MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE NEED FOR SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201540001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Need for Self-Propelled Artillery
by
General-Mayor of Artillery I. Konoplev
and
Colonel N. Pavlov
In recent years as a result of more in-depth and detailed research
into the nature of ground forces operations in a future war, the judgment
has become more and more clear that the role of artillery will be rather
important in it. Nevertheless, the experience of operational training
shows that the necessary- attention is not given to matters of the
organization of the combat employment of artillery in an operation, and of
control of its fire and maneuvering. In the planning of an operation,
these matters are often limited to the distribution of artillery among
divisions and to the indication of the general tasks for it. Detailed
calculations of the need for artillery and ammunition are either not made
at all or are done superficially. These matters have not been sufficiently
aired in scientific research works. The phrase "combat employment of
artillery is organized in divisions" has already become a cliche, as though
the solution of these problems had been taken away from the staffs of the
formations.
Meanwhile, in operations conducted without the employment of nuclear
weapons, it will be impossible to limit the activity of artillery to only a
tactical framework; its firepower has operational significance, and staffs
of the armies will have to study the organization of the employment of
artillery.
Even in operations employing nuclear weapons the role of artillery is
not diminished, inasmuch as employment of nuclear weapons can be limited
not so much by the ratio of the quantity of nuclear warheads to the
quantity of enemy targets, as by the Itmit of the safe distance of one's
own troops from the ground zeros of nuclear bursts.
Calculations show that tactical nuclear weapons, artillery, tanks and
antitank means of the enemy will be left undestroyed ever, hen nuclear
warheads of a low or very low yield are employed in front of attacking
tanks and motorized infantry. The task of destroying these targets falls
mainly to artillery. 50X1-HUM
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In our view, the judgment is groundless that a large quantity of tanks
in our divisions can be substituted for a considerable portion of
artillery. In their purpose and armament, tanks are not adaptable to
conducting all types of fire necessary for destroying enemy targets varying
in nature and location. This is completely obvious, if we take into
consideration not only their present-day armament (rifled guns) but also
their future armament.
It is also necessary to note that the considerable degree of equipping
of the ground forces with tanks brought on the rapid development of
antitank means, with which subunits, units and large units of probable
enemies are equipped in great quantity. This circumstance presents a
serious problem to our tank troops in overcoming the antitank defense of
the enemy, in the solution of which artillery will play a substantial role.
In our opinion, the main element in the development of artillery is
increasing its maneuverability and firepower.
Equipping the artillery with new means of towing and a number of new
models of guns considerably increased its march capabilities and its
capability for cross-country movement. However, the mobility of large
units and units grew to an even greater degree, which led again to a
disparity between the maneuverability of artillery and the troops being
supported by it.
Since its entire personnel complement is unprotected by armor, towed
artillery is inferior to tank and motorized rifle units in its capability
to withstand nuclear strikes and fire from conventional. weapons of the
enemy and to negotiate areas of radioactive contamination. The
insufficient maneuverability of towed artillery will also affect the
effectiveness of fire support of the troops, since, most often, it must
move cross country, over terrain subjected to nuclear strikes, and must
negotiate areas of radioactive contamination and destruction, while
requirements for speed in deployment and opening fire will be immeasurably
higher. And, improvement in the means of towing artillery alone will not
solve the problems of increasing the maneuverability of artillery.
Analysis of the conditions of combat actions of artillery in the
modern battle and operation obviously leads to the conclusion that it is
necessary to develop self-propelled artillery and substitute it for towed
artillery, first of all, in t Fe tank troops. 50X1-HUM
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The development of self-propelled artillery is not a new matter for
us. The necessity of equipping our troops with such artillery became
apparent in the very first days of the war with Fascist Germany. This was
caused by the maneuvering nature of combat acticns, by the necessity of
combating enemy tanks and self-propelled artillery, and also by the
organization of fire support, at first, for armored and mechanized large
units and units only, and later, for rifle large units and units. The
overall ratio of self-propelled guns to tanks in individual offensive
operations in 1944-1945 was approximately 1:1.
At present, self-propelled artillery occupies a fine place with the
troops of our probable enemies, displacing towed artillery -- which is
obsolete for modern war -- not only in armored but also in motorized
infantry large units. In the US Army alone more than ten models of
self-propelled guns and mortars, developed in the past decade, can be
counted, the newest of which have nuclear amnamition, can float, and are
air-transportable. We have some models of self-propelled guns, remaining
from the time of the Great Patriotic War, which are still in service.
In speaking of the necessity of equipping our ground forces with
self-propelled artillery in place of towed artillery, we certainly do not
have in mind a return to the self-propelled guns of the last war.
Under the conditions of modern operations self-propelled artillery of
the old type is unsuitable even as guns for the close support of tanks and
motorized infantry. The employment of nuclear weapons, and the development
of antitank guided missiles and tank armament, are redefining the role of
artillery in combating enemy tanks. This task for artillery providing
close support for tanks and motorized infantry will no longer be a main
task. Becoming the main tasks for artillery are combating enemy tactical
nuclear means, combating antitank means, and combating artillery and
mortars, that is, combating targets which, in general, are protected, and
for the destruction of which not so much flat trajectory fire as high
trajectory fire and extensive maneuvering are required.
A fundamental solution to this problem can be achieved by the
development of a new type of self-propelled artillery, adapted for
conducting all types of fire, to ensure the destruction of any enemy
targets which are left for artillery. In other words, it is necessary to
make the bulk of the artillery self-propelled, equipped with armor and
preserving its characteristic combat features. Obviously, in so doing it
is necessary to resolve questions about the proportions of gun, howitzer
and mortar ,weapons, about a more suitable caliber for artillery at various
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50X1-HUM
troop organizational levels, and also about the possibility of putting on
the self-propelled gun a unit of fire of about the same size as for those
existing at present. Equipping the control and reconnaissance organs of
artillery with armored and highly mobile control posts also is an absolute
necessity.
The conversion of artillery to self-propelled chassis significantly
increases its capabilities for fire support of the troops under the complex
conditions of the modern battle and operation.
The firepower of artillery can be immeasurably increased by the
introduction of nuclear ammunition for several types of guns. Judging by a
number of statements in our press, there exists a rather widespread opinion
that equipping troops with small nuclear weapons can be achieved by way of
developing short-range tactical missiles. It appears to us that this is
not the only way, and, above all, it is not the best way, since there are
rather considerable limits to the accuracy of fire of missiles, which
require increasing the yield of the nuclear warhead, and consequently the
magnitude of the safe distance for one's own troops from the ground zeros
of the nuclear bursts, in order to achieve a specified result.
For this same reason, and also because of their low rate of fire, the
employment of missiles with conventional warheads has little effectiveness,
which substantially limits their employment under various battle
conditions.
The advantage of artillery in rate of fire, accuracy of fire and speed
of opening fire is indisputable. With the obtaining of nuclear ammnunition,
artillery becomes something like a multi-purpose means for destroying
targets of the most diverse nature within the tactical depth of the enemy;
along with the delivery of nuclear strikes, it can conduct really effective
fire with chemical and conventional ammunition, and when necessary --
destroy armored mobile and stationary targets with the direct fire of
armor-piercing (shaped-charge) shells.
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50X1-HUM
In this way, self-propelled artillery will become an even more
effective means of fire support of the troops in the battle and the
operation, both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons.
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