MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR THE ASSAULT CROSSING OF WATER OBSTACLES IN ARMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6 0X1-HUM
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 13 Pages
50X1-HUM
13 May 1976
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Engineer Support for the Assault
Crossing of Water Obstacles in Army Offensive Operatior50X1-HUM
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 4 of 13 Pages
50X1-HUM
ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR THE ASSAULT CROSSING OF WATER
OBSTACLES IN ARMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
by
General-Mayor of Engineer Troops I. Zhemchuzhnikov
One of the conditions for the successful development of an
offensive in modern operations is, as is known, engineer support
for the assault crossing of water obstacles. Considerable
importance has been attached to a study of this problem in the
Carpathian Military District; it is being worked out in many
command-staff exercises and exercises with troops.
In this article we should like to present, on the basis of
the experience of a front command-staff exercise, some comments
regarding possible variants of calculations in expanded form for
a crossing by combined-arms and tank armies of a water obstacle
400 meters wide in the course of an offensive operation during
the low water level period.
In keeping with the overall operational situation, one
combined-arms army and one tank army advanced in the first
echelon of the front. On the average, they had to make an
assault crossing of two rivers (one wide and one of medium width)
during each 24-hour period; the rivers were separated by over 50
kilometers. Many additional small water obstacles also had to be
negotiated. The combined-arms army consisted of three motorized
rifle divisions and one tank division; the tank army had four
divisions. In both armies, three divisions made the assault
crossing of the river. In the interests of maintaining the set
rate of advance, the forward detachments consisting of reinforced
motorized rifle or tank regiments had to be moved across within
an hour and a half, and the main forces of the motorized rifle
and tank divisions had to be moved across within four to five
hours. The amount of equipment moved across in the reinforcement
units amounted to about 20 percent of the equipment in each
echelon. When the speed of the current was 1.5 meters per 50X1-HUM
second, trips across lasted 15 minutes on K-61 amphibious
carriers and PTS amphibious carriers, and 20 minutes on GSP
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 5 of 13 Paaes
50X1-HUM
tracked self-propelled ferries and ferries. The number of
crossing means required to move the divisions across in one trip
which we used in calculating the combat equipment is shown in
Table 1.
In our calculations we assumed that the following number of
means were available to the troops:
tank division: six K-61's, six PTS's and six GSP's;
motorized rifle division: four K-61's, four PTS's, one
quarter of a TPP heavy pontoon
bridge set;
army assault crossing battalion: 18 K-61's, 18 PTS's,
18 GSP's.
Table 2 gives the hourly performance of these means in the
amphibious-ferry variant.
Table 3 indicates the amount of time (in hours) in which the
crossing of an army can be ensured in the amphibious-ferry
variant based on these data and the use of the crossing means of
the second-echelon division (when it begins to cross) and half of
the 50 to 60-ton ferries available for tanks.
The technical calculation, which was made without taking
losses of crossing means into account, shows that in the
amphibious-ferry variant a 400-meter-wide river can be crossed by
the tanks of a combined-arms army in 11 hours on the army's
organic means, and that the rest of the equipment (not including
rear units) can cross in 20 hours on PTS's, K-61's, and
one-quarter of the ferries from the PMP and TPP pontoon bridge
sets. However, if the enemy employed two or three nuclear
warheads in the army zone against the areas of the crossings for
the purpose of disrupting the assault crossing (which is feasible
from an analysis of his capability), then up to 20 to 30 percent
of all the crossing means could be put out of commission during
the assault crossing by the first echelon. At such a time the
total crossing time for the tanks of the main forces of the army
could take up to 15 hours, and for the rest of the equipment, up
to 27 hours on K-61's, PTS's and ferries from the PMP and TPP
pontoon bridge sets. These times, however, urgently require that
composite bridges or low-level bridges be put into use in a 5O>1-HUM
timely manner.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 6 of 13 Pages
If conditions permit the preparation of six routes for
underwater driving of tanks (two routes per division in the first
echelon) in the zone of the combined-arms army within 1.5 hours,
then the crossing of the units of the tank division can be made
in 4.5 hours, and that of the tanks of the motorized rifle
divisions in three hours, provided GSP's are used for the forward
detachments. On the whole, large units of the first echelon of
the army will arrive on the opposite shore in six to seven hours
from the time the assault crossing is initiated. In this case
all the army's other equipment can be moved across in 13 to 15
hours on K-61's (PTS's) and 50-to 60-ton ferries (with 20 to 30
percent loss of these means taken into account). The tanks
belonging to the division in the second echelon of the army will
be taken across by GSP's and by means of the underwater routes
prepared by the divisions of the first echelon, or on bridges.
If, in place of the ferries, the army can set up a 60-ton
floating bridge consisting of two PMP sets within 1.5 hours after
the initiation of the assault crossing, then the crossing can be
accelerated by two to three times, but there is increased danger
of casualties to the troops being moved across and destruction of
the pontoon bridge means by the enemy. For this reason, laying a
single floating bridge longer than 400 to 500 meters is not
always advisable. It is more advantageous, in our opinion, to
lay two or three composite bridges within five or six hours after
the initiation of the assault crossing by extensively employing
low-level trestles on pile supports for this purpose. An army
that uses three or four bridge-building rigs for each bridge
erected in the assault crossing sectors of a wide river can
ensure the construction of two or three low-level bridges or
trestles for composite bridges at a rate of 20 linear meters per
hour and more if it has at least half of the required number of
portable ready-to-assemble structural components for the
low-level bridges.
At the same time we must point out that the crossing of
troops, particularly of the second echelons of the divisions and
army, on amphibious means and ferries is not the best solution.
This requires the wide dispersal of the troops along the assault
crossing front, complicates the organization and control of 50X1 HUM
crossings and troops, breaks up their march and battle
formations, and slows down the movement of the troops into the
assigned areas for the accomplishment of combat tasks. For this
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 7 of 13 Pages
reason, whenever the conditions of the situation and the
availability of crossing means permit, bridge crossings,
particularly for 60-ton loads, must be prepared in all cases,
especially composite bridges.
Because of the peculiarities of the assault crossing of a
water obstacle by a tank army, as compared with a combined-arms
army, the following must be pointed out. It will take about 14
hours for a crossing by tanks on tracked self-propelled ferries
and half of the 50 to 60-ton ferries from the PMP and TPP pontoon
bridge sets (possible losses of crossing means not taken into
account). This time, however, can be cut to one-half or
one-third if a 60-ton bridge is laid within 1.5 hours after
initiation of the assault crossing. This is more advantageous,
but more dangerous from the point of view of vulnerability to
enemy strikes.
Thus, when crossing means are maneuvered skilfully along the
front and from the depth, when all available methods of moving
troops across are employed, and when pontoon bridge sets are
freed in a timely manner by the construction of low-level bridges
and the utilization of captured enemy crossing means, the organic
crossing means of divisions and of a combined-arms (or tank) army
primarily can ensure the assault crossing of one wide water
obstacle as well as the negotiation of the small obstacles on the
approaches to it -- which are spanned by vehicle-mounted treadway
bridges and bridges made from local materials -- within a 24-hour
period. For the subsequent assault crossing of a second
medium-width river along a broad front, the army must be
reinforced by a minimum of one pontoon bridge battalion with a
PMP set, a company of tracked self-propelled ferries and a
company of amphibious carriers. If the tanks can be driven
underwater, a combined-arms army and a tank army will be able to
make an assault crossing of two rivers (including one wide river)
independently by maneuvering the crossing means and making
extensive use of low-level bridges and trestles.
Regarding the capabilities of organic crossing means,5ox1-HUM
must also take the following into account. If an extensive
network of roads is already present -- as, for example, in the
Western Theater of Military Operations where for each 100 square
kilometers of terrain there are 75 to 125 kilometers of roads --
a great many column routes need not be laid on the approaches to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 8 of 11 Pes
50X1-HUM"
water obstacles, since the troops can comparatively easily
circumvent destroyed sections of roads and contaminated zones,
except in mountainous areas. On the routes by which troops are
moving toward the assault crossing sectors, primarily the
negotiation of streams and shallow rivers, over which the bridges
may be destroyed, must be ensured. The troops will negotiate
such small water obstacles by fording or by means of organic
bridge-laying tanks, vehicle-mounted treadway bridges and bridges
built from local materials.
Experience in the use of crossing and bridging means in
1964-1967 exercises with the troops of the Carpathian Military
District shows that in a 24-hour period of the offensive the MTU
bridge-laying tanks and the TMM vehicle-mounted heavy bridges (or
KMM vehicle-mounted treadway bridges) can be used two or three
times, whereas one-quarter of the TPP heavy pontoon bridge set
and half of the PMP pontoon bridge set can be used only once or
twice. In this case, if a combined-arms army with four divisions
(one a tank division) has 18 MTU's, 14 KMM's, 12 TMM's, and
three-quarters of a TPP set, while a tank army of four divisions
has 24 MTU's, eight KMM's, and 12 TMM's, the negotiation from the
march of any small water obstacles, up to 70 meters wide,
encountered on the routes for moving the troops to wide rivers
can be guaranteed. However, in order to ensure the timely
movement of these means to the next rivers, the troops require an
increased number of TMM's, which must be distributed one set to
each regiment or brigade in place of the KMM's, as well as two
sets of TMM's in the combat engineer battalion of each division.
In planning the assault crossing of water obstacles we must
remember that organic and attached table of equipment crossing
means can be used at full rated capacity under specific
conditions only for a short time. Local materials and means
(timber, ready-to-assemble structural components, enemy pontoon
bridge sets, ferries, barges) should be used along with these
means to prepare crossings; this was done extensively during the
last war. 50X1-HUM
In order to guarantee the survivability of the crossings
(for the purpose of camouflage) the forces and means of all the
bridge-building subunits must construct, from local materials,
main, alternate and dummy trestles for low-level bridges along
the entire front of the assault crossing.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 9 of 13 Pages
50X1-HUM
The assault crossing of several water obstacles from the
march in the course of an operation at a rate close to the rate
of advance of the troops can be guaranteed only if all forms and
methods of crossing, primarily bridges, are used skilfully and if
tanks are driven under water.
Bridge crossings are most effective from the point of view
of technical capabilities. However, in view of the limited
number of pontoon bridge sets in the armies at the present time,
the erection of bridges over rivers that are 400 meters or more
wide will not be done frequently, particularly bridges with a
load capacity of 60 tons. Moreover, the threat of enemy use of
nuclear weapons makes it more difficult to ensure survivability
and maintain the bridges. For this reason, during the assault
crossing of wide rivers, an amphibious-ferry variant is best for
the first echelons of the armies. For the second echelons bridge
crossings in the form of composite bridges will be built with the
floating portion committed for short periods of time, preferably
during hours of darkness or under other conditions of limited
visibility.
As far as the crossing of tanks under water is concerned,
this method has been well mastered during recent years and is
employed on a large scale by the troops. Moreover, it has been
determined that the routes for driving tanks under water can be
completely reconnoitered and prepared even in sections of wide
rivers. For example, on the Rhine River during the low water
level period such routes can be tentatively reconnoitered west
and south of Mainz, south of Gernsheim, Worms and Germersheim.
In the flood period, however, when the rate of current, depth and
width of the rivers in the Western Theater of Military Operations
increase sharply, in most cases it is impossible for tanks to
cross under water.
In view of this, a crossing by troops must be planned in
several variants: an amphibious-ferry-bridge variant (with tanks
driven under water); an amphibious-ferry variant (with or without
underwater crossing by tanks), with subsequent employment of
composite bridges not later than five or six hours after the
assault crossing of the river is initiated.
In conclusion, it must be said that increasing the
capabilities of combined-arms and tank armies to conduct engineer
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Page 10 of 11 Dn'
50X1-HU
reconnaissance of water obstacles and a troop crossing requires
speeding up the development of vehicles for reconnoitering rivers
and obstacles on the shore and in the water. Motorized rifle and
tank divisions should have in their tables of equipment half of a
PMP set, and each pontoon bridge regiment should contain six
pontoon bridge companies with three PMP sets. Moreover, engineer
bridge-building subunits should have for each bridge-building rig
two or three heavy-load trucks with trailers for transporting
prefabricated bridge structural components. This will give
armies the ability to independently make an assault crossing of
one wide and one medium-width river in succession within a
24-hour period without being reinforced with means from the front
(or with little reinforcement).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Required crossing means,
by types
Echelons of the
combined-arms
army to be
moved across
Total pieces
of equipment
K-61 PTS
amphibious amphibious
carriers carriers
50-60-
ton
ferries
GSP
track
self-
pro-
pelle
ferri
First echelon
(two motorized
rifle divisions
and one tank
division with
means of
reinforcement)
Second echelon
(one motorized
rifle division
with means of
reinforcement)
2,060 3,060
d
es
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Army echelons to
PTS amphibious
50-60-ton
GSP tr
acked
be moved across
carriers and
amphibious
carriers
K-61
ferries
self-
propel
ferrie
led
s
Second echelon
and the rear units
256 pieces of
equipment weighing
five to ten tons
288 pieces of
equipment weighing
five to ten tons
78 tanks or
276 other
pieces of
equipment
87 tanks or
294 other
pieces of
equipment
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6
Army
By K i-61, PTS, and
On one-quarter
On GEP and
echelons
one-quarter of the
of the ferries
one-half of
to be
ferries from the
from the PMP and
the ferries
moved
PMP pontoon bridge
TPP pontoon bridge
from the PMP
across
set and TPP heavy
sets
and TPP
pontoon bridge set
pontoon bridge
sets
First echelon
5,120:325 = 15.4
535:69 = 8.0
978:(72+32)=9.4
Second echelon
1,840:362 = 5.1
192:73 = 2.5
302:(72+39)=2.6
Rear units
1,200:362 = 3.3
100:73 = 1.4
---
Total:
23.8 hours
11.9 hours
12.0 hours
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201890001-6