MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE EMPLOYMENT OF ROCKET TROOPS IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201640001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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DATE
23 Februa r 1 Q %F
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Employment of Rocket
Troops in Mountainous Areas
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The Employment of Rocket Troops in
Mountainous Areas
by
General-Leytenant A. Mayorov
During the past training year our army conducted an exercise with
rocket troops, the basic purpose of which was to acquire experience in
actions of the rocket troops of an army in an offensive operation involving
the negotiation of a large mountain mass as well as to investigate the
special features of combat actions of the rocket troops of an army in the
mountains. To the exercise were assigned the missile brigade of an army,
the mobile missile technical base of an army and separate missile
battalions of large units, and operations groups of the staffs of divisions
and regiments.
We would like to share some results of these exercises in this
article.
First of all we would like to mention that the experience acquired
corroborated the desirability of conducting a tactical exercise with the
rocket troops of an army against a broad operational background, under the
immediate direction of the army commander, and with the participation of
the field headquarters and operations groups of the divisions and
regiments. It made it possible to improve the training and coordination of
rocket troops, staffs and control means in an integrated whole, from the
subunits up to the staff of the army. Conducting field missile launches
raised the responsibility of personnel and officers of all ranks for their
actions, brought the conditions of carrying out tasks close to those of
combat, and necessitated thorough practical organization of troop
cooperation and the working out of combat support measures.
The exercise showed that missile units with appropriate support can
operate successfully in mountainous and wooded terrain, and maintain close
cooperation with tank and motorized rifle large units. During redeployment
in a mountainous region, such as the Eastern Carpathians, their average
march speed while transporting operational-tactical missile launchers on
large-load trailers in night conditions could amount to 20 kilometers per
hour, and, while negotiating passes, about eight to ten kilometers pesrX1 HUM
hour; average march speeds of tactical missile units were 12 to 18
kilometers per hour and nine to 13 kilometers per hour, respectively.
Operational-tactical missile launchers were transported by '1A?-537 prime
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movers, and the tactical missile launchers by KrAZ-214 prime movers. It
should be noted that when negotiating passes average speeds were somewhat
higher on the ascents than on the descents.
Average speeds for other types of equipment negotiating passes were:
GAZ and ZIL trucks -- 25 kilometers per hour by day and 20 kilometers per
hour at night; 8U-663 prime movers,18 kilometers per hour by day and 14
kilometers per hour at night. Fuel consumption of trucks increased up to
five percent, of prime movers up to 12 percent, and of launchers up to ten
percent.
All types of equipment possess sufficient mobility and
maneuverability,_except for 8T210 truck-mounted cranes (on a MAZ-200
chassis). They have low clearance and a long boom reach, which hampers
movement in the absence of roads, especially in a wooded area.
The selection of missile launching areas in the mountains, especially
in deploying missile units from the march, is quite limited. Positions are
prepared only close to paved roads and some dirt roads. However,
deployment conditions, can be improved in wartime by using private plots,
populated areas, and plowed and seeded plots of land. Selection of
tactical missile battery launch sites was calculated to ensure launches
over the crests of heights to a minimum range of ten kilometers.
Conducting combat actions requires preparing the redeployment routes
and launching areas by the means of the army, since missile units, as they
now exist, do not have the forces to do this work. It is also desirable to
organize a provost and traffic control service and a traffic control
service in passes and difficult route segments using forces of the army.
Further, allocation of a detail of engineer troops and spare prime movers
to narrow places, defiles and "peak spots" is required. It is recommended
that outer curves of serpentine roads be marked with luminous markers and
black-white tape, as well as posting traffic controllers. Traffic
controllers and markers also should be posted on descents from the roads to
ravines and valleys and to sectors of terrain suitable for troop
deployment.
Reconnaissance groups were detailed during the exercise from the
missile brigade according to the number of routes. One group, headed by
the deputy commander of the brigade, included the reconnaissance groups of
two battalions; the other group was from the battalion following along a
separate route. The experience of the exercise showed that it is e'0x%iiuMt
for these groups to accomplish their tasks if they operate only in
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vehicles. To speed up their work it is desirable to include in a group an
MI-4 helicopter to fly over the planned deployment areas of the battalions
and draw up a battle formation plan. Working according to this plan, a
reconnaissance group spends two to two and one-half times less time on the
selection and survey of launch sites. The exercise also corroborated the
desirability of including in reconnaissance groups artillery prime mover
dozers to grade and widen roads and launch site pads, and prepare descents
from roads and to fords of mountain rivers.
Meteorological support of missile units during the exercise was
carried out by the forces of the meteorological batteries of the missile
brigade and the separate artillery reconnaissance battalions of the army,
and was planned by axes by the staff of the rocket troops and artillery.
Abruptly changing weather in the mountains and the complexity of selecting
weather station locations necessitate bringing them as close to the launch
sites as possible. Therefore two weather stations were set up at a slight
distance from each other. One almost on the same level as the launch site,
the other 200 meters higher. The first produced ground measurements, the
second atmospheric soundings. The station must be positioned no less than
500 meters from the closest mountain range. The clearance angle at surface
wind velocity of no more than 15 meters per second should not exceed ten to
15 degrees. Otherwise, as experience shows, there will be frequent
interference in radiosonde tracking, due to the screening action of the
mountains. Sounding altitudes reached 20.4 to 38.4 kilometers during the
exercise.
The coordinates of the launch site were determined on a map with the
help of topographic survey personnel. The tie-in was also checked by this
method, but in some instances also by theodolite traverse. The bearings to
aiming point were determined by means of an artillery gyrocompass with two
independent starts, and, in favorable weather conditions, by celestial
orientation. The separate missile battalions determined the grid bearings
to aiming point also with a PAB-2 artillery director compass. The
correction for the tie-line of the topographic surveyors in the mountains
to account for damp road and ground surfaces in the mountains averaged 3.9
percent of the traverse line. The density of the geodetic network in the
mountains is extremely limited. Topographic-geodetic preparation of
missile launching areas in mountainous terrain took on the average about 25
hours.
Great difficulties in missile delivery, especially to a missile
battalion operating on an independent route, were experienced in the
mountains. It is desirable to use MI-6 helicopters to deliver missiles
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under these conditions. Furthermore, increased reserves of missiles should
be set up in the units while they are still conducting combat actions in
the foothills. The control of the transports delivering missiles can only
be accomplished by using R-125 radios to transmit established signals for
each movement phase control line.
In order to speed up the delivery of missiles to missile brigades and
separate missile battalions, it is necessary to assign additional tasks to
reconnaissance groups of selecting helicopter landing sites and access
roads in the mobile missile technical base deployment area and in the
brigade and separate missile battalion missile launching areas.
Missile delivery to launch batteries by mobile technical support posts
was examined during the exercise. By this method a missile from the
technical battery of the brigade was delivered to the area of a battery
launch site. The crane, compressor and charging station of a battalion
were also delivered there. This experiment justified itself. Delivering
missiles directly from a technical battery to the launch site took
significantly less time. However, this should be considered only an
exception to the general rule for missile delivery to a battery launch
site, since the forces of the mobile missile technical base and the
technical battery of the brigade are limited and their efforts should not
be dispersed. The striving to speed up missile delivery to individual
launch batteries by allocating mobile posts of the mobile missile technical
base and of the technical battery of the brigade may lead to the opposite
result -- the breakdown of planned and organized missile delivery to all
the other missile battalions.
As a whole, the preparation of missiles (mating and fueling) by the
forces of the missile technical platoons and launch batteries during the
exercise deserves attention. Use of such a variant to speed up missile
preparation, especially for the first grouped strike, and increase the
missile preparation capabilities of the mobile missile technical base, is
highly promising.
The brigade, mobile missile technical base and combined-arms large
units were controlled from the command post and forward command post of the
army, and the operations groups of the regiments and the missile battalions
of the divisions were controlled from the comrnand posts of the divisions,
using radio and radio-relay communications. In controlling rocket troop
combat actions the commander of the army assigned tasks of preparing and
carrying out missile strikes through the chief of rocket troops and
artillery to the missile brigade commander, as well as directly to missile
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battalion commanders, bypassing the brigade staff. We practiced the method
of assigning tasks directly from the army staff to the brigade batteries on
alert status, with the latter using R-311 radio receivers. This permitted
reducing strike preparation time by six to seven minutes. Centralizing of
the control of the missile battalions of the divisions was carried out also
with their use of R-311 receivers.
The organization of continuous and stable communications was assigned
a special place. The screening action of mountains had a considerable
effect on the operation of radio-relay communications. Therefore relay
stations set up on the dominating heights were widely used. The experience
showed that communications via R-108 ultra-shortwave radio stations and
radio-relay communications are maintained stably (even with mountain ranges
between stations) under conditions when the distance of the station from
the screening range is equal to or greater than the elevation of the range.
Quite wide use was made of installing radio stations on the heights and
supplying remote control equipment to the control posts.
Thus, the experience showed that by the thorough preparation of the
directing body and the troops being trained for actions in difficult
mountainous and wooded terrain and in a complex situation, it is possible
to conduct an exercise which will be highly useful in raising the level of
field training of the rocket troops, commanders and staffs at all levels of
an army. The exercise permitted observing in detail the special features
of the actions of rocket troops in the mountains, the capabilities of
missile technical support in the period of preparation and conduct of an
offensive operation involving the negotiation of a large mountain mass, and
the control of rocket troops in a complex and abruptly changing situation.
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