a
short-term form of combat'actions which we are forced to use when, because
of a shortage of forces and means on a given axis, an offensive will be
impossible and hopeless.
* Second World War 1939-1945, Military Publishing House, 1958, D. 451.
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Such cases occurred in the last war, also. Even in 1944, when the
Soviet Army conducted large-scale offensive operations almost continuously,
our troops were on the defensive for a prolonged time on a number of axes
and sections of the front; and, in certain periods, defense was conducted
along the entire Soviet-German front (December 1943 to mid-January 1944, 12
May to 10 June 1944, November to December 1944). But, regardless of the
great scale on which it was carried out, such defense was not viewed as a
form of combat actions for achieving strategic goals. It was employed to
gain time in order to prepare for a subsequent offensive, or to conserve
forces and means in support of an offensive on other decisive axes. This
means that this defense was conducted with limited forces with which it was
impossible to begin or continue an offensive. The only task set for this
defense was to repulse a possible enemy offensive and to hold the lines
occupied. The task of disrupting an enemy offensive in preparation was
either not set at all, or set but not achieved. With the counterpreparation
which was carried out at that time, it was very difficult to inflict such
damage on the enemy that he would not begin the prepared offensive.
Modern means of combat allow more powerful strikes to be delivered
against the enemy, and therefore it would seem possible and expedient to
set for defense the task of disrupting an enemy offensive in preparation.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that, just as before, a transition
to the defense will be implemented only when we do not have sufficient
forces at our disposal for an offensive, i. e., when superiority of forces
and means, including nuclear weapons, will be on the enemy's side. Under
these conditions the defending troops can inflict serious damage on the
enemy during his preparation for the offensive. But, to inflict such
losses as would force the enemy to give up the offensive is exceptionally
difficult with only the limited number of nuclear warheads available to the
defending troops. Therefore, the goal of nuclear strikes by the defending
troops will be to destroy the enemy's nuclear means of attack and his troop
groupings, and to weaken the force of his strikes when he goes on the
offensive. This will subsequently permit us to stop the enemy's offensive
and, thus, fulfil the task of defense -- repulsing the offensive and
holding the areas occupied.
In those cases where there are sufficient forces and means, especially
nuclear weapons, to disrupt an enemy offensive in preparation, it is not
even necessary to go over to the defense. Having delivered massed nuclear
strikes we must exploit their results with maximal effectiveness and go on
the offensive.
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From what has been said it is clear that under modern conditions
defense will be a less common phenomenon than in the last war. But, in
those cases where troops will still have to go over to the defense, it is
most proper to assign them the task not of disrupting an enemy offensive in
preparation, but of repulsing his offensive and holding the areas occupied.
The very same thing should be said of the other goal of defense which
is dealt with in this work -- routing an attacking enemy grouping. After
all, troops will go on the defensive only when there are insufficient
forces and means for an offensive. Therefore, naturally, they will not be
able to completely fulfil this task. With the available forces and means,
defending troops can rely only on inflicting serious damage on enemy
groupings which are preparing for or have broken through our defense, which
could force the enemy to give up the offensive.
And, we would like to speak about another goal of defense -- creating
conditions for going over to the offensive during the course of defensive
actions. This goal is achieved as a result of the successful fulfilment of
the main task when the defending troops, while repulsing an enemy
offensive, hold advantageous lines and areas and inflict damage on the
enemy. Besides this, conditions for going over to the offensive are
created also when, in the course of defensive actions, time is gained for
concentrating additional forces and means and preparing for an offensive.
However, whether a transition to the offensive is advisable will depend not
only on the successes of defensive actions, but mainly on the overall
operational or strategic situation and the plans of the higher command. It
is not often that the task of creating the conditions for going over to the
offensive can be assigned to the defending troops. Therefore, we cannot
agree with the opinion of the author of the book, set forth on p. 27:
"Troops, on the scale of both army formations and large units can and must
strive to go from defensive actions to offensive actions...". These
recommendations are hardly suitable, especially for large units.
Underrating the assumption that defending troops will have limited
forces and means, including nuclear weapons, at their disposal compared
with the attacking enemy, obviously has led the author of the work to make
certain incorrect recommendations on the disposition of a defense and
methods for conducting it. 50X1-HUM
General Petrenko assigns a decisive role in the success of defensive
actions to areas of fire destruction "...for concentrating the fire efforts
of various long-range means of destruction, which might not always be
directly tied to a defensive position" (p. 82). Can a defending division
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rely on destroying the main forces of an enemy grouping attacking in its
zone if the division at best has two or three nuclear warheads? It is
completely obvious that it can not. Therefore, when organizing a system
for defense and fire, we must proceed from the assumption that the decisive
role in modern defense must be given to close combat fire means --
artillery, mortars, tanks, antitank means, and small arms and machineguns.
Only by combining the power of all means, presenting a zone of continuous
fire of all types (which, by the way, is denied by the author, p. 101), can
we count on success in repulsing an enemy offensive. This means that the
defending units and subunits on the axes of the enemy offensive must firmly
hold their occupied positions and defensive areas and destroy the advancing
enemy by firing from position.
General Petrenko writes that areas of fire destruction, where fire and
attacks by the troops will be massed, should be the points where the main
efforts of the division are applied. (pp. 82 and 84). In addition, he
feels that "for the number of powerful fire strikes the division can
deliver in succession, there should be as many counterattacks" and "that
all subunits and units must strive to carry out the counterattack..." (p.
20). In our opinion, it is imp loss ble to concur with these
recommendations.
The experience of the last war convincingly shows that, in a defensive
battle and operation, counterattacks were the culminating moments of the
defensive actions of troops. Counterattacks were successful only when they
were carried out at the most crucial, critical moments of the battle, not
separately by small subunits but by units and individual large units
simultaneously, according to the instructions of the senior commander on
the basis of his overall concept for conducting the defensive actions. In
this, part of the forces of the defending troops were given the task of
firmly holding defensive positions in order to support the deployment and
transition to the counterattack of other troops. If we rely completely on
the initiative and decisions of subordinate commanders in this matter, it
is extremely difficult to count on success. It is also impossible to make
the number of counterattacks by a division directly dependent on the number
of fire strikes delivered. There undoubtedly will be instances when,
because of the conditions of the overall situation which has developed, a
fire strike by a division will be more expedient than a counterattack and
will produce the proper effect. In particular, this applies to the50X1-HUM
delivery of fire strikes against an enemy who has prepared for an
offensive, when the defending troops must leave their defensive positions
and deliver a counterattack in front of the forward edge of the battle
area.
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The author of the book attaches great importance to the delivery of an
attack in front of the forward edge of the battle area. The advisability
of delivering such an attack is made dependent only on whether, according
to the conditions of the situation, the division in carrying it out can
count on success in achieving the rout of the enemy (pp. 84, 85).
Moreover, it is pointed out that if a fire strike is delivered under
conditions of close contact with the enemy, then an immediate attack by the
troops is absolutely necessary in order to complete the destruction of the
enemy on that axis (p. 99). In our view, it is impossible to consider such
an opinion correct. An attack in front of the forward edge of the division
should be delivered only in those instances when it is necessary to seize
specific areas in the enemy's disposition in order to improve our defensive
positions or create more favorable conditions for a subsequent transition
to the offensive, as well as when we intend to go on the offensive
immediately after an attack is delivered in front of the forward edge. The
decision to deliver such attacks will be made by the senior commander, and
army and even front fire means can be allocated to deliver the fire strike.
Such instances can occur in a modern defense, but not very often.
A serious shortcoming of the book being reviewed is that it mentions
the disposition of a defense only with reference to the concentration of
the main efforts in the depth, while how it is set up and on what scale
such a defense is possible are not stated. Moreover, in examining the
question of the composition of echelons of units and large units, their
purpose, combat tasks, and methods of combat actions, the author proceeds
only from the variant in which the main forces are included in the first
echelons and only a part of the forces in the second echelons or the
reserves. General Petrenko even proposes that troops located in the depth
be called reserves, rather than second echelons, based on the fact that
these troops will be multipurpose (p. 65). This proposal, in the first
place, emphasizes that the author does not consider the possibility of
concentrating the main efforts in the depth of the defense, since the main
forces, which are concentrated in the depth of the defense to offer
decisive resistance in the fight for defensive areas in the depth, can in
no way be called reserves. These troops comprise a very real echelon,
actually the main echelon. And, in the second place, even when the main
efforts are concentrated in the first echelon, in some instances it is
sufficient to have only reserves, while in others -- powerful second
echelons, designated by the concept for the defensive battle primarily to
deliver counterattacks, are needed.
The underestimation of the role of fire of all types and the
significance of firmly holding defensive positions also influences the
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author of the book in that he considers it unlikely that an enemy offensive
can be repulsed during the fight for the forward edge of the battle area
(p. 80). He states directly: "...it will hardly be possible to disrupt an
enemy offensive which has already begun on the forward edge of the battle
area" (p. 108).
If this assumption applied to the disposition of a defense involving
the concentration of efforts in the depth, then we could agree with it.
However, inasmuch as it is viewed as applicable in all cases, it is
unconvincing. It seems that, by delivering fire strikes against an enemy
who has prepared for an offensive, it is possible to disrupt his offensive
even when only long-range means of destruction can take part in these
strikes. But, when all fire means including means of close combat are
brought into action, it is impossible to fulfil this task. We must assume
that the period of the fight for the forward edge, when the main efforts
are concentrated in the first echelons of the defending troops, is the most
decisive in repulsing the enemy's offensive. Fire of all types, including
by long-range means, must be carried out in this period to the maximum
possible extent. In our opinion, this is the key to fulfilling the task of
defense. It is natural that, in a number of instances, the enemy will
succeed in breaking through into the depth of the troop disposition; but,
if serious damage can be inflicted on him in front of the forward edge,
then combating the groupings which have penetrated into the depth will be
considerably easier.
The author of the work being reviewed has not portrayed fully enough
the procedure for going over to the defense under the conditions most
characteristic for today -- when there is direct contact with the enemy and
when under his active influence. On pages 87 and 88 the author speaks
about these conditions. However, he feels that they do not cause special
difficulties. As a result of the growing capabilities of modern
reconnaissance, according to the author, it is possible to make the
decision to go over to the defense in advance, and to make the necessary
changes and additions in the previously adopted decision for the operation
and battle. It is impossible to imagine that the transition from offense
to defense is so simple. The transition to the defense in the course of an
offensive will require the timely assignment of completely new tasks to the
troops, the fortification of the areas seized, the setting up of a system?
of fire of all types, and then the carrying out of the necessary regrouping
of troops and engineer preparation of the terrain. Implementation of these
measures in a short time under conditions of continuous combat actions with
the enemy is not an easy matter and requires precise organization in regard
to establishing the procedure and sequence for implementing them. These
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matters should have been covered extensively in this work.
Finally, we must point out still another substantial mistake of the
author regarding the sphere of antinuclear protection of the troops.
General Petrenko introduces a new term -- "antinuclear defense" and
identifies it with the concept of "antinuclear protection" (p. 52). As a
matter of fact, if "antinuclear defense", as it is properly pointed out, is
the essence of defense as a whole, and if in this case it is correct to
include measures for combating the enemy's nuclear means within the total
set of measures for "antinuclear defense", then "antinuclear protection"
must include only those measures which are directly aimed at protecting the
troops and reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's employment of nuclear
weapons. At the same time, nothing is said about eliminating the
aftereffects of the enemy's employment of means of mass destruction, which,
as we know, is also included under protective measures.
In conclusion we should say that in addition to the shortcomings which
have been pointed out, General Petrenko's book contains a number of useful
theoretical assumptions and practical recommendations for organizing and
conducting the defensive actions characteristic for modern conditions.
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