MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROBLEMS OF AIR DEFENSE IN A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION CONDUCTED TO THE ENTIRE DEPTH OF A THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201690001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report 50X1-HUM
Page 3 of 13 Pages
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DATE 17 Marrl, 1976
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUQ-rr (USSR): Problems of Air Defense in a Front Offensive
Operation Conducted to the Entire Depth of a Theater of Military Operations
50X1-HUM
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Problems of Air Defense in a Front Offensive Operation
Conducted to the Entire Depth of a eater OT-Military Operations
by
General-Mayor of Artillery V. Rozhdestvenskiy
and
Colonel V. Bilanonov
A front offensive operation to the entire depth of a theater of
military operations is a new phenomenon in military art. Naturally there
has arisen a need for a thorough treatment of the many questions related to
such an operation, including the organization of the air defense of the
troops and installations in a front.
The air defense of front troops in an offensive operation conducted to
the entire depth of a theater of military operations is organized on the
basis of those same principles that apply in ordinary front operations,
which are characterized by the concentration of efforts on covering the
main groupings of troops, ensuring continuity of cover, the broad-scale
maneuvering of forces and means, and close cooperation with the air defense
forces of allied countries in the given theaters and of adjacent fronts,
and with the Air Defense Forces of the Soviet Union.
At the same time, the organization and conduct of air defense in such
offensive operations has certain distinctive features. In the course of an
operation it is necessary to provide continuous cover for the advancing
troops to a depth almost twice as great as in conventional operations,
under conditions in which the distance from the territory of one's own
country is great and the rear areas of fronts and lines of transportation
have been extended. For example, if the ceptl of a front offensive
operation in the European Theater of Military Operation's is s 2,000 to 2,500
kilometers, the lines of transportation will be extended to 1,000 to 1,500
kilometers or more. Due to these circumstances, it will be considerably
more difficult to provide reliable cover for the main groupings of troops
and installations, as well as to control the air defense forces and means
and to ensure cooperation of the front air defense system with the air,
defense of the country (allied countries) and adjacent fronts. 0X1 HUM
Without pretending to cover all aspects of this important problem, we
will try to examine only some of the questions which, in our opinion, are
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the most urgent ones -- ensuring the continuity of air defense, organizing
cooperation between the front air defense system and the air defense system
of the country (allied countries) and adjacent fronts, and supplying
surface-to-air missiles to the air defense troops of a front.
Continuity of the air defense of a front. The chief means of action
by an air enemy against t e troops and installations of a front in a
theater of military operations in coming years obviously will be tactical
aviation and, in part, carrier-based and strategic aviation.
We should assume that a certain part of the air forces will be
destroyed in the basing areas by strikes conducted by our missiles and
aviation. However, because of dispersed basing and the advance take-off of
aircraft, a significant number of them may survive and be able to take part
in subsequent combat actions. Thus, the troops of a front will require
continuous cover throughout the duration of the entire offensive operation.
Calculations show that at least three to five long-range
surface-to-air missile brigades (regiments), nine to 14 medium-range
surface-to-air missile regiments and up to 15 to 20 short-range
surface-to-air regiments (battalions) are required to provide continuous
cover for the troops of an advancing front consisting of three to five
armies. These forces and means operating jointly with the front's fighter
aviation can reliably cover the advancing troops of a front and t eir rear
facilities and units (subunits) to a depth of 500 to 600 kilometers from
the line of contact with the enemy.
If the offensive develops successfully, there may be exposed
installations in the rear of the front and along its lines of
transportation that are extremely u ro tant both to the front and to the
interior of the country. In other words, a significant gap may be formed
in the course of the operation between the system of air defense of the
troops and the air defense system of the country. It is possible that this
gap may extend a distance of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers toward the end of
the operation, while in ordinary operations it would be much less. Neither
the Air Defense Forces of the Country nor the air defense troops of the
front are capable of protecting the lines of transportation and
installations located in this territory without the appropriate
reinforcement. For this purpose the Supreme High Command obviously mutt
have, on a given strategic or operational axis, sufficiently strong 5ox1-HUM
reserves of air defense troops in the form of mobile air defense large
units. Such reserves may be created in peacetime as well as during the
course of combat actions. In addition, the continuity of air defense may
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be maintained by expanding the boundaries of a front-area air defense
formation and by using forces and means taken from installations that are
no longer important. In the process of setting up air defense in occupied
territory it may be possible to place some of the air defense units of the
front under the command of the air defense forces of the country, and, on
tihe other hand, a certain part of the forces and means of the formation of
the air defense of the country under the command of the front.
An indispensable condition for the continuity of cover for the troops
of a front is the presence of a continuously operating radar reconnaissance
system.
In order to conduct continuous radar reconnaissance in the zone of the
offensive and throughout the depth of the operational disposition of the
front troops, there must be at least 65 to 70 radar companies, that is, at
least two separate radiotechnical regiments (with nine to 11 companies in
each) in the complement of the front air defense troops and up to two
radiotechnical battalions (with four to five companies per battalion) in
the air defense troops of each army. This means that a front, in addition
to its organic means, must be reinforced with a minimum off'-one
radiotechnical regiment, and each army -- with no less than one
radiotechnical battalion.
The radar field that is established must be solid and capable of
detecting an air enemy throughout the entire range of his possible
operational altitudes. A front zone 500 kilometers in width should have at
least 15 to 16 radar companies placed in the first line of radar posts for
the detection of air targets at low altitudes within 70 to 100 kilometers
of the forward edge. The second and subsequent lines of radar posts must
be arranged 50 to 70 kilometers from the first line and in such a way as to
create a solid radar detection field above altitudes of 1,000 meters.
The relocation of surface-to-air missile units for the purpose of
providing continuous cover to the troops is carried out in accordance with
the rates of advance. If the rate of advance is 80 to 100 kilometers per
day, long- and medium-range surface-to-air missile units should be moved
two to three times per day, and by entire units, not by subunits. At the
same time, they will be located in their positions for the major part of
the time and will be providing cover for the troops. For the above number
of surface-to-air missile units, more frequent moves may lead to a
weakening of the air defense of the troops.
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In the case where an army has one brigade or two self-propelled
surface-to-air regiments, it is possible to provide continuous cover for
the main grouping of the army to the entire depth of its operational
disposition against enemy strikes from medium and high altitudes, at the
same time making no more than two moves per day and spending no more than
three hours on the moves. This is corroborated by the following
observations. If the radius of the kill zone of a self-propelled system is
35 to 40 kilometers, then two regiments armed with such a system can
provide continuous cover, against the strikes of an air enemy from medium
altitudes, of the troops and installations of the army operating in an area
of about 60 kilometers along a front and up to 100 to 120 kilometers in
depth.
In addition to the above units (large units), the air defense troops
of a front and armies should have enough low-altitude surface-to-air
missile systems to ensure the destruction of targets at maximally low
altitudes throughout the zone of operations of the army and of each
independently operating large unit. The needs for such systems may be
calculated on the basis of the fact that a surface-to-air missile unit
armed with low-altitude systems is capable of providing continuous cover to
divisional units operating in an area with a front of 25 kilometers and a
depth of up to 50 kilometers.
Such front installations as new airfields of front aviation, command
post areas, missile technical bases, etc., must be covered in the course of
an offensive operation. Furthermore, some front installations (such as
front missile technical units, nuclear warhe storage and assembly bases,
airfields for nuclear weapons-carrying bombers and the positions of
separate missile battalions of front subordination) must have continuous
direct cover from surface-to-air sile units in addition to the cover
provided by the overall zonal air defense system.
Therefore, the number of air defense forces and means of a front
proposed by us for operations throughout the entire depth of a t eF~a`ter of
military operations may be considered the minimum. If we consider that the
irrecoverable losses of air defense troops during an operation may reach 25
to 30 percent, the requirement will correspondingly increase.
The continuity of cover of front troops provided by fighter aviation
is predetermined to a considerable extent by the timeliness with which it
is rebased immediately behind the advancing troops. However, it is
extremely difficult to build a large number of bases in a short period of
time if the rates of advance are high and to great depths. For example,
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while six to ten airfields would be required for the basing of two fighter
aviation divisions in a conventional offensive operation by a front, this
number would double for an offensive to the entire depth of a Mater. An
air army would not be capable of building this number of airfields using
its own engineer battalions. This suggests the conclusion that the fighter
aviation units of a front should be supplied with longer-range fighters (on
the order of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers) capable of providing cover for the
troops of a front to the entire depth of a theater of military operations
with the minimum number of rebasings (one or two at most). Another
solution would be the development of fighter aircraft not requiring
airfields and having the ability to operate from small dirt strips and to
relocate rapidly behind the advancing troops.
The mobility and milea e reserve with respect to fuel cons tion and
track w eel life, o modern air e ense systems i er little from t ose
of the modern tanks and armore personnel carriers (motor vehicles) of
motorized rifle and tank large units. Modern surface-to-air missile and
antiaircraft artillery units and subunits are mobile, self-propelled air
defense systems with a considerable mileage reserve and speeds equal to
those of modern tanks and armored vehicles, and the time required to bring
them from travelling status to a state of combat readiness enables them to
be deployed to repulse enemy air strikes within limited time periods not
exceeding five to 15 minutes. Therefore, the mobility and mileage reserve
of air defense systems are not an obstacle and do not limit the
capabilities of air defense systems to provide cover for front troops
conducting an offensive to the entire depth of a theater o military
operations.
Co eration of the forces and means of a front air defense system with
the Air Defense Forces o the Country (allied countries) anadjacent
fronts. This organization requires first of all that an initial period of
the operation be specified in which the air defense forces of the front are /
deployed in the same area as the Air Defense Forces of the Country-ring
this period the forces and means of the air defense of the country play the
main role in covering the deploying front forces. The air defense troops
of the front and the air defense forces of the country maintain tactical
cooperatio which hich involves the coordination with respect to time and place
of the combat efforts of air defense units (subunits) and the fighter
aviation subordinate to various chiefs. Such cooperation is organized and
worked out in advance, before the start of combat actions. 50X1-HUM
A decisive condition for the successful cooperation of all air defense
forces and means in a front zone at the beginning of an operation is the
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colocation of control over the different air defense means at a single
command post and the establishment of stable, reliable and high-speed
communications between the cooperating means. The decisions of the
commanders for the destruction of enemy air attack means and control of the
cooperating air defense means must be based on the same radar
reconnaissance data in order to avoid confusing the situation and missing
individual targets.
At the beginning of an operation, when the forces and means of air
defense of the front and army troops, which are covering the movement of
the large units andunits to their departure areas for the offensive or ti
directly to the state border, are acting within the areas of responsibility
of the air defense of the country, the organization and support of
cooperation between them must be the duty of the commanders of formations
(commanders of large units) of the air defense forces of the country, since
the control procedure in the air defense system of the country has been
worked out beforehand and is distinguished by a higher level of stability
than the control over the deploying air defense troops of a front. The
existence of a stable multichannel communications system and automated
control systems, as well as the large number of alternative communications
channels, create the most favorable conditions for controlling the
cooperating air defense means. For this reason, the full responsibility
for providing cover to the troops and installations of a front in its own
territory (within the area of responsibility of the air defense forces of
the country) lies with the commanders of the formations (commanders of the
large units) of the air defense of the country. In addition to covering
installations in the country, they also provide cover for all installations
and troops of a front located in the given territory. The plan for the
cooperation of all air defense forces and means during this period is
prepared in advance in peacetime and is worked out in practice in exercises
and training sessions conducted long before the start of combat actions.
With the announcement of an increased level of combat readiness, the
chief of the air defense troops of the front or his deputy with a group of
officers should be located at the command posts of the formations (large
units) of the air defense of the country in order to ensure coordination of
the actions of the air defense means of the different components. 50X1-HUM
In the course of an offensive operation the troops of a front, and
with them the air defense means, will begin to move gradually out of the
area of responsibility of the air defense forces of the country, and the /
air defense of the front will begin to take shape as an independent system.
On the third or fourt ay of the operation there obviously will occur a
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division of responsibility between the two air defense systems in the cover
provided to the troops and installations. In this connection, the
cooperation between the air defense of the troops and the air defense of
the country will become more complex: in addition to destroying the air
enemy jointly in one area, it will be necessary to destroy them in
different areas without tactical liaison.
Operations groups play an important role in ensuring cooperation.
Where the air defense forces of the country and the air defense troops of
the front are operating in one area or in immediate proximity, experience
gained in exercises has shown that their cooperation can best be ensured by
sending operations groups from the staffs of formations (large units) of
the air defense forces of the country and the staff of the air army to the
command post of the air defense of the front.
Where a gap forms between the air defense forces of the country and
the air defense system of a front, their cooperation will be maintained in
the same way as between format ons carrying out a common task on one or
several operational axes. Cooperation between the air defense forces and
means of adjacent fronts is maintained in an analogous manner. The bases
for such cooperation are defined in the orders of the Supreme High Command
during preparation for the operation. In particular, these orders
establish the tasks and areas of responsibility of the air defense forces
of the country during an operation, as well as the number of forces and
means that will be used by them and the front to cover installations in the
gap that has formed.
Questions of the cooperation of the air defense troops of a front with
the air defense forces of allied countries are resolved under the direction
of the Combined Command on the basis of the same principles as cooperation
with the air defense forces of the Soviet Union.
The missile technical support of the air defense troops of a front in
the course of an o ensive is a problem that is extremely complex ans
no easy solution. This is explained by the fact that the speed of
relocation of surface-to-air missile units has increased while the time
required to check and prepare the missiles for launch is still, as before,
too long. This contradiction may be eliminated drastically by the 50X1-HUM
development of technically new principles and methods of missile
preparation: they should be sent to the missile technical bases of the
front (armies) in an assembled form, armed and tested. In this case the
missile technical base need only perform mating operations (if necessary)
and the obligatory test procedures based on the "go-no go" or "ready-not
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ready" principle. A maximum of three to five minutes should be spent on
testing the missiles, which will enable a missile technical base to check a
large number of'surface-to-air missiles in one day (up to 192 to 288
missiles).
With the existing methods of missile preparation, the productivity of
surface-to-air missile technical bases may be further increased by
improving their technological (technical) equipment and their table of
organization. Practice has shown that the possibilities for this are
great.
For example, in the last three years as a result of an improvement in
the technical process, improvement in rigging equipment, assembly tools and
the quality of manufacture of the missiles themselves, as well as an
accumulation of experience in the assembly and testing of missiles, it has
been possible to reduce almost twofold the time required for the
preparation of missiles for S-75 systems.
How many surface-to-air missiles will be required by a front during an
operation and how can their delivery to the troops be organize
Judging by the experience of exercises, the average expenditure of
surface-to-air missiles in an operation is 10 to 12 units of fire per
launcher or 60 to 66 missiles per system.
Consequently, a total of 6,500 to 9,000 surface-to-air missiles of all
types would be required to support an offensive operation by a front having
nine to 15 long-range battalions (systems), 54 to 84 medium-range batteries
and 45 to 75 short-range batteries.
If we proceed from the fact that at the start of an operation each
surface-to-air missile unit will have an average of up to 2.5 units of
fire, which is approximately 25 percent of the total number of missiles
needed for the entire operation, the remaining number (5,000 to 7,000) must
be brought to the front before the start or in the course of the operation
by various forms o transport (air, motor and rail).
In our opinion, the basic means of delivering missiles to the front
and within a front will be motor transport and air. If we assume t as t 50X1-HUM
one-fourth of t e required number of missiles will have been delivered
before the start of the operation, then it will be necessary to deliver
about 270 long-range missiles, 1,700 medium-range missiles and up to 2,750
short-range missiles in the course of the operation. This would be about
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500 missiles per day (27 long-range, 170 medium-range and up to 300
short-range). To carry and deliver these missiles simultaneously would
require approximately 190 aircraft or two to 2.5 trips of one military air
transport division.
Shipment of the missiles by motor transport would require a much
greater number of units of transport (about twice as many) and would also
require more than one day for delivery.
The delivery of missiles by motor transport to the launch positions of
the surface-to-air missile units within a front will be impeded by the
great distances, and by partial destruction and contamination of the roads.
Therefore, in this case it would be most advisable to use MI-4-type
helicopters to supply short-range missiles and larger-capacity helicopters
for medium-range missiles.
Calculations show that, in some cases, particularly when an operation
develops at a high speed, a front will require at least one helicopter
regiment for the supply of missiles alone.
Such an organization of the missile supply process will permit the
uninterrupted delivery of missiles to the launch positions of
surface-to-air missile units and the reliable cover of the advancing troops
of a front to the entire depth of a front offensive operation.
Under the existing technology of missile preparation and testing,
surface-to-air missiles arrive at the front in factory crates. Their
unpacking, assembly, mating and testing t ke a great deal of time. Front
and army missile technical bases have the responsibility for preparing and
testing such missiles. The number and composition of these bases must be
such as to ensure the preparation and delivery to surface-to-air missile
units (subunits) of missiles that will arrive at the front within one day's
time. If the productivity of a surface-to-air missile tec ical base is
approximately 64 short-range and 24 medium-range missiles per day, then
there should be two to three front missile technical bases and one base for
each army in order to assemble and test missiles which will be supplied to
the surface-to-air missile units (large units) in the course of an operation. 50X1-HUM
In addition, each surface-to-air missile unit should have technical
subunits to perform prelaunch testing. Under these conditions, all
surface-to-air missiles reaching the front from the arsenals and bases of
the ChiefMissile and Artillery Directorate, as well as from the country's
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missile plants, will be assembled and tested in advance and delivered to
surface-to-air missile units in the required number.
On the whole, concerning the question of air defense in a front
offensive operation conducted to the entire depth of a theater of military
operations, we may say that the study of this problem has just begun. It
is extremely desirable that a wide range of military specialists take an
active part in working out this problem.
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