MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SPEEDING UP THE AUTOMATION OF CONTROL PROCESSES IN GROUND FORCES FORMATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201860001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 7, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9 ox1-HUM
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
7 May 1976
50X1-HUM
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Speeding Up the Automation of Control
Processes in Ground Forces Formations
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 4 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
Speeding up the Automation of Control Processes_
in Ground Forces Formations
.
b
y
Colonel
A.
Kolgushkin,
Colonel
Yu.
Chernyshev,
Colonel
P.
Sagaydak,
Colonel
F.
Malenko, and
Colonel B. Khabarov
In an article with the above title* General-Leytenant of
Communications Troops P. Kurochkin has set forth his point of
view on the matter of automating troop control. Contrary to the
established opinion that it is necessary to have integrated
automation of control processes from bottom to top based on the
use of computers and other automatic and semiautomatic equipment
produced especially for military application, the author proposes
to resolve this problem using computers from the civilian economy
and existing communications channels. In his opinion this
automation must be limited to the operational levels (front,
army).
On the whole, the author's proposals are conceived as a
second direction for automation and presented as if in contrast
to an initial direction.
We consider that only an automated system of troop control
will make it possible to eliminate the gap which has formed
between the forces and means of armed combat and the systems for
controlling them. Unquestionably the introduction of an
automated troop control system into the troops must take place in
stages, taking economic and technical capabilities into account.
Stationary electronic computers from the civilian economy may
also be used temporarily at one of the initial stages. (This is
already being done in operational training.) They are
particularly useful in the field of scientific research, in
solving various combat training and supply problems in military
districts and in central institutions of the Ministry of Defense,
and, caithout any question, in training personnel for a future
50X1-HUM
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1
(83), 1968.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 5 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
automated system.
P. Kurochkin's proposals to diverge from the path of
integrated automation, in the development of which he
participated actively at one time, did not come into being by
chance. The author indicates that two serious obstacles stand in
the way of an automated system of troop control; the need for
substantial economic outlays and the great loss of time involved
in the introduction and mastery of complex technical means.
Without denying these difficulties, we nevertheless regard
them as surmountable. Moreover, pertinent experience must also
be taken into account, and it shows that in the majority of
instances no positive progress has been observed when an army has
been supplied with equipment produced without consideration for
the specific requirements of war; on the contrary, this has
inevitably led to our lagging behind our potential enemies.
As regards difficulties connected with the expenditure of
time in mastering complex technical means, it must be kept in
mind that the later we begin the introduction of automated
equipment into the troops, the longer this process will be drawn
out. However, the first step must be taken, because without it
we cannot go forward.
Citing the actual use of general-purpose computers from the
civilian economy for automatic solution of problems during
operational training, the author concludes that it is desirable
not only for the staffs of military districts but also for the
staffs of ground forces formations to use mobile versions of
these computers under combat conditions.
The author sees the essence of the proposed automated
systems in the following: "Computer centers -- composed of
mobile-version MINSK-22-type computers as well as punchcard and
keyboard calculators, also adapted for vehicle transport -- are
being developed for front and army command posts. To ensure
dependability and cont-inuity of operation, each computer center
must be designed for two positions (operating and reserve)..."
Thus, this system involves an autonomous complex of mach~np~
to serve the internal needs of a given (front or army) staff 50X1-HUM
This system provides for a "mating" of the manual work of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 6 of 22 Paaes
50X1-HUM
collecting, organizing, and entering information with the
operation of automatic calculators, the latter role being
allotted to the MINSK-22 computer. It is proposed to do the most
time-consuming work manually, as previously.
It is therefore not surprising that such a system is
considerably cheaper than integrated automation, but
unfortunately it eliminates none of the problems of troop
control. Moreover, neither the mobile nor the stationary
MINSK-22 computer produces the expected results, because it is
not capable of solving the information problems which, as is well
known, comprise the basis of control. The correctness of this
statement is confirmed by the experience of using the mobile
variation of the RAZDAN computer for troop control.
If it is a question of employing computers from the civilian
economy for military purposes in peacetime, there should hardly
be any objection to it. But it would be highly erroneous to
conclude from this that such computers are suitable for
controlling troops under field conditions in a combat situation.
The reference to the experience of the staff of the Order of
Lenin Leningrad Military District concerns earlier experience in
utilizing computers from the civilian economy under peacetime
conditions with a low information load on communications channels
and computers. The experience of this staff confirms the concept
of the desirability of using civilian computers for certain tasks
in the army in peacetime. We can grant the possibility of using
them in interior military districts in wartime as well. But in
our opinion, the experience of the Red Banner Leningrad r~iilitary
District does not support the author's conclusion regarding the
possibility of setting up automated systems in the field on the
basis of general-purpose computers and existing communications
means and using them under combat conditions.
In comparing the two directions in automation, the author
has taken as his criterion of evaluation the increasing of
reliability and efficiency in troop control. Efficiency is
illustrated by a table showing the increase in work perform=^^~
achieved throu h solvin certain 50X1-HUM
g g problems using a computer.
It is impossible not to agree that increasing efficiency is
extremely important, but what we need for a qualitative jump in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 7 soxl~HUr~ages
solving troop control problems is not an overall increase in
efficiency, which could be attained even on the existing
technical base, but an increase in certain specific instances.
We therefore consider that without specific quantitative
expression the author's criterion is inadequate for revealing the
advantages of any given direction.
The table illustrating the operating peformance of the OPYT
system does not include data reflecting the results of employing
computers for troop control during combat actions.
Analyzing the table, the author concludes that utilizing
this system will make it possible to solve certain problems an
average of 3.1 times faster than can be done manually. But it
remains unclear as to whether this provides a fundamental
solution to the problem or only a partial improvement of the
existing system of control. Is this fast enough to satisfy the
requirements of, let us say, rocket troops, air defense means,
and combined-arms large units and formations, or is it not? It
is impossible to evaluates the proposed system properly without
the answers to these questions.
As is well known, the information circulating within a
control system varies as to quality and as to speed of passage.
There is urgent information and less urgent information. The
urgent, or priority, information usually includes reports on
enemy means of mass destruction, the employment of such means by
both sides, the forecast of the radiation situation, and certain
other data.
Increasing, by a factor of 3.1 the speed of passage of
priority information pertaining, for example, to the matter of
delivering a strike essentially will not change anything, since
such an acceleration will not ensure that our strike preempts the
enemy, and the enemy will still have an opportunity to launch
missiles before we do and to effect a timely change of his launch
position.
Theoretical calculations have shown that the successful
solution of such problems requires a 20- to 30-fold acceleration
in the passage and processing of data, and staffs must receive
them tvao to five minutes after the occurrence of an event. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 8 of 22 Paaes
50X1-HUM
Therefore, we consider that P. Kurochkin's proposals are
acceptable only for the initial stage of automation, facilitating
the transition to integrated automation of the processes of troop
control in wartime.
In our view, General-Leytenant of Communications Troops P.
Kurochkin correctly indicates that there are two directions for
solving the problem of automating control processes: first --
the establishment of an integrated automated system of troop
control and second -- utilization, for automation purposes, of
computers from the civilian economy in combination with existing
military and government communications channels. The author is
also correct in stating that all of the pros and cons of each
direction must be carefully weighed in choosing the methods of
automation.
For this purpose let us make a more detailed examination of
the positive and negative aspects of the methods of solving the
problem. The second direction is attractive because it makes
possible the immediate automation of several processes of control
in ground forces formations, as well as a sharp reduction in
economic outlays. But how efficiently will this system function
in a combat situation?
The automation method proposed by the author intends that
only command posts of fronts and armies be equipped with MINSK-22
general-purpose computers. The tactical control levels, first of
all the divisional command posts and all rear control posts, will
remain witrout means of automation. This means that the
collection, processing, and dissemination of situation data will
take place, in the control system proposed by the author, within
the same time frame as under the existing system. Moreover, to
ensure that communications channels will be sufficiently reliable
for satisfactory solution of problems by computer, it will be
necessary, as the author himself indicates, to have manual
readback or triple transmission of information, which would
naturally cause additional expenditures of time. Thus, if the
second direction is followed in automating, it will, on the 50X1-HUM
whole, be only calculation problems which are involved, while
information processes, i.e. collection, processing, and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 9 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
dissemination of situation reports, will remain unchanged.
Under present-day conditions, when the time factor has
acquired decisive significance, we cannot allow information
processes not to be automated. Today situation reports must be
collected considerably more frequently than in the Great
Patriotic War period: two to three times per hour in regiments
and divisions, one to two times in armies, and about one and one
half times in fronts. At the same time the areas over which the
reports are collected have become larger: three to four times
larger in fronts, 10 to 11 times larger in armies and regiments,
and 20 to 30 imt es larger in divisions.
The equipping of the troops with missile/nuclear weapons has
resulted in a large quantity of data which must take precedence
in transmission. In particular, all work connected with the
'collection and transmission of data on enemy nuclear attack
means, with the making of decisions on the basis of the data
collected, and with the transmission of orders to executors must
be carried out in three to 15 minutes depending on the nature of
the target to be destroyed, since the time the majority of enemy
nuclear attack means stay at their positions is measured in
minutes (nuclear artillery - five minutes, Lance missiles - 20 to
25 minutes, Pershing missiles - 30 minutes, etc.).
A considerably greater amount of detail in information has
become necessary. Today, for example, a division must become
aware in good time of every enemy nuclear battery. Even at the
front level, each nuclear installation is taken into account.
The total number of our own and enemy targets on which
information must be obtained will reach: 150 to 200 for a
division headquarters, 500 to 600 for an army headquarters, and
about 1,000 for a front headquarters.
There also has been an increase in the number of types of
information. In addition to the existing types (concerning our
own troops, the enemy, the chemical and weather situation, etc.),
there are now new types of information such as reports on nuclear
strikes, radiation contamination, and the bacteriological
situation. The volume of information on nuclear strikes alone,
collected at a time of extreme tension, comprises about 1,200
words in a division, 3,000 to 5,000 words in an army, and a5ox1_HjM
as 14,000 words in.a front.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 10 of 22 Pages
The experience of training exercises and maneuvers testifies
to the fact that without automation of the processes of
collecting and transmitting reports, staffs cannot cope with such
a flow of information within the allotted time. According to
data received from many military districts, combined-arms (tank)
armies and motorized rifle and tank divisions, and also according
to the results obtained by timing training exercises and
command-staff games for the collection and processing of complete
situation reports in a rapidly changing situation (enemy delivery
of a massed nuclear strike), the use of existing technical means
of control requires the expenditure of up to one to two hours in
a division, up to two to three hours in an army, and up to four
to five hours in a front.
The need to reduce information passage time is fully
obvious. However, the automation method proposed by the author,
while providing for a substantial time gain in solving
calculation problems in army and front staffs, has almost no
effect on the solution of informati no problems.
The lack of means of automation at the tactical level also
requires the attachment of specially trained personnel to the
army (front) field headquarters to code information, prepare
punchcards, collate information, and enter it onto the
calculator, which will take large amounts of time.
In seeking the optimal variant for providing technical means
of automation to the control organs in an integrated automated
system of troop control, we have used mathematical modeling to
examine control systems in which the battalion, the regiment, and
the division were each taken as the lowest level of automation.
The last-named variant, in which the lowest level to have
information transmitters is the divisional headquarters, is very
close to the author's proposed system of automated control.
Modeling by means of constructing network models of these
variants, with their subsequent analysis and optimization, has
shown that if the battalion is taken as the lowest level of
automation, the troops can begin combat actions in accord with
the decision of the commander of the army three to four times
faster than if automation begins at the army staff level and
information .transmitters are allocated to division staffs. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 11 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
Modeling was also performed for variants of equipping
control systems with means of automation, variants in which only
calculation problems or only information problems were solved.
The first instance provided for automatic calculation of matters
regarding the utilization of forces and means and for manual
solution of all information problems. The duration of the entire
control cycle was reduced in all by only 16 percent compared with
the existing control system.
Another serious shortcoming in the automation of control
processes by the second variant is the lack of a common automated
control system for the various branch arms and the special
troops, since information problems cannot be solved on a computer
of the MINSK-22 type. This means, for example, that there will
be no automatic exchange of information between the computers of
the combined-arms staff and those of the staff of rocket troops
and artillery, although reconnaissance reports collected by the
combined-arms staff, particularly regarding enemy targets for the
delivery of nuclear strikes, must arrive within a short time at
the computers of the staff of the rocket troops and artillery.
In turn, the same type of information collected by the
reconnaissance organs of the staff of rocket troops and artillery
must be forwarded immediately to the computers of the
combined-arms staff in order to carry out the task of allocating
targets among the various means of destruction.
We could cite many additional serious shortcomings inherent
in a control system based on MINSK-22 computers and existing
communications channels. In our opinion, however, one direction
in automation should not be considered an alternative to the
other, but they should be regarded as links in one chain of
measures directed toward establishing a control system which will
correspond the most fully to the nature of modern combat actions.
Analyzing the second direction in automation from these
viewpoints, we may conclude that the immediate introduction into
control processes of computers employed in the civilian economy
is of great importance. This is explained not so much by the
fact that certain calculation problems in the staffs of
formations will be solved more rapidly than manually, as by the
fact that these computers will pave the way for the establishment
of an integrated automated system of troop control. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 12 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
Therefore, the introduction into control processes of
computers designed for the civilian economy may be more correctly
regarded not as an independent direction in automation but as a
very important preparatory stage in establishing an integrated
automated system, since only on the basis of such a system can
reliable troop control be provided in modern combat and
operations.
In evaluating methods of developing the. automation of
control, two directions can be noted: on the one hand there will
be extensive research, experiments, and test operation of means
of automating the processes of controlling troops in a battle and
operation, and on the other hand -- there will be automation
(mechanization) of labor-consuming processes and activities
performed by assigned personnel in their daily responsibilities.
General-Leytenant of Communications Troops P. Y.urochkin,
after a brief analysis of the development and introduction of
automation into troop control processes over the last eight to
ten years, attempts to define the next steps in the possible
solution of this problem in the ground forces.
In our opinion the author commits an error in basing his
conclusions on a small body of experience which he has distilled.
from the employment of computers in the daily work of staffs and
troops.
The experience in the use of computers by the staff of the
Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District can not serve here as
sufficient basis for final conclusions. Scientific research
shows that departments and directorates of the district staff,
and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, in most
instances seek to submit for computer solution only problems
which are unrelated and are independently programmed. It happens
extremely rarely that the solution of one problem can ser~5oxi-xUM
the initial data for solving the next.
There are very few problems of an informational nature in
peacetime. The flow of information among computers of control
organs is inconsiderable. The frequency of interchange also is
low.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 13 of 22 PanoG
50X1-HUM
Classifying of problems by categories of priority is
virtually unnecessary. The order in which they are processed
usually is determined by schedule, or alternatively by orders of?
the senior chief.
Since each problem is solved independently, it is not
necessary to have a special memory unit in the computer to retain
programs, initial data, or different norms.
All of this has made it possible to use the computers
available in the civilian economy for the automation of control
processes.
These computers are technically capable of handling most
problems of the control organs of a military district, in
addition to which the computers are relatively cheap and easy to
operate. It must be assumed that in the near future we shall
succeed in using computers even more to handle the everyday needs
of control organs and to carry out required tasks at training
exercises. In doing this, it is true, we shall have to allow for
numerous conventional activities, since stationary computers do
not have the features required for controlling troops in a battle
and operation. Nonetheless, if staffs utilize computers during
training exercises, officers of control organs can become
accustomed to working with computers, and labor-consuming
processes can be made less onerous.
Thus, the automation of control which has been carried out
so far using civilian computers of the b1INSK-22 type, has made it
possible to facilitate and simplify some processes, to speed up
the performance of calculations, and to reduce the number of
generals and officers needed for this purpose.
But this direction in automation certainly does not rule out
research in the field of integrated automation of troop control
in a battle and operation.
It would be a good thing, of course, if control organs could
have the same computer equipment for both peacetime and wartime.
But since troop control in a battle and an operation requires
more complex equipment, which may be slightly delayed in reac5oxl-HUM
the troops, computer equipment has had to be drawn from the
civilian economy to meet everyday needs. Since this equipment is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 14 soil HuMPages
mass-produced, it has become possible to equip military districts
with computers having the same technical characteristics, in
order to facilitate the interchange of computer programs and
results.
Among the computers available in the civilian economy, the
best model for our purposes is the MINSK-22. It can become the
basic computer for the computer centers of military districts.
If this computer is installed in the mobile variation, it
will become possible to bring electronic computer equipment into
closer proximity to the needs of armies and divisions in training
exercises. If training exercises are organized with this in
mind, it will be possible to concentrate several mobile MINSK-22
computers in each given military district, forming a rudimentary,
simplified automated control system. Such a system obviously
will not satisfy anywhere near all of the requirements placed
upon integrated automated control systems based on new
technology. Nevertheless, this system will enable a wide circle
of generals and officers to gain experience in utilizing
computers for troop control.
In setting forth these considerations, we particularly
emphasize our disagreement with Comrade P. Kurochkin's view on
the desirability of using this type of computer not only in the
staffs of military districts but also for the automation of
control in the staffs of ground forces formations under combat
conditions. Immediately following this statement, the author
outlines an automated system based on the MINSK-22 computer and
then draws the conclusion that it will be possible to use such a
system to solve the pressing operational problems connected with
making the most rational decision for an operation and with
effecting a drastic reduction in the time needed to plan an
operation. This, of course, is not so.
An analysis of the work of control organs in combat and
operations shows that only individual calculation problems can be
solved with the MINSK-22.
In an automated system based on MINSK-22 computers, a vital
process will remain unautomated -- the information process.5ox1-HUM
this means that information on one's own forces, the enemy,
nuclear strikes, etc., will have to be translated into machine
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 15 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
language in order to be used as initial data for solving
problems. This task will put an additional burden on control
organs. And, although we can allow ourselves the luxury of
conventional activities in training exercises, it will be
impossible to detach personnel for such unproductive work in
combat.
Scientific research has shown that automated control of
front and army troops, as well as of the units of a division,
wiTll require computers not just as calculators but as complexes
of calculators, providing for simultaneous, not successive,
solution of problems.
The development and introduction of such a system, which
represents a vital direction in the development of automation of
control in the ground forces, will, ,unquestionably, also demand
economic outlays and time. But this does not mean that it should
be rejected and replaced with a system based on the MINSK-22
computer, a system which will not ensure the control of troops
under combat conditions.
Numerous research studies indicate that it is not only the
economic expense which is holding back the establishment of an
automated system of troop control. The means invested in an
uncoordinated manner over the past ten years could have paid for
if not an entire system, at least a substantial portion of one.
However, the fact that the ground forces do not have any
unified scientific organ to direct the production and
introduction of an automated control system has made it
impossible to resolve this problem purposefully or to bring about
the necessary coordination in working out prototypes of means of
automation in accord with the accepted overall policy.
Therefore, in many instances the technology appeared first and
then the search was begun for ways to introduce it. The
independent approach to producing separate forms of equipment has
led to the situation that some of them are incompatible with each
other. In order to utilize these forms in a system, it will be
necessary to have additional adapters or to modernize existincr
forms . 50X1-HUM
It seems to us that the first thing required is a systematic
approach to the production of automation equipment and a unified
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 16 of 22 Paaes
50X1-HUM
overall policy regarding these matters, a policy to which all
organizations and departments concerned must adhere. And second,
it is advisable to unite all scientific forces working in the
field of automation into one ground forces scientific organ which
would determine the basic tactical-technical requirements for the
system and its individual forms, provide for correlation with the
industrial organizations producing the system models, concern
itself with software and programming, and work out the matters of
experimental operation of the system in training exercises and
the procedure for its introduction into the troops.
In any automated control system, communications, as is well
known, occupy a very important place, and General-Leytenant of
Communications Troops P. Kurochkin quite rightly devotes a great
deal of attention to them. The author examines the possibility
of introducing means of automation into troop control, making use
of existing communications channels.
Actually, the OPYT system was based on the communications
system of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District and was
supported mainly by overhead wire communications leased from the
Ministry of Communications and by the communications centers of
military staffs. This communications system, suitable for
peacetime, was sufficiently reliable and dependable to satisfy
the requirements for exchanging information.
These assumptions are also corroborated by the experience of
a series of other training exercises employing computers. For
example, in a civil defense training exercise conducted in the
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, existing communications
channels were also employed, and they provided for the exchange
of information between the "center" and its subscribers.
It is emphasized in the article that the exchange of
information at command-staff exercises, in which time for the
solution of the majority of problems by computer was severely
limited, was handled over electrical communications channels and
in a limited time. Under field conditions, the matter became
more complicated, because the reliability of communications
decreased. In order not to delay the transmission of 50X1-HUM
information, it was necessary to increase the number of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 17 of 22 Pages
communications channels.
If we take into account the existing tables of organization
of communications troops, then, it seems to us, it will not
always be possible to take this course.
In the Red Banner Leningrad Military District and in a
number of other military districts, the reliability of
communications even under peacetime conditions is not
sufficiently high. In a period of combat actions, communications
reliability may decrease sharply, in the opinion of Military
Communications Academy specialists. The way in which the article
proposes to increase reliability -- by increasing the number of
channels -- may be considered only a temporary emergency measure,
suitable for the initial period of independent utilization of
computers in the troops in peacetime. An integrated automated
control system requires communications reliability no lower than
0.9 to 0.95. It consequently is necessary to effect a sharp
increase in the coefficient of serviceable operation of
communications. It is obvious that the proposed ways of
achieving this for an automated system of troop control in
wartime are not fundamental but serve only as a partial measure.
In order to increase communications reliability, a whole
complex of different measures will have to be applied. In our
opinion, the principal measures may be the following: the
placing in reserve status of channels, centers, stations,
equipment, and sometimes even whole communications subunits; wide
dispersal of the communications system to provide for its
relative safety; improvement of the engineer preparation at
installations of the communications system and their camouflage
against all types of enemy reconnaissance; and many other
activities.
The article also focuses attention on such an important
aspect of the system as communications reliability. In
transmitting over existing wire communications channels, one
distortion will occur per 1,000 characters, and in transmitting
over radio channels -- one or more distortions per 100
characters. If these information distortions are not reduced to
the necessary minimum, satisfactory solution of problems b~
computer will be impossible. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 18 of 2~ D~^^
50X1-HUMS
In the OPYT system, as the author indicates, representatives
of the Military Communications Academy proposed a series of
methods for increasing communications reliability: manual
readback, semiautomatic readback, triple transmission, and a
combined method. Utilization of any of the proposed methods will
make it possible to increase communications reliability to the
necessary level.
But will it always be possible to make use of these methods
under field conditions and particularly in time of war? No, of
course not. Moreover, manual methods of increasing
communications reliability are absolutely unsuitable for an
automated control system. The author emphasizes that the time
element plays an important role in solving problems by computer
under field conditions. But how can this be reconciled with the
proposed methods of increasing communications reliability, which
require spending additional time?
In an automated troop control system, one distortion per
10,000 to 100,000 characters is allowed in transmitting
information by radio and radio-relay communications channels.
These high requirements for reliability of information
transmission in an automated control system are occasioned by the
fact that telecoded information (i.e. information circulating in
an automated troop control system) is transmitted in cipher form
without redundancy, and it is impossible to correct an error as
is done when transmitting logically connected information.
Consequently, every error can lead to an incorrect solution of
problems by the computer.
Therefore further increase in the reliability of information
transmission is linked with the introduction into the troops of
technical communications means and new methods for utilizing
them. For this reason we cannot agree with the author, who
considers that this does not require the development of new
communications means.
The need for extensive introduction of computer equipment5oxl-HUM
into staffs is, in our view, indisputable. Moreover, such
capabilities already exist: within cur country there is a large
inventory of electronic computers and punchcard calculating
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 19 of 22 panAG
50X1-HUM
equipment, as well as military and government communications
channels. The actual operation of the system discussed by
General-Leytenant of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin in his
article has shown that it is completely feasible to use the
existing technical means to increase the effectiveness of troop
control in a military district.
On the basis of a favorable evaluation of the results of
operating the OPYT system, the instruction is given: first, to
consider the introduction of computer equipment into control
organs as one of the most important everyday tasks for increasing
the efficiency of the work of staffs and as a necessary condition
for the subsequent mastery of automated systems; and second, in
the period 1967-1970 to establish, in all headquarters of
military districts and groups of forces, computer posts and
computer centers, equipped with complexes of punchcard
calculators and MINSK-22 general-purpose computers. At the same
time, automation sections are to be established in all staffs of
districts and groups of forces.
Clearly, computer centers in military districts will provide
the capability to set up a unified system linked with the
computer center of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces. This
will make it possible to exchange computer solution results among
the control organs of the different command levels on the basis
of standardized documentation and work methods.
Therefore, the question posed by General P. Kurochkin
regarding the independent direction for automating control
processes in large ground forces staffs has gone from the
theoretical stage to the field of practical realizaticn.
Individual questions regarding the essence of this direction
are open to argument, for example, the methodology of utilizing
computer equipment in the everyday activity of control organs and
in command-staff exercises, war games, and other operational
training measures; the problems solved on a system; increasing
the reliability of computer equipment, communications, and the
system as a whole; etc. But the correctness of the direction
itself cannot be disputed, since it has already become an
objective reality. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 20 of 2? D~no
50X1-HUI~1
Does this mean that stating this fact diminishes the need to
develop integrated automated systems based on specialized
computers, new high-performance communications means, and other
technical means? Not at all. It is true, as Comrade P.
Kurochkin has pointed out, that the establishment of such systems
will require a great deal of time and considerable economic
expenditures, because of the novelty of the problem and the need
to overcome substantial technical difficulties.
Nonetheless, work in this direction must be expanded with
all available means, since only such complexes of improved
technical means can completely satisfy current demands for
establishing a highly effective system of troop control.
It is characteristic that in such branches of the armed
forces as the rocket forces, the air forces, and the navy, where
the need for maximum automation of control processses is felt the
most keenly, a great many specialized automated systems have been
developed and are in operation.
The automation of control processes in the ground forces is
a more complicated matter. This is due to the complexity of the
modern operation as a many-faceted phenomenon involving a large
number of different relationships and factors which influence the
course of combat actions and which do not lend themselves readily
to formalization.
At the same time, the interests of combat readiness require
that active measures by taken immediately to increase the
effectiveness of the control of large units and formations of the
ground forces, regardless of what measures will be taken in
this connection in the future. And since the military districts
constitute the basis of the ground forces, it is precisely the
military districts which must be the first to use the existing
computer equipment extensively.
i
General P. Kurochkin has cited numerous generalized indices
which testify convincingly to the substantial time saved by
employing computers to perform various operational-tactical
calculations, to the reduction in labor expended in performing
numerous voluminous tasks, and to the existence of other way:5ox1-HUM
effecting economies. Let us cite one further example. It is
well known how much time and energy are expended by the staffs of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 21 of 22 Pages
military districts in working out mobilization plans. For
example, in order to work out or refine one variant for
allocating personnel resources, 30 officers of the mobilization
directorate expend two to 2.5 months. It is further obvious that
this one variant will not always be the optimal one, and
consequently the qualitative aspect of such planning is far from
perfect.
The use of computers for this purpose will make it possible
to solve the same problem in eight to ten hours. Thus it becomes
possible to calculate several variants and to choose the one that
conforms best to the status of the mobilization resources of a
given district.
A mobilization plan can be amended by computer in one to two
hours in line with a developing situation.
As regards operational training of troops and combined-arms
staffs, all of the operational-tactical calculations required for
planning an operation can be performed using existing computer
equipment. Of great importance is the conclusion drawn by
General P. Kurochkin concerning the capabilities of the existing
communications system. Indeed, by applying a series of J
uncomplicated organizational-technical measures developed by the
Military Communications Academy, communications reliability will
be increased to a level which will ensure the attainment of
considerable effectiveness in utilizing computer equipment.
In conclusion it should be stated that the author is correct
in saying that systems based on existing computer equipment and
existing communications means are not equivalent to the projected
integrated automated systems from the standpoint of capabilities
for increasing the effectiveness of control. But in the first
place, the use of existing computer equipment does not require a
great deal of time or significant economic expenditures, and
secondly, and this is the main point, the establishment of
systems on the basis of existing computer equipment and 50X1-HUM
communications means will make it possible to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of control right now, which will
unquestionably promote an increase in the combat readiness of the
ground forces. Finally, the extensive utilization of existing
computer equipment will enable staffs to accumulate experience in
working under conditions in which control organs are well
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9
Page 22 of 22 Pages
50X1-HUM
supplied with technical equipment, thus creating the
prerequisites for effective mastery of future automated systems.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000201860001-9